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Introduction 
 
 
Jon Abbink & André van Dokkum 
 
 
 
 
 
The struggle for development in Africa - The culture of politics 
and the rooting of culture 
This book unites studies on the contemporary dynamics of Africa. The chapters 
reflect new developments in the arenas of politics, economics and cultural strug-
gle. These domains look far apart but are not. In their widest definition, culture – 
as the symbolic universe of shared meanings and of behavioural repertoires used 
by people – and politics – as the public struggle of interests and of attaining 
power and influencing others – intermingle and recombine in surprising and 
sometimes disturbing ways. They always have a definite economic logic as well, 
informing value commitments and behaviour in the wider sense. Politics and 
economic life in Africa have, perhaps more visibly than elsewhere, influential 
cultural aspects and referents, such as religion and ethnicity, that often play a 
constitutive role. Also, “culture” and its symbolism are used as an instrument in 
the political, economic and social struggles in today’s African societies, marked 
by a preoccupation with “development”, a notion increasingly problematic be-
cause not easily definable in a purely material sense and having normative over-
tones. What is at play are of course new hegemonic struggles of a material but 
also ideological nature.  
The recent literature on Africa is replete with discussions of this subject of 
cultural innovation, adaptation and instrumental use of “culture” in conflicts of 
interest, and indeed also in those of previous generations the theme is already 
found (a nice illustration is J. Clyde Mitchell 1956 on the Kalela dance). This 
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observation is a reminder that today’s developments within African societies 
know dynamics of their own and are not fully understandable from the shocks of 
colonialism, decolonization and global inequalities alone. Neither is a dominant 
focus on politico-economic development issues helpful to understand what oc-
curs at the grassroots levels, or the ways external influences and transnational 
interactions are locally and culturally appropriated by African actors. If, for 
instance, some 20 years ago people would have talked about an impending 
phenomenal rise of religious (often “fundamentalist” and militant) movements of 
both a Christian and Muslim nature, dominant Africanist and developmentalist 
opinion would perhaps have dismissed such predictions. 
Since people’s actions are inherently constrained not only by social and physi-
cal environments but also depend on how they interpret these environments, 
explaining people’s behaviour and belief can rarely be deterministic. This is a 
challenge for social scientists, for they have to accommodate multiple outcomes 
of theories that are themselves based on singular fieldwork experiences, subject 
to often multiple interpretations. The problems of “computational intractability” 
that John Barrow (1998: 221-230) summarizes for physics could well have their 
counterparts within social science. Specifically reflexivity, people’s capability to 
assess their own social life, poses difficulties in setting up deterministic social 
scientific theories (van Dokkum 2005).  
Nevertheless, it can safely be assumed that a minimally coherent factor to be 
dealt with here is the commonly acknowledged adverse distribution of well-being 
and economic opportunities for most of the African populace. This relative em-
pirical coherence enables social scientists to write about people’s constraints in 
life (including social and cultural constraints) and how they cope with these. 
Social scientists can also, in varying degrees, assess to what extent people are in 
a position to analyse their own situation, and in this book several examples are 
provided concerning such self-analysis and the consequences thereof. Since 
issues of distribution of resources and power often occurs in terms of collective 
categorizations of people, it is to be expected that such distribution is a contrib-
uting factor to the dynamics of social identity, and therefore some of the chapters 
in this book will also delve into this topic. To actually predict future develop-
ments is intrinsically fraught with difficulties, but social-scientific studies can 
certainly help in giving directions where to look for solutions of developmental 
problems. 
Indeterminacy is to be distinguished from deconstructionism, of which 
Clifford & Marcus’s (1986) provided the classic early reference within anthro-
pology. The bundle of chapters in that book dealt mainly with issues of reflexiv-
ity performed on and by the scientific observers. The “participants’ view on their 
own situation” played a less decisive role in the book. The participants’ view 
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performs a double role in ethnographic research, going beyond the classical 
emic/etic distinction within anthropology: on the one hand, it provides assess-
ments which may be compared with researchers’ views; on the other, it is itself 
object of research. This makes any social-scientific assessment subject to a 
degree of ambiguity. However, this ambiguity – and this is a difference with 
deconstructionist approaches – does not prohibit the production of ethnographi-
cally real statements or knowledge claims on social situations. In this book, 
descriptions are given of social situations in three different orders of delineation: 
first, local; second, national; and third, international. In all three, however, the 
struggle of Africans for “development”, in its various forms, is obvious. This is 
where social science analysis can make a contribution, exploring its empirical 
ramifications and its theoretical status. The venture poses challenges notably for 
non-African analysts, to who need to as identifiable actors in specific contexts 
and avoid Eurocentric approaches. 
 
Locality and global connectedness 
The chapters in this book reflect on topics in certain African localities taken as 
units of analysis. Naturally, these localities are connected to others, and the fact 
that interconnectedness now unequivocally spans all of humanity may be indi-
cated by the term “globalization”. Globalization has been viewed as a back-
ground for diminished strength of states (see Hyslop 1999: 6-11 for a discussion). 
Since African states have often been considered weak actors, except in exercising 
patronage and authoritarianism (Hyslop 1999: 5), it might be hypothesized that 
globalization and attendant phenomena of transnationalism will change little 
concerning state strength, or will even enhance institutional weakness. Whatever 
the outcome, for many analysts an important yardstick along which to measure 
the African state will be its effectiveness to promote material development and 
distribute its fruits among a nation’s population. The recent vogue of the Millen-
nium Development Goals has only reinforced this trend. 
Globalization has not obliterated the usefulness of such measurement. As all 
of the chapters in the present volume make clear, local and national contexts of 
social, cultural and economic life have not lost their own idiosyncrasies. Differ-
ences in the prevalence and quality of natural resources, possibilities in making 
use of these resources and the dynamics of power relations between people (on 
several scales) make it unlikely that globalization will result in or equals 
uniformity. It therefore makes sense to analyse current developments in Africa 
from geographically circumscribed focal points, as is done by the present authors 
in varying degrees. 
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Assessing struggle in Africa 
Generalizing across continents, Africans perhaps have to struggle more than most 
other global citizens for their economic sustenance and social stability. Though 
there are signs of improved economic performance in the last couple of years, 
and some countries have achieved high economic growth rates, limited economic 
performance capacities and socio-political oppositions will constrain develop-
ment at least for the near future. Few African countries will reach an average of 
more than 10% annual GDP growth by 2010 (a value achieved in 2005 only by 
Chad, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, all oil-producing countries – cf. World 
Bank 2006: 144. In 2007 Angola and Liberia had joined them, cf. IMF 2007: 80). 
The amount of investment in technology and training in order to sustain and 
manage this increase in productivity cannot be implemented with such a short 
time from now. But in the last few years growth in African has picked up, 
although unevenly spread and not durable enough. While there is of course no 
logical reason to believe that Africa could not be a continent with middle-income 
levels if not prosperity by, say, 2050, conditions of governance, human security, 
imbalanced population growth, skewed investment and legal insecurity will need 
much attention. The disappointing economic and social achievements since 
decolonization are not necessarily a predictor for the events which will manifest 
themselves in the next decades. Just as colonialism does not wholly explain the 
present state of affairs in Africa, the present situation will not fully determine 
Africa’s future. 
What the present chapters have to say about this is perhaps well illustrated 
against the background of some ideas in a widely-read though controversial book 
on sub-Saharan Africa, namely Chabal & Daloz’s Africa Works (1999). Chabal 
& Daloz state that it is a challenge “to explain how the continent can be both 
modern and undeveloped” (1999: 144; cf. 125). Specifically with respect to the 
difficulty to “develop”, their book proposes some guidelines for understanding 
postcolonial Africa and, on the basis of this understanding, derive as one conclu-
sion that politics in Africa is inimical to development (p. 162) because of the 
“inability or unwillingness to institutionalize more formal and impersonal social 
relations” (p. 132). Chabal & Daloz controversially relate this to both socio-
political and cultural characteristics, where “culture is not just an allusion to 
given ‘values’ but refers to a general framework, a matrix, which, however con-
straining, is liable to change over time” (pp. 131-32). The reader may find it use-
ful to consult Brumann (1999), who elaborates on this idea of cultures quite 
literally as matrices, where one dimension stands for persons and another for the 
occurrence of traits associated with persons. 
The matrix method has the advantage that the distribution of cultural traits can 
be represented without being forced but also without being prohibited to indicate 
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boundaries between cultural units (e.g. countries or ethnic groups). This enables 
the accommodation within theory of historically shifting cultural identities. A 
further advantage is the possibility to incorporate contradictory traits within 
theory as long as no demands for overall consistency within a proposed matrix 
are made. A disadvantage is that the matrix method cannot fully guarantee the 
harmonization of information contained in a matrix and information drawn from 
that matrix. This situation sets upper limits as to the range of conclusions that can 
be based on it. However, this does not rule out the possibility of stating at least 
some positive conclusions. The task here is to compare Chabal & Daloz’s general 
conclusions with the more fine-grained descriptions of traits presented in this 
book. 
If Chabal & Daloz state that Africa is “modern and undeveloped”, it must be 
understood what the terms “modern(ization)” and “development” stand for. 
Considering that “[t]hough the two have a different intellectual ancestry, […], 
they have come close to each other in substantive meaning” (Dube 1988: 1), 
Chabal & Daloz’s statement constitutes something of a paradox. What they seem 
to mean is that technological innovations are consumed on the African continent 
at the individual level but that no society-wide improvements in organizational 
(specifically economic) efficiency is achieved (1999: 144-145). This is specified 
by the following three points: 
- the lack of institutionalization of political relationships (p. 132, alluded to 
above); 
- the reluctance to accept a Western socio-economic and political order (p. 132); 
- “the subtle use of [possibly incompatible] registers of socio-political behav-
iour” (p. 132), of which (neo-)patrimonial forms of social relationships (pp. 
22, 28, 38-39, 44, 162), suiting both patrons and clients (p. 104) constitute an 
important ingredient. 
These points are summarized by Chabal & Daloz in the phrase “instrumentali-
zation of disorder” (pp. 141-63). Whether they hereby adopt a too Eurocentric 
point of view of African society – as critics like Bryceson (2000: 423, 425) have 
contended – is a moot point. 
 
Dimensions of inquiry 
As already indicated above, for the purpose of this book it may be useful to 
distinguish three orders of delineation – in our research matrix, so to speak – 
along which the authors’ chapters can be classified. First, the local relationship of 
the concerned people with the natural environment together with the associated 
social conflicts of interest; second, the interactions (contingent or structural) 
among the people of the researched locality with respect to economic and/or 
political subordination within their country; and third, the interactions of the 
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local people with people outside the delineated locality, specifically in the current 
international global order. 
With an eye on the chapters in this book, the application of specifically the 
concept of (neo-)patrimonialism can be discussed. In the first dimension, the 
relationship of Africa with the natural environment remains predominantly 
characterized by a dependence on the extraction and export of raw materials 
rather than manufacturing (e.g. Ahmed & Louw 2005: 209). Such dependence is 
then, according to Chabal and Daloz, a resource for African political leaders 
because it provides opportunities for handling foreign aid and structural adjust-
ment programmes (pp. 110-23 – see Mkandawire & Soludo 1999: 21-48 for an 
alternative discussion of the same topic).  
 
Part I:  The struggle for the extraction and management of natural resources 
Hans van den Breemer addresses the interrelationship between nature conserva-
tion policies and rural development policies in South-eastern Senegal. Extraction 
of resources, in the form of agriculture and hunting and gathering practices, con-
flicts here with demands of nature conservation and using nature for purposes of 
promoting tourism. To manage these requirements as well as the conflicts arising 
from them, quite a number of government agencies and NGOs, sometimes with 
funding from abroad, exist that have to cooperate with each other and the local 
population. Coordination between all these organizations seems to be difficult, 
and may provide a corroboration of the phenomenon of “disorder” as discerned 
by Chabal & Daloz. But this must be qualified by the observation that foreign 
organizations and donors do not seem to promote cooperation either. The 
government also seems to have genuine developmental intentions with the 
(though perhaps insufficiently) elaborated programmes. It is remarkable, how-
ever, that the jobs provided by the government institutions, as well as at the 
hotels, are allocated to people outside the community, specifically from Dakar, 
so that the local population does not profit from the opportunities which are 
indeed created. In one of the concerned villages, outsiders from the Mouride 
centre in Touba were allocated plots of land. Although Van den Breemer does 
not probe into the background of these allocations of jobs and plots, neo-patri-
monialism does seem to play a role here. What is clear, nevertheless, is that the 
local population obviously does not approve of this. Even though patrimonialism 
may explain “disorderly” distribution of resources, such a patrimonial political 
economy is itself subject to critical assessment by the local people involved. 
Unfortunately for themselves, they see no possibilities for reversing the applica-
tion and effects of such patrimonialism. 
Paul Hebinck & Nelson Mango write about legal pluralism among the Luo in 
Western Kenya and how this pluralism is used by individuals as embedded 
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within social relationships. Pluralism here refers to the simultaneous applicability 
of bodies of legal rules to certain areas of land, specifically farm land. One body 
of such rules can be referred to as customary land tenure, but the term patrimoni-
alism (here without the prefix “neo”) might well be appropriate as well. Access 
to land is here heavily dependent on inheritance rules within families, in which 
aspects of descent, gender and primogeniture are decisive. The other body of 
rules, however, assumes that plots of land are privately registered under indi-
viduals’ title deeds in formal archives, making transaction of plots possible on 
the basis of monetary selling and buying. Luo people appear to make use of 
arguments derived from both bodies of rules. As Hebinck & Mango indicate, the 
privatization of land allocation has not obliterated the importance of kinship-
based customary arrangements of land allocation. In the matrix method we use 
here, the distribution of two clusters of traits (identifiable directives for action) 
among the Luo is clearly feasible ethnographically. Within each cluster, homo-
geneity of rules may be more easily established than when the clusters are 
considered conjoint. But the matrix method does not, by itself, force the re-
searcher to either separate or conflate the two clusters; this is a matter of inter-
pretation. It is likewise with local participants; it is quite understandable that Luo 
people operate as if legal rules are one body of options, albeit sometimes contra-
dictory ones, with which they deal in order to reach certain goals. As for 
patrimonialism, its existence can be confirmed within Luo society, but the ethno-
graphic matrix also contains other traits with individualistic characteristics. Even 
within the customary cluster, disputes can arise, showing that the effectuation of 
rules is not as clear-cut as may seem. These considerations considerably qualify 
the observation that patrimonialism determines life in Luo land. 
Katja Werthmann portrays social behaviour in mining communities in Burkina 
Faso. Seemingly chaotic at a first glance, these communities are sociologically 
well-ordered, with functional divisions between bosses, diggers, buyers, bar-
keepers, shoe-shiners etc., also moving across different mining camps. The 
personnel of these functions can switch, however, especially among bosses and 
diggers, and there is a strong egalitarian spirit. Separated from the customary life 
of family and village, social life and spiritual beliefs encountered in these mining 
camps compare better with other such spots outside Africa than with the sur-
rounding environments within Burkina Faso. For those in the mining camps, life 
seems little dependent on a neo-patrimonial social order. On the other hand, one 
may wonder what the macro-economic effects of these mining camps are for 
Burkina Faso. They do not embody the Weberian “Protestant work ethic” as 
mentioned by Chabal & Daloz (1999: 160-62). The money squandering high-
lighted by Werthmann could be said to be, in some limited sense, a form of 
reinvestment, namely as a redistribution of financial resources into the economic 
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activities of non-diggers within the mining communities. However, while 
perhaps raising average income in Burkina Faso, this process does not lead to 
investment in productive enterprise or capital. Rather than exemplifying neo-
patrimonialism, the mining camps form another instance of economic growth 
through primary sector dependence (cf. Mkandawire & Soludo 1999: 3). 
 
Part 2: Struggle as politics within local and national communities 
Bayleyegn Tasew explains certain ideas on social order among the Anyuaa of 
Western Ethiopia. The anti-authoritarian stance of the Anyuaa is coupled to a 
strong sense of social and juridical order, as the story of the mythical hero 
Očudho indicates. The Anyuaa recognize village leaders to regulate their political 
affairs. These village leaders are, however, strongly subjected to the will of the 
village people, and this sense Anyuaa villages are instances of the principle that 
“sovereignty resides in the people”. Through the performance of an event called 
agem, a village leader may be peacefully or violently ostracized or even killed 
when his actions are not according to local residents’ expectations. This case is 
important because it gives a clear example of indigenous non-patrimonial politi-
cal relations. According to Evans-Pritchard (1947: 95), the Anyuaa at his time 
also clearly distinguished between the office of village headman and the person 
occupying the office, showing that politics is not necessarily identical with 
personal patrimonial relations (cf. Chabal & Daloz 1999: 158). Bayleyegn Tasew 
ends his essay with an overview of recent developments concerning the situation 
of the Anyuaa people within Ethiopia. Having formerly been relatively undis-
turbed by the central Ethiopian imperial government, since the Dergue period 
(1974-1991) the Anyuaa of Ethiopia have become victim of (often violent) intru-
sions from outside, specifically the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement 
(SPLA/M), making their predicament an international matter. While the central 
Ethiopian government could be expected to act as a protector, the Anyuaa seem 
instead to be ignored - or worse - by their own state officials, without the possi-
bility to influence the latter, as their indigenous political mores would have 
enabled them. 
Tijo Salverda reveals the complexities of elite relations on Mauritius and their 
interplay with ethnicity. Mauritius provides a good test-case for establishing the 
persistence of clientelistic relationships. Interestingly, it is precisely the Franco-
Mauritian descendants of French colonizers who hold most of the important 
positions in economic life, though not necessarily in political life. Life on Mauri-
tius is ethnically divided: businesses within respective ethnic communities are 
often run by related persons and social clubs are virtually mono-ethnic. Franco-
Mauritian control of economic life, combined with intra-ethnic vertical loyalty 
between elite members and commoners with this ethnic group, emphasize the 
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still existing dominant economic position of most of its members, who still keep 
track of their French family lines of many generations ago. It is significant to 
note that this situation of ethnicity-based clientelism did not prohibit impressive 
economic growth in the 1980-1990s. However, this period of growth does not 
seem to have drastically changed the relative economic positioning of the several 
Mauritian ethnic groups, perhaps with the exception of a minority of Sino-
Mauritians. 
Anna B. Kanneworff provides a striking example of “re-traditionalization” (cf. 
Chabal & Daloz 1999: 45-47), the conscious rejection of Westernization, Christi-
anity and capitalism and the propagation of what is seen as authentic African 
ritual attitudes, combined with a strategy to realize these visions in society by 
either violent or political means. Kanneworff deals with the Mungiki in Kenya, a 
movement that has never been formally recognized due to its often violent 
actions committed to pursue its goals. The movement is particularly attractive for 
youths, who are unable to attain socio-economic mobility in their country. In 
certain areas of life the movement seems to have succeeded: it was capable of 
monopolizing many mini-bus routes in Nairobi. Attempts by Mungiki leaders to 
align themselves with the Muslim community by announcing to convert to Islam 
turned out to be a miscalculation, however. Mungiki’s critical stance towards 
Christianity will probably not be enhancing the movement’s popularity among 
Christian Kenyans either. Even though Mungiki has been capable of drawing 
much media attention, it has never gained mainstream political power. Even 
though the state apparently feels compelled to use harsh repressive measures 
against Mungiki instead of more subtle methods, in the end the movement does 
not represent a threat to the power position of the state. 
Meine Pieter van Dijk investigates the urban bias of economic growth and 
poverty reduction in Tanzania. Rural areas do not seem to profit from the healthy 
economic performance of Tanzania as a country. Moreover, the central govern-
ment relies heavily on revenue collected in Dar es Salaam. Apart from this urban 
bias, the state misses out on tax revenue due to the fact that much economic 
activity takes place in the informal sector. The informal sector does play an 
important role however, Van Dijk argues, because it allows large numbers of 
people to earn a living, it contributes to overall economic growth and it may be a 
breeding ground for enhanced formal sector enterprises. For the latter, external 
inputs are marked as necessary such as infrastructure and skills development, 
indicating that there certainly is a possibility for formalizing activities now 
carried out in the informal sector, if only the right policies are developed. This is 
what indeed seems to be case in Tanzania nowadays. If rationalization of the 
economic order has been a problem, it is now changing. Concerning struggle, it 
is noteworthy that the formal and informal sectors compete. The vitality of the 
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informal sector, however, makes that it is difficult to eradicate, if such eradica-
tion would be desirable at all. This is also not necessary: the wish of the Confed-
eration of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) to have informal sector enterprises as 
members instead of adversaries can be seen as a step towards formalization. It 
might be hypothesized that the government profits from this as well, as more tax 
revenue should lead to increased capacity for formalization, and this again to 
more revenue. As an assessment of one’s own economic situation the case is also 
interesting: Though the future outcome of the policies is technically unpredict-
able, through the interpretation of possible adversaries as actors with whom one 
can cooperate, the CTI seems to have opened up possibilities for Tanzania’s 
economic functioning which otherwise would not have existed. 
Wendy Willems shows how Zimbabwean cartoonists and comic strip artists 
express discontent with their current government. This is relevant for the 
question whether citizens in Africa are willing and/or capable to challenge 
oppressive political leaders (cf. Chabal & Daloz 1999: 26). Willems addresses 
the influence of mass media on people’s perceptions and provides examples of 
how comic strips bring with them opportunities for political and social criticism. 
Assuming that the messages expounded in the strips not only reveal the outlooks 
of their authors but also of most of their readers, such criticism makes clear that 
political mismanagement is not generally approved of (a similar point may be 
made referring to Alpers’s [1999] essay on bureaucracy in Mozambique, which 
indicates a dysfunctional overinstitutionalization of the state apparatus). It may 
be argued that this would delineate the profitability of patrimonialism to certain 
sections of the Zimbabwean population only. No doubt Mugabe still enjoys 
enough support to stay in power, although more in the army and security forces 
than among the general public. But the discontent with his record is also obvious 
and this cannot be explained by reasoning that political opponents “challenge 
their exclusion from the state in the hope that their agitation will earn them co-
optation” (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 26). 
Naglaa Elhag gives an exposition of the Dinka-Nuer conflict in South Sudan. 
This conflict complicates the view that violence in Sudan before the Comprehen-
sive Peace Accord of 2005 was only occurring along the North-South axis. Elhag 
describes how the Dinka-Nuer conflict escalated into severe violence and how 
eventually peace between the fighting groups was reached. Representations of 
the local situation by the participants are essential in understanding the conflict 
as well as its resolutions. Dinka and Nuer are often described as “different 
people” having “different ways of life”. Such a distinction can be turned into a 
demonizing depiction if, from one standpoint, the “other” group is seen as “the 
enemy”, while cooperation with that other group would be much more viable. 
Ordinary people feel, it is said, to have been drawn into the conflict by their 
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leaders. Contemplating the issues of responsibility will perhaps reveal a more 
complex picture, but it was a sign of hope that apart from the interventions of the 
New Sudan Council of Churches also local prophets have made efforts to 
promote peace between Dinka and Nuer. While the tensions created by the civil 
war are not resolved for good and have contributed to the creation and imagina-
tion of new boundaries (as evident in the post-war period), recent views that 
“Nuer and Dinka are one people” reflect a self-description that could form a basis 
for resolving their conflicts and solidify peace between them.  
 
Part 3: International issues in Africa 
Sabine Luning describes the complex of authorities who have a stake in the gold 
mining activities in Burkina Faso. Her exposition shows a clear example of how 
the local and the global can be inextricably interrelated. After the ending of the 
state monopoly on gold mining, the role of the state transformed from an opera-
tor into a custodian of mining areas and operational permits. These permits are 
distributed among domestic and foreign mining companies. Together with local 
intermediaries, all these parties make up a complex socio-economic environment 
linking intercontinental trade relations with local villages. Naturally, Luning’s 
exposition compares well with Werthmann’s, the two of them providing a good 
case of reproducibility in social science. Like Werthmann, Luning also points out 
the quick access to and loss of wealth through gold, as well as the importance of 
spiritual beliefs. The people involved in gold mining are shown as hard working 
(“what else are we to do?”), but wealth gained is not revolved into business 
investment. This lack of productive investment seems not to be ascribed to the 
mining people in local areas; though here their access to plots is governed by 
neo-patrimonial dependence on intermediary “Mahama”, it remains the question 
whether this local dependency is crucial for such absence of re-investment. 
Rather people, in Luning’s experience, seem to need the generated money for 
immediate consumption. Moreover, a significant conclusion is to recognize the 
invisibility of the mining companies on the local mining spots. This indicates that 
local people do not always have a complete picture of their own social matrix 
beyond their immediate environment. The commercial mining companies are 
dependent on the local intermediary for actual local access to exploitation areas 
and labour, and in this sense globalization is certainly not merely a top-down 
phenomenon. For the gold miners themselves, however, in contrast with the 
Tanzanian economic actors mentioned above, their lack of information is an 
impediment to reflect appropriately on, let alone influence, the role they play in 
the current global economic order. 
Marloes van Amerom discloses the difficulties of managing Peace Parks, or 
more formally Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs), specifically the Ai-
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Ais/Richtersveld TBPA in the border area of Namibia and South Africa. TBPAs 
are assumed to facilitate the settling of boundary conflicts because of the induced 
cooperation of two or more countries necessary for the management of such 
parks. Van Amerom points out that TBPAs may become an additional part of a 
border dispute rather than solving it. In matrix terms, TBPAs become items 
within a social matrix while they are conceived as solutions to yet other items 
which are judged problematic. This does not mean that the idea of promoting 
cooperation does not work: operations within the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld TBPA 
function well and people involved even express sympathy for the official position 
of another’s country concerning the Namibian/South African border issue. How-
ever, they feel they are not in a position to influence the course of affairs, leaving 
this to their respective Ministries of Environment. 
Marijke Steegstra demonstrates how local communities in Ghana install and 
use “development chiefs”, or “queen mothers”, with the objective to promote 
development. Such development chiefs can be Ghanaians but they may also be 
Westerners. Development chiefs are not themselves (political) chiefs but are 
subject to local chiefs, and in this sense they provide an excellent example of the 
fruitful co-existence of political chiefdom and (the wish for) development. As a 
confirmation of Chabal & Daloz’s (1999: 38-39) general assertion that elections 
and their results express geographical solidarity, Steegstra reports that in Mepe 
town government efforts to boost development have diminished since the NDC 
party suffered electoral defeats. But the possibility for people to reflect on their 
own situation does have an enabling capacity here: the installation of develop-
ment chiefs is actively sought after for the purpose of obtaining electricity and 
hospital equipment. Though this may confirm the state’s failure to bring facilities 
in certain places of Ghana, it also shows people’s rejection of “modernity without 
development” (cf. Chabal & Daloz 1999: 125). As a matter of curiosity, it may 
be highlighted that incorrect representation of the phenomenon of the “develop-
ment chief” by both Western media and Ghanaian diaspora members can impact 
on the development chiefs themselves, as Steegstra fascinatingly describes for 
the Dutch development chief Otte. 
Elisa Diallo reflects on literary representations of, and from, Africa and in her 
discussion unfolds a quite wide-ranging perspective on the place of Africa in the 
world. Drawing on the work of Guinean writer Tierno Monénembo, she indicates 
how Africa as an object of contemplation is no longer trapped in its past of 
colonialism and slavery, but now is reaching out to other continents for engage-
ment, cooperation and communication. (This point of communication is also 
made by, e.g., Rijnierse (1999) who, like Bryceson (2000), argues that Chabal & 
Daloz (1999) have stressed too much the distinctiveness of Africa vis-à-vis the 
Western world.) The perspective revealed in Monénembo’s novel Pelourinho 
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(1995) is that of a common cause across both sides of the Atlantic Ocean – a 
theme that perhaps matches Surendra’s common identification of Mozambicans 
and Indians as índicos, people of the Indian Ocean, in Mia Couto’s Terra 
Sonâmbula (1992: 26). The colonial past is not forgotten, but the memories and 
reflections of that past do not immobilize freedom of action in the world’s 
present-day configurations. 
 
Conclusion: Indications for Africa’s changing dynamics 
Perhaps the most resounding argument of Chabal & Daloz (1999) is that African 
political relations are patrimonial and clientelistic, and that this situation is too 
profitable for too many people to be readily discarded, leading to non-develop-
ment. Examples of patrimonialism (neo or old) and clientelism can easily be 
found also in the present collection of papers, confirming much of Chabal & 
Daloz’s judgment in this respect. However, as Hungwe & Chipo (2000: 277) 
point out: “That there is some instrumental value in the disorder for some is not 
surprising. What is more important is to identify who the winners and losers are”; 
the latter being mostly poorer sections of the population, women and children, as 
well as certain (ethno-regional) minorities and marginal groups like pastoralists. 
The chapters in this book make evident that the lower people are in the societal 
hierarchy, the more they experience the disadvantages of political mismanage-
ment and, more significantly, cannot be supposed to subscribe to the idea that 
“disorder” is instrumental to them. 
As also becomes clear from the chapters, people are mostly well aware of their 
adverse situation. The degree to which the socio-economically disadvantaged are 
able to identify origins of their hardships differs across populations. Moreover, 
the solutions based on such identifications, developed to increase communities’ 
potentials, are highly contingent. Strategies vary widely, such as simply accept-
ing one’s fate, mixing local and foreign traits, or use violence. Here the view of 
society as a matrix shows its main shortcoming clearly: as said, a social matrix 
does not enforce its own interpretation and agenda for action. This makes it 
difficult to predict the future course of democratization and equitable distribution 
of wealth. It does, however, weaken Chabal & Daloz’s suggestion of Africa 
following a “different agenda” (that of modernization without development). The 
recent acceleration of African economic growth and the continent’s further 
integration into the world economy through elites (both political and criminal), as 
well as connections made through migration, monetary and social remittances, 
and popular culture would seem to confirm a more sceptical attitude. 
As it stands the nature of the state will continue to be ambiguous; too strong 
for those challenging its authority to overcome its power, but too weak to stead-
fastly pursue a sophisticated economic infrastructure or aim at socio-political 
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equity. This leaves the state, described by Chabal & Daloz (1999: 9) as “simul-
taneously illusory and substantial”, with the disparate capacities for impressive 
resource acquisition but limited efficiency or will in applying those resources. 
For instance, the state in Africa is the major partner for current business and 
development contracts with the People’s Republic of China (Alden 2007). Deals 
are struck between African and Chinese national and sub-national governments, 
with little possibility for control by the populace, resulting in ambiguous effects 
on the economic and personal interests of African citizens. The same will be true 
for other new players, like India, Brazil and several Arab/Muslim countries in the 
Near and Far East. 
Many parts of Africa, with its 850 million inhabitants, know more democracy 
and provide more opportunity and freedom for civil society organizations than 
China with its 1.3 billion people (see Obiorah 2007 for a discussion). The distri-
bution of the fruits of economic and socio-cultural development will, however, 
depend heavily on the capability and space of individuals, civil society organiza-
tions and “neo-traditional” institutions to claim such progress for themselves vis-
à-vis state apparatuses that are not satisfactorily under democratic control. As the 
studies contained in this volume show, this is difficult but possible and not 
necessarily constrained by neo-patrimonialist structures. Finally, they also 
illustrate that struggles for the definition and competing uses of “culture” are part 
of the dynamics of material and social change. Indeed, the debate on African 
politics on the state and local levels has shown a new interest in cultural patterns 
and representations, both political culture and popular culture, and as the latest 
work of Chabal & Daloz (2006) shows, the analysis of the impact of “culture”, in 
both its fleeting meanings and its instrumental and expressive roles, is more vital 
than ever. 
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Introduction 
During repeated stays in the department of Tambacounda in Senegal, in order to 
supervise fieldwork by Dutch Masters’ students in development sociology,1 I 
became interested in the problematic relationship between the directory board of 
the national park Niokolo Koba and the villages around the park. As a conse-
quence of a fortress conservation policy in the past, all people living in villages 
in the park had been forcibly removed from it and resettled in or between the 
already existing villages outside the park. Although these imposed changes have 
not been undone, the directory board decided afterwards to follow a participatory 
approach towards the local communities; that means, creating a positive attitude 
within these communities to nature conservation by contributing to their 
development.    
In this chapter I want to deal with the question of the interrelationship between 
nature conservation policies and rural development policies: how does this inter-
                                                     
1  This paper could not have been written without the enthusiasm and perseverance of the following 
Masters students: Esther de Graaf and Rebecca Vanmechelen in 2002, and Elke Boyen, Nienke 
Feenstra and Sander Muilerman in 2003. Data mentioned here have been gathered for a large part from 
their research reports and from conversations with them in the field. However, the selection, analysis 
and interpretation of the data in this paper are my responsibility. 
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relationship work in the area around the national park Niokolo Koba? Do they 
reinforce each other, as current ideas on sustainable development prescribe?  
For practical reasons, research was limited to the rural municipality 
(communauté rurale) of Dialokoto (about 70 km south of Tambacounda). I was 
happy to find five students willing to carry out the research: Two in 2002 and 
three in 2003, from June to September in both years.1 The municipality is well 
suited for this research because the Senegalese state is markedly represented by 
at least two significant instances of nature conservation: Firstly, the already 
mentioned national park (Parc National de Niokolo Koba, PNNK) and, secondly, 
the forest reserve of Diambour (Forêt Classée de Diambour, FCD).  
The park started, in the 1920s, as a protected hunting reserve for French 
hunters. After a number of border changes and extensions the park has, since the 
last extension in 1969, an area of 913,000 ha, i.e, more than a quarter of the size 
of the Netherlands. It acquired the status of National Park in 1954. All human 
settlements were removed from the park during the 1970s, and all human 
inhabitation and exploitation of any resource within the park was officially 
forbidden. In 1981 it was classified as a biosphere reserve within the Man and 
Biosphere Programme (MAB) of UNESCO. This meant the introduction of a 
‘participatory’ ideology, with the result that in recent times some human exploi-
tation of some resources in the buffer zone (an adjacent area of approximately 1 
km wide) was allowed under certain conditions (Feenstra 2005: 58). For a more 
detailed history of the PNNK, see Takforyan (1994: 53-6), Larrue (2002: 151) 
and Ndiaye (2003).  
To the north of the National Park, separated from it by a long, narrow belt of 
land, we find the protected forest of Diambour, an area of about 150,000 ha. It 
was established in the second half of the 1930s in order to prevent the catchment 
basin of the river Nieriko from deforestation by the local people (Larrue 2002: 
151-152). The status of reserve implies that it is forbidden by law to establish 
human settlements, to cut living trees and shrubs, to hunt, to use fire, and until 
recently also to cultivate crops. On the other hand, certain human activities have 
always been allowed, such as grazing cattle and gathering wild fruits, herbs, yam 
tubers, dead wood, etc. for local consumption. Since the new forest code of 1998 
also some cultivation of food crops in places demarcated by the State forest 
service is allowed. For any form of commercial exploitation, however, an 
authorization by this national service is needed.  
The rural municipality of Dialokoto numbers 44 settlements, with a total 
population of 7,121 inhabitants in 2004 (Boyen 2004: Annex 6), predominantly 
Mandinka and Peul (Fula). Most of the 44 settlements are not represented in the 
rural council (conseil rural), which has 28 seats and is based in the village of 
Dialokoto. The council has members of different political parties, but since the 
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rural elections of 2002 the PDS of President Wade has the majority (Boyen 2004: 
28, 97-98; Vanmechelen 2004: 62). My students lived in five of the villages: 
(from north-west to south-east) Badi, Wassadou, Dialokoto, Dar Salam and 
Dienoudiala but some more villages were involved in their research like 
Nionghani, Touba Badi, Damantan, etc.    
Administratively, the municipality of Dialokoto belongs together with the 
rural municipalities of Neteboulou and Missirah to the district (arrondissement) 
of Missirah, which has a “sous-préfet” as its head and which in its turn belongs to 
the département of Tambacounda under a préfet. The sous-préfet is assisted by a 
small group of specialists in agriculture, cattle husbandry, forestry, health care, 
nutrition etc., called the CERP (Centre d'Expansion Rurale Polyvalente), which 
has to serve the three municipalities within the district, the councils as well as 
private groups.  
For the park authorities, the rural municipality of Dialokoto belongs to what 
they call “the periphery of the national park”; it is stretching out from west to 
east along the northern border of the national park. 
In order to answer the above-mentioned questions I will first explain in brief 
the ideology underlying the desired integration of conservation and development 
policies (1). Then follows an overview of organizations active in the research 
area (2). First we will look at the governmental organizations for nature protec-
tion (2.1) and for rural development and income generation (2.2). Next we will 
look at private projects, first for nature conservation (2.3) and second for rural 
income generation (2.4). In a comparative analysis and conclusion (3) we will try 
to formulate some generalizations about the relationship between conservation 
and development policies in our research area. 
Conservation of nature and rural development: Twin concepts 
With the definitive breakthrough of the concept of sustainable development in 
the international discourse on environment and development during the 1980s 
(IUCN 1980; WCED [Brundtland] 1987; IUCN 1991), awareness has been 
widely generated that attempts at the conservation of nature and those at rural 
development have necessarily to be integrated (Adams & Hulme 2001: 13-16). 
While in former days development experts and nature conservationists often 
worked apart and sometimes even had antagonistic relationships (Anderson & 
Grove 1987: 3, 7-10; Adams & Hulme 2001: 12), several economic and 
environmental crises, for instance in Africa in the 1970s, required their coopera-
tion. Conservationists became aware that, if they wanted to realize their goals in 
a sustainable way, they would have to take into account the needs and develop-
mental wishes at the local level (IIED 1994; Hulme & Murphree 2001: 1-2; 
Achterberg 1994: 26-30). And development experts started to recognize that, for 
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development to be durable, they had to respect the “carrying capacity” of the 
environment (Harrison 1987: 27-43; World Bank 1992: 1-63; Shepherd 1998: 1-
89). So, at an ideological level both parties became locked into interdependency. 
As a result, several Integrated Conservation and Development Projects, the so-
called ICDPs, have been undertaken in the zones around national parks and 
nature reserves, often with community-based management (Adams & Hulme 
2001: 20). It is believed that the protection of nature and wildlife, in combination 
with growing tourism, will stimulate rural development by creating paid jobs and 
other remunerating activities, whereas progressing development and alleviation 
of poverty will facilitate the protection of nature, among others by removing the 
motivations for what are regarded as illegal practices. Policies of conservation 
and those of development should be synergetic in this ideological construction. 
However, there is a contradiction within this construction. Although the two 
parties are interdependent and should cooperate, the tension between conserva-
tion goals and development goals remains. So, the complaint is often heard that 
the ICDPs have too little to offer either for rural development or for nature 
conservation (Adams & Hulme 2001: 20-21), that means that the supposed 
synergy does not work. In every practical situation the interrelationship between 
the policies of nature protection and rural development has to be analysed and 
negotiated, and therefore a forum for coordination is a must. How is this ideology 
applied in our research area, as perceived by different stakeholders? 
Overview of organizations active in the research area 
In 2002/3 there were at least 13 organizations for nature conservation and/or rural 
development. They may be divided into state and private organizations. Next 
they may be arranged along a continuum going from those aimed at nature 
conservation to those aimed at rural development or rural income generation. 
 
State organizations for nature conservation 
The DPN (Direction du Parc National). Since 1967 the management of the park 
has been in the hands of a governmental directory board (DPN), whose legal 
competencies are limited to the park and its buffer zone. From the 1960s until far 
into the 1980s, the policies with regard to the local people had the reputation of 
being very repressive, with the culminating point during the 1970s in the forced 
resettlement of all villages’ inhabitants into zones adjacent to the park. However, 
as poaching and degradation increased (Ndaye 2003: 7), and under the influence 
of UNESCO’s MAB programme, a new policy was installed (Takforyan 1994: 
56). In order to prevent poaching and to realize the durable conservation of 
nature, supported by the local communities, the inconveniences of the forced 
resettlement had to be relieved by creating economic opportunities, outside and 
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possibly also inside the park, and by involving local people, to their advantage, in 
the maintenance of natural species. If local people enjoy economic advantages 
from the park and the wildlife, they will see it as being in their interest to protect 
nature and to abandon or prevent poaching. The growth of tourism is regarded as 
a necessary condition for nature protection and rural development. Moreover, the 
park was not intended to become a green island in an ocean of degraded 
environment but it was supposed to function as a store-room from which plants 
and animals, which are still abundant within the park, could spread or be trans-
ferred to zones outside. This demands a sustainable use and management of 
natural resources in these adjacent zones.    
Thus, according to this new philosophy of the DPN, rural development is 
required to achieve the sustainable conservation of nature. During the period of 
research (2002/3) there were four tourist facilities, two inside the park (the Hôtel 
de Simenti and the Camp des Lions) and two in the buffer zone (the Campement 
touristique de Dar Salam and the Campement touristique de Wassadou). The 
park and these tourist facilities offer some opportunities for local development 
(Muilerman 2004: 111-115; Boyen 2004: 42-44). 
Firstly, they bring with them paid employment: As hotel personnel (about 65 
salaried jobs during the top season from November till March); as tourist guides 
(the park has about 40 of them); and as temporary labourers during the weeks 
after the rainy season for the repair and maintenance of roads, bridges and obser-
vation-posts inside the park (at 1,750 frs. CFA or 2.67 euro per day according to 
Vanmechelen 2004: 117). Most interesting for local people is the job of tourist 
guide in the national park. These guides usually are recruited from neighbouring 
villages and they must be available on demand. During the tourist season they 
work most days, but in the low season only occasionally. For instance Dar Salam 
has 12 tourist guides. The mean salary of a guide for the whole tourist season is 
estimated at an amount of 300,000 frs. CFA (or 461 euro) (Boyen 2004: 44). 
Badi is described as having eight tourist guides and eight labourers as well as two 
persons employed in the Hôtel de Simenti (de Graaf 2004: 94). The number of 
guides of Dialokoto is not exactly known (at least four); that of the labourers is 
about ten. For Wassadou (Feenstra 2005: 86) and Dienoudiala no guides have 
been registered, only some occasional labourers. 
There are other developmental effects of tourism as well. Local people may 
earn some money by selling locally produced or gathered foodstuff and fruit to 
the hotels and the park guards, by selling candles of beeswax and souvenirs, and 
by cultural entertainment (music and dance) for the tourists. 
Next, the new participatory policies of the DPN have created new economic 
opportunities for local communities. These are allowed to fish and to gather 
several kinds of forest products inside the buffer zone for local consumption, on 
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condition that they are organized, respect certain quota or practise reforestation. 
For example, in Dialokoto, an officially recognized local group of entrepreneurial 
persons (a GIE, Groupement d'Intérêt Economique) has been allowed to harvest 
honey in the buffer zone. Elsewhere GIEs have been permitted to practise 
irrigated cultivation of bananas (Badi, Wassadou) or to keep guinea-fowls 
(Medina) or grow bamboo (Dar Salam), with raw materials from the buffer zone. 
One day per six weeks the people of Dar Salam are collectively allowed to 
practise fishery inside the park, for local consumption only (Boyen 2004: 38-41). 
The women’s group of that same village is allowed to gather dead wood in the 
buffer zone in exchange for reforestation activities within and around the village. 
Dienoudiala has been allowed to exploit the “campement des lions” inside the 
park.  
The EFC (Service des Eaux et Forêts et de la Chasse). This is a country-wide 
organization which sees to the observance of the national forest law. Its main 
objective is to realize a sustainable use of Senegal’s forests through regulation of 
their exploitation as well as by reforestation. EFC has always had a double task: 
On the one hand, to provide the Senegalese cities with wood and charcoal by 
allocating licences and quota to entrepreneurs, and on the other hand, to maintain 
the productivity of the forests for future generations. One important task derived 
from this is the prevention and fighting of bush fires in cooperation with local 
groups (comités de lutte contre les feux de brousse); another the management of 
tree nurseries.  
Another main objective is the regulation of the hunt by the allocation of 
hunting territories and quota to entrepreneurs (Muilerman 2004: 65-66, 115; 
Boyen 2004: 94; Feenstra 2005: 52-54). In 1989 the regional EFC at Tamba-
counda created within that region 24 lease holdings (zones amodiées) for hunting 
small game and one large zone for big game hunting (Zone d'Intervention 
Cynégétique or ZIC). Our sources do not mention whether all the holdings are 
actually leased or not. The leaseholders are partly foreigners and partly entrepre-
neurial, wealthy nationals. They have to pay 300,000 frs. CFA a year for a 
licence plus a small amount per hectare. They usually have their own camp 
(campement de chasse) in their lease zone and they recruit their clients, by means 
of modern publicity channels, mostly from French hunting associations. It is in 
their own interest to manage the game stock in their holding in a sustainable way 
and to prevent poaching. Big game hunting in the ZIC is organized and con-
trolled by the forest service itself. Hunters, mostly from France, have to buy a 
general licence (15,000 frs. CFA [23 euro] per week) and next a special permit to 
shoot a fixed number of the kind of animal they want, for instance for one 
buffalo or one antelope (at 300 euro each). Local people cannot afford big game 
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hunting. For small game hunting they have to buy a licence (13,000 frs. CFA [20 
euro] for the whole season). They are not allowed to hunt in the lease holdings. 
In the rural municipality of Neteboulou there are at least two hunting camps. 
The leaseholders recruit their personnel mostly from the neighbouring villages, 
i.e., guides, cooks, cleaners, guards, musicians, etc. The hunting season largely 
coincides with the tourist season (from November until March). 
After the general paradigm change in tropical forestry towards more partici-
patory approaches, the Senegalese parliament finally accepted a new forest law in 
1993. This code forestier makes co-management by state organisms and private 
groups legally possible and specifies its conditions. Moreover, local groups may 
obtain permission for the commercial exploitation of forest products. In 1998 this 
law was altered again. Legal competencies of the municipal councils were rede-
fined and they were allowed to transfer part of their responsibilities to specialized 
private partners (entrepreneurs, local groups or NGOs) on condition that there is 
an approved plan for sustainable use.  
With regard to forestry, EFC as the nation-wide guardian of the state forests 
has to cooperate nowadays with many councils at the different administrative 
levels and with the village heads, but also with numerous groups of women or 
young people in the villages and with GIEs, NGOs and private projects for nature 
conservation as well as with the DPN.  
The CR (conseil rural). The rural council has several tasks and powers with 
regard to rural development as well as the maintenance of natural resources 
within its administrative territory: Firstly, the allotment of use rights on land and 
on forest, with the exception of the right on commercial forest exploitation, 
which means that the allotment of this last right remains the task of the EFC; 
secondly, the carrying out and the coordination of development projects in the 
different villages of the rural municipality (as roads, bridges, schools, health 
centres, water wells); thirdly, the coordination of reforestation (wind breaks, 
woodlots) and the prevention and combat of bush fires (laying out of fire-lanes). 
Within the context of progressive decentralization more powers have been 
delegated to the rural council. So, in 1993, the council acquired the right to 
demand subventions from the national forest fund (Fonds Forestier National) for 
local forest management. It also got the legal power to redistribute the use rights 
on natural resources (gestion de terroir) according to a management plan 
approved by the EFC. In 1998, it was allowed to transfer certain responsibilities 
to specialized private partners. In the early 1990s the council had already been 
given the right to collect annual taxes in the villages of its territory and to keep 
these revenues as its budget.  
In 1999 the rural councils of Dialokoto, Missirah and Bala (department of 
Bakel) delegated the management of zones with high densities of rônier palms 
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(Borassus aethiopum) to the CIVD (Comité Intervillageois de Développement) in 
order to protect the biodiversity of these zones and to develop a sustainable use 
of the palms (Feenstra 2005: 66-69). Initially, 18 of the 22 villages identified as 
neighbouring on such a high density zone, took part; in 2003, 12 of them were 
still participating. 
  
State organizations for rural development and income generation 
There are too many governmental organizations and services concerned with 
some aspects of rural development, to discuss them all here. According to the 
criterion of furthering income-generating activities among the local people, we 
may select some organizations. One of these is the SONACOS, the state organi-
zation which sells groundnut seeds to farmers who for one reason or another do 
not have sufficient groundnut seeds themselves. Complaints are rather general 
that these seeds are delivered too late and in insufficient quantities, and that 
prices are too high. Rumours are current that this is done on purpose in order to 
force the farmers to cultivate cotton in favour of another income-generating 
organization, namely SODEFITEX. 
The SODEFITEX (Société pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles). Since 
1963 the Senegalese government has been trying to promote the cultivation of 
cotton. In the early 1970s the government divided the country into several 
agrarian or ecological zones. For each zone a specialized development organiza-
tion was established, to which the rural development in that particular zone was 
entrusted. So, the so-called cotton zone (zône cotonnière; Kaolack, Tamba-
counda, Kolda) became the territory for the newly formed Sodefitex in 1974. 
Sodefitex has been charged by the Senegalese government with two tasks: 
Namely 1) the promotion of the production and commercialization of cotton, and 
2) rural and agricultural development. The second task implies the advancement 
of food crop production (horticulture; small scale irrigation agriculture), animal 
husbandry, literacy and health care and in a later period also social forestry. 
Over the course of time Sodefitex has faced several reorganizations. At the 
local level farmers have been organized in cooperatives, at first in large village 
cooperatives and later, since about 1999, in smaller groups called GPCs (Grou-
pements de Producteurs de Coton) which are covered by the National Federation 
of GPCs (FNPC). The GPCs may buy requisites (seeds, chemical manure, insec-
ticides, pesticides etc.) and agricultural equipment (ploughs, several types of 
machines, carts for transport etc.) from Sodefitex on credit, to be repaid in 
phases. The management of the credits has been delegated by Sodefitex to the 
GPCs and the FNPC. The formation of the cooperatives and GPCs as well as the 
necessary professional and literacy training of the farmers involved, surely has 
been a tremendous stimulus for rural development in its broadest sense. 
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Nevertheless, the relationship between Sodefitex and the farmers has over the 
course of time been subject to periodical crises. One of the general reasons is the 
rising price for requisites and the declining price for the produce, but there are 
other important reasons which have to do with the vulnerability of cotton culti-
vation, some past organization principles for the local cooperatives, and the 
attitude of Sodefitex in the case of bad harvests and farmers’ inability to pay back 
the credits. After an initial enthusiasm for cotton growing and high production 
figures, farmers started to withdraw from cotton cultivation by decreasing their 
cultivated cotton area. Many farmers cultivate only some cotton just to have 
access to Sodefitex’ credit system and to agricultural equipment and fertilizer, 
things which they also use for their food crop production (Muilerman 2004: 95; 
Boyen 2004: 111). However, farmers who are relatively wealthy or have a large 
labour force at their disposal, may accept the risk of a debt, and cultivate large 
areas of cotton. 
 
Private organizations for nature conservation   
Projet de Gestion de la Biodiversité des Rôneraies de Wassadou. This project, 
carried out by the CIVD, belongs to a group of nine small-scale local projects, 
which all joined into the “Fédération des Conservateurs de Biodiversité à la 
Périphérie du Parc National de Niokolo Koba” in 2000. All nine micro-projects 
are related to the National Park. They formed a federation to be able to acquire 
some support from the UNDP (Muilerman 2004: 69-70). 
This project has as objectives the protection and the regeneration of areas with 
a high concentration of a kind of palm trees, the rônier, and the generation of 
financial income out of its sustainable use. The rônier is a multifunctional tree: 
Its leaves serve for roofing, for mats and fences, for baskets and fish traps; its 
fibres supply the material for pieces of furniture (arm-chairs and tables) and for 
sponges; its fruits are processed for human consumption; its roots have medicinal 
value; the wood of its trunk serves as rafters for roofs, and lastly the tree 
produces a stimulant, namely palm wine. The traditional way of exploiting the 
tree often means its death. In most zones around the national park this useful tree 
has become scarce or has already completely disappeared. However, around 
Wassadou and Badi it still exists in large numbers. In order to counter the process 
of decrease, the project members have established a rônier nursery and woodlot 
in Wassadou, and they also planted young trees between the farms (Feenstra 
2005: 69). In July 2003 they made a proposal to the rural council to establish a 
communal rônier reserve. They provide information about the use value of this 
tree, how it is threatened, and how to protect it. Finally, they try to organize the 
production and sale of furniture and sponges.  
The PRCNK (Projet des Rôneraies Communautaires de Niokolo Koba). This 
project was started by a Belgian NGO. Aims of the project were the protection of 
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concentrations of the rônier palm in the periphery of the national park and the 
development of new economic opportunities related to this palm (to enhance the 
economic value of the tree). To these ends the project organized training in the 
sustainable use of the rônier and in making baskets, brooms and furniture and 
tried to set up a GIE for the artisans (de Graaf 2004: 111; Feenstra 2005: 71-74). 
Moreover, woodlots of rôniers and other trees were planted by local groups. The 
making of sponges (out of fresh branches) by the women was discouraged on 
account of the bad effect on the rônier. Since the building of an office in 
Dienoudiala in 2000, the project has been able to set up activities in 23 villages. 
It established, parallel to the CIVD, its proper network, the CIVG (Comité Inter-
villageois de Gestion), in which initially 18 villages took part. In 2003 this 
number had dropped to six (Feenstra 2005: 70). Unfortunately, the project did 
not succeed in developing a form of cooperation with the EFC because this 
organization wanted its services paid by the project (Muilerman 2004: 69-70). 
Therefore, the project decided to work with the DPN of the national park, 
although the DPN had no jurisdiction outside the park. Within the context of this 
cooperation, the DPN placed one of its agents as a public relations officer 
(animateur) within the PRCNK, although this man lacked the necessary qualities 
and was not popular among the local people (Feenstra 2005: 80). After the first 
phase of three years the project was stopped.  
It is worth mentioning is that the local Projet de Gestion de la Biodiversité des 
Rôneraies de Wassadou was already functioning some months before the arrival 
of the PRCNK. It is amazing that the two projects did not succeed in realizing 
any form of cooperation. According to staff members of the Belgian project, the 
local project staff wanted access to the resources and means of the PRCNK, they 
wanted to be paid on the same basis as the local personnel of the Belgian project 
and they wanted local people to be paid for their contribution (“money for 
work”), which was all unacceptable for the PRCNK. For additional reasons see 
Feenstra (2005: 77-81). 
The PROGEDE (Projet de Gestion durable et participative des Energies 
traditionnelles et de substitution). The PROGEDE is a very large project, 
financed by the World Bank and the Netherlands (Boyen 2004: 100-105). Given 
the alarming situation of an increasing need for wood fuel and charcoal in the 
cities and the rapidly decreasing forest area in Senegal, this project has a twofold 
aim: Firstly, to develop a system for the supply of energy (fuel wood, charcoal, 
gas) to the urban consumers and for the promotion of a sustainable use of energy; 
secondly, to develop a systematic and sustainable exploitation of the remaining 
forests in Senegal, around Kolda and Tambacounda. To this second end these 
forests were divided into a large number of blocks, separated from each other by 
large fire lanes. This allows a more systematic and controllable allocation policy 
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by the EFC and it confines the damage in case of bush fires. Moreover, in order 
to reduce the pressure on the remaining forests, the project promotes many 
diverse activities such as sustainable land use and horticulture, tree culture and 
planting, fighting bush fires, the choice of new, drought-resistant varieties, stock-
feeding for commercial purposes and vaccination campaigns, prevention of cattle 
theft, poultry farming and the production of eggs, breeding guinea-fowl, apicul-
ture (without the dangerous use of fire) and honey processing, and the creation of 
income-generating activities such as marketing poultry and eggs, cattle, honey 
and wax etc. On all these points, and dependent on the local situation, the project 
in principle works with local groups, or committees for management and 
development (Comités Villageois de Gestion et de Développement). The project 
also helps to finance the construction of water wells for horticulture as well as 
permanent water pools for cattle breeding. Some agricultural tools, beehives etc., 
are given for free, which other projects find disturbing. In Dar Salam the project 
has fully financed the construction of a water pump and two wells. After a fire 
had destroyed the whole village in 1996, the project organized training in fire 
prevention and donated all kinds of fire-fighting appliances freely (Boyen 2004: 
105-107).  
For its second objective the project has an office (antenne) in Tambacounda. 
In order to consolidate the process of administrative decentralization this office 
aims at cooperation with rural municipal councils in the vast regions of Tamba-
counda and Kolda, also with the council of Dialokoto (Muilerman 2004: 73). It 
tries to strengthen the knowledge and capacities of the councils with regard to the 
sustainable use and management of natural resources. The project also works at 
higher administrative levels: It cooperates closely with the regional EFC, with 
the DPN and the CERP, in order to strengthen the capacities of those state 
services.  
The ASAN (Association Sénégalaise des Amis de la Nature). This Senegalese 
NGO also has the twofold aim of protecting nature and improving the living 
conditions of the rural population. It has a French partner organization and is a 
member of the international “Amis de la Nature” and the IUCN. It puts a heavy 
emphasis on nature education by means of radio broadcasting and schools. In this 
context it delivers useful services to the EFC and to the DPN by explaining their 
programmes and measures to the public, and by making people aware of the 
worth of nature conservation. It also organizes conferences, public debates, 
courses in ornithology, excursions to the park, film projections and the yearly 
world days for the environment (in June). Moreover, it has created tree nurseries 
at schools and at village and regional level.  
To improve living conditions it has co-financed school buildings, health 
centres, water wells and grain mills, and tries to find funds for such small 
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projects (Boyen 2004: 111-114; Muilerman 2004: 74-75). It is active in several 
villages around the national park such as Missirah, Dialokoto, Badi, Wassadou 
and Dar Salam. 
 
Private projects for rural income generation 
The CMS (Crédit Mutuel du Sénégal). This non-profit organization, established 
in France and working throughout francophone West Africa, has a small office in 
Missirah (Muilerman 2004: 91-92). The CMS designs and organizes saving and 
credit projects. Individuals, groups or NGOs can become members and receive 
micro credits. To become a member one has to save and deposit a certain 
minimum amount of money. Once a member, one gets further information about 
banking affairs. At first, members can get loans up to the amount saved. Later, 
after the client has proven to be able to pay back the loan and to pay the interest, 
he or she can obtain a loan up to the maximum of three times the mean positive 
balance of the last six months. There are five types of loans for agricultural, 
consumptive or commercial ends. All loans must in principle be paid back within 
a year. The CMS has clients in many villages (also in Dienoudiala), and also 
several projects are contracting out their micro finance system to the CMS. The 
CMS has filled the vacuum that the SGBS (Société Générale des Banques au 
Sénégal) and other official banks have left. 
The PROMER (Projet d'Appui aux Micro Entreprises Rurales). This project, 
financed with a loan that the government received from the IFAD (International 
Fund for Agricultural Development), has as its objective to stimulate non-
agrarian initiatives (micro-enterprises) in the villages of the administrative 
regions Tambacounda, Kolda and Kaolack. Now that the prices for peanuts and 
cotton have gone down, people can no longer rely on agriculture only, and alter-
native economic activities have to be encouraged. Thus, PROMER creates 
professional training facilities, tries to find new markets or to facilitate access to 
existing ones, gives assistance in the contact with official banks to obtain loans 
etc. Initially PROMER concentrated its activities on cattle husbandry and 
commerce, nowadays more on small industrial activities and services. It also 
provides for adult literacy campaigns, notably for functional adult literacy which 
means it is at the same time a course in entrepreneurship. According to a key 
informant (Muilerman 2004: 94), the most important problem is that an accepted 
regional plan is lacking within which the projects have to function. Efforts to 
organize a forum for coordination and negotiation (Cadre de Concertation) for 
the different projects have failed. Its success would mean that the international 
donors give up a part of their autonomy. 
The GIEs (Groupements d'Intérêt Economique). After the State, in 1984, had 
created by law the possibility of establishing formal economic associations of 
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entrepreneurial individuals, many GIEs came into being. A GIE officially is an 
organization of between 4 and 20 members, which is formally recognized by the 
State and on those grounds may demand subventions or credit facilities to realize 
its economic objectives (commerce, gardening, transport, grain mill, water well, 
etc.). A GIE must have an official board (president, secretary etc.), official regu-
lations approved by the State, and a bank account with at least 10,000 frs. CFA 
(15 euro). To fulfil all bureaucratic conditions and taxes an amount of about 
50,000 frs. CFA (77 euro) is needed.  
All villages have several GIEs. Badi has an unknown number of GIEs (de 
Graaf 2004: 64-65), one for the sponge-making women and the others for 
irrigated banana cultivation in the buffer zone. Wassadou has two GIEs for the 
irrigated cultivation of bananas (Feenstra 2005: 62-5): One large GIE (77 parcels 
of land and 103 participants) which has made a demand for more land, and a 
smaller one (25 parcels of which only 21 in use in 2003, after a break-down of 
the pump in March 2002 which meant the loss of all the banana plants). The 
plantations were laid out in the buffer zone with the consent of the DPN. In 
September 2003 all the plantations were devastated by the flooding from the 
river. 
Dialokoto has at least 14 GIEs (Vanmechelen 2004: 58). Only some of them 
are active within the domain of nature protection and reforestation (control of 
poaching, bushfire prevention, commercial woodlots). Dienoudiala has five GIEs 
(Muilerman 2004: 91). Dar Salam has two GIEs (Boyen 2004: 25): Both of them 
are active in the domain of nature protection as well as that of rural development. 
The MFR (Maison Familiale Rurale). This organization has 51 workshops, 
spread over rural Senegal. One of them is in Dialokoto (Vanmechelen 2004: 59). 
Its aim is to encourage and support local initiatives, in particular projects of 
GIEs, within the domain of agriculture, cattle breeding, apiculture and literacy. 
The MFR is financed by international donors. All members of the cooperating 
GIEs have to contribute 1,000 frs. CFA (1.53 euro) a year. Among the activities, 
carried out in 24 of the 44 villages of the municipality of Dialokoto, can be cited: 
Granting micro-credits (for example to buy a donkey, a plough or a cart), literacy 
training in Pulaar and Mandinka, establishment and organization of cereal banks 
and grain mills, training in advanced apiculture (without fire). This form of 
apiculture by GIEs was allowed in the buffer zone by the DPN.  
The APROVAG (Association des Producteurs de la Vallée de la Gambie). This 
association, established in 1988 as a local follow-up for the international 
OFADEC (Office Africain de Développement Economique), has started a 
commercial banana plantation along the Gambia river 9 km from the villages of 
Badi and Nionghani in 2001. The objective was to generate a more regular and 
stable financial income for farmers from these and other villages, who had once 
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lived inside the park and have to cope with poverty since their resettlement in a 
less fertile area (de Graaf 2004: 104-109). 
For the establishment of this plantation consent was needed from the DPN, 
because of its location within the buffer zone of the national park: Trees had to 
be cut down as well as water withdrawn from the river for irrigation, while pesti-
cides, insecticides and artificial manure had to be applied. Moreover, to produce 
a top harvest a plantation may remain only for four years in the same spot. An 
agreement between the DPN and the APROVAG was signed at the end of 2000. 
The project agreed to help in the fight against poaching, among other things by 
forbidding its participating farmers to cross the river.  
In the village of Badi 24 families received a parcel. Other families had to be 
put on a waiting list. Therefore, it is remarkable that parcels were assigned also to 
people from outside the periphery of the PNNK, notably to a group of Mouride 
children from Touba. They live in a settlement near the plantation, called Touba 
Badi. Preparations on the spot started in August 2001: 113 parcels of 10 x 20 
metres as well as adjacent grounds and paths had to be laid out by the partici-
pants, while the APROVAG delivered the necessary banana seedlings, two water 
pumps, tubes, etc. During the research period, in August 2002 (de Graaf 2004: 
106), the second harvest took place. Transport and marketing were carried out by 
the APROVAG. 
People in Badi were very positive about the APROVAG. Unfortunately, 
because of the extremely heavy rains in September 2003 all the plantations along 
the river Gambia were flooded what meant the loss of all the banana trees and of 
all the energy invested, as well as replanting and waiting for the first harvest. 
There were more plantations along the river Gambia, managed by GIEs or 
supervised by NGOs such as the plantation called Laboya 15 km from Dialokoto. 
At this plantation several young men from villages as far away as Tambacounda 
had a parcel. 
Comparative analysis and conclusion 
In answering the question of how to characterize the relationship, within our 
research area, between nature conservation policies and those for rural develop-
ment, we have, as is already evident from the above, to make a distinction 
between the ideological level and reality as perceived by the representatives of 
different stakeholder groups. 
 
Governmental interventions at ideological level 
The “conservation and development” ideology seems to be clearly reflected in 
the objectives and the approach of the DPN, the EFC, the Rural Council (CR) 
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and also of the Sodefitex to some extent, thus in all governmental organizations 
for nature conservation or rural development which have been discussed here. 
The directory board (DPN) of the national park Niokolo Koba emphasized the 
necessity of creating economic opportunities for the local people living in the 
adjacent zones in order to realize durable conservation and a solid local protec-
tion of nature. The words “dialogue” and “negotiation” were recurrent in their 
conversation with the researchers. 
The national forest service (EFC) showed enthusiasm for realizing the 
objective of sustainable exploitation of the state forests with the new means 
given by the forest laws of 1993 and 1998. That means co-management of state 
forests with private groups as well as commercial exploitation of forest products 
by local groups, and since 1998, the legal transfer of conservation responsibilities 
of the rural councils to specialized private partners as well as some food crop 
cultivation in certain parts of the state forests by groups of local people. For the 
hunt, the EFC already had a system of lease holding, in which it is in the interests 
of the leaseholder to manage the game stock in a sustainable way and thus to 
prevent poaching. 
The rural council (CR) officially represents the local communities, and has the 
task of coordinating development projects and increasingly also the protection of 
natural resources. The council collects the annual taxes for its own budget. 
Moreover, it has the right since 1993 to demand subventions from the national 
forest fund for projects of forest management. Since 1998 it has also had the 
legal power to reorganize the use rights on natural resources (gestion de terroir) 
according to a management plan approved by the EFC. 
Then there is the rural development organization of Sodefitex, established in 
1974 by demand of the Senegalese government. Besides the promotion and 
commercialization of cotton, the Sodefitex has been charged with the more 
general task of rural and agricultural development. While both these tasks imply 
the rise of financial income for the farmers, the second task includes the 
advancement of food crop production, animal husbandry, literacy, health care 
and in a later period also social forestry (woodlots, windbreaks etc.).  
Thus, at an ideological level the international message of the integration of 
nature conservation and rural development seems to be well understood by the 
governmental organizations discussed above. 
  
The perceived reality of governmental interventions 
All these governmental organizations, with the exception of Sodefitex, make 
clear that they have to cope with an enormous lack of money and means.  
The staff of the DPN had dwindled to about 70 members in 2003, and had 
only two cars at its disposal to cover an area of 913,000 ha (Takforyan 1994: 60-
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61; Ndiaye 2003: 14; Feenstra 2005: 56-58). Although the DPN got some help 
from the army, illegal exploitation, especially commercial poaching, still is a 
major problem (Boyen 2004: 78; Muilerman 2004: 61; Feenstra 2005: 57). 
Moreover, the national park is surrounded by nine rural municipalities which 
form together the so-called periphery of the park and which belong to different 
higher administrative units (Ndiaye 2003: 4; Boyen 2004: 87-88, annex 6; Feen-
stra 2005: 57). It is time-consuming to maintain contacts with all these actors at 
the different levels, let alone to come to effective agreements. In addition to this, 
the DPN has started an international cooperation with the neighbouring Badiar 
National Park in Guinea, which may be desirable from several points of view but 
is yet another competitor for the limited means. Therefore, communication and 
cooperation with the local communities in the periphery is mostly left to special 
projects.    
The EFC also has to face a serious decrease of means (personnel, money, cars 
and computers), consequently with complaints about insufficient communication 
with the many conservation and/or development projects and with the DPN, 
about unsatisfactory contacts with the villages (de Graaf 2004: 50; Muilerman 
2004: 67) and about corrupt behaviour of agents (Feenstra 2005: 88). According 
to EFC officers, the regional consultation structure (cadre de concertation) also 
does not function well. The complaint is that there are too many different 
projects, which are richly funded, whereas their staffs behave arrogantly and 
refuse cooperation.  
With regard to the hunt, hunters must be accompanied by an official guide 
who must see to the observance of the rules. Among local people the hunters 
have a bad reputation: They do not respect the rules, while their guides and local 
drivers do not dare to intervene for fear of losing their jobs, and the EFC is 
understaffed (Boyen 2004: 95). Ndiaye (2003: 11, 14) calls the lease system “in 
principle correct”, but speaks about a lack of respect and control by all the 
partners concerned. Within this context it is interesting to note that Takforyan 
(1994: 62) mentions contradictions between the policy of the DPN and those of 
other governmental organizations. While the DPN regards it as necessary for the 
maintenance of biodiversity within the park to further it also in the periphery of 
the park, the remunerative exploitation of wildlife and forests outside the park is 
in the hands of the EFC. Moreover, the government stimulates the cultivation of 
cash crops (cotton, bananas) in the periphery, which can hardly be reconciled 
with the maintenance of biodiversity. 
With regard to the rural councils, they also have to cope with a serious lack of 
means and specialized knowledge to carry out their tasks in a satisfactory way. In 
several rural municipalities, also in that of Dialokoto, local communities are so 
dissatisfied with the functioning of the council that they refuse to pay the taxes 
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which means a decrease of revenue for the council (Feenstra 2005: 84-85). 
Although project leaders are expected to present their plans to the council, there 
is a general recognition that these projects function too independently of the rural 
council. 
As far as the Sodefitex is concerned, its relationship with the farmers has been 
subject to periodical crises. One of the principal reasons is that the cultivation of 
cotton regularly does not bring the desired rise in financial income, because of 
rising prices for requisites and declining prices for the produce, combined with 
poor harvests as a result of bad weather or insects. Thus, many farmers have 
withdrawn from cotton cultivation by decreasing their cotton area to a minimum 
in order to keep access to Sodefitex’s credit system. Cotton growing is interesting 
only for the relatively wealthy farmers who can sustain the risk of a bad harvest 
and debts.  
Also with regard to the DPN and the EFC local people show mixed feelings. 
On the one hand, the negative effects of the national park and the forest reserve 
on local income generation have been amply explained to the researchers: Reset-
tlement on less fertile soils, ever shifting borders of the buffer zone, enclosure 
between protected areas and consequently a smaller agricultural area, shorter 
fallow and longer cultivation periods, soil degradation and smaller harvests; 
hunting and fishing not options anymore; damage to crops and cattle by wild 
animals without any form of compensation and with heavy sanctions on shooting 
them. On the other hand, it is widely recognized that thanks to governmental 
intervention, flora and fauna within the park still are more diverse and beautiful 
than elsewhere in Senegal and hence have kept their tourist attractiveness. People 
have high expectations of tourism. It is much appreciated that the tourist facilities 
and the hunting camps already bring a number of paid jobs to local people (such 
as hotel personnel, guides, labourers) as well as other economic opportunities 
(such as selling foodstuffs and fruits, souvenirs, cultural entertainment). People 
are also positive about the newly created opportunities in the buffer zone (such as 
the apiculture, the use of guinea fowls and bamboo and the cultivation of ba-
nanas) as well as in the reserve (food crops). Nevertheless, they consider this all 
to be far from sufficient, the more so on account of all the sacrifices they have 
had to make in the past and still have to make. In particular, they severely 
criticize the fact that the higher – and better paid – personnel of the DPN and the 
EFC (staff, park guards and forest agents) as well as those of the hotels are 
recruited from elsewhere in Senegal, mostly from Dakar. 
 
Private initiatives at intentional level 
Student reports make mention of four non-governmental initiatives in nature 
protection, namely the biodiversity project of Wassadou, the PRCNK of 
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Dienoudiala, the PROGEDE, and the ASAN. All these projects have the double 
aim of protecting nature and improving living conditions (or developing new 
economic opportunities). The PROGEDE is by far the largest project. As has 
been said, its second goal is to develop a sustainable exploitation of the remain-
ing forests in Senegal. In order to reduce the pressure on these forests, many 
diverse development activities are promoted: From horticulture to vaccination 
campaigns and to the creation of income-generating activities such as marketing 
poultry and eggs, cattle, honey etc. It also tries to strengthen the knowledge and 
capacities of the rural councils, the EFC and the CERP with regard to the 
sustainable use and management of natural resources. 
Five initiatives in rural development have been mentioned: The CMS, the 
PROMER, the GIEs, the MFR and the APROVAG. With the exception of a 
small number of GIEs, none of these five initiatives seems to have the protection 
of nature and natural resources as an explicit objective. Thus, while the private 
projects for nature conservation explicitly consider rural development as essen-
tial, those for rural development do not explicitly recognize the protection of 
nature and natural resources as necessary for rural development. Here the mes-
sage of an integrated approach has not come through or has been marginalized.  
 
The perceived reality of non-governmental interventions 
When it comes to the reality of the private projects for nature conservation, the 
most remarkable fact undoubtedly is the failure of the Belgian Projet Rôneraies 
(PRCNK). This project was sociologically not well prepared before its start and, 
once in the field, proved to be not flexible enough to cope with the wishes of al-
ready existing organizations, namely the countrywide EFC and the small local 
biodiversity project of Wassadou (Muilerman 2004: 70-72; Feenstra 2005: 77-
81).  
This failure probably could have been prevented if there had been a regional 
forum for coordination and negotiation (Cadre de Concertation). Its absence is 
felt as a serious lack, notably by the EFC, the DPN, the CERP and the PROMER. 
There was a rather general complaint that the international donors often are un-
willing to give up their autonomy (Muilerman 2004: 94; Feenstra 2005: 82; 89). 
Another observation has been that local people, despite a high appreciation of 
the activities of PROGEDE, had accepted its conditions only in name and that in 
practice they continued to secretly cut rôniers and bamboos within the national 
park (Boyen 2004: 107). Often there is a hidden tendency to realize one’s own 
short-term interests first of all, which has undermined several projects (Feenstra 
2005: 81-82).  
With regard to the reality of the private projects for rural development, some 
other problems have been noticed. Although the CMS office in Missirah is said 
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to function well and several projects (PROMER, MFR) make use of its services, 
individual local appeal for micro-credit is still limited. Familial logic does not 
seem to match with that of entrepreneurial management, which is thwarting 
private initiative (Muilerman 2004: 97). 
All private initiatives, with exception of the PRCNK were positively appreci-
ated by many people at the local level. Nevertheless, they did not find it suffi-
cient. In Badi there was a waiting list for the APROVAG. In Wassadou one of 
the GIEs wanted to enlarge its plantation to satisfy the demand for parcels. 
Moreover, all banana plantations were devastated by flooding in September 2003 
which meant the loss of all local investments and another year to work and to 
wait for the first harvest. Also there is always the risk that the pump will break 
down which means severe damage to the plantation, as recently happened to one 
of the GIEs at Wassadou. Lastly, apes and hippos are fond of bananas and cause 
a lot of damage, despite the long hours of guarding. Unfortunately, the cultiva-
tion of bananas in the buffer zone probably is unsustainable and harmful to the 
environment. 
 
Conclusions 
Integration and synergy of conservation and rural development policies presup-
pose at least three conditions: Formal expression in the philosophy and objectives 
of most organizations and projects concerned, sufficient means to realize those 
objectives, as well as a forum for coordination and negotiation in order to elabo-
rate a synergetic cooperation adapted to the specific situation. On the basis of the 
foregoing description and analysis we may formulate three conclusions: 1) that 
the governmental organizations discussed here (DPN, EFC, CR and Sodefitex) 
and all the private projects for nature conservation do recognize this double aim 
of nature conservation and rural development, but that the private projects for 
rural development, with the exception of some GIEs, have not formulated any 
intentions to nature conservation; 2) that these governmental organizations, with 
the exception of Sodefitex, have to cope with such a serious lack of means and 
personnel that they cannot correctly implement their policies, whereas many 
private projects are relatively rich and dispose of much more means; 3) that the 
much-needed forum for coordination and negotiation does not function because, 
according to several important organizations, many private projects are behaving 
in an independent and arrogant way. Thus, conditions for integration and synergy 
are clearly unfavourable.  
Moreover, although the developmental effects of nature conservation seem to 
be appreciated by the majority of the rural people, these effects are generally 
regarded as being far too limited, while the state’s efforts to achieve rural 
development are considered insufficient. In addition to that, the cultivation of 
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cotton and bananas, regarded as basic for rural development, is difficult to recon-
cile with the maintenance of biodiversity. In sum, the desired synergy is 
obviously hardly seen at local level, which means that, so far, it does not work.  
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Introduction 
People’s relationships to land are in Kenya inherently contradictory, conflictive 
and confusing at the same time. Confusion and conflict is part of everyday life. 
Local people, state agencies and the elite alike position themselves differently in 
such conflicts. Whereas in the policy arena much emphasis is given to govern-
ance issues (The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission 2002), social movements such as the Kenya Land Alliance 
(KLA) push for the enactment of relevant legislations to address the ambiguities 
of agrarian policies such as land-grabbing, land quarrels and land related ethnic 
clashes.2 KLA’s main focus is to curtail the practices of political elites that alien-
ated public land for private purposes. The current land tenure policy debate in 
Kenya, however, stresses the solution of problems associated with its political 
system of patronage, rivalry and corruption. It tends to neglect the rather complex 
everyday life of land rights practices at the local level and the kind of conflicts 
that emerge from conflicting interpretations of land arrangements. 
                                                     
1  The authors wish to thank those who commented on earlier drafts of the paper: O. Ayot, H. van Dijk & 
D. Roth. 
2  Land Update. A newsletter of the Kenya Land Alliance, vol. 2, no. 1, January-March 2003, p. 1. 
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Considering and addressing land conflicts and disputes are not easy and 
demand a social analysis that unpacks legal repertoires and goes beyond the view 
that relationships to land are property rights. Conflicts over land are often under-
stood as emerging out of the overlapping of laws uphold by the state and custom-
ary land arrangements of, in this case, the Luo of the Siaya area in Western 
Kenya that mediate people’s relationships and attributes regarding land. Both are 
normative, institutional arrangements that are constructed by actors involved in 
land issues and these repertoires sometimes overlap and sometimes do not. 
Customarily land is the inalienable property of the clan given in usufruct to a 
lineage member and inherited according to lineage membership. Such land tenure 
arrangements have been reshaped over the years by the introduction of private 
land ownership, which dates back to the colonial period, and more specifically to 
the Swynnerton Plan implemented in the 1950s. Rights to access land are since 
then formally registered, the land being adjudicated and title deeds issued 
according to modern state land laws. This certainly has opened doors for the sale 
and the acquisition of land outside the realm of customary arrangements. But if 
the “owner” wishes to sell his land, the consent of the council of village elders is 
still required. These elders cannot be ignored as they are the custodians of 
customary land law. Whereas modern, private land tenure arrangements are 
codified, customary law is not and as this paper argues, rather presents itself as a 
repertoire of land rights and embedded social relationships that are open for 
competing interpretations. 
Von Benda-Beckmann (2002: 39) conceptualizes this social phenomenon as 
the “co-existence of law or legal orders” within a given society. Von Benda-
Beckmann (Ibid: 69) draws attention to the fact that “people are aware of alter-
native normative repertoires and/or procedures in which these can be used. But 
generally the condition of legal pluralism challenges the exclusiveness and self-
evidence of any single normative system. … [I]n the context of legal pluralism, 
different participants and decision-makers may refer to the same law. But they 
often mobilize different legal repertoires against each other”. In other words, co-
existence of legal repertoires thus implies different types of interactions or 
encounters between actors and social practices constituting an arena3 where 
normative repertoires are contested and used as “weapons” in the struggle with 
others over land.  
Custom or the reference to what is supposed to be representing custom, plays a 
key role in the way the conflicts are played out. An interesting observation is the 
                                                     
3  Von Benda-Beckmann (2002: 35) stipulates that there are many possibilities where legal pluralism can 
be studied. Depending on one’s interest it could be a politico-administrative space, structural places 
like households, analytically conceived functional domains, semi-autonomous fields or arenas. The 
notion of “arena” fits the purpose of this paper the best. The notion of arena and processes of 
contestation is also derived from the work of Long (2001) and Arce & Long (2000). 
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one by Channock (1991: 97) about custom. “Custom” he maintains, operates as 
“a weapon in the battle against” others, for instance in the settling of conflicts 
over land. He points out that in this battle “accentuated and narrower version(s) 
of ‘custom’ became a weapon in the hands” of others.4 This paper will show how 
the repertoire by which people identify their relationship(s) to others is indeed 
used as a weapon to defend their specific interests and claims on their rights to 
land. We thus need to explore these repertoires in great detail if only to show 
how such repertoires are constructed and used in the negotiations about land. 
Conflicts over land rights, however, can only partly be explained by custom-
ary rights to land being reshaped and reconstructed by the introduction of 
individualized and privatized property rights to land. Property rights in fact are 
social relationships. Anthropologists have (always) argued that African land 
tenure is not about ownership per se, but instead rights and social obligations 
(Shipton 1994; Chanock 1991; Lund 2002). Rights to land are rather embedded 
rights; embedded in complex social relationships and shaped by obligations, 
reciprocity and shifting alliances between family members. Rights are not fixed, 
but often temporal and subject to negotiation (Odegaard 2002). While mapping 
these conflicts in Luoland, tensions at the level of kinship relations come to the 
fore. These kin quarrels often become part of or are played out during a conflict 
over land. Rights to land, whether embedded in customary or state law, then, do 
not represent one shared and accepted notion, but rather one that is subject to 
various and often conflicting interpretations that hinge on actors’ interests, social 
relationships, gender, status within the community and to which age group one 
belongs.  
The first part of the paper depicts the Luo kinship relationships with reference 
to land allocation and inheritance by drawing upon local people’s accounts of 
kinship and customary rights to land gathered during fieldwork that was carried 
out between 1998 and 2002 in Siaya District in West Kenya. These accounts are 
supplemented by existing ethnographies of scholars (Southall 1952, Wilson 
1961, Ochola-Ayayo 1976, Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo 1989). Such an account 
as argued earlier, needs to be treated with caution as it suggests a shared notion 
of customary law. This article shows indeed that differently placed Luo have 
been construing and reconstructing, using and abusing, the various distinctions 
between tradition, custom, customary law and national legal frameworks. The 
second part takes this further by introducing case material to explore contempo-
rary practices in relation to the complexities of inheritance and acquisition of 
land. Because of the embeddedness of land relations in wider social relations, 
genealogies are ideal to present and order the case material. The case material 
                                                     
4  Ref. Chanock (1991: 67) where he narrates the role of “custom” in the complex process of the 
transformation of labour power into a commodity form eroding the basis of customary kinship. 
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underpins that land laws, whether customary or private, are often conflicting 
narratives or normative repertoires and that land conflicts take place in arenas of 
contestation. What custom is, and who is in a position to frame custom, emerges 
as crucial for understanding land conflicts as much as reciprocity of social obli-
gations is. 
Settlement and kinship relations 
Charles Obudho5 and other old and well-respected men like him in Muhanda 
village in Siaya district insisted that if we wished to capture land rights we 
needed to investigate kinship and the way the Luo have settled over the years. 
Inheritance, he says, “may become confusing if one does not understand kinship 
relationships and the terminology used to describe the relationships of the 
persons involved”. Together they constructed in a few meetings an almost ideal 
typical version of customary rights to land. They began to explain that a (typical) 
Luo homestead (dala) consists of a site where the monogamous or polygamous 
domestic groups build their houses, in the surroundings of which they have their 
fields. The smallest social unit in the homestead is the “household”. A homestead 
consists of at least two generations, that of the father and the mother(s), and their 
offspring. Occasionally, households of brothers of the homestead’s owner also 
reside in the dala, as well as servants and “strangers” (see Figure 3.1). Several 
homesteads make up a gweng and resemble what we now recognize as villages or 
settlements. Residence in a village, as Southall (1952: 27) also noted, is based upon 
kinship – or more specifically people that descend from the same grandfather 
(Jokakwaro) – but also upon alliances developed out of strategic considerations 
(Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo 1989: 14). 
The elementary social relationship is patrifocal, which cements the relation-
ships between father, mother and their children. People refer to this as jokawuoro 
(“people of the same father”) who operate as one corporate group sharing and 
distributing most of the domestic activities. Marriage and inheritance of re-
sources are intertwined and shaped by the normative respect of age (i.e. senior-
ity). Seniority works out such that the eldest son has to marry first, then the 
second eldest, and so on in order of seniority; the same is true of the daughters.6 
                                                     
5  C. Obudho is one of the twelve old men that were selected in the entire district to sit on the District 
Land’s Board chaired by the District Commissioner. He has been on the Siaya District Land’s Board 
for the past thirteen years. We had many and long discussions about his views on Luo customary (land) 
law and social relationships.  
6  Custom dictating social behaviour is of course subject to changes and deviations. During our fieldwork 
we came across a “case” in which a junior son has left his father’s compound before his older brothers 
married. Our informants who brought this to our attention referred to this situation as “jumping the 
seniority principle”. To make things even more complicated, the junior son married several wives and 
had build several but separate houses for them. The elderly informants uttered clear expressions of 
disagreement with such behaviour. 
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When the senior son marries and has children, he is the first to build a new and 
independent homestead.7 When the father dies, the eldest son takes over the 
responsibilities of leadership of the family. An implication of the responsibility 
and prestige of genealogical seniority is that it puts the holder into the primary 
position of first harvesting (dwoko cham), first sowing (golo kodhi), as well as of 
eating specified parts of an animal killed, which are usually the best parts.8 The 
inheritance rights of daughters are limited to before their marriage. When married 
they leave the dala and loose the right to any wealth realized. 
If Luo society were composed only of this line of groupings, the study would 
have been much easier. The complication arises when one considers a polyga-
mous homestead, which is composed of a plurality of matrifocal units 
(jokamiyo). Polygamy shapes the mothers’ marital relationships with a common 
husband. The Luo commonly refer to the relationship between such matrifocal 
units as nyiego. Nyiego means “jealousy” when it refers to the relationship 
between the co-wives, and means “rivalry” when it involves all in a matrifocal 
unit as a group against another, opposing group.9 Jokadayo, “the people of the 
same grandmother” denotes the matrifocal unit that combines a mother and her 
sons in the second generation. At this level, the rivalry and competitive relation-
ships between the co-wives and their sons starts fading.10 The position of the 
grandfather becomes important. 
Beyond the grandmother and grandfather line, at the third and up to the fifth 
generation, the keyo appears as a next organizational form. People descending 
from the same great-grandfather constitute a keyo.11 The elders of the keyo act as 
representatives in disputes between various opposing keyo. They are also inter-
mediaries between younger members and the ancestors and therefore act as foster 
father guardians. They form the first organized council to arbitrate land and 
                                                     
7  The Luo call this “liberation”. They distinguish, however, between two different forms. The first 
liberation is when a woman starts cooking in her own house in the compound of her father-in-law. The 
second liberation is when a man establishes his own homestead. 
8  For the Luo living along the shore of Lake Victoria, it is the senior brother who can first own a fishing 
boat. Since it is he who communicates with the ancestors, he also conducts or leads the sacrifices of 
religiosity regarding the boat. 
9  The nyiego relationship often generates the various kinds of conflicts, competitions, envy, confronta-
tions and even divisions that are so characteristics at various levels of Luo social organization. 
10  The polygamous setting explained above accounts only for the first three wives in a polygamous 
homestead. A further complication occurs if there are more than three wives in a homestead. In the 
basic Luo polygamous homestead, (see Figure 3.1) the house of the senior wife (mikayi) is at the centre 
back. The second wife’s house is at the right-hand side of mikayi to which people refer to as nyachira. 
The third wife (reru) has her house on the left-hand side of mikayi. Women married after the first three 
wives are called nyi-udi, which means the daughters of the house to which they are attached. They also 
stand in juxtaposition and compete with one another. 
11  According to Wilson (1961: 7), a keyo constitutes extended polygamous families tracing descent from 
a common great-grandfather. The point of division is descent from the hut of one of his wives. The 
members of each of them thus constitute sub-groups sharing a common grandfather and are rightly 
called jokakwaro, “people of the same grandfather” (Ochola-Ayayo 1976: 122). 
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boundary disputes between members of their keyo. Social control of the commu-
nity is here exercised partly through the authority of these elders and in the past 
partly and certainly through their control over the means of accumulation. The 
migration of their sons and daughters to towns has changed the role of the elders 
considerably, but when it comes to land the elders still maintain a large degree of 
authority. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Spatial ecology of a Luo homestead 
Source: Sennyonga (1997) 
 
 
A next level in the lineage is the libamba, which involves descendants of a 
common ancestor, usually from four to seven generations back. It is a maximal 
lineage of landholding co-operating agnates and generally considered by anthro-
pologists as the backbone for settlement, household and family formation, and 
social reproduction (see for instance Evans-Pritchard 1965, Southall 1952, Parkin 
1978). Its members characteristically meet often at the keyo level to discuss the 
distribution of land titles, land conflicts and other property disputes. The study of 
Luo economic structure is most conveniently in terms of the operation of the 
libamba units, because these units define maximal frameworks for economic, 
social and political competition. According to Ochola-Ayayo (1976: 121) “the 
Luo sum up in the libamba all those forces of friction and competition, which 
weaken the solidarity of a lineage segment and lead to its further subdivision”. 
Thereafter, the next level is the clan (dhoot). 
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Luo customary land tenure arrangements 
The Luo acquire land rights in several ways. Charles Obudho explains that rights 
to land derive from being a member of the clan. Secondly, the clan also used to 
grant access to land to strangers and also slaves and servants were in the past 
given rights to access land. Finally, roughly since the late 1940s, land can also be 
purchased. Given that the land conflict cases this article explores in detail all deal 
with land that is accessed through customary inheritance arrangements, the 
buying and selling of land is not documented. 
 
Land allocated to clansmen 
The basic right to access land stems from being a member of a tribe in a given 
territory for which lineage or clan members and their ancestors fought, and that is 
“once acquired by conquest” (Wilson 1961: 18). This represents the strongest 
claim to land in Luo territory: Every member of a clan has an inalienable right to 
cultivate a garden within the territory of his grandfather. This right is normative 
because it is associated with lineage membership.12 This is important socially, 
because it provides a sense of security, which springs from living among kins-
folk. It is economically important as well, because a clan member is entitled to 
occupy such land on terms of correct usage without payment, except customary 
dues to land-controlling elders. 
Natural boundaries well define the land that belongs to the clan, and the 
natural landscape of ridges and valleys aids this demarcation. One clan usually 
occupies a ridge or part of a ridge. This now is the area in which a man from that 
clan may expect to obtain a right to cultivate and to raise stock. 
Formally, the land belongs to the head of the homestead. He in his turn 
allocates land to his wife or wives and keeps that part of the field closest to the 
gate for himself. Father’s field is commonly known as the mondo. Before they 
establish their own compounds, sons work on their mothers’ field(s). Below we 
will discuss how sons inherit land. 
 
Land allocated to strangers 
A jadak13 (stranger) is the person who comes to the area of a clan other than his 
own and asks for land. According to Luo tradition, it is difficult to refuse a 
stranger the land he requests to provide for his subsistence. It is this tradition that 
allows people to live among tribes or clans other than their own. Friendship, or 
maternal or affinal connections, qualify one to ask for land which is given in 
usufruct. In any case, the council of elders must approve such a transaction. The 
                                                     
12  According to Luo beliefs, land that was found unoccupied was left as a trap, or smallpox had killed the 
owners. Advance parties of warriors and diviners tested such land. 
13  In Dholuo Jadak is singular, and jodak is the plural form. 
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lands given to a stranger are usually within the territory of the clan. In return, the 
stranger must show solidarity and allegiance to the clan members. The stranger 
and his descendants have no right of inheritance; his children can only renew the 
usufruct right. The length of usufruct is indefinite, and this has led to many 
misunderstandings by the colonial and current government administration, and 
still complicates many land cases today. 
The jodak tradition dates back to the time when a rich man counted his 
security and prestige by the number of followers he could attract to his holding. It 
is fair to say that the Luo encouraged jodak to settle among them and, until 
recently, a jadak was not normally turned out of the land “given” to him, except 
in certain serious situations. According to some informants, the expression chiem 
gi wadu (”eat what you have with your neighbour”) is strongly associated with 
the Luo concept of jadak. If, on the other hand, the clan in which a jadak was a 
squatter was at war with another clan, and he had shown bravery on the battle-
field, upgraded his position to that of landowner. He, after all, had fought for the 
land and had been prepared to sacrifice his life in the same way, as did the 
ancestor of the present member. 
The allocation of land to a jadak was not intended as an economic enterprise 
in a direct way, but as a means to achieve a higher status. The land was being 
valued as a source of wealth and as a means of subsistence, which may raise a 
person into an honorific, higher position. Land distribution was a vehicle for 
prestige and a means of protection. 
 
Land allocated to slaves 
Misumba is the word used to describe a servant or a foundling brought up as a 
foster child, or a slave in the proper sense of the word (Ochola-Ayayo 1976: 
131). Under the first meaning of misumba, the homestead head assigns a child, or 
an adult man, to the house of a migumba as if he were her son. A woman is 
regarded a migumba if she has not had a male child. People expect a misumba to 
fill the social position of a male child in the house of the migumba, as if he were 
that woman’s actual son. In any case, a misumba inherits his foster mother’s 
gardens and livestock, but his position with regard to the inheritance of his foster 
father’s field (mondo) is like that of an illegitimate child. If the foster mother 
gives her misumba cattle to marry a wife, then he is expected to become a mem-
ber of the clan, and his children will be members of this clan. If, however, he 
should one day decide to return to his original clan land, then not only does he 
lose the land, but so do his children and their mother. The children are regarded 
as the legal descendants of the social father, or as an informant put it: “their 
mother’s bride-wealth was clan wealth”. 
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The inheritance of land: Customary rights 
The way a father while still alive allocates land to his sons resembles the ap-
proach to land inheritance. The division of land between brothers or sons in a 
monogamous family is rather simple and straightforward. Land conflicts usually 
arise between nyiego groups. In the case of two or three sons of the same mother, 
the senior son takes the centre portion of the land in the homestead up to and 
beyond the gate or to the buffer zone;14 the other sons then have the remainder of 
the land to divide among themselves. If the land is divided among the elder sons 
after they are married, and they take to living on their lands, it often happens that 
the youngest son remains in the father’s compound to care for him in his old age. 
His inheritance is the mondo and the remaining gardens of his mother (Wilson 
1961: 13, Ochola-Ayayo 1976: 129, Francis 2000). 
In the event of a father’s death, then whoever remarries his wife (indicated as 
jater) is the legal guardian of his fields and his children. A jater may take the 
widow to his village or may live in the village of the deceased. The widow will 
continue to cultivate her deceased husband’s land. The jater may also cultivate 
these lands on a usufruct basis but must vacate them if ordered to do so when the 
sons of the deceased have married and established their own homesteads. In most 
cases, a jater is a classificatory father to the children, and he will fulfil his obli-
gations to the latter according to custom. Should a jater be a stranger, then it is 
the duty of the clan elders of the dead man’s lineage to watch him closely and see 
to it that the sons get the land of the deceased. The jater, whether relative or 
stranger, has no permanent right whatsoever to any of the dead man’s property; 
nor have the leviratic children (children born of the jater), unless there is no male 
heir. Once the eldest son has built his homestead, it becomes his duty to set up 
homesteads for his junior brothers. He should divide the land equally; or else the 
junior brothers may seek redress from the council of elders. 
The right of inheritance also depends on the presence of ancestral graves on 
the land (Shipton 1992: 377). Furthermore, if the ancestors conquered the land, a 
descendant can lay extra strong claims to it (Ogot 1967: 222). Land is inherited 
only through patrilineal relationships. A sole survivor of the grandfathers would 
then inherit all the grandfathers’ land. A brother only inherits land belonging to a 
full brother if the latter does not have a male descendant. The eldest of the group 
of brothers is the temporary owner of the father’s entire land, and acts as arbitra-
tor in disputes between the younger brothers. Younger brothers can appeal to the 
council of elders. A man can only inherit land belonging to a paternal uncle if the 
uncle does not leave a son, or full or half-brothers. The unwritten rule of inheri-
tance by the nearest agnatic kinsman operates throughout the clan, that is, if no 
                                                     
14  A buffer zone is open land between family lands. Nowadays, because of population pressure, buffer 
zones no longer exist. They have been allocated to homesteads for use. 
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heirs can be found from the father, grandfathers or great-grandfathers, then the 
nearest male relative to the deceased within his clan inherits. The sons, when 
they marry, share their mother’s land. A mother usually gives her sons part of her 
garden at that time, but unmarried sons inherit those fields remaining at their 
mother’s death.  
In the event that a man dies without a male heir, then his land reverts to his 
father or nearest agnatic kinsman, except that portion allocated to his wife or 
wives provided they remain within the lineage of the deceased. In the case of a 
man dying without a son and his wife having been unable to provide a male child 
through another relationship, she may “remarry” a girl, usually from her own 
clan, with the cattle of her dead husband or with her own cattle. She then calls a 
close agnatic kinsman of her deceased husband to cohabit with this girl to serve 
as genitor. Children of this union are the legal sons of the deceased husband, and 
they will inherit his remaining wealth: Land, cattle and other personal properties. 
This form of marriage is what anthropologists call “ghost marriage” (Ocholla-
Ayayo 1976: 131). 
 
Inheritance of land in a polygamous setting 
In polygamous settings, the land is divided along the same lines, except that, 
within the village, the sons claim the area contiguous to the houses of their 
mothers. Each wife and her sons constitute a group with similar rights as a son of 
a sole wife: Children of the senior wife are given that portion of the total area that 
would have been given to the senior son in a monogamous family. The sons of 
the second and third wives lay claim to those portions that would have fallen to 
the second and third sons, respectively, in a monogamous situation. 
There is, however, a further complicating factor and that concerns situations 
where there are more than three co-wives (perceived as attached daughters). 
These co-wives are attached to the first three sets. The sons of the senior wife 
inherit as a group with the sons of daughters attached to the senior wife; sons of 
daughters attached to the second wife and the sons of daughters attached to the 
third wife will also inherit as groups with the sons of the second and third wives 
respectively. 
Kinship and land inheritance in practice 
Let us now examine how kinship and land inheritance work out in the practice of 
everyday life in the Siaya region of Luoland. Issues of land allocation and 
inheritance have become much more conflictual and complex as land became 
scarce due to increased population. Land use has intensified over the years 
leaving little opportunities to fallow land to restore soil fertility.15 The room for 
                                                     
15  See for a detailed account of land use changes, Mango (2002), Chapter 2. 
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manoeuvre for allocating and dividing land according to Luo customs among 
clan members, or for allocating land in usufruct to strangers and slaves, has been 
substantially limited over the years and is virtually absent nowadays. Moreover, 
the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan from the mid 1950s onwards partly 
restyled Luo land tenure arrangements. This Swynnerton Plan laid the political 
groundwork for a state policy to privatize land tenure in Kenya (Hebinck 1990: 
59 ff.). Practically all the land is now adjudicated and registered, and subse-
quently title deeds have been issued. This opened doors for the buying and 
selling of land. However, private land tenure has continued to operate concur-
rently with Luo customary law, whereby Luo elders still have to quell land 
disputes among their people. Where there is no conflict over land, people have 
been able to buy and sell land on an individual basis. Jodak and misumba have 
been able in this way to get land as long as they could afford to buy it from a 
willing seller. As we shall see in the cases presented below, the legal and written 
evidence that a piece of land belongs to a certain person stirred intra-lineage and 
intra-household conflicts. Privatization of land implies a breakaway from the 
situation where land is collectively owned by the lineage under the authority of 
its leaders. While in the recent past, Luo elders would act as judges in the case of 
land disputes and settle them, their role is now minimized and increasingly been 
taken over by the government’s magistrates’ courts and district land tribunals. 
The cases presented below aim to elaborate on such conflicts. They were 
chosen in such a way that the different ways by which land customarily may be 
inherited and allocated are represented. The cases show local legal pluralism at 
work: Customary and private land tenure systems interface and are embedded in 
day-to-day quarrels about social obligations. 
 
Case 1 
The situation of Oketch Bundmawi and Oduor Lomo with regard to land illumi-
nates the complex nature of land quarrels. They are brothers and have the same 
father, Ogonji, and are married with children. Despite Luo customary land 
arrangements, neither has yet managed to inherit land from their father. Their 
elder brother, Abednego, currently holds all the title deeds of the land of their 
grandfather, Olum (see Figure 3.2). Oketch for the moment cultivates the land of 
his deceased uncle, Agina, where he has also established his own homestead. 
Lomo, as the youngest son, according to the custom should have inherited the 
mondo and the homestead of his father, Ogonji. However, Abednego cultivates 
the largest portion of his father’s land and he has established his homestead on 
his father’s mondo, thus dashing Lomo’s hopes of inheriting the mondo. Their 
mother retains another portion of the land. According to Luo customary law, his 
mothers’ field should go to Lomo after her death. Lomo currently works on 
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another part of his mother’s field and a small portion of the land of his paternal 
uncle, Odongo. 
To fully explore the many dimensions of this particular conflict we need to go 
back to the brothers’ grandfather, Olum. The origin of the conflict can partly be 
traced back to him and his eighth wife, Adungairo, who was a seer and a witch 
doctor. Olum had three sons from his seventh wife: Ogonji, Agina and Odongo. 
His only remaining son, Odongo, has a hearing problem due to his old age and 
does not say much about his father. When asked about Olum, his grandson, 
Abednego, mentioned that he was a well-known farmer who had come to 
Muhanda at more or less the same time as the British arrived in Luo land. He had 
six other wives in his original village some ten kilometres from Muhanda. 
Olum’s family also belongs to a lineage of the real landowners, the Gem people 
who conquered Muhanda village (from the Abaluhya) before the establishment of 
colonial rule. 
 
 
 
Ogonji
Lomo
Olum
Oketch
Abednego 
Agina Odongo
Lived in another village
Okumu
marriagemalefemale deceased
Figure 3.2 The descendants of Olum 
 
 
Olum came to Muhanda with his seventh wife who died in 1934, after which 
he married Adungairo. This marriage did not produce any children. People 
believe that she was possessed with evil spirits who did not allow her to have 
children, but because she had healing powers, she made Olum rich, as people 
brought her many cattle and goats. At the time of his death, he was a famous and 
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a wealthy person.16 People also believed that Adungairo bewitched Olum’s sons, 
as they experienced marriage problems. 
To escape the witchcraft, they went to the Rift Valley to find work on white 
settler farms. Odongo did not stay for long and came back home almost immedi-
ately after his father’s death to settle into farming. He got married and had a 
daughter. His wife died soon after that and he never remarried. Agina married in 
town and did not return to the village. He died in town and his wife did not live 
long afterwards. Their son, Okumu, is now a high-ranking railway functionary in 
Nairobi. He married in Nairobi and never visited his father’s village. 
Ogonji was Olum’s first-born son. When Olum died, Ogonji worked in Kitale 
as a mechanic for the Hughes Company. He married and had three sons and a 
daughter. These sons are Abednego Ochieng, Oketch Bundmawi and Oduor 
Lomo. The daughter is married and lives in Seme. Since Ogonji married rather 
late, he fathered his children when he was at an advanced age. He retired in 1970, 
returned home, and died in 1979. 
The land tenure and inheritance arrangement in the Ogonji family is that of 
people descended from the same grandfather (jokakwaro). When Olum died, he 
had allocated land to his three sons. The records of the District Land Register in 
Siaya indeed specify that the title of plot no. MN 426 (7.5 acres; 3.0 hectare) is 
vested in Ogonji, that of plot no. MN 423 (6.5 acres; 2.6 hectare) is on Agina’s 
name, and plot no. MN 424 (5.5 acres; 2.2 hectare) is registered in Odongo’s 
name. 
Abednego, being Ogonji’s eldest son, customarily holds the title deeds for all 
three plots. This is because his uncle Odongo is now old, has no heirs and is 
depending on Abednego and his wife for his daily subsistence. Odongo officially 
has a say over all the title deeds, but has given them to Abednego for safekeep-
ing. To complicate things even further, Abednego is also cultivating his father’s 
plot (mondo). Oketch and Lomo are not happy with this situation at all. They feel 
that they should get their share. One day when the issue came up, Odongo made 
clear to them that “you can subdivide your father’s plot among yourselves. I will 
retain Agina’s plot because he was my brother and I will also retain mine. 
Furthermore I can still marry and get a boy child who can be heir to my plot”. 
This scared Ogonji’s sons. Their mother advised them to suspend their quarrel 
for the time being. They fear they will lose these plots – the more so, because 
Odongo has the right to sell his own and Agina’s plots. So they do not want to 
annoy him or else they will lose the land. 
                                                     
16  After Olum’s death, Adungairo left and remarried somewhere else. Her wealth followed her. In 
Luoland it is believed that when a rich person dies or leaves an area, whatever wealth he or she leaves 
behind disintegrates.  
 
52 Hebinck & Mango 
The reason why Abednego is holding on to the title deeds and not allocating 
them to his younger brothers is a combination of how authority is exercised and 
of not complying with expected patterns of behaviour, such as mutual help in 
return for assistance later. When Ogonji died, Abednego shouldered his respon-
sibility as senior brother and paid for his younger brothers’ education up to 
secondary school level. Furthermore, he says, “I paid bride-wealth for my 
brother Oketch when he married”. When they later got jobs, he demanded assis-
tance from them to help him pay school fees for his children. Both refused to 
help him out. Abednego is not happy with them, given that he expended re-
sources on them that he could have used to improve himself. 
On the other hand, Lomo and Oketch argue that they do not like the way 
Abednego exercised his authority as the senior brother. When they returned home 
from working in town, neither had yet established own homesteads. Abednego 
made them eat in his house, while their wives had to eat in their mother-in-law’s 
house. Abednego’s objective clearly was to draw labour from his younger brothers 
and to make them work in his fields; but, when the harvest was brought in, he 
barely shared it with his brothers. Abednego defends himself by arguing that he was 
using his position as eldest brother to unite the family. Lomo was not happy with 
the situation and liberated himself unofficially by 1994, when he ordered his wife to 
start cooking in her own house. Lomo thus violated the Luo custom of seniority. 
Being the last born, he should have been the last one to be liberated. Oketch also 
followed with his wife. Lomo then requested to be given his own plot so that he 
could engage in serious farming without being controlled by Abednego, but his 
mother refused. She told him outright that Abednego is everything in their family. 
Lomo is only allowed to farm part of his father’s land and his uncle Odongo’s land 
temporarily. 
The conflict, as it now stands, partly involves people of the same father 
(jokawuoro) but has the potential of also involving people of the same grand-
father (jokakwaro). Okumu, who can claim the land of his father, Agina, will not 
be a serious contender however. Oketch, who now lives and works on Agina’s 
land, is convinced of this: 
My cousin is a very irresponsible man. When my uncle Agina grew very old, he did not take 
care of him. When he died, he did not even come home to bury him. When his own mother 
died, he never came back home. This means he delinked himself from us. We can only give 
him a small portion of this plot.  
The situation will become more complex if descendants of Olum who are still 
in his original village show up and claim the land. This is because Olum’s fourth 
wife and seventh wife are daughters attached to the first wife’s house (Nyiudi) 
and their sons inherit as one group with the sons of the first wife. Customarily, 
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they are entitled to claim the land of Agina and Odongo, as it is part of the land 
belonging to Olum, their father. 
 
Case 2 
This case is about Martin and his struggle for land. It involves genealogically the 
Ogonda (I) family (see Figure 3.3) who are descendants from a jadak. The case is 
further compounded by the fact that the son of Ogonda (I), Obudho, had several 
wives, and this stirred rivalry when it came to land allocation. As a result, one of 
Obudho’s sons, who at that time worked in Uganda, missed land. He remained 
landless until he died. The problem now is that his remaining three sons, among 
whom Martin, are landless. Martin only has access to the land he is working on 
by virtue of being “people of the same grandfather”. His other two brothers have 
migrated to town to seek casual employment. Martin and his brothers are seen as 
squatters and not entitled to title deeds. Their future will be based on their ability 
to acquire land through purchase. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 The descendants of Ogonda I 
 
 
The Ogonda (I) family lives in Luero village. Ogonda (I) founded this village 
a long time after the region had been conquered by the Luo, who, however, had 
left the place unoccupied until then. Before Ogonda (I)’s arrival, it was used as 
grazing land for livestock. This pastureland was allocated to Ogonda (I) in the 
jadak relationship by his brother in-law who was married to his sister. His 
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brother in-law belonged to the Kalanyo clan and Ogonda (I) belonged to the 
Kathomo clan. Luero was then still grazing land. One of Ogonda’s sons was 
Obudho who married nine wives. He had two sons with his sixth wife, Abigail. 
The first son to Abigail is Jeconia Ogonda (II) and the other, John Ambajo. 
Ogonda (II) had two wives. The first wife gave birth to two sons of whom Martin 
is the eldest. The second wife also had two sons. 
Martin lost his mother in 1965 when he was eight years old. When his father 
completed his primary education, he found work in Mulago National Hospital in 
Uganda. He came back to Kenya in 1971 on a transfer to work in Kenyatta 
National Hospital in Nairobi. While in Uganda, he married a second wife who is 
now a tailor in Kakamega. Martin does not have land himself. He has only access 
to his uncle’s (John Ambajo) land. When the land was subdivided, his father was 
in Uganda. Since his grandfather had many wives, there was stiff competition for 
land because of the nyiego (rivalry) relationships between the co-wives. As a 
result, his father was not given land simply because, when he was summoned to 
come back for the land allocation, he never turned up. His step uncle, Adero (son 
to Obudho’s first wife, Okwatch, Abigail’s sister), allocated the land to his pater-
nal uncle, John Ambajo. This is the land on which Martin is now living and 
which contains Obudho’s second homestead. Most of Martin’s step-grandmoth-
ers’ graves are in that homestead, as well as that of his father and mother. John 
Ambajo, whose name is registered on that land (plot no. L723 at the District 
Land Registrar’s office in Siaya), lives in Nairobi and rarely visits the village. He 
is separated from his wife, and his two sons still live with their mother. Martin 
lives in his grandfather’s homestead. His father, however, never managed to 
establish a homestead of his own. Martin still lives with his grandmother, who is 
about 100 years old, in Obudho’s homestead. Martin built his hut behind his 
grandmother’s house in accordance with the Luo customs. Martin is married and 
has one son, Ogonda (III). 
Martin has only usufruct rights to the land in Luero village because he is a 
member of jokakwaro. Most likely, after the death of his grandmother, his uncle 
may ask him to look for land to purchase somewhere else. He does not know his 
fate as far as land allocation is concerned,  
I hope my cousins will understand and give me a place to put up a homestead. The field 
where I planted maize belongs to my paternal uncle, John Ambajo. If I fail to get land here, I 
will have to look for land in another village and buy. However, this will only happen after 
the death of my grandmother. 
The complexity is heightened by the fact that, customarily, Martin has the 
right to use the land of his grandfather because his grandmother is still alive and 
he has the right to use her gardens. Moreover, the homestead where they are 
living contains the graves of his mother and father. The migration of Ambajo to 
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town with his sons has enabled him to cultivate part of Ambajo’s land, but only 
under the conditions of usufruct rights.  
 
Case 3 
This case also involves a jadak who came to live in Muhoho village among his 
maternal uncles. The man who came to this village was Opiyo Naki. The conflict 
we will discuss involves brothers from the same mother. The appellant is the 
biological son and the defendant is a social son. 
Opiyo belonged to the Isuha clan and came to Muhoho as jadak. He had two 
wives. The first wife had two sons: Okelo Naki and Otieno Naki (see Figure 3.4). 
The second wife had two sons and two daughters. Opiyo lived from 1890 to 
1939. Before his death, he had allocated both his wives parcels of land. Accord-
ing to Luo land tenure arrangements, the sons were to inherit their mother’s land. 
However, after Opiyo’s death, his eldest wife was married by one of his relatives 
(jater) called Agulu. Agulu shares the same grandfather as Opiyo, but they have 
different fathers. He only came to Muhoho to inherit Opiyo’s wife and went back 
to his village some 60 kilometres from Muhoho. Opiyo’s eldest wife produced a 
son with this man. According to Luo custom, the son, Oluoch Agulu, is a bona 
fide son of Opiyo, rather than of the man who remarried his mother (jater). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 The descendants of Opiyo Naki 
 
 
Oluoch Agulu, born in 1945, does not have land of his own. In this village 
they are strangers and were not allocated a large piece of land. His brothers, 
Okelo Naki and Otieno Naki, tried their best and assisted in his education up to 
college level. He graduated as a primary school teacher in 1966. Oluoch Agulu 
married two wives. He had three sons and two daughters with the first wife. 
 
56 Hebinck & Mango 
However, they were not happily married and so they divorced. He then married 
the second wife, Pamela, with whom he has two sons and one daughter. Oluoch 
is a retired primary school teacher. 
When we visited Otieno for the first time, we wandered over the plots he was 
farming. This did not please Otieno. One day, Otieno met one of us alone and 
started quarrelling about why we were trespassing on his field without his 
knowledge. When we checked the land register in Siaya town, only the names of 
Oluoch’s two brothers and his stepmother are registered as owners. Plot no. MH 
734 is in the name of Okelo (Opiyo Naki’s eldest son) and plot no. MH 736 is in 
the name of Otieno Naki. The plot covers Oluoch’s homestead and the fields he 
cultivates. Plot no. MH 735 is registered in the name of their stepmother. Earlier 
on, another informant mentioned to us, however, that Oluoch is not a real son to 
Opiyo, even though he had established his homestead on Opiyo’s mondo. We 
were told that he did this on his mother’s instructions. Throughout our conversa-
tions with Oluoch and his wife Pamela, they did not at all mention the biological 
father. In any case, Oluoch now calls himself Charles Oluoch Agulu Naki, which 
is in fact a combination of the names of his biological and social father. 
In 1995, Otieno took this case to the council of elders of Muhoho village and 
some elders from their original village. The case was decided in favour of 
Oluoch. Based on Luo customary law, he is the son of the deceased. The ruling 
did not convince Otieno, and he decided to take the case to the High Court of 
Kenya in Kisumu. The case underwent several hearings and was still pending in 
court by the end of the research, following the death of the magistrate who was 
handling it. A new magistrate now has to take it up. Most villagers who know of 
the case argue that Otieno cannot win because Oluoch is his brother. 
This case shows the complications that arise out of confrontations between 
jadak-based land allocations and private land tenure arrangements. Oluoch Agulu 
refers to customary law to lodge his “rightful” claim on the land because he is a 
son to his father. Otieno, for his part, is resorting to private land tenure arrange-
ments to secure his case and hopes that the court will rule in his favour. Mean-
while, because of this land issue and some other family-related problems, Oluoch 
Agulu and Pamela became active members of the Anglican Church and claim to 
live according to Christian norms and values. Pamela one day made the follow-
ing remark: “somehow I get peace in salvation. Christianity is my strength”. 
Conclusion 
This article has shown that land appears to mean more than property as often is 
assumed. Land has different meanings and is not just a resource that is required 
for productive purposes. A whole complex and dynamic set of social relation-
ships is built around land, tying people together and defining their relations vis-à-
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vis each other. Over the years, and largely still, the key normative principle has 
been that one can gain and maintain access to land by membership of a clan. 
Rights of individuals are not thought sacrosanct; rather, they interlock with the 
rights of others, and overlap with those of families, their members and wider 
groups. A place on the landscape implies a place in a kin group, and vice versa. 
Patrilineality, virilocal residence and the subdivision of holdings devolving from 
one generation to the next remain the socially defined norms in Luo country. The 
multiple meaning of land and the intrinsic complexities and conflictive nature of 
Luo land tenure arrangements are often misunderstood. 
Having said this, one cannot escape the lessons of the cases presented. The 
first case shows that land inheritance is clouded by relationships between mem-
bers of the same kin group or family. This particular conflict is not necessarily 
about customary land law and rights, but about actors using and constructing 
elements of that law strategically to position them in the conflict. The second 
case of Martin is quite clear, as each party understands its obligations. The two 
operating land tenure arrangements do not interfere with each other. Customarily, 
Martin has the right to be on his uncle’s land where he resides at the moment, but 
his identity as a stranger confines him to just that and he will never be able to 
acquire more land. His dreams of becoming a farmer through investing in peren-
nial crops and soil fertility management will only materialize if he is able to 
acquire land privately. Martin, like Lomo from the first case, represents the 
numerous members of the younger generation who have developed a more 
individualistic attitude, and who are eager to get their own title deeds, since this 
would enable them to make their own plans, without having to accept the author-
ity of an elder, a father or an older brother. However, in conflict situations, the 
owner of the homestead, in most cases the one holding the title deeds, tends to 
hold on to these deeds as long as possible to maintain his authority. In many 
cases, this hampers the construction of a proper inheritance arrangement, which 
could mean the continuation of the quarrel between sons after the death of the 
father. In the “old” days, the eldest son succeeded his father as the head of the 
homestead. In more recent times however, younger brothers often question and 
challenge his seniority position. The absence of title deeds is felt as impeding one 
from acquiring a loan that would enable investment in agricultural production, in 
other economic activities, or in marrying other women. Obtaining title deeds, 
either through the private property or the customary route, offers new opportuni-
ties. 
The third case shows the role played by customary and private land tenure 
arrangements. Each party in the conflict reverts to the tenure arrangement that 
fits their particular interest, and engages in strategic positioning. Such cases 
generate the kind of conflicts and confusions about land and inheritance with 
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which Kenya as a nation, with its recent politically and ethnically induced land 
conflicts, is grappling. In the absence of an integrated land policy, the unresolved 
issue of land tenure persists. 
The paper has also shown inter alia that women do not normally inherit culti-
vation rights but acquire them mainly through marriage. Women’s rights are only 
ancillary, depending on allocations from their husbands. Their position regarding 
land can also be seen from the angle of matrilineal relationships in a patrilineal 
society. Women are the ones who work the land most of the time, and obtain 
rights in their post-marital homesteads by devolution from their mothers-in-law. 
The argument developed in this paper is that it is too simple to explain land 
conflicts only with reference to situations as evolving around overlapping 
customary and private land tenure arrangements shaping the way the Luo deal 
with land, understand land issues and resolve conflicts over land. In more 
theoretical terms this paper has underlined the usefulness of legal pluralism as an 
approach to research situations constituted by co-existing normative legal reper-
toires. Claims on land are subject to various, competing interpretations of 
customary and state law that often result from and lead to embroiled relationships 
between family and/or clan members. But as this article has shown, there is a 
need to go beyond legal pluralism and emphasize the wider set of social relation-
ships people are embedded in. Rights to land have to be seen in relation to other 
social relationships (seniority, kinship) with their associated rights and obliga-
tions. Land conflicts thus take place in arenas of contestation wherein people 
position and reposition themselves continuously in their understanding and 
(re)construction of the existing customary and modern, private laws with regard 
to land. The metaphor of “forum shopping” as a social practice, borrowed from 
von Benda-Beckmann (1981), seems to do justice to an attempt to characterize 
the land rights arena. People literally shop between the various kinship and legal 
repertoires and actively (re)construct them in situations of conflict. In contempo-
rary Luoland, legal shopping manifests itself in the socially constructed tension 
between collective/customary versus individual/modern. Differently placed Luo, 
both in terms of membership of social categories and in terms of their immediate 
social circumstances, have been construing and reconstructing, using and 
abusing, the various distinctions between tradition, custom, customary law, and 
national legal frameworks for as long as these have been around. The challenge 
for any advocacy group and government to address seriously local level land 
conflicts is the question to adhere to which legal repertoire of (customary and 
private) law and find ways for relating to conflicts at the level of social relation-
ships. 
Meanwhile, people tend to organize their daily lives by doing their own thing. 
Kinship principles and customary arrangements and obligations are not dead but 
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subject to reinterpretation and negotiation. Despite the fact that nobody talks 
about them, kinship-defined social relations and customs still act as a go-between 
the tensions of contemporary, everyday Luo life.  
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Introduction 
Mahmoudou Traoré has been working in gold mines in Burkina Faso for many 
years. He explains: “Gold mining is like an addiction. Even if you want to quit, 
you cannot. Many who come to the gold mines for the first time have a specific 
goal, like earning enough cash for a moped, a cow or a corrugated iron roof. But 
once in the mines, they forget about their goal. In the mines, you can earn more 
money in one day than during a whole season of strenuous farm work. So you 
spend your money for alcohol, meat, cigarettes and clothes until it’s gone, and 
you have to start again” (interview 8.3.2001). In fact, many gold diggers admit 
that they stay in the mining camps “despite themselves”. The main reason for 
staying is the experience or the hope of being one of the lucky few.1 
Mining camps all over the world are predominantly male worlds in which 
money is “frivolously squandered”, as one observer put it (Biersack 1999: 68). 
Some authors have interpreted these “irrational” ways of spending money in 
mining camps as a response to modernization.2 My article questions this 
                                                     
1  Cf. Znoj (1998: 202) about gold mines in Sumatra: “There are a few tales of success ... But there are 
many more tales of those who were ‘fixed in enchantment in the mines’ ... and never struck the vein 
that would lift them, even temporarily, into luxury”. For the equation of mining and drug addiction see 
also Maennling (1996: 383). 
2  Similar processes took place in Europe during the industrialization. By contemporary bourgeois ob-
servers, the alcohol consumption of the lower classes in 18th century London was judged irrational. 
 
 Consumption and redistribution in mining camps in Burkina Faso 61 
assumption and highlights the role of consumption as a means of engendering 
social coherence in the mining camps. Drawing on some recent empirical studies 
about non-industrial mining including my own,3 I will point out how consump-
tion serves to create and maintain a “moral economy of mining”. 
Not only in Burkina Faso, but in several developing countries there have 
recently been discoveries of gold, diamonds, or other important mineral re-
sources. These discoveries have led to “gold rush” phenomena that are reminis-
cent of 19th century California.4 Although anthropologists and sociologists study 
these phenomena, there have yet been few attempts to relate findings about 
particular localities to research about other regions or continents, or, as two 
authors recently put it: “... studies of mining have been persistently parochial and 
regional in their scope” (Ballard and Banks 2003: 287).5 This neglect of 
comparison is striking, especially since there are so many similarities. This 
paper, therefore, aims at comparing some features of non-industrial mining in 
some African countries with case studies from Latin America, South-East Asia 
and Oceania. I am focussing on one particular aspect: The peculiar ways of 
spending money in the mining camps. 
Common features of non-industrial mining 
Let me briefly outline some general characteristics of non-industrial mining. 
According to a World Bank publication, “informal” or “artisanal” mining con-
stitutes “the most primitive type of mining, characterized by individuals or 
groups exploiting deposits … with the simplest equipment” and is regarded as a 
response to poverty (Barry 1996: 1). However, on an assumed scale non-indus-
trial mining can vary between a seasonal, artisanal activity by farmers on one end 
and a semi-mechanized business that involves tens or even hundreds of thou-
sands of people, many of whom consider themselves “professionals”, on the 
other end. Whether it is “informal” depends on the degree of intervention by the 
nation-state that may range from benign neglect to tight control, including, for 
instance, the expulsion of non-nationals from mining areas. 
                                                     
 
The historian H. Medick (1982) concluded that these drinking patterns expressed both a new desire for 
distinction and a kind of surrogate commensality that replaced pre-industrial patterns of social life. 
3  This article is based on several field trips to Burkina Faso between 1997 and 2001 under the auspices 
of the Special Research Project 268 “Kulturentwicklung und Sprachgeschichte im Naturraum 
Westafrikanische Savanne”, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main. 
4  There are also “rushes” to other new resources, as for instance land that was formerly covered by Lake 
Chad in north-eastern Nigeria. Not only fishermen and farmers, but the whole panoply of providers of 
goods and services from all over Nigeria and the neighbouring countries are attracted to this area 
(Freyer 2001, Kirscht & Krings 2003, Krings 1998, Platte 2000). 
5  The article by Ballard & Banks (2003) focuses explicitly on the Asia-Pacific area, and on English-
language material. 
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The discovery of mineral resources can initiate the immigration of tens of 
thousands of people into one area in a very short time. Especially in the initial, 
dynamic phase, fortune seekers may appropriate claims by force. Sometimes, this 
has led to violent attacks and even massacres of local populations as in the well-
documented case of the Yanomami in northern Brazil (MacMillan 1995: 48). 
Although this was an extreme case, desperadoes are in fact attracted by 
discoveries of mineral resources. In a gold mine in Burkina Faso, a small group 
of criminals terrorized the mining camp for about two months after it had been 
established in 1998. Eventually a military unit was sent in, and four men were 
shot (Werthmann 2000: 94). After this incident (which was reported by Amnesty 
International as a case of extrajudicial execution), life in the camp became more 
peaceful. 
In spite of the proverbial “lawlessness” in mining camps, there are certain 
hierarchies and rules. These rules are sometimes based on social structures and 
norms of the original communities of the immigrants, as for instance in Papua 
New Guinea: 
At first glance, Mt. Kare seems to epitomize the popular conception of a gold rush as a 
chaotic free-for-all in which people will endure any privation for the chance to make a 
fortune. ... Miners suffered from sickness, drank, gambled, brawled, and stole, and groups 
fought pitched battles. Yet, paradoxically, there was an orderliness on the gold fields that 
impressed observers ... . This stability stemmed not from the embryonic government 
presence but rather from the traditional law that regulated life in the miners’ home 
communities. (Vail 1995: 356) 
Mining camps in Burkina Faso – like elsewhere – have been commonly 
perceived as “a collection of strangers rather than a community of kinsmen, 
friends and neighbors” (Douglass 1998: 100). A closer look, however, reveals 
that many of its temporary inhabitants have known each other for years. Even 
people in positions that are structurally opposed to each other, such as represen-
tatives of the state authorities and black market traders, will reminisce about 
times they spent together in previous mining camps, or swap news and gossip 
about common acquaintances. 
In some extremely remote areas or war zones, where state control is weak, 
powerful individuals may establish a mining camp as a “state within a state”, as 
for instance in the former Zaïre. Tshonda (2000) described how Big Men in Zaïre 
established diamond mining camps as “fiefdoms” that resembled miniature 
versions of the Mobutu state. Access was controlled by “brigadiers” who guarded 
the main gate and who issued “residence permits” to traders after a kind of 
customs duties had been paid (Tshonda 2000: 107). The mining camps were 
subdivided in sections, each headed by a “chief”. In the middle of the camp a 
tower of 5 to 8 m height was erected from which the “minister of information” 
made daily announces about work regulations, collective activities, or offenses 
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and punishments (Tshonda 2000: 108). These “fiefdoms” resemble the “closed 
garimpos” in Brazil (Cleary 1990: 69-72, Rodriguez Larreta 2002: 23). 
In Burkina Faso, there are no “closed” mining camps. Nevertheless, one man 
in a gold mine in Burkina Faso attained a leading position by creating a “system 
of personal power” (Médard 1992: 174) that resembled Sahlins’s classic model 
of the Big Man in Melanesia. Although he was elected to represent the gold 
diggers vis-à-vis the state authorities and local communities, his leadership rested 
not so much on a formal vote as on wealth, violence, and charisma, and he was 
definitely more powerful than the state representatives in the camp (Werthmann 
2003b). 
Workers and bosses 
The organization of work varies according to the type of mineral deposit. 
Whereas alluvial (or placer) gold, for instance, can be worked individually or in 
small teams by washing, panning or shallow-pit surface mining, lode (or reef) 
gold requires deep shaft mining. Where mining is mainly a seasonal activity that 
supplements agricultural production, teams may consist of men and women from 
the same family or kin group who share the proceeds among themselves 
(Maennling 1996: 225, Vail 1995: 347). In full-blown mines that attract tens of 
thousands of people, teams are not necessarily recruited according to ethnic or 
regional origin and can comprise of 30 or more workers (Cleary 1990: 106, 144-
146, Kivilu 2000: 134, Werthmann 2003a: 160). 
Many gold diggers or diamond divers do not receive salaries or wages, but a 
part of the raw material. Both possibilities may also co-exist. In eastern Brazil, 
gold diggers can choose between a daily wage or a percentage of the gold. The 
first option is “ideal for those who do not wish to make a long term commitment 
to garimpagem [mining], and want a guaranteed sum, which they can calculate in 
advance” (Cleary 1990: 84), whereas the second option allows for striking it 
rich.6 
In some gold mines in Brazil as well as in West Africa, the extracted ore is 
equally divided between the crew and the pit owner. For the most part these pit 
owners claim the most valuable pieces of ore for themselves, citing the overhead 
costs of running the mine to justify their larger share. Nevertheless, these pit 
owners do not constitute a “dominant class”. Due to the unpredictability of 
chances and risks, workers can quickly become bosses and vice versa. Since 
everybody knows that a “rags to riches”-career is easily reversed, many pit 
                                                     
6  There is a social differentiation between diaristas (wage workers) and porcentistas, as the former tend 
to work in the mines only seasonally and only in order to supplement their agricultural production, 
whereas the latter tend to be professional miners who “regard the daily wage with contempt” (Cleary 
1990: 86). 
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owners refrain from abusing their temporary power, although there are of course 
some well-known “bad” bosses. A good boss will see to his crew’s needs and 
tolerate minor cases of ore pilfering. The crew, on the other hand, will endure a 
lean period provided the boss will compensate them later. However, the 
transgression of certain limits will lead to the boycott of a pit owner or the 
sacking of a worker respectively (Cleary 1990: 108-109, Grätz 2003a: 200-201, 
Rodriguez Larreta 2002: 54, 80, Werthmann 2003a: 174-175, Znoj 1998: 203). 
There is, however, one category of thieves who will not go unpunished. Cleary 
noted in eastern Brazil that entering and working the pit of another man in his 
absence was considered “the most heinous sin, short of outright murder, that a 
garimpeiro [miner] can commit” (Cleary 1990: 59). In Burkina Faso, the so-
called topo-man are not members of a crew but live excluselively on stealing ore 
from temporarily unsupervised pits. Since they are damaging not only bosses but 
potentially everybody, they will be detained – or worse – when they are caught 
(Werthmann 2003a: 174). 
This does not mean, of course, that cheating or theft does not occur. On the 
contrary, it may occur on all levels of ore processing. In Burkina Faso, gold 
diggers who sell their sack of ore on the spot may mix it with worthless stones in 
order to dupe the buyers who only take samples to estimate the sack’s value. The 
ore buyers, for their part, keep a poker face when paying a much lower sum than 
the actual value. The day labourers who crush and grind the stones may steal 
valuable stones – or, if they receive a wage, simply throw a portion away to 
lighten their workload. The women in whose stalls the ore is processed, store 
worthless stones or stone powder in order to quickly switch it for the good ore 
brought by a customer as soon as his attention is diverted. Gold buyers can fool 
inexperienced gold diggers by manipulating their scales. Gold diggers, on the 
other hand, may sell counterfeit gold to inexperienced gold buyers. Of course, 
everybody is aware of the possibility of being cheated and invents ways of 
guarding against these possibilities. In order to survive – and possibly prosper – 
in a mining camp, one has to learn the rules of the game.7 Moreover, one needs at 
least one close relative, friend or colleague who may assist in various activities 
(Grätz 2004, Werthmann 2003a: 176-186). 
“Bitter” or “hot” money 
In several cases, local communities as well as immigrating miners regard the 
proceeds from mining as “bitter”, “hot”, or “sterile”. These notions are based on 
the conceptual connection of mineral resources with supernatural powers. The 
sale of gold or diamonds is identified with the sale of the earth, the ancestors or 
                                                     
7  Cf. Cleary (1990: 130): “A prudent garimpeiro will work on the assumption that the other party, if not 
actually cheating at present, is looking for an opportunity to do so in the future ” 
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nature spirits. Investing such proceeds in bride prices, cattle or other items that 
are considered essential for the reproduction of a community may lead to sterility 
or death.8 Consequently, cash from mining is often spent on short-lived 
consumer goods, food, cigarettes, and alcohol. 
The present-day populations of southern Burkina Faso started immigrating 
into the area during the eighteenth century. With the exception of Lobi and 
Birifor women in the Gaoua region who perform seasonal small-scale shallow-pit 
mining and panning (Schneider 1993), most of these groups seem not to have 
practiced gold mining except as forced labour during colonial rule. The recent 
appropriation and exploitation of gold deposits by immigrants from other regions 
or neighbouring countries threatens the local population’s land use rights and 
affects religious beliefs regarding “natural” resources. Despite differences in 
origin and language, the populations of present-day southern Burkina Faso share 
the idea that gold is dangerous. A commonly held view is that gold is a living 
creature, which moves and can suddenly appear or disappear. It can make a 
person blind, lame or crazy and can even kill. If one happens to find gold in the 
bush or while working in the fields, one must first “kill” it before it can be taken. 
Gold is killed by sprinkling it with blood or urine; but the corresponding body 
part will “die” too. It is not the gold itself that brings bad luck, but rather the 
nature spirits to whom the gold “belongs” (Werthmann 2003a: 62-108). Such 
beliefs exist not only in the Southwest, but also in other regions of Burkina Faso, 
for instance among the Mossi and Gurunsi (Kiéthéga 1983: 187). 
Although the Mossi are stereotyped throughout Burkina Faso as capable to do 
anything for money, Mossi gold diggers may also refer to the supernatural 
powers of gold. Some say that when gold was first discovered in their provinces, 
they too were afraid of gold. It was said that one could not find gold without a 
relative falling ill or dying. These gold diggers too say that gold “belongs” to the 
spirits. Whoever discovers a gold deposit runs the risk of dying, because he has 
uncovered a spirits’ secret. On occasion, spirits appear in the mines, manifesting 
themselves in human or serpent form. 
These notions regarding the origin and nature of gold are by no means re-
stricted to Burkina Faso. Similar ideas regarding nature spirits or “local demons” 
may be found throughout Africa (Zwernemann 1968: 388f.). Moreover, “ideas 
about the mountain spirit” characterizes mining folklore all over the world 
(Heilfurth 1981: 209). In southern Burkina Faso, gold is thought of as belonging 
to the realm of the earth deity, the bush spirits and the ancestors. Any intrusion 
into these spheres is potentially dangerous and has to be accompanied by ritual 
                                                     
8  E.g. Biersack (1998: 77), Clark (1993: 742), Harris (1989: 254), Sallnow (1989: 212), Schneider 
(1993), Shipton (1989: 37), Werthmann (2001, 2003c), Znoj (1998: 203). 
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measures. These conceptions help to explain why many people in that region do 
not engage in gold mining.  
The dangerous properties of gold may contaminate the money that one earns 
for selling it. Gold is associated with the earth and the earth deity, and its sale 
generates “bitter money” (Werthmann 2003c). Just like other kinds of bitter 
money, the proceeds from gold extraction must under no circumstances be used 
for payments that are vital for the reproduction of the patrilineage and by 
extension for the relationship between the living and the ancestors. If one were to 
use “bitter” money for such a payment, this would risk the wife dying or the 
marriage failing soon. “Bitter money” can only be used for certain purposes. One 
should spend it on the occasion of social events such as markets or funerals by 
inviting others to grilled meat, bean cakes or millet beer. If it is not spent in this 
way, it should be used only for payments that are not linked to subsistence 
activities or ceremonial exchange. One may, for example, pay taxes (“debts to 
the white man”) or repay one’s debts. It is also permissible to pay personal, 
short-lived consumer goods that are not inheritable, such as clothes or bicycles. It 
is not just older people who emphasize this difference between “good” and 
“bitter” money. Even younger people are very conscious of the difference. One 
of the few Dagara gold-diggers, for instance, justified his working in the mine by 
claiming he needed to pay off his debts at the Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agri-
cole and that he would not do anything serious with it. 
Of course, the phenomenon of “squandering” money also occurs in places 
where the proceeds from mining are not considered as dangerous. What Znoj 
observed in Indonesia applies to mining camps all over the world: “The average 
daily incomes of goldminers are roughly five to ten times the wages for day 
labour in agriculture … But the drains on this income are heavy. Cigarettes and 
food are extremely expensive in the mining settlements, and miners eat a lot of 
meat and smoke the best cigarettes. A great deal of gambling and prostitution 
goes on, and there is an etiquette of generosity among miners that makes it hard 
to economize” (Znoj 1998: 203). In Brazil, miners say that the money from the 
first rich strike must be spent on whores and rum. If the money was not 
dissipated in this way, one would never have another strike (Cleary 1990: 125). 
Diamond miners in the former Zaïre who return to town from the diamond fields 
with money in their pockets do not stay with their relatives but prefer hotels 
where they can indulge in “extravagances” (Tshonda 2000: 91). In order to show 
that they can afford it, gold diggers in Benin and Burkina Faso go to the nearest 
town, where they stand rounds for friends and other customers in bars and flirt 
with local women (Grätz 2003b: 160-161, Werthmann 2003: 186). The 
consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, clothes and other luxury goods is literally 
staged on photographs, and paying for these pictures taken by ambulant 
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photographers is in itself a way of conspicuous consumption. Yet another way of 
excessive consumption leads to the destruction of the objects of desire, for 
instance when the newly-bought pair of white jeans is worn for work the next 
day.  
Many anecdotes that refer to excessive consumption have recurrent motives 
such as lighting cigarettes with dollar bills (Roopnaraine 1996: 39), or going to 
town in two taxis: One for the miner and one for his hat (Cleary 1990: 125-126). 
Cleary even attributed the gold miners’ hope to strike it rich to the desire of 
becoming “somebody who can afford to be mythically generous, in a way that 
ensures they will become celebrated figures in garimpagem’s oral pantheon” 
(Cleary 1990: 126). 
Huli people in Papua New Guinea considered the proceeds from gold mining 
at Mount Kare as “barren”. They were mainly used “for the purchase of luxury 
commodities such as beer, gifts, and airline tickets. The gold, as one myth 
relates, is closely associated with Satan, and this belief is strikingly similar to that 
of the Colombian peasants described by Taussig” (Clark 1993: 724). 
By referring to Taussig, Clark interprets the notions about gold-induced illness 
and unproductive money as a “metacommentary” on colonialism and new power 
structures: “Work at the goldfields, like that on plantations, is comparable to 
prostitution; it is an impersonal relationship between Huli, their labor, and 
Europeans, one that is mediated by money” (Clark 1993: 750). However, the 
application of Taussig’s model to this and other cases of non-industrial mining is 
misleading. Gold mining at Mount Kare was not predominantly a capitalist 
venture where Europeans controlled the local labour. An Australian mining 
company was but one actor in a contested field where conflicts occurred mainly 
between different local groups (Vail 1995). Moreover, when Vail visited the area 
some years after the gold rush, he found that not much had changed (Vail 1995: 
356). Most people had returned to subsistence production, and the only traces of 
the gold rush were some luxury items. These and other findings confirm Godoy’s 
statement that Taussig’s view of mining and “proletarianization” as a “coercive, 
tyrannical, and unilineal” process was far too narrow: “... contrary to Taussig’s 
claim, ... miners in many LDCs [less developed countries] may be currently 
shifting back and forth between precapitalist and capitalist relations of produc-
tion with much less conflict, stress, and agony than he assumes” (Godoy 1985: 
210). 
Life-style and male-female relationships 
People from all walks of life flock to the mining camps. There are various 
economic and social reasons for individual migration to the mining camps. On 
the one hand, mining camps provide a wide range of economic opportunities for 
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men, women, and children. On the other hand, they are also a refuge for people 
who have lost their jobs in the city, who have been in jail, or who, for one reason 
or another, do not wish to remain in (or return to) their communities of origin. 
Although many people come to the mines in the hope of striking it rich, those 
who are most likely to earn a steady living in the mining camps are the providers 
of goods and services. A new mining camp, even if it is in the middle of 
nowhere, soon attracts a whole range of commercial activities that can normally 
be found in urban settings: Bars, restaurants, video cinemas, barber shops, tailors, 
butchers, shoe-shiners, etc. Those who pursue these commercial activities are 
often as mobile as the miners and may similarly have spent many years in mining 
camps. 
For people from more remote rural areas, going to the mines also offers access 
to an urban life-style without having to go to the cities. Especially the very young 
gold diggers in West Africa emulate US-American popular culture and fashion. 
They wear jeans, T-shirts, baseball caps, and sneakers, and they carry nicknames 
which refer, among others, to prominent actors, athletes or politicians (Grätz 
2003: 160-161, Tshonda 2000: 81, Werthmann 2003a: 182). Adopting this urban 
life-style also includes a particular kind of speech. In Burkina Faso, some of the 
miners’ vocabulary is imported from Nouchi, a sociolect spoken by street gangs 
in the ghettos of Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire, but there are also some terms and 
idiomatic phrases that are used only in the gold mines. A lot of this vocabulary is 
related to leisure activities such as drinking. For instance, a specific brand of beer 
is called “donkey piss”, Pastis is called “lion’s tears”, and a mixture of Nescafé 
and Pastis is simply referred to as “the drug”. If a gold miner wants to get a 
colleague to buy him a drink, he says “I need help”, “Give me water”, or “Do 
something!”. If someone is really drunk, he is “at the top” or “dosed”. A gold 
miner’s girlfriend is called “vulture”, as is pork (many gold diggers are Muslims 
who even so eat pork). The usage of the name for an impure animal for two of 
the most wanted “objects of desire” in the mining camps points to the 
ambivalence of these desires. 
Although many women provide goods and services in the mining camps, the 
camps are frequently represented as predominantly male worlds by both in- and 
outsiders. In many mines, women must not enter the mining shafts. In one 
mining camp in Indonesia, women are not admitted in the camp at all and 
prostitution is carried out by male transvestites (Znoj 1998: 203). In several 
cases, migration to mining camps is explicitly compared with male initiation 
rites. Diamond seekers in Angola identify the diamond mines with the bush 
camps where young men become hunters (de Boeck 1998). Faiwolmin in Papua 
New Guinea say that mining camps have replaced the men’s house (Polier 1996: 
10). Physical force at work and endurance during drinking bouts as well as 
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friendship among peers are highly valuated. At the same time, the social 
atmosphere in mining camps – like in many predominantly male settings – is 
characterized by potential violence and specific uses of bad language that is 
aimed at questioning other men’s virility.9 
Male-female relationships in mining camps are clearly governed by economic 
considerations. Whereas men tend to regard women as objects of desire through 
whose consumption they can prove their financial success and their virility (de 
Boeck 1998: 793, Rodriguez Larreta 2002: 122, Tshonda 2000: 91, n. 25), 
women may have an equally instrumental approach in dealing with men. Women 
traders in Angolan diamond areas carefully choose their temporary partners on 
the basis of their economic performance and their political influence and may 
leave them as soon as they have served their purpose (de Boeck 2000).10 In gold 
mines in Burkina Faso, women are well informed about the current production of 
individual mining pits and pay visits or offer drinks to successful pit owners and 
gold diggers in order to attract their attention. The relationship, however, only 
lasts as long as the gold digger is capable of demonstrating his affection through 
gifts of cash (Werthmann 2003a: 169-176). These relationships should not, 
however, be equated with “prostitution”. Even if the directness of male-female 
relationships in the mining camps is shocking for outsiders, material 
considerations are always present in the choice of a partner, even in regular 
marriages. In Burkina Faso, as elsewhere, marriage (and thus adult status) is 
increasingly difficult to obtain for young men without sufficient financial means. 
Although extra-marital relationships are on the increase, an unwanted pregnancy 
often terminates these relationships. This is especially problematic for the female 
partners who thus lose both their reputation and the material support of their 
partner. The potential readiness on both sides to look for a more suitable partner 
colours many male-female relationships that are consequently marked by distrust 
and a constant fear of “betrayal” (Attané 2000). In the mining camps, many 
fights among men are about women. Since there are no other instances such as 
family heads or elders, conflicts of couples are often mediated by the police. If 
the relationship is terminated, the police may fix compensation payments to the 
“guilty” party (Werthmann 2003a: 189-192). 
Men’s feelings of uneasiness about shifts in gender relations may discursively 
connect to other aspects of mining. Gold diggers at Mount Kare in Papua New 
                                                     
9  For an overview on anthropological studies about the cultural construction of masculinity see Gutmann 
(1997). 
10  Congolese women traders who go to the mining camps in Angola on their own are called “dogs 
breaking their leash” (de Boeck 2000). Tshonda (2000: 122) reports that in a mining “fief” in Zaïre 
married women had to wear two wrappers in order to be distinguishable from non-married women who 
wore only one wrapper. Prices for sexual intercourse with the latter were periodically fixed and 
announced publicly. 
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Guinea attributed diseases in the mining camps not only to the gold itself but also 
to the presence of women. Here, the discovery of gold was interpreted as a 
millenial event and the gold was identified with the skin or excrements of a 
mythical snake. Strictly speaking women should not be in this sacred area at all, 
because menstrual blood and traces of sexual activities on women’s bodies could 
anger the serpent, but the gold rendered the men weak and thus incapable of 
enforcing taboos (Clark 1993).  
The moral economy of mining 
In mining camps all over the world virility and success is equated with a capacity 
for excessive consumption. These patterns of behaviour have been termed “per-
formances of profligacy” (Roopnaraine 1996: 39), “economies of ejaculation” 
(de Boeck 1998: 790) and “daring consumption” (Walsh 2003) respectively. De 
Boeck rejects the interpretation that such behaviour demonstrates the incapability 
of adapting to capitalist ideologies and practices of accumulation. Instead, he 
stresses the continuity with pre-colonial patterns of becoming a man by becom-
ing a hunter. Young men “hunt” dollars and diamonds in order to domesticate 
and consume them. In pre-colonial times a man acquired prestige by killing and 
distributing the meat of a wild animal. Today, it is by standing rounds or by 
flaunting jewellery and ghetto blasters. De Boeck sees the “hunting” of diamonds 
both as an initiation and as a way of actively shaping modernization processes. 
The Zaïrean fortune seekers in the Angolan diamond fields are not passive con-
sumers of imported Western commodities or patterns of behaviour, but transform 
local moral discourses in order to “capture” modernity without being “captured” 
themselves (de Boeck 1998: 802). In a similar vein, Walsh (2003: 299) writes 
that sapphire miners on Madagascar “consume daringly in the process of being 
and becoming active, powerful, attractive, and even ‘charismatic’”. 
Gold mining camps on Sumatra represent a slightly different case. Znoj (1998) 
describes them as spaces where a discontinued model of male identity is revived 
or rather reinvented. Znoj presents the seasonal migration of Rejang rice farmers 
to the gold mines as a kind of adventure holiday. There, men can temporarily 
withdraw from the drudgery of farming in their home communities where their 
wives actually control the family budget. According to Znoj, male self-esteem is 
threatened by the growing influence of the nation-state, Islam, and the economic 
success of immigrants. The farmers compensate this situation by reviving the 
cultural concepts of “hot money” and “war debts”. These concepts include the 
creation and maintenance of social relationships among men that are based on 
pre-colonial patterns of debt bondage and patron-client relations. The “hot” 
money earned in the gold mines must be spent quickly on alcohol, cigarettes and 
cash gifts among friends in order to avoid conflict. Znoj concludes: “The hot 
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money of Rejang men has its sources in this traumatizing modernization-conflict 
and is a symbolic means to maintain a cultural identity in spite of modernization” 
(Znoj 1998: 209). 
Clark, de Boeck and Znoj agree that patterns of consumption in the mining 
camps may be interpreted as reactions to modernization processes. However, 
Clark and Znoj view these processes as external forces that may have destructive 
effects on local communities and identities, whereas de Boeck stresses the 
agency of the young diamond miners. By appropriating objects and symbols of 
modernity, they actively transform cultural concepts of work, fertility, and 
wealth. 
Referring to Shipton (1989) or to Bloch & Parry (1989), the seemingly 
irrational handling of money may be interpreted as a reaction of subsistence-
oriented communities to the introduction of the market economy. By classifying 
some kinds of income as “bitter”, “hot”, or the like, such money is largely kept 
out of a community’s morally embedded subsistence economy. These assump-
tions are clearly reflected in a statement by Znoj who says: “The tolerance shown 
by mine owners towards theft of gold ore, the lavish gifts of money that can 
reach hundreds of thousands of Rupiah among mine owners, and the ‘war debts’ 
that may legitimately never be paid back can all be interpreted as the politics of 
conflict-avoidance in a group of people with an egalitarian ideology and 
suspicion of the wealthy” (Znoj 1998: 203).  
But what about the “Wild West”? Given the fact that similar patterns of 
dealing with the proceeds from mining also exist in non-egalitarian societies, this 
explanation seems rather limited. Such an interpretation does not explain, for 
instance, why gold and diamond mining seem to engender almost uniform 
patterns of consumption both in the “classic” Wild West and today. Many of 
those who went to the goldfields of California or Alaska in the 19th century were 
clearly not members of pre-industrial, subsistence-oriented societies. Yet, the 
term “gold rush” became proverbial not only in the sense of “fast fortune” but 
precisely because this fortune was frequently lost as fast as it was gained by 
spending it on drinks, gambling, and prostitution. Interpreting such a behaviour 
as a lack of experience with capitalist practices is inadequate. It rather expresses 
a very capitalist belief in the unlimited possibilities of getting rich. What con-
nects miners of the past and the present is the fact that mining is experienced as a 
form of addiction, as many gold diggers in Burkina Faso put it: Even if you want 
to stop, you cannot. 
Recent ethnographies about gold and diamond mining suggest an alternative 
hypothesis: The seemingly irrational squandering of money is in fact a form of 
redistribution. The redistribution of money from mining contributes to create and 
maintain a moral economy within the mining camps. The conspicuous and exces-
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sive consumption is based on an etiquette that stresses generosity and sharing. 
Although violence, theft and fraud do obviously occur on a daily basis, a person 
who permanently deceives others will eventually be sanctioned. A miner who 
stands rounds or gives cash to friends not only demonstrates his success in this 
risky business but also acquires prestige, and thus trust- and creditworthiness. In 
emergencies, he can expect support from others. Although this general rule is 
obviously not realized in every single case, there are normative expectations and 
sanctions that prove the existence of this moral framework. 
Even though single mining camps may be short-lived, their temporary inhabi-
tants will meet again in other camps. This creates the need for a shared rule of 
conduct. Economic and social relationships in the mining camps are often based 
on mutual obligations and debts. What Cleary noted in mining camps in eastern 
Brazil also pertains to other countries: “Credit is the lubricant of the economic 
system in all garimpos; without it, most operations would never get off the 
ground” (Cleary 1990: 118). Newcomers get credit from traders or shop owners; 
shop owners help out pit owners, pit owners lend equipment to one another, and 
so forth.11  
In Burkina Faso, gold buyers do not only lend money to gold diggers who in 
turn sell their gold to them, but provide mercury12 free of charge in order to 
attract more customers. Friends help each other out with cash, buy drinks for one 
another or cover up for each other in cases of absence of work or when 
organizing the pilfering of ore (Werthmann 2003a: 168-169). When a miner is 
sick or has an accident, it is often friends who collect money and organize trans-
port to a hospital or the home town. Whoever has money is expected to stand 
rounds. If a miner is reluctant to share his money with others, there are ways of 
pushing him more or less gently. A friend can ask him for “help” which means 
buying him a drink. In order to avoid this, some gold diggers buy a bottle of beer 
in a bar and hide to drink it in their hut. But a person who consistently refuses to 
share acquires a bad reputation and eventually becomes isolated. Miners in 
Burkina Faso are also expected to express respect for superiors by offering them 
drinks, and some less benevolent bosses may systematically search the bars for 
their workers who then have to buy them a bottle of beer. Consequently, those 
bars that are frequented mainly by the bosses will be avoided by the workers. A 
boss who consistently spends his money for luxury goods and women without 
taking proper care of his workers is characterized by the proverbial saying: “His 
pit is open, but his mind is closed”. In such a case the workers see it as their right 
to steal ore from his pit. 
                                                     
11  Roopnaraine (1996: 26-27), Walsh (2003: 293-294), Znoj (1998: 202). 
12  The use of mercury is officially prohibited, but there is little enforcement of this regulation. 
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In Latin America as in West Africa, information circulates between different 
and sometimes remote mining camps. A person who consistently disappears 
without settling debts will eventually be sanctioned or avoided. In mining camps 
in Burkina Faso, shop or bar owners require pawns such as radios, bicycles or 
other valuable items for outstanding debts. Sometimes these pawns are never 
recuperated. If a creditor learns about the whereabouts of a debtor, he may go 
there in order to retrieve his money. When I visited one mining camp in the com-
pany of a former bar owner from another mining camp, many people thought he 
had come to collect outstanding debts. One woman told him to keep the bicycle 
she had left as a pawn two years ago. Debts in gold mines on Sumatra are 
considered as “war debts” that are not retrievable outside the immediate context 
of the mining camps, like for instance from the wife of a miner. However, they 
are “revived” when the miners come back in the next season (Znoj 1998: 203). 
Pit owners in Brazil help each other out with tools or spare parts. If a pit owner 
cannot return a loan when asked, he will rather borrow the item from a third 
person in order to pay back the original loan than admit his incapacity to 
reciprocate (Cleary 1990: 139). Of course all this does not mean that friendship 
and partnership in mining camps are always reliable and harmonious. But it 
seems that petty theft, insults or brawls are forgiven more easily in the mining 
camps than for instance in the villages where the miners come from. 
Conclusion 
Mining camps are paradoxical social and spatial formations. Although they often 
emerge in the middle of nowhere, they bring about a pronounced urban lifestyle. 
Although heterogeneity, anonymity and individuality are characteristics of social 
life in the mining camps, relationships of trust and solidarity are prerequisites for 
the individual’s survival. These contradictory dynamics may be reconciled 
through the construction of mining camps as spaces where “conceptions and 
categories of wealth, accumulation, expenditure, physical and social reproduction 
and well-being” are tied up with particular notions of masculinity that entail the 
obligation to share (de Boeck 1998: 779). 
From an anthropological point of view, the seemingly irrational “squandering” 
of money is in fact a form of redistribution that contributes to the social embed-
dedness of mining. The case studies from Africa and other areas cited above 
show that there are norms and relationships in mining camps that help to limit the 
dangers of the work and the violent or fraudulent appropriation of resources. The 
ostentatious and excessive spending of money is not necessarily an “irrational” 
response to new ways of production and consumption. Of course it may in fact be 
irrational and self-destructive in individual cases. It is precisely the potential for, 
or the tolerance of, “irrationality” that draws some people to the mines. Many 
 
74 Werthmann 
mines in the past and present have been the last refuges for people who for one 
reason or the other failed to lead a “normal” life. Nevertheless, the peculiar 
patterns of spending money in mining camps all over the world do seem to create 
a moral economy of mining. Whoever makes money in the mines is expected to 
distribute at least a portion of it in the form of alcohol, meat, cigarettes and the 
like among his companions. Those who fail to conform to this expectation are 
eventually isolated. Speaking in terms of Bourdieu or the New Institutional 
Economics, by redistributing money miners acquire social capital which gene-
rates trust which in the long run reduces transactional costs. Thus the emergence 
of a moral economy of mining helps to aggregate people in a social context 
where kin or ethnic ties are absent, to curb violence, and to maintain a certain 
degree of social coherence and reliability in the context of this extremely mobile 
and risky way of life. 
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of “violence” and peace: The Anyuaa 
experience (Western Ethiopia)1 
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Introduction 
This chapter investigates a tradition of the Anyuaa, a Nilosaharan-speaking 
people of Western Ethiopia, in maintaining peace through an indigenous method 
called agem. It is a culturally instituted way of controlling traditional political 
organization and normalizing social crises either peacefully if possible, or else 
violently. The question posed is what the logical principles of the tradition are. 
Secondly, as field data show, I claim that this indigenous tradition is at risk, and 
has in fact been declining in the past three decades. It can be asked why this 
happens, and why it cannot be preserved for peace-making attempts and for 
traditionalizing ‘modernity’ based on local experiences.  
As with other African countries, multi-ethnic Ethiopia exemplifies the para-
doxical relationship of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’. According to theories, 
‘modernity’ needs first to create interest in and be minimally appealing to the 
prevailing traditions of local people. It demands appreciation, acceptance, 
adoption and absorption by a target group (cf. Hobsbawm 1983, Bauman 1983, 
2001, Nyanga 2005). Hence, demonstrating the peculiar nature of the conflict 
between tradition and modernity in Ethiopia becomes a main issue in this 
                                                     
1  My grateful thanks to the Editors of this volume for their detailed comments and suggestions on an 
earlier draft of this chapter. 
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chapter. The interpretation rests on an analysis of texts in their socio-cultural 
context (cf. Dundes 1980, Bauman & Briggs 1991). In addition, in this chapter, 
narrative is taken both as method and embodiment of theory. 
The Anyuaa live in the western part of Ethiopia, bordering south-eastern 
Sudan. They speak a language of the Nilosaharan family. The total population is 
estimated at 41,000, but several sources suggest the number to exceed a 
100,000.2 According to many observers and the people themselves, the estima-
tions often seem political. 
Anyuaa livelihood strongly depends on the rivers. Fish is their main food. 
They also cultivate crops and vegetables using river-bank fields. Their home-
steads are built along or near the rivers, and they hunt game animals around the 
rivers. The Anyuaa are thus sometimes referred to as ‘river people’.  
The Anyuaa are traditionally administered by kings and chiefs. They elected 
their leaders through rituals called rony. The Anyuaa also remove their leaders 
when they consider them morally weak, violent, or deviant from certain norms. 
Real power is in the hands of the people. They control power through a mecha-
nism called agem. Perner says: 
The Anyuak are convinced that the principle of justice is stronger than any other power in 
the universe and that it will always have the upper hand on all forms of existence … The 
entire Anyuak worldview is rooted in this belief in Justice as the principle of creation, in its 
spiritual as well as in its material life. (Perner 1991: 29) 
In my view, the Anyuaa conceptions of justice, order and peace seem to rest in 
the belief they have in agem. What is agem? Basically it is a notion of justified 
popular protest against abusive personal rule damaging the interests of the wider 
community. How do the Anyuaa understand it and implement this concept in 
practice? From the Anyuaa point of view, agem functions to regulate traditional 
political authorities through some form of election, evaluation and correction. It 
is also used to keep peace and order and protect the whole community from 
ačieny (curses). As we shall see, agem is intended action with predictable out-
comes, as well as culturally structured ‘violence’, articulated in discursive forms 
and channeled into use in times of abnormal situations.  
Scholars like Evans-Pritchard (1940), Lienhardt (1958), Wall (1976), Ellman 
(1985) and Kurimoto (1997) made mention of the concept and practice of agem. 
                                                     
2  The figures are controversial. In 1911 the total population of the Ethiopian Anyuaa was estimated to be 
between 30,000 to 40,000 (Bahru 1990: 82). Evans-Pritchard (1940: 7) talked about “forty to fifty 
thousand and probably between thirty to forty thousand”, based on figures estimated by the then 
Sudanese Colonial government. The Central Statistical Authority of Ethiopia mentioned 65,000 as the 
total population figure in 1970, and 85,000 in 1985. Many observers, for example Kurimoto (1992, 
1997), suggested the total Anyuaa population to be no less than 100,000. The figure of 44,581, given 
by the 1994 Ethiopian Population Census, can also be questioned when compared to the number of 
Anyuaa refugees of 51,000 recorded recently (2004) in Pochalla, a refugee camp in southern Sudan 
(The McGill Report 16 May 2004). 
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In the views of Evans-Pritchard and Wall, agem is described as “village revolu-
tion.” Particularly Evans-Pritchard values the Anyuaa political system as 
“democratic in nature.” He also expresses it metaphorically as “the power of the 
chief as an individual is more apparent than real. … It is the tail that wags the 
dog” (1940). In this context, “the tail” stands for the people who can control 
political power through agem. The “the dog” stands for a leader, who serves as a 
symbolic object (Caam Adhom 1997: 9-12). Lienhardt sees agem also as “a 
village rebellion” and alternatively as “violent rebellion”. ‘Rebellion’ might 
connote unregulated social action with unpredictable outcome(s). However, 
interestingly, on the other hand he notes: 
[T]he Anuak are able to avoid diffused and uncontrolled conflict within the village, and to 
rule themselves, rejecting any submission to the symbol of their implicit contract which they 
themselves have created. The Anuak indeed believe that nobody ought to be in office for a 
very long time, and in fact as will be seen a headman must be a person of exceptional talent 
and wealth to remain in office for more than a few years at the most. (Lienhardt 1958: 32; 
emphasis original, notes omitted) 
But when he makes remarks on the effects of agem, he says, “no compensa-
tion is payable for killings in the course of a rebellion. … Killing in a rebellion is 
compensated for by killing in a rebellion. … Like the feud also, a violent rebel-
lion is never completely settled and done with (Lienhardt 1958: 31). If seen in 
ethnographic reality, types of conflict between rival individuals or parties are 
effectively settled through a mechanism known as kwor, while conflicts among 
traditional political authorities and the community as a whole are not unsolved 
matters either, but they get an end through the Anyuaa tradition of agem. 
Kurimoto (1997) describes agem ambiguously when explaining it as “a total 
anarchy” on the one side and as a “revolution” on the other. He says, agem 
means “a rebellion” or “coup d’état” against a ruling noble or village headman in 
order to replace him with a new one. The Ethiopian revolution in 1974 fits this 
notion. After May 1991, when violent clashes between various armed groups 
deteriorated life conditions among the Anyuaa, the term agem was replaced by 
girgir, borrowing an Amharic word meaning “a riot” or “rebellion”. It applies to 
a situation of “war against all”, “a total anarchy”, an action without end or 
without being able to be controlled (Kurimoto 1997: 807). 
This fact of institutionalized resistance in Anyuaa society raises the question 
of how conflicts of any kind can at all be ended, and how society can continue as 
a society? Does it exist without certain mechanisms of regulating conflicts and 
conflict behaviour?  
 
82 Tasew 
The mythic agem: Conception and construction 
Agem, as an ideology of (justified) social correction or reordering, is a strong 
belief which is held as dating from creation, and is claimed to be established in 
accordance with the myth told about a divine culture hero called Očudho. Rather 
than being seen as a socially constructed tradition, agem is seen as a transition to 
culture, as a foundational law endowed by the divine hero. agem was initiated 
and consecrated when Anyuaa ancestors were killing each other in a time of 
absence of order, peace, justice and laws. As narrated by a 98 year-old informant, 
Othow Adier,3 the tradition evolved out of necessity: 
In ancient times there was a kučlwok (clan leader) whose name was Čway. He was cruel and 
injudicious. His rule was known as Molčway. Čway was killing people without any reason. If 
one accused another, Čway’s judgment would end up in killing. He was simply saying “kill 
him …” One day Čway’s son, Dičär, killed a man. The victim’s family went to Čway to 
report their complaints. This time Čway pronounced “Nekkyie.” “Nekkyie” means “punish 
not Dičär but his belly”. This was unclear. It can mean “take his property” or “attack him”. 
As that was not considered fair, the people did quite the contrary, and instead of taking away 
his property they killed his son, Dičär. Čway then took revenge. He was cruel: He killed 
children. He was taking women by force. He was slaying whomever he disliked. As he was 
cruel and injudicious he destroyed the “toro”4 and imposed a severe law on the people, 
prohibiting them to dance, sing, play, or enjoy music. 
Another narrator, a chief called kuaro Philip Ngenynyo, described the time 
designated by the myth about agem as being full of disorder. He said: 
Rivalry among members of the society was very strong. Glory was won by snatching other 
men’s wives, daughters, cattle, and by taking lives. Blood feuds and revenge were incessant 
phenomena among individuals, groups and clans. The injured took revenge against rivals. 
The consequences were frequent murder and mutilation. These men were applauded by their 
accomplices and followers and enjoyed their respect and admiration. The defeated were 
evicted to places they didn’t know before. Feuds and disputes were not settled on the basis of 
the wrongs and the rights ascribed to them. Men, before the coming of Očudho, took justice 
into their own hands. After the teachings of Očudho, however, those chaotic situations came 
to an end. 
As we can understand, realities of killing, looting, robbery, adultery, cruelty 
and fear gave way for the consecration of the myth. Causing factors are also 
represented by the opening episode of the mythic narrative, typically symbolized 
by the quarrelling brothers: 
…. Očudho came in that time. … He emerged out of the water when two brothers were 
fighting for a fish. … One day, two brothers caught a fish. The elder brother held it by its 
                                                     
3  I recorded several versions of the myth. Othow Adier, 98, gave one version. Othow was born in Čiro, 
near Ethiopian Akobo. He was living in Gambella town when he told me the myth. With him I 
conducted discussions and interviews during the period 1997-2005. The other narrator was Philip 
Ngenynyo. He narrated the story of Ocudho at an impressive ceremony called rony, where he was 
elected as a chief, kuaro, at Ukuna village, Abobo wereda, on 26 February 1998. No less than 800 
people (male and female) of differing ages participated at this rony. 
4  “Toro” refers to an inter-village central place for dance, music and plays, and thus can represent the 
central sphere of social and spiritual life of villages.  
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head. The younger held it by its tail. The boys held the fish simultaneously. Therefore, they 
started quarrelling over the fish. The boys were fiercely shouting and insulting each other. 
The elder said “it is mine.” The younger also said “it is mine.” While they were insulting and 
wrestling with each other the boys heard a strange voice saying, “Stop quarrelling!” 
Immediately, the boys looked in the direction from where the strange voice was coming. 
Grabbing the fish firmly, they saw a strange man emerging out of the deep water of a river 
swimming toward a čudho standing in the midst of the stream. The čudho was … a very 
thick big piece of dry wood. The strange man climbed on the čudho. His head was covered 
with sedge. The man had strings of four types of glittering beads. The beads were učuok 
beads tied round his neck and strings of dičär, udëëge and dimui beads round his waist. He 
also held an učale (a special type of spear) with it rest – diqweri – in his hands, and wore 
udole (thick circular ambers) round his wrists and ankles. The boys were very surprised with 
the man and his decorations. They had never seen such a man and such kinds of objects. 
Sitting on the čudho, the man looked at the quarrelling boys while they gazed at him full of 
wonder. One of the boys grabbed the fish's head. The other grabbed the fish’s tail. Then, the 
man asked the boys to know the cause of their quarrel. 
“Why are you fighting my sons? What is your problem?” he asked them. 
The elder brother uttered: “I caught the fish but he says, ‘it is mine’.” 
The younger also complained: “I have caught it. The fish is mine! But, he wants to take it 
for himself. ‘It must be mine!’ he says scornfully.” 
Then the man advised the younger one who held the fish by its tail to set the fish free. 
The boy released it. But the fish could not escape. Next, the man told the boy to hold the tail 
again and the elder boy to let the head of the fish free. The younger held the tail tightly. 
Then, the elder released the fish out of his hands. The fish easily slipped out of the hands of 
the younger boy. 
Then, the man asked the boys “Why did the fish escape when it was held by its tail and 
did not escape when it was held by its head?” The boys could not give the right answer. 
Then, the man told them: “The power of a fish is in its head. Therefore, a person who holds a 
fish by its tail should not claim to be its owner because its tail is slippery … It can escape 
easily. But, a person who holds its head can claim to be its owner because a fish held by its 
head is powerless. Remember. A fish’s power is in its head, not in its tail”, he said. 
Then, the man asked the boys again: “Who should be the owner? You can solve your 
quarrel now.”  
The boys fully accepted his wise words, so that they gave the right answer for the man. 
The younger said, “I understand. The owner should be the one who catches the fish by its 
head. He should really be the owner but I should not be.” The boys settled their problems by 
themselves. As a result the boy who held its head took the fish for himself. 
But soon, a miracle took place. The strange man disappeared at a glance without being 
noticed by the boys. The boys could not tell whether he ascended into the sky or immersed 
into the water or fled to any other direction. He suddenly disappeared. The boys … were 
frightened with the event. Therefore, they ran quickly to their village out of fear. Then upon 
arrival they told the villagers all about what they had observed and experienced at the river 
that day. The news excited the villagers. They admired [the man’s] way of solving the 
problem. They appreciated his wisdom. They also assumed that the man who came out of the 
water and disappeared suddenly without being seen afterwards could be no other than a 
nääm-jwøk (the god of the water) – “He might be a nääm-jwøk”, they said. Therefore, they 
wanted to find this man around the river. At last, they decided to find him. … There was no 
order, law and justice in that time. There was a cruel leader called Čuai. His way of ruling 
was called mol-Čuai. It means rule of Čuai. … 
The story continues with the villagers going to the river and finding the 
strange man after a long search. After great effort, they took him to their village 
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and he then taught them laws and wisdom, established the agem and kwor tradi-
tions of conflict resolution, and for the first time in their history installed tradi-
tional political authority – Anyuaa chieftaincy and kingship.  
Očudho is also regarded as the primeval ancestor of the noble lineage. The 
name of the hero, Očudho is composed of two words: “O” and “Čudho”. “O” 
means “a man” while “čudho” refers to “a big-thick-dry log of wood”. The words 
in one form bring to us a lively image of “a man sitting on a big dry log of 
wood”. As indicated, the hero came out of water while the two brothers were 
fighting for a fish. The conditions leading to the formation of the traditions have 
been symbolized in oppositional terms, as “dry” and “wet” substances. A dry log 
of wood standing firmly at the centre of flowing water can remind us of death in 
life, representing the time in which the Anyuaa ancestors were suffering before 
the coming of the culture hero. 
As depicted from the boys’ point of view, the hero, a strange figure wearing 
strange objects (glittering beads round his wrists, neck, waist and ankles and 
holding spears and harpoons, etc.) emerged out of the water in the same way as 
put in the opening episode of the myth (i.e., the boys’ dispute) that preceded the 
first revelation. We are also told about the quarrelling boys from the strange 
man’s perspective. Though the contesting boys were very fascinated with the 
unknown figure and his colourful possessions, they still greedily held on to the 
fish. After looking at them fighting in this way, the man asked them to let him 
know the reason for their quarrel. 
Desire was induced in the villagers as a result of the boys’ story. As indicated 
in the opening episode of the narrative, the villagers were ‘in need of peace and 
order’, so that they decided to find him and use him to help them devise a way 
out of the times of cruelty and chaos. The villagers made to make quite some 
efforts to get to him. One day, Očudho emerged from the water just in the way as 
had been narrated by the boys. The villagers then told Očudho about the chaotic 
conditions they were enduring and begged him to show them a way out. Očudho 
initially refused to accept their demands, as evident from the next episode in the 
myth:  
… Then, they requested the nääm-jwok to go to their village to teach them laws. But the 
nääm-jwok rejected their request. He said, “I must go back to my country. I am the king of 
the underwater world. Why do you insist and make me desert my kindred: My sons, daugh-
ters, wives and relatives living in water? My country is in the underwater. Therein I have 
cows. How can I live without my cows and my people?” he said. 
Although he refused to accept their demand, the Anyuaa begged him to go with them to 
their village. Finally they caught him and tried to force him to go to their village. They 
grabbed him to take him by force. But … he changed into a lion; then into a leopard, then 
into an elephant, next into a half-bull and half-man, and, finally, he changed into human 
form. This was a miracle. The people believed him as a true river-god. They said, “It is true. 
He is a nääm-jwøk without doubt.” Therefore, instead of running away they held him and 
tried catching him while he was frequently changing himself into many terrible beasts. 
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At last, the nääm-jwok went with them to their village. He was welcomed by 
all people except Čway. As the way of life in the time preceding the myth had 
seen the application of force, the villagers captured and dragged the hero into 
accepting their demands. 
However, he (re)asserted his superior abilities. It is important to note the series 
of repeated supernatural actions that create grounds for generating mythic 
images, ideas prescriptions, and actions. Therefore, as encountered by the boys in 
the first episode, the hero metamorphosed himself into the shapes of an elephant, 
a lion, a tiger and then into a human form. This, in a mythic conception, serves to 
narratively create for an audience a divine hero ‘absolutely’, as a supernatural 
being, with the villagers accepting him as a god. They built up a belief in his 
divine power. Thereafter he became willing to help and accompanied them to 
their village.  
As the story goes on, the hero, after entering into the human sphere, preferred 
to live in a solitary hut, abstaining from eating food and drinking water. He 
constantly went on (re)confirming his superior ability of existing without nutri-
tion, unlike the common people as seen in other mythological conceptions and 
hero worship. The villagers learned about his ability of living with the aid of a 
certain mysterious force he had. In what follows I focus on the construction of 
agem given to the Anyuaa forefathers by their hero as “boons”, to use a term 
suggested by Campbell: “A hero ventures forth from the world of everyday life 
(1960: 30) into a region of supernatural wonder: Fabulous forces are there 
encountered and a decisive victory is won: The hero comes back from his myste-
rious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellowmen.”  
The “boons”  
As we saw, the hero taught them laws in compliance with the villagers’ interest 
in peace and social order. Interestingly, the hero’s methods of teaching the 
villagers about “law” and cultural order were more participatory and interactive 
than prescriptive or authoritative, to use some of our modern concepts. He did 
not force them to obey his ideas or interests. For example, questions and answers 
modelled in the mythical narrative suggest his methods of teaching: 
…. The villagers were always petitioning Očudho to teach them rules and to be their leader. 
One day he summoned all the villagers. Then he asked them, “You are asking me to teach 
you laws and be your leader. If I do as you demand, will you give me your properties: Cows, 
goats, and sheep?” 
The people replied cheerfully, “yes!” in one voice. 
Očudho continued asking, “I have left my daughters and sons in the river to live with you. 
Thus, will you allow me to take your sons and daughters as my own children?” The people 
unanimously answered “yes!” 
Očudho asked them again: “I have left my wives in the under water. Are you willing to 
give me your wives if I become your king?” 
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This time, the crowed kept silent. 
Then, he repeated his question: “You are insisting on me to teach you laws and to be your 
king. Aren’t you insisting me?” 
The people replied “yes!” 
“If I do as you want, won’t you give me your wives?”  
Everyone kept quiet. 
At last, Očudho said, “I understand your silence. A wife belongs to her husband. Remem-
ber! A person who commits adultery can be killed. Except that no one should be killed for 
any crime he commits. Instead, he should be set free from any wrongdoing through kwor … 
Then, he taught them about kwor … 
Očudho taught wisdom to the villagers. Čuai was opposing him. One day he came to a 
gathering to stop Očudho from teaching. But he suddenly fell on the ground. He was not able 
to stand in front of Očudho. His body was trembling. At last he knew that Očudho was 
certainly a nääm-jwøk. As soon as he knew this he stood up and could again move his limbs 
freely. … Then, Čuai asked Očudho to sit on a lion skin. But, Očudho refused. He said, 
“Unless the skins are new, I will not sit on them. I do not sit on old lion and leopard skins”. 
Soon, the villagers brought new lion and leopard skins. Očudho sat on the skins. 
According to the story, Očudho begot a son called Gilo from Čuai’s daughter 
called Korie, and disappeared a little before Gilo was born. As told, “he returned 
to the water, to his country”, leaving his personal property to his son. His per-
sonal belongings were held as emblems of power. For example, the čudho, the 
thick beam of dry wood on which he sat for the first time in the midst of the 
river, has been imitated as a throne. It is now called woolo. In addition, the hero’s 
teachings, conduct and actions were adapted as laws, rules and norms regulating 
traditional political power, governing agem and kwor. Kwor is a method of 
dispute settlement between individuals or parties through compensation. He 
installed rony (the ritual of electing leaders and investing them with power; 
Bayleyegn 2002). As modelled in the myth, the cruel Čuai changed into a more 
human character. He voluntarily transferred his power after being influenced by 
the hero’s teachings. In the myth we see Čuai ritually asking forgiveness for his 
evil doings against the people, which is today considered as a model to be 
applied in times of agem.  
Očudho became the first king based on the choice of the villagers. The choice 
and consent of the villagers are an important norm in regulating traditional 
authorities. As Očudho was seen as a divine power, kings and chiefs were also 
seen as divine. Očudho abstained from nutrition for some time. Traditionally, a 
king is not expected to eat food in the presence of common people. In this way, 
sets of actions ordered in the myth have been taken as laws, procedures, and 
principles of agem with which Anyuaa collective identity and ideal values may 
be defined. Authority and governance are interpreted locally in connection with 
the logical principles of agem. In brief, agem is said to have been proclaimed 
through the myth presented above about Očudho. It is conceived as given rather 
than as the outcome of a social process. 
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In the normative sense, agem is set in motion to replace a morally wicked 
leader by another leader. As believed, to let a transgressing chief stay in power is 
seen as ašeni (curse), which might cause war, drought, plague, or flooding. A 
leader is expected to be free from the following weaknesses: 
 
(1)  disrespect of his people;  
(2)  irreverence to heroic deeds; 
(3)  discrimination between his people; 
(4)  showing greediness; 
(5)  negligence of feeding his people by preparing festivals at least three times a year;  
(6)  lack of courage in fighting a war; 
(7)  unfairness in sharing war booties among warriors; 
(8)  decisions without the consent of his people; 
(9)  failure in performing public rituals;  
(10)  disregarding advice addressed to him through elders, etc.; 
(11)  having sex before midnight; 
(12)  killing, harassment, offence of or applying force against an Anyuaa; 
(13)  heedlessness of the emblems of power, etc. (Bayleyegn Tasew 2002: 19-23). 
  
A leader will be at a risk of removal from his position if he is proved to be a 
violator of one of the above norms. 
Agem is achieved in two ways: Mostly peacefully, but by force when peaceful 
means have proved to be impossible. The process has two major phases, cate-
gorically put as immature and mature and also follows steps and procedures with 
expected outcomes. The first stage needs to be secretly prepared by elders, while 
the second is carried out overtly. The following are some of the steps of the first 
phase: 
 
(1)  Substantiating an alleged offence. If the allegation is considered to be damaging, the 
case needs to be discussed by elders. Therefore, elders from different villages meet to 
discuss secretly with the following aims: 
(a)  to agree on the allegation(s); 
(b)  to weigh the degree of the offence; 
(c)  to gather additional information; 
(d) to assess which section of the community might or might not ally with the 
accused leader; 
(e) to address the problem to all adult members on underground basis, etc. 
(2) If the elders believe in the villagers’ readiness for the agem, they take it as mature. 
Therefore, elders take the following steps: 
(a)  informing their spiritual leader (nyibour); 
(b)  electing representatives among them; 
(c)  the representatives led by the nyibour address the community’s grievance to the 
deviant chief or king. 
(3)  At this point, the people can also expect the agem to follow one of these directions: 
(a)  It may end in peaceful ways if the deviant chief’s or king’s responses were 
positive, following Čuai’s conduct as modelled in the myth. In this case, he will 
summon a gathering either to ask forgiveness or resign for the offence he made 
against not only the whole community but also against the souls of the dead. If he 
asks forgiveness, he should promise to improve his behaviour in a short period of 
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time. If he improves his “bad” behaviour within the promised time, the commu-
nity becomes pleased so that the end is appreciated as peaceful. The agem is also 
considered peaceful if he resigns from his position based on his decision. In this 
case, the people hold a series of rony (election ceremonies) to appoint another 
leader from the noble lineage. Therefore, these ways are often regarded as ideal 
means of restoring peace. 
(b)  The second direction is a violent one. This may be experienced if an accused 
chief or king is irresponsible and decides to quit the agem using force. He can try 
to organize his “teiieng” (age-mates),5 jobura (militia defending villages) and 
wadi (guards) to avert the agem by killing or punishing active protestors. This 
may end up in bloodshed. If the agem moves in this direction, the people may 
prefer to boycott or capture the violent leader before he can act. In case of boy-
cotting, the villagers may totally desert their villages leaving the violator alone in 
his bura (residence), by joining neighbouring villages or by migrating to far-away 
villages. As a result, the tyrant chief or king will suffer from psychological, social 
and economic crises, which eventually compels him to flee to a place where his 
people doing the agem are not settled. But as soon as he abandons his bura, the 
people return to their deserted village. 
(4)  When the above means are found impossible, an agem can end in bloodshed. The people 
can finally overthrow a violent leader by capturing him at any time. The tyrant will be 
subjected to punishments, ranging from flogging to expulsion from his village. If he is 
captured he would be ritually flogged, deprived of his property, expelled from his 
quarter and even evicted from his village. These are not the only consequences; his off-
spring will be transformed into a watong section of society. Watong means the lowest 
section of the society, deprived of legitimate claims to be descendants of a noble lineage 
through Očudho, the culture hero. This means that his offspring will never be elected or 
come to power, for their father had once been proven a violator against the respected 
societal norms ordained by the divine ancestor. 
 
As we see, agem is a very important tradition to lay the ground for ‘good 
governance’ within Anyuaa society. Traditionally, the people elect their leaders. 
They debate on the personal qualities of a candidate. They invest a person with 
power when they agree on his leadership qualities. The Anyuaa thus evaluate, 
criticize, advise, and also remove a bad leader from his position when they find 
him a transgressor, a norm breaker. 
The conflict between “tradition” and “modernity” 
It is a generally excepted fact that a culture is or cannot be a ‘pure’, closed, 
entity. Cultures influence each other. As the UNESCO report No Culture is an 
                                                     
5  People born on the same day, within the same week or in a month are called “teiieng” (same in age-
grade). They are regarded as sharing common fate and fortunes. Attachment, considerateness and 
endearment among age-mates are much stronger than between brothers or sisters. The intimacy is 
cultivated from childhood. They grow up eating in groups at fireplaces. They also feast together at 
ceremonies such as weddings, based on age and on “teiieng” affiliations. They go in groups to hunt, 
fight or to catch fish. If one quarrels with another person his or her age-mate considers the quarrel as 
his or her own concern. One selects a lover or marries a wife through the mediation of his/her 
“teiieng”. One may know the secrets of another through “teiieng”. Based on the tradition, “teiiengs” of 
an accused leader often ally with him in a time of agem. 
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Island (1995) states: “All cultures are influenced by and in turn influence other 
cultures. Nor is any culture changeless, invariant or static. All cultures are in a 
state of constant flux, driven by both internal and external forces. These forces 
may be accommodating, harmonious, benign and based on voluntary actions, or 
they may be involuntary, the result of violent conflict, force, domination and the 
exercise of illegitimate power.”  
Contacts of the Anyuaa with the central state led to culture change. These 
contacts have usually been to be punitive and violent, based on misunderstand-
ings and disregard for local ideologies. This was especially the case since 1974, 
when a military government assumed power. As oral data and written sources 
indicate, centre-periphery relationships during the feudalist monarchy of Ethiopia 
(1883-1974) were by far better than contacts at present. During the feudalist 
monarchy, the central state approached the Anyuaa indirectly and differently, 
partly for reasons related to the unsettled controversies on the international 
boundary lines between the Anglo-Egyptian Colonial Government of the Sudan 
and the Ethiopian government (Bahru 1990, Johnson 1981, 1986). While in 
imperial times new things were introduced to the Anyuaa, such as a taxation 
system and the balabbat structure of appointed local leadership, they retained 
most of their internal autonomy. Some chiefs and kings were appointed as balab-
bats. Showing fidelity to the Emperor, collecting taxes, keeping peace according 
to their own ways were the main requirements. Though there were incidents of 
resistance, the Anyuaa culture continued to be more or less undisturbed until 
1974. As Abbink (2002: 155-156) writes, 
Up to 1974, imperial policy towards the smaller and politically less relevant populations on 
the margins of the empire was marked by a situation of what one might call ‘tolerated differ-
ence. … For example, they became part of the political economy of this state through 
indirect rule (via balabbats or local chiefs). … Ethno-cultural differences and indigenous 
social organization were largely tolerated in the imperial system of governance: There were 
no mass campaigns of forced conversion or abandonment of customary law, traditional 
socio-political organization, or ‘harmful custom’ as long as political loyalty was shown to 
the centre. 
Nevertheless, the creation of balabbats led to a first reorientation of political 
thinking among the Anyuwaa. 
Problems developed markedly when the military socialist Derg government 
took power in 1974. Its socialist policies and ways of implementation were 
radical, naïve and wasteful. First and foremost, “Marxists” as they were, they 
considered indigenous systems of knowledge and traditions in Ethiopia as 
“backward elements” that had nothing to contribute to progress as they saw it. 
Therefore, the Derg engaged in eradicating what they saw as hualaq’er-bahiloch 
(“backward cultures”) and abolishing ‘reactionary forces’, and tried to wipe out 
traditional beliefs and practices. In this context, the Anyuaa were labelled as 
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“violent”, “unruly” and “aggressive”. Their traditional institutions, customary 
laws, the agem tradition, knowledge, values, beliefs, rituals, etc. were defined as 
irrelevant. Traditional authorities were seen as seen as “anti-revolutionary ele-
ments”, so they repressed and isolated chiefs, divine kings, spiritual leaders and 
even elders. Symbolic objects and emblems of power kept as marks of identity 
and sovereignty were either confiscated, burned or thrown into rivers (Kurimoto 
1997, Dereje 2004). The values of agem went through demythologization and 
endured delegitimization and ridicule when qualified as a feature of “backward-
ness”. Minority groups in Ethiopia were generally called anasa (in Amharic), 
meaning “small in number” in a literal sense, but “inferior” in its deeper sense. 
As an effect, the people fell into confusion. Cadres of the ruling party and 
government authorities misinterpreted inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts, regarding 
them as manifestations of “primitive communities in the tribal stage”. So in these 
contexts, negative images towards ethnic groups and destructive tendencies 
towards cultures of the periphery intensified. Changes and discontinuities in 
administrative structures affected internal stability. Opposing beliefs and interests 
brought up cultural conflicts and destabilization. 
The Derg also settled about 60,000 people with a different language and 
culture from draught-stricken parts of northern Ethiopia in Anyuaa-land. As a 
consequence, the Anyuaa were forced to integrate into the new villages of the 
settlers, and to abandon their villages and the burial places of ancestors behind 
their homesteads. In the view of the indigenous people, these acts of coercion 
were damaging and disturbing and had to be checked through agem. The Anyuaa 
were criticizing such anomalies, which created gaps between the indigenous 
people and government cadres and also settlers.  
The SPLA/M (the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement), backed and 
condoned by the Derg and then after 1991 to some extent by the EPRDF-led 
government to use Anyuaa land as a spring-board and training ground, frequently 
attacked the Anyuaa from 1983 to 2003. But whenever the latter tried to defend 
themselves, or to appeal to the government when in need of protection, the 
government repressed the Anyuaa by force. Surprisingly, the Ethiopian govern-
ments endorsed the SPLA to administer the peripheral peoples in the Gambela 
region, including the Anyuaa. The Ethiopian government opened four camps at 
different sites in Anyuaa-land for refugees from southern Sudan, numbering 
about 350,000 in 1985-1987 (currently estimated at 85,000 (IRIN 2003). Refu-
gees were involved in the massive clearance of land and forest. Especially Nuer 
refugees from southern Sudan were allowed to settle in Anyuaa-land, quickly 
gaining Ethiopian citizenship. The future of the Anyuaa remained jeopardized 
even after the fall of the Derg government. As recent reports indicate, more than 
20,000 armed pastoral Nuer have crossed into Anyuaa territories up to 2005. 
 
 Construction and de-composition of ‘violence’ and peace, Ethiopia 91 
Many Anyuaa lost their land and were forced to live as refugees in other districts, 
pushing other neighbouring people. 
After the fall of the Derg in May, 1991, ethnic ideology blended with a sort of 
‘revolutionary democracy’ promoted by the new EPRDF-led Ethiopian govern-
ment replaced Marxist ideology. The new government also came to accept a 
similar policy to that of the Derg regime toward the SPLA/M. According to oral 
data and written documents, the SPLA accused the Anyuaa before the govern-
ment of any complaints made against it. On the other hand, the Anyuaa sought 
protection from “their government” about the SPLA’s attacks against them, as 
for example, in the case of the SPLA killing ca. 120 Anyuaa in villages in 
Punydho in 1989 (Kurimoto 1997). The Anyuaa often report to the government 
following a killing; however, the blame was always put on them. As a result they 
were often subjected to further harassment by the Ethiopian authorities.  
In sum, the more the responses of the government authorities in the last three 
decades has been destructive, the more the psychological and physical damage 
was done to the Anyuaa. But the agem procedure could not be followed. The 
Anyuaa tend to resist against unjust government actions and negative stereotypes 
informed by their tradition of agem. If it were not seen as harmful culture (in 
Amharic goji-bahil) and if it had not been negatively used in stigmatizing the 
people as “lawless”, “unruly”, “rebellious” etc., many of its aspects could have 
been utilized in discussing or restoring local order and even in culturally oriented 
development. The indigenous legal political culture based on ideas of a popular 
control of power was continuously sidelined and devalued in the past three 
decades. But agem, being a culturally structured tradition of just government and 
limits to authority, has been an authentic marker of Anyuaa identity. It could 
have been drawn upon in cultivating mutual respect between cultural and politi-
cal traditions and in devising developmental initiatives in the region.  
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Introduction 
The island of Mauritius, located in the Indian Ocean roughly eight hundred kilo-
metres east of Madagascar, has an interesting mixture of ethnicities originating 
from India, Africa, China and Europe. During the colonial days of Mauritius the 
different ethnicities strongly corresponded with the social hierarchy of its popu-
lation, with the whites, the Franco-Mauritian planter elite, at the top. 
The independence of Mauritius from the United Kingdom in 1968 changed the 
social hierarchy and influenced the elite position of the Franco-Mauritians. The 
prospect of an independent Mauritius, the shift of political power to the Hindus 
originating from the Indian subcontinent – creating a Hindu political elite- and 
the fear of losing their economic privileges, triggered the exodus of a substantial 
number of Franco-Mauritians. Nearby South Africa where white minority rule 
was still prevailing was an important destination, and the east of South Africa 
nowadays has an estimated Franco-Mauritian community of more than 10,000 
(Boudet 2001: 1). 
Today the Franco-Mauritians constitute about one percent of the total popula-
tion of 1.2 million, and fear over Hindus bringing the country to bankruptcy 
proved unjustified, and losing their economic privileges and plantations never 
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became reality. On the contrary, the last few decades have been rather prosperous 
for Mauritius. In the 1960s the island was considered a hopeless case in which 
the future of its inhabitants was at stake, because of a rapidly increasing popula-
tion and an economy mainly relying on one single product: sugar, very suscepti-
ble to world market prices. The first decade of independence was difficult indeed, 
but from the 1980s onwards two newly emerging economic pillars, tourism and 
the textile industry, grew at a fast rate, making Mauritius into an Indian Ocean 
equivalent of the Asian Tigers. Franco-Mauritian businesses benefited impor-
tantly from this diversification, investing heavily in luxurious hotel resorts and 
the textile industry. Although losing most of their direct political power with the 
island’s independence in 1968, new economic opportunities sustained the 
Franco-Mauritian elite position, and until today they have remained an important 
factor in Mauritian society – especially in the private sector (Eriksen 1998: 19, 
63). 
In the context of this transformation of a colonial society to an independent, 
democratic society with a majority of non-whites and significant global and 
regional changes, processes of Franco-Mauritian elite maintenance, and their 
correlation with ethnicity, are worthwhile to study. How do Franco-Mauritians 
sustain loyalties from other parts of the Mauritian society? Do they downplay 
their “white” and ethnic identity, because of its negative association with the 
colonial days? What happened to the social hierarchy of the island? 
Before taking up the Franco-Mauritian case study in more detail, however, I 
will summarize some important aspects of elite theories in order to enhance our 
understanding of the current state of affairs of the Franco-Mauritian elite posi-
tion. It will increase also our understanding of the mechanisms involved in 
maintaining their important role in the social hierarchy of Mauritius. 
Theorizing elite cultures 
In anthropology, relatively little attention is paid to elite groups (Marcus 2004: 
633). In other domains of social sciences, especially political science and sociol-
ogy, we find more contributions devoted to the roles of elites in contemporary 
societies. Theory coming from these domains, combined with anthropological 
studies of elites, will, nevertheless, give a clear picture of mechanisms involved 
in maintaining and sustaining an elite position and culture. 
Below I specifically focus on a few important aspects of elite theory that are 
highly relevant for studying the Franco-Mauritians. First, I explore some theories 
on the interaction of elites with the rest of society in order to create and sustain 
loyalties between them and other segments of society. Second, I elaborate on the 
dual aspects of being an elite group and an ethno-cultural community, because 
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apart from the social and political roles elites often coincide with other ways of 
group categorization or definition, like nobility and, in this paper, ethnicity.  
 
Privileged 
Elites appear in many different ways. Chris Shore and Stephen Nugent (Shore & 
Nugent 2002: 4) argue that we should use qualifying adjectives such as “busi-
ness” (in the case of the Franco-Mauritians), “military”, “governing”, “modern-
izing”, “religious”, “academic”, or “bureaucratic” to distinguish between the 
different varieties of elites. Other authors refer to the varieties as “functional elite 
diversity” (Dogan 2003: 1). These are useful additions because we have to take 
into consideration that different societies indeed engender different elites. Also, 
old and newly emerging elites significantly impact each other’s position in 
society. 
Despite the above-mentioned “qualifying adjectives” and parallels with other 
ways of belonging, elites share similarities. First, an elite has privileged access 
to, or control over, particular resources which may be mobilized in the exercise 
of power (Woods 1998: 2108). For purposes of clarification, I would like to add: 
an elite is a collectivity of persons who occupy commanding positions in some 
important sphere of social life, and who share a variety of interests arising from 
similarities of training, experience, public duties, and way of life (Cohen 1981: 
xvi). Second, members of an elite are linked by a network of social or profes-
sional relations, performed in exclusive back-region spaces, and which may be 
used for recruitment, or for the transmission of influence or patronage. It is to 
note that many scholars who are predominantly focussing on formal networks 
with a high degree of visibility – due to high perceptibility data are easier acces-
sible – fail to spot the importance of informal and other sources of networking 
(Camp 2003: 143, 149). Third, elites are socially and discursively constructed as 
an elite, either by themselves or by others. Woods suggests, though, that this 
model should not be adopted as a hard-and-fast definition of elites, but rather that 
by acknowledging that elites posses the above characteristics a new perspective 
can be opened on the study of elites (Woods 1998: 2108). 
Next to the issues underlined in the definitions, an important pursuit of elites is 
to consolidate their position at the top of the social hierarchy over time. Elite 
groups therefore have to or tend to encourage the social cohesion of the group 
itself and its relation with, and acceptation by, the rest of society. These intra- en 
inter-group relations are often reinvented throughout history, in order to prolong 
the elite’s position. Abner Cohen (1981: xiii) states the following: 
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To carry out its universalistic functions, i.e., its services to the public, an elite is forced to 
organize itself particularistically, to keep itself in existence, and enhance its image. Con-
versely, an initially particularistic elite is forced to seek legitimacy for its high status by 
assuming universalistic functions. The same organization is thus evolved to serve both 
universalistic and particularistic ends, and elites can therefore be located on a continuum 
from the most particularistic, least universalistic, at one end, to the most universalistic, least 
particularistic, at the other. In time, an elite may move from one end of the continuum to the 
other, and history repeatedly records the rise and fall of elites. 
In other words, “… the justice (or fairness) of an elite system affects its 
operation and stability over time” (Marcus 1983: 70). According to Cohen, the 
problem of finding a balance between universalistic and particularistic functions 
concerns not just elites but social groups generally. However, the contradiction 
between the universalistic and particularistic functions at the heart of group 
organizations is most evident at the higher levels of social hierarchy, notably 
among elite groups, Cohen (1981: xv, xvi) argues. Shore and Nugent state that in 
order to constitute itself as an elite in the first place, an elite group must develop 
its own particularistic set of interests, norms and practices to differentiate itself 
from the masses (Shore & Nugent 2002: 2, 3).  
 
Vertical loyalties 
Looking at it from a social pyramid point of view, as social hierarchy – and fairly 
similar to universalistic and particularistic functions, but more precisely focussed 
on the specific actions and existing social networks – elites have to maintain 
vertical and horizontal loyalties. An elite group, which by its very nature is only 
a small minority of society, needs support for its existence from wider parts of 
society. At least, the elite group needs consent of the non-elites, subordinate 
and/or lower classes, which is required for perpetuating its position over the long 
run. Meindert Fennema refers to this phenomenon as “vertical loyalties” 
(Fennema 2003: 29).1 
Different elites often require different mechanisms to achieve vertical loyalty. 
A political elite, for instance, obtains loyalty from its supporters by backing their 
ideology and/or demands. Fennema argues that a political elite is in need of a 
morality, because the supporters can relate to morality along vertical lines and 
can control this morality, because they share it. Political elites which are inclined 
importantly towards professionalism instead of morality do have difficulties in 
gaining sufficient loyalty, because professionalism requires experts. Between 
experts (the elite) and the laymen (the elite’s supporters) there are no vertical 
lines: the expert does not recognize the opinion of the layman and the layman 
does not share knowledge with the expert, like they can share morality (Fennema 
2003: 29).  
                                                     
1  Fennema refers to these loyalties in relation to democracy, or “matrix democracy” as he calls it, and its 
political elite, but it shows similarities with elites in general.  
 
 Maintaining an elite position in Mauritius 97 
In the case of business elites, they can to a certain extent maintain their posi-
tion by staying low-profile and avoiding too much attention. Thus vertical loyalty 
is less required, because unlike a political elite a business elite does not rely on 
the electorate. However, some sort of vertical loyalty is always required, and 
business elites have to look for other means to achieve it, because in contrast to a 
political elite they do not have a “natural” group of supporters. A business elite 
can obtain vertical loyalty by, for instance, financially supporting a community 
and/or social work.  
A few things regarding vertical loyalties have to be taken into account, though. 
First, frequently no intentional strategies are behind obtaining vertical loyalties: 
supporting community work may just be a charitative gesture to the less fortunate 
and an element of a specific elite culture, which eventually may help to construct 
vertical loyalties. Second, elite groups need to have a sense of having something 
in common and/or awareness of the interdependence among social groups in 
order to perceive the functioning of vertical loyalties (Reis & Moore 2005: 5).  
 
Horizontal loyalties 
Elites have their own interests and need to further if not maximize their own 
material rewards and privileges. These “particular” interests are, often, secretly 
performed, because in liberal-democratic societies these are rather incompatible 
with the principle of equality of opportunity usually upheld by the formal con-
stitution and ideology of society, and therefore cannot be advanced by a formal 
association. Cohen (1981) argued that in the West, elites are not recognized as 
such, i.e., as part of the recognized social structure. The members of the group 
are not acknowledged as a group, but only as a category of persons who have 
achieved their status by merit within a highly competitive system. However, 
Cohen continues, those who earn their way into elite status soon begin to coordi-
nate their actions in an increasingly systematic and consistent way. They also 
seek to perpetuate their elite status and privileges by socializing and training their 
children to succeed them (Cohen 1981: xvi). These actions of elites are per-
formed in the exclusive back-region spaces, in which a network of social or pro-
fessional relations links the elite, held together by horizontal loyalties. 
Especially the horizontal loyalties can be studied by examining the elites’ 
social networks. The interests and functions that cannot be advanced by formal 
associations are usually articulated by kinship, friendship, and a host of other 
primary relationships (Cohen 1981: xvi-xvii). Studying how elites ensure their 
survival requires close attention to their kinship structures and networks (Shore 
& Nugent 2002: 13). Therefore, network analysis will provide an understanding 
what these primary relationships are; how elites operate and ensure their survival; 
whether its members share the same (economic) interests, or whether feelings of 
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belonging are sufficient to maintain horizontal loyalty; and what the tasks of 
important community members are. 
At a horizontal level – and essential for understanding local power structures – 
there is also co-operation and/or rivalry between different elites. First, formal and 
informal networks linking elites with different adjectives (i.e. political and busi-
ness elites) often necessitate some sort of inter-elite horizontal loyalty, because 
they share common interests and goals. However, sharing common interests and 
having inter-elite horizontal loyalties may, nonetheless, in many cases require a 
certain degree of secrecy, because different elites may have different vertical 
loyalties along, for instance, political and/or ethnic lines which do not correspond 
with inter-elite horizontal loyalties. Second, a significant element of the inter-
elite horizontal level is rivalry and competition: different elite groupings often 
are more occupied with competing interests and defending elite statuses against 
other elites (Case 2003: 250) than with the interdependence with other social 
groups (Reis & Moore 2005: 161). 
 
Ethnicity 
The correlation between elite status and ethnicity and colour of skin is significant 
in many non-western states: South Africa and Brazil and their domination of 
“whites” in many elite segments (Reis & Moore 2005: 34: 157), Southeast Asian 
countries like the Philippines and Indonesia and their small Chinese business 
elites (Case 2003: 266), Nigeria and its aristocracy from the North (Daloz 2003: 
275), and Mauritius with its powerful Franco-Mauritian business elite are cases 
in point.  
Ethnic affiliation often bears a strong ‘primordial’ sense of belonging; and 
with ethnicity coming into play, vertical and horizontal loyalties of specific elite 
groups often have a strong overlap with their specific ethnic background. I shall 
illustrate this with the Mauritian case, where the overlap of ethnicity with vertical 
as well as horizontal loyalties is undoubtedly present. In the first place, business 
elites and political elites alike receive vertical loyalty along ethnic and religious 
lines. The political elites as the representatives of the different parties are aware 
of the ethnic composition of the twenty-one constituencies of Mauritius (one 
counts for the island of Rodrigues, part of the republic of Mauritius). The politi-
cians make use of this information in their party’s advantage by putting up 
candidates for elections with the same ethnic background as the largest ethnic 
group of the constituency. Slightly in contradiction with the strong relation 
between ethnic affiliation and politics, and really interesting regarding my study 
and unique for African sub-Saharan countries is the fact that the prime minister 
from 2003 till 2005 was a white, the Franco-Mauritian Paul Bérenger. Bérenger 
had been in Mauritian politics for over three decades and had no strong links 
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with the Franco-Mauritian business elites (often Bérenger was even in conflict 
with them), and could therefore establish trust among large numbers of the 
electorate, crossing the instituted ethnic boundaries.2  
In certain cases, business elites establish vertical loyalties along ethnic lines by 
employing ethnic affiliates, and thus creating mono-ethnic workforces (Salverda 
2002). Nevertheless the Franco-Mauritian community is considered an elite com-
munity par excellence because they lack members belonging to the working 
class. The Franco-Mauritians are socially stratified with a wealthy group of 
businessmen and landowners at the top, employing most middle-class Franco-
Mauritians and, thus, creating a strong sense of vertical loyalty within the 
‘ethnic’ group. However, the Franco-Mauritian case and their strong association 
with white minority rule in the colonial days and showing vertical loyalty along 
ethnic lines also bears a risk, as illustrated in the case of South Africa. During 
much of the twentieth century the white Afrikaner elite was concerned with the 
poor in their own segment, but with the end of the Apartheid regime the Afri-
kaner elite peacefully negotiated away its position of ethnic dominance. This 
eventually meant that the poorer Afrikaners were left to fend for themselves 
(Reis & Moore 2005: 171, 172). The Catholic Franco-Mauritians do obtain verti-
cal loyalty along religious lines also from the predominantly Catholic Creole 
community. For instance, many Creoles held jobs in the administrative machin-
ery during colonialism and in the wake of independence, and out of fear of Hindu 
dominance in general and losing their jobs to the Hindus in particular, they 
supported the anti-independence front, which was importantly controlled by 
Franco-Mauritians. Vertical loyalty was, thus, created by religious affiliation, 
with a strong component of fear – fear of the dominance of another religion 
(Simmons 1982: 98, 144).3  
Moreover, multi-ethnic societies with a strong overlap of elite status and 
ethnicity may cause friction, rivalry and competition between different ethnici-
ties. First, rivalry and competition with a strong emphasis on ethnic belonging 
may occur in societies with a variety of elites strongly identified with ethnic 
groups. Inter-elite horizontal loyalty may be weakened or even undermined by 
the lack of trust between one ethnic group and another (Daloz 2003: 277). Verti-
cal loyalties of ethnic elites between them and the majority of their ethnic group 
may even further undermine any inter-elite horizontal loyalties, as shown in the 
tense relationship between the Franco-Mauritian business elite and the Hindu 
political elite. Second, particular ethnic minorities coinciding with a group of 
                                                     
2  In 2005 Bérenger and his alliance lost the elections. The campaign preceding the elections was often 
fuelled by members of the opposition with ethnic arguments and references to the prime minister’s 
white skin colour. 
3  Especially the vertical loyalty between the Franco-Mauritians and the Creoles (often put together by a 
shared Catholic faith), who had a master-slave relationship, is very interesting and needs further study. 
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power holders may cause frictions and explosive conditions. In particular 
frictions may be provoked because horizontal loyalty sustaining an elite position 
requires some secrecy, which interferes with the visibility of ethnic markers. The 
group of power holders is easily identified and distinguished from the others, 
which Amy Chua further illustrates by global similarities in clashes and practice 
when there is a strong correlation between elite status and ethnicity (Chua 2003: 
7, 16, 17). The example of the Afrikaners is a clear case of circumventing too 
strong a correlation with an elite favouring their own ethnic community and, 
thus, prevailing elite position over ethnic affiliation. 
The Franco-Mauritians 
Mauritius was uninhabited before the European explorers set foot on the island in 
the latter half of the sixteenth century. The Dutch were the first Europeans to 
colonize it in 1598 and named it Mauritius, after Stadhouder Maurice of Nassau. 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Dutch abandoned Mauritius, and 
the island was left idle for some years. The French then took possession and 
called it Île de France. The French period was important for Mauritian history, 
because with the French the cultivation of the island really started: they planted 
large areas of the land with sugarcane; and to work the fields they brought in 
slaves from Madagascar, other parts of Africa and their Indian colonies. The 
descendants of these French colonizers, named after them, are the present 
Franco-Mauritians (Salverda 2002: 4, 5). 
In 1810 the British conquered the island from the French, renaming it Mauri-
tius. The British left the existing social order of Mauritius unchanged and never 
imposed their own culture upon the inhabitants. The Franco-Mauritians were, 
therefore, able to maintain their French culture and elite position during the more 
than 150 years of British colonial rule, until Mauritian independence in 1968. 
Nevertheless, the British period was important for Mauritian history: in 1835 
slavery was abolished, causing their new status as free men, and also leadng to 
the move of slaves away from the plantations. A new chapter in Mauritian his-
tory started: in order to continue sugar production, large numbers of indentured 
labourers were shipped in from the British colony of India. Nowadays their des-
cendants comprise the majority of Mauritians (MacMillan 2000: 9, 10; Eriksen 
1998: 40-70). 
The Franco-Mauritians formed the politico-economic elite of the island 
throughout most of Mauritian history, even, as noted above, during British 
occupation. Yet, at that time they were never the absolute top of Mauritian politi-
cal power, because that was the small group of British colonizers. Other Mauri-
tian social groups, however, undermined the Franco-Mauritians’ elite position 
during the colonial days: from the 1930s onwards a group of highly educated 
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Hindus, in particular, started to challenge the secure position of the Franco-
Mauritians – especially in the political sphere, with the introduction of mass 
politics. Politics along ethnic lines could eventually give Hindu politicians the 
majority of votes, with their community counting for more than fifty percent of 
the population (Simmons 1982: 50, 52). The Franco-Mauritians had seriously to 
fear for their role and position in society. The independence of Mauritius in 1968 
was the final result of this process, with the Hindus as the most important sup-
porters of independence and most Franco-Mauritians as vigorous opponents.  
Today the composition of the Mauritian population is roughly as follows: 
Hindus (50%), Creoles4 (30%), Muslims (16%), Sino-Mauritians (3%) and 
Franco-Mauritians (1%) (cf. Eriksen 1998: 15).5 And although the independence 
of Mauritius stirred the social and political situation to a large extent, it did not 
significantly change the economic power of the Franco-Mauritians. They were, 
and remain to this day, the owners of the major sugar-cane plantations of the 
country – the backbone of the Mauritian economy in its colonial heydays – and 
are represented in all other important domains of the Mauritian economy 
(Eriksen 1998: 63). Conclusions drawn from studying elite change in East 
Central Europe, but also in other regions, state that political elites are more 
affected by sudden social and political change than economic elites (Bozoki 
2003: 220, 221; Dogan 2003: 13). This is confirmed by the Franco-Mauritian 
case study. 
The strong economic position of the Franco-Mauritians, however, does not 
imply a total absence of competition in the private sector with other ethnic elites: 
the situation of prosperity and newly emerged business opportunities brought 
growth and wealth to other ethnicities also, and thus increasing competition for 
Franco-Mauritians and their powerful economic position. In particular in the 
textile industry Sino-Mauritians challenged Franco-Mauritian economic power.6 
We have to take the limited size of Mauritius into consideration too, because it 
implies that meetings and confrontations between different social groups are part 
of everyday life. An elite group like the Franco-Mauritians has to consider its 
relationship with the masses carefully in order to sustain its universalistic 
functions and vertical loyalty, because they are confronted with each other and 
                                                     
4  The majority of Creoles are the descendants of slaves and importantly have African ancestors. How-
ever, the Creoles are also referred to as a ‘rest group’, which consequently makes them less ethnically 
homogenous than the other ethnic groups. The Creoles, although predominantly associated with 
African and Malagasy ancestry, can be considered a mixed group with a large variety of features, skin 
colours and ancestors originating from Europe, India and China. 
5  According to M. Dinan (pers. comm.; cf. Dinan 1986), there has been quite some conversion from 
Hindus to Christian churches, especially to Pentecostalism. Since Hindus converting to Christian 
churches will become part of the heterogeneous Creole rest group, I adjusted the percentages given by 
T.H. Eriksen to the present situation. 
6  The Sino-Mauritians are, apart from the Franco-Mauritians, the only ethnic community that have few 
or no members belonging to the working class (Eriksen 1998). 
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on a daily base. Compared to large nation-states like South Africa where despite 
the growing exposure of elites to other groups since the end of apartheid, there is 
still little close contact between these groups, and Bangladesh where there is a 
significant difference between national and local elites and their direct social 
interaction with the poor masses (Reis & Moore 2005: 111, 162), contact be-
tween the elites and the masses is most certainly of a different order in Mauritius. 
 
History 
In studying the Franco-Mauritians, and elites in general, we have to bear in mind 
the importance of the historical situation. History’s relevance in the Franco-
Mauritian case study is twofold. First, a historical approach is required for study-
ing the balance between acquiring and maintaining vertical and horizontal loyal-
ties. Second, we have to consider it as context: the white Franco-Mauritians came 
to power in an era of European colonialism, and until now they play an important 
role in Mauritian society. By studying the present situation we can, therefore, 
never leave out the past. Clear examples of the past impacting on the present 
situation are the historically embedded Franco-Mauritian transnational networks 
linking Mauritius with France and South Africa.  
Many central figures in Mauritian history are related to the Franco-Mauritian 
community (MacMillan 2000). Consequently, the development of the country is 
also related to Franco-Mauritian forefathers, at least to the ones who were in 
control of development. It is surprising how Franco-Mauritians stress their 
historical contribution; because of the atrocities of slavery their history is one full 
of tensions – after all the perpetrators were in many cases the ancestors of the 
Franco-Mauritians. However, my impression is that slavery is just left aside in 
their historical (self-)representation, and the rest of history is used as an impor-
tant tool of justifying their presence in Mauritius. 
Today the Franco-Mauritians, as a small minority, often have the feeling of 
being squeezed by other communities and of being “somehow a vanishing 
species”, as a description by the Franco-Mauritians by the French writer J.M.G. 
Le Clezio (of Franco-Mauritian descent himself) goes.7 Thus history is appealed 
to justify the presence of the Franco-Mauritian ethnic community in a more 
general, universalistic sense. Referring to the input of Franco-Mauritian ancestors 
in the creation of Mauritian society – for instance, the development of different 
Mauritian towns, including the capital Port Louis – will demonstrate the histori-
cal importance of Franco-Mauritians to the other communities.  
History also seems to be important in maintaining horizontal loyalty, within 
the elite of the community. Vertical loyalty between different social segments of 
the Franco-Mauritian community is also obtained through the use of history. 
                                                     
7  Letter in possession of the author. 
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Uncertainty over what the future will bring is undesirable as a means to keep the 
community together. History seems better to function as a resource, because in 
the colonial period the Franco-Mauritian community had more political and 
economic power – nowadays, as a community, they lack direct political power. 
Many Franco-Mauritians had highly “civilized” manners and a culture of French 
orientation that clearly set them apart from other Mauritians, and even the 
middle-class segment of the community ranked far higher in the social hierarchy 
of the island than they do now. These aspects act upon the present Franco-
Mauritians as (still) belonging to an elite culture. It may also be less problematic 
to relate to a culture that could more clearly make a distinction between itself and 
others in the past. Today the Franco-Mauritian community and its culture, which 
in a globalizing world – where Mauritians of all communities are most influ-
enced by French television programmes – is less able to set itself strongly apart 
as being the only one with a “civilized” (French) culture and manners, and which 
has to compete with newly emerged elites. 
A clear example of the functioning of history – and an ingredient for horizon-
tal and vertical loyalty within the community – is the knowledge of families, 
their ties and genealogies. Tracing back family genealogies is a common charac-
teristic in Franco-Mauritian circles anyhow, and many can even trace back their 
aristocratic ancestry to pre-French revolution nobility. Consequently, the bounda-
ries of the Franco-Mauritian community are set by family names, which lack 
traces of non-white blood. Since the community numbers around 10,000 only, 
most Franco-Mauritians know which families are included in the community and 
which are excluded. Often, they even know which families, and branches of 
families, are aristocratic and/or rich, because the community has a stratification 
within itself. Many, but by no means all, of the upper segment of the Franco-
Mauritians claim aristocratic descent, while the less well off middle class are 
considered “the commoners” (there are non-well off aristocratic Franco-Mauri-
tians also). Until recently these two groups did not marry and socially mix 
(Eriksen 1998: 16). I would argue that social stratification is not as strict as it 
used to be, indeed. Nevertheless, parents will in certain cases still disapprove of 
children’s marriage partners, because of the status of the partner’s family. 
 
Business 
Nowadays in Mauritius the Franco-Mauritians should be qualified primarily as a 
“business” elite: they cannot be labelled with another adjective since they lost 
their elite position in other domains of Mauritian society. “Business elite” is a 
suitable term for the Franco-Mauritians since they are still today an extremely 
powerful economic factor in the country. Franco-Mauritians control a large 
number of the top 100 companies (Business 2004). They control the largest and 
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oldest bank of the country, the Mauritius Commercial Bank (MCB). Interest-
ingly, in a globalizing world Franco-Mauritian and other Mauritian businesses 
have predominantly local competition. Mauritius counts only a few multi-nation-
als, because the Mauritian market is considered too small by most multi-nationals 
to begin a local branch. Multi-nationals are, nevertheless, represented on the 
island, yet primarily as a franchise or a joint venture with local (Franco-)Mauri-
tian companies.  
Globalizing trends, however, do influence the economic state of affairs in 
Mauritius importantly. During the colonial days the main economic product, 
sugar, was subject to the world market. The prosperous situation of independent 
Mauritius was largely due to increasing numbers of international tourists and 
Western markets for textile products. The last couple of years the Mauritian 
economy seems to be in a decline, especially in the textile industry, where global 
competition of China – outcompeting the whole world in this sector – is felt 
badly; the impressive economic growth rates of the 1980s and the 1990s proved 
impossible to sustain over the long run. 
Due to the powerful economic position of the Franco-Mauritians the majority 
of them is relatively well off, and, although members of the community argue 
that there are also poor Franco-Mauritians, I have not come across extremely 
poor members – belonging to the community seems to correlate with a certain 
standard of living. The only unemployed Franco-Mauritian I met still has a maid. 
He does not own a car and has most certainly withdrawn largely out of public life 
and lives in an area of the island where there are hardly any other Franco-
Mauritians living, a non-affluent area with a mixture of industrial and residential 
functions. By Franco-Mauritian standards he would be considered not well-off 
but with either his own savings, support from his family and/or an inheritance he 
is able to maintain a certain standard of living.  
Apart from the example above the Franco-Mauritians have the ability to create 
jobs for the community; the majority of the Franco-Mauritians do easily find 
employment in the private sector. A Franco-Mauritian respondent, who pointed 
out the virtual absence of unemployment in his community, further illustrated 
this ability. Along the social, ethnic and family networks of the community job 
opportunities are enhanced, and an elite status is sustained in a society where 
there is poverty and unemployment. In the case of the Franco-Mauritians creating 
jobs seems to be an important feature for maintaining an elite status and, as 
mentioned before, creating vertical loyalty within the ethnic community. 
Yet, in post-colonial Mauritius there is increasing pressure on Franco-Mauri-
tian businesses to open up their ranks for other ethnicities and implement a com-
petitive system. Implementing a competitive system is ideologically grounded 
upon liberal and capitalistic business principles in which merit prevails over 
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origin – ethnic origin in the Mauritian case. Influenced by pressure, many large 
Franco-Mauritian business groups have nowadays members of other ethnicities 
on their boards or at senior management level, in contrast to the largest Muslim 
and Sino-Mauritian business groups who only have high ranking employees of 
their own community (Business 2004). One Franco-Mauritian respondent stated 
that members of other ethnicities on the board are essentially puppets: They have 
no real voice in the decision-making process, because in the end the Franco-
Mauritians own the bulk of the shares and are, essentially, in control of the 
company. A Franco-Mauritian CEO of an important Franco-Mauritian business 
group, nonetheless, in an interview underlined the change towards a competitive 
system by stating that he wanted a greater separation between the shareholders 
and the managers. Cousins and nephews used to be and often still are in manage-
ment positions, but he wanted them to compete with others over the positions. In 
the eyes of the CEO the process of change is not proceeding fast enough, 
although he stated the father-son situation is definitely over since the end of the 
colonial days. In a sense, it is a defensive reaction to maintain vertical loyalty: 
The elite group needs acceptation of society at large and therefore grants the 
demands of society – vertical loyalty is reinvented under pressure. 
The situation of cousins and nephews in management positions is a clear 
example of Mauritian life, which is still strongly family-orientated. Therefore, 
most businesses are family-run businesses. For instance, only a few Franco-
Mauritian families – and not even all branches of these families – control the 
largest Franco-Mauritian businesses. One could argue that in a sense, the over-
whelming presence of Franco-Mauritians in the private sector is nothing more 
than doing what every other business or company does in Mauritius: running a 
family business. In a reaction to opposition to the overwhelming presence – and 
simultaneously a plea for the universalistic function of the Franco-Mauritians – a 
member of a powerful Franco-Mauritian family made an interesting remark. He 
said that Franco-Mauritians are better equipped for running businesses, because 
apart from the Franco-Mauritians there are no other communities reinvesting in 
the country. 
Franco-Mauritian businesses obtain vertical loyalty by financially supporting 
social and community work, although attaining this loyalty might not be the 
direct intention behind it. Interesting with regard to supporting social and com-
munity work is the following. A Franco-Mauritian woman involved in an alcohol 
and drug rehabilitation centre and raising funds for the centre argued that the 
same companies were always funding the centre, and they are predominantly 
Franco-Mauritian companies. According to her the richest Muslim business 
group never backed her financially, and with Sino-Mauritian companies it only 
works now that a Sino-Mauritian is on the board of the centre and is able to get 
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access to the upper-level of the companies along ethnic Sino-Mauritian networks. 
She finds it remarkable that almost exclusively Franco-Mauritian-owned compa-
nies support social work in general. Her receiving support is not about her shared 
Franco-Mauritian background, as the same companies also support (social) 
organizations and causes with different ethnic signatures. Interestingly, anonym-
ity in these gifts is not considered an option, because the companies financially 
supporting community and social work always entail publicity over their gifts – 
spotlights are required for establishing vertical loyalty.  
 
Social aspects 
A trait of elites is their networks, social and/or professional, performed in exclu-
sive back-region spaces, and which may be used for recruitment, or the transmis-
sion of influence or patronage. The Franco-Mauritians have a few exclusive 
social clubs that may function as back-region spaces. The most well known and 
traditional of these clubs is the Dodo Club in Curepipe, a residential area on the 
higher plateau of the island and populated by large numbers of the Franco-
Mauritian community. 
The Dodo Club was established during the colonial days, in the beginning of 
the twentieth century, when beliefs of ethnic superiority were widespread. At the 
time the Franco-Mauritians were the politico-economic elite of the island, and 
had virtually no competition from other elites. A respondent, and former chair-
man of the club, explained the club was initially founded as an exclusively 
Franco-Mauritian – white – sports clubs, but turned into a social club as well.  
A club like the Dodo Club may function for recruitment, and/or the transmis-
sion of influence or patronage since many Franco-Mauritians meet in an exclu-
sive Franco-Mauritian domain. It is a perfect location to ‘work on’ horizontal and 
vertical loyalties within and between different segments of the Franco-Mauritian 
community. However, one would assume from a universalistic point of view that 
the Dodo Club is an anachronism in present-day Mauritius. Membership of the 
Dodo Club is purely based on ethnic affiliation, skin colour and ancestry, while 
post-colonial Mauritius supposedly is a nation-state with a liberal constitution 
and universal rights. It can be argued, though, that Mauritius is a society strongly 
divided along ethnic lines and many other ethnic communities have social clubs 
with membership excluding other ethnic groups. 
On the one hand, it has not become clear to me whether the members of the 
Dodo Club adhere to the idea of segregation along skin colour and/or are just not 
challenging the club’s anachronistic rules for membership, because they are, for 
example, pleased with the good facilities. Franco-Mauritians opposing the club’s 
rules and regulations may just not want to become a member, or discontinue their 
membership, instead of challenging the rules. For instance, a Franco-Mauritian 
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respondent and non-member of the club refers to the Dodo Club and other non-
Franco-Mauritian single ethnicity clubs as “missed opportunities”, instead of 
challenging their existence. 
On the other hand, the Dodo Club is opening up its premises for tourists play-
ing golf and for open-tournaments for all Mauritians in, for example, squash and 
tennis. At the club there is also discussion going on about opening up the 
membership to other ethnicities, be it either all ethnicities or the fair-skinned and 
elite part of the Creole community, who are considered culturally close to 
Franco-Mauritian culture. The discussion seems to be in the initial stages and it is 
also not clear whether the driving force is a change in the mindsets of (new 
generations of) Franco-Mauritians, challenging ideas of ethnic segregation. It 
may be a ‘survival strategy’ to sustain vertical loyalty with the rest of society, 
since Franco-Mauritians’ perceived peculiarity as being of ‘white blood’ is under 
threat, or purely a defence mechanism of the Dodo Club caused by a decline in 
commitment. For instance, Le Bal du Dodo, the famous New Year’s Eve party of 
the club was cancelled in 2004. It was argued by the manager of the club that the 
reason for cancellation was that the location was ‘too far’ for many Franco-
Mauritians, because they moved from Curepipe and the surrounding areas on the 
higher plateau to the seaside – mainly to areas with already a substantial number 
of Franco-Mauritians: Grand Baie on the north coast and Rivière Noire on the 
west coast. 
 
Ideology 
Apart from sharing purely economic and/or political interests, the coordination, 
socializing and perpetuating of an elite status often comes with sharing a culture. 
Elites may easily draw boundaries along these lines and exclude others from their 
networks. By sharing cultural and ideological characteristics, differences with 
others can be emphasized and, consequently, references to particular economic 
interests can be avoided. 
In Mauritius arguments linked to cultural difference often refer to ethnicity, 
which plays an important role in Mauritian everyday life, although not in a 
purely segregated manner, because many Mauritians live side by side with other 
ethnicities than their own and frequently meet in everyday life.8 Social life, how-
ever, is mostly a family affair in Mauritius, and as a consequence an ethnic affair, 
because most communities in Mauritius are relatively endogamous. Interethnic 
marriages are on the rise, although they still constitute only a small percentage of 
all marriages. Effectively, the dual aspect of being an elite group and ethnic 
community is significant, too, and ethnic loyalty, vertical and horizontal, is often 
                                                     
8  Apart from a few areas, most Mauritian towns, villages and neighbourhoods, as well as many work 
places, are ethnically mixed.  
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used to the advantage of the elite group (Eriksen 1998: 13, 49, 66). Studying the 
Franco-Mauritians therefore requires looking at the interaction between the 
purely financial interests and the safeguarding of the position at the top of the 
social hierarchy of a business elite on the one hand, and at the ideology of 
belonging and safeguarding the existence of an ethno-cultural group on the other. 
The interference of ethnicity and purely economic interests and elite status brings 
about ambiguity, because it may be hard to distinguish between horizontal and 
vertical loyalty solely referring to the elite position and sharing an ethnic identity. 
For example, while the Franco-Mauritian community is socially stratified, it 
has virtually no members belonging to the working class. Are Franco-Mauritians 
protected from becoming impoverished by others in the community? A few 
respondents referred to financial support to poor members of the community, 
which seems to relate to the “ideology of belonging” more than to the “financial 
interests of a business elite”. One respondent mentioned that you would not spot 
poor Franco-Mauritians in the streets, because more affluent Franco-Mauritians 
are ready to assist the unfortunate financially, hence they will not end up in the 
gutter. Another respondent, and wealthy CEO of a large Franco-Mauritian con-
trolled business group, often supports members of his large extended family 
when they come to ask for it. He, however, states that once they misuse his 
helping hand, financial support is not given anymore. 
Another feature related to interaction between the attributes of elite and ethnic 
groups is ‘marriage politics’. Many ethnic groups are known for marrying endo-
gamously, and often have penalties for disobeying the group’s preferred marriage 
policy. Marriage politics of elites are more concentrated on the financial situation 
of the partner and her or his family’s status. In Mauritius it is often difficult to 
make a distinction between the variables of the elite and the ethnic group, be-
cause the correlation between class and ethnicity is strong. In the case of the 
Franco-Mauritians, personal choice in choosing a partner is the practice, although 
the parents and community limit the choice morally and economically. Marrying 
‘down’, class-wise, is considered problematic, and partner choice is preferably 
related to a white skin, ancestors without traces of non-white background and of 
good standing (Eriksen 1998: 60, 125). Given the size of the Franco-Mauritian 
community, many families are related, but also many Franco-Mauritians find 
their spouses abroad, mainly European and South African whites. 
One Franco-Mauritian respondent married a Muslim girl. She comes from a 
wealthy established Mauritian Muslim family, which is traditionally strongly 
present in the private sector. Although an exception within the Franco-Mauritian 
community, their marriage did not cause exclusion from the community. Their 
marriage choice probably upset some members of the community, which the 
respondent actually liked, but it did not stir too much trouble. Most importantly, 
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the partners come from the same social class, and I would also argue that the 
opposition a Franco-Mauritian male marrying outside the community experi-
ences may be less significant than a Franco-Mauritian female marrying outside 
the community. 
The dual aspect of being an elite group and ethnic community can hinder 
sustaining an elite position also, as Amy Chua already showed. In the case of the 
Franco-Mauritians frictions with other segments of Mauritian society are 
predominantly engendered due to their visible ethnic markers and history and 
may interfere with sustaining their elite position. The Franco-Mauritians’ easily 
distinguished feature of their white skin colour, their historical colonial role and 
its negative connotations, their disproportionate economic power and their virtual 
absence in the working class make them an elite group easily to target or con-
demn. The secrecy required for horizontal loyalty is, therefore, difficult to main-
tain for Franco-Mauritians and/or easily focused upon by other social groups. 
 
Transnational networks 
In the case of the Franco-Mauritians it is relevant to ask what the local influence 
and significance is of transnational networks and vertical and horizontal loyalties 
between the Franco-Mauritians in Mauritius, France and South Africa, because 
their networks and contacts crossing the borders of Mauritius go back a long 
time. In a globalizing world the relevance of these transnational networks can be 
significant, as is shown by Amy Chua: Asians in East Africa benefit extremely 
from globalization and market liberalization, partly because of their global 
connections (Chua 2003: 41, 42, 113). This might apply also to Mauritian ethni-
cities. 
In the first half of the twentieth century many Franco-Mauritians migrated to 
South Africa, hoping to improve their lives. Success stories of Franco-Mauritians 
in South Africa were coming back into the Mauritian community, and many were 
tempted to leave also. The ones who migrated were often the relatively poor or, 
as one respondent remarked, Franco-Mauritians with the capacity and the urge to 
succeed in life but not belonging to families who owned the sugar plantations and 
could never reach the higher ranks of people controlling the plantations and 
related companies, because these positions were reserved for the families them-
selves. Many chose to try their luck in the Durban region, where sugarcane was 
one of the primary agricultural products. Especially in the wake of Mauritian 
independence a large number of Franco-Mauritians migrated, increasing the 
importance of transnational networks between the community in Mauritius and 
South Africa (Boudet 2001: 3).  
Until the large influx of Franco-Mauritians into the Durban area in the 1960s – 
firmly establishing a Franco-Mauritian community in South Africa – and the end 
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of colonialism in Mauritius, the contacts were mainly one-way. Franco-Mauri-
tians went from Mauritius to South Africa, probably maintaining some family 
contacts and doing some irregular business with Mauritius. From the 1960s to the 
end of the 1980s contacts were at their peak and were working both ways, also 
due to growing modern communication and air travel. The new government of 
independent Mauritius introduced the exchange control, which meant that Mauri-
tian businesses could only invest locally and not export their money. Prior to 
implementation of the exchange control, networks between Franco-Mauritians in 
Mauritius and South Africa were used to export large sums of money and invest 
in South Africa. After the implementation of the law, money was illegally ex-
ported from Mauritius to South Africa. Horizontal loyalty was required because 
Franco-Mauritians investing outside Mauritius needed reliable persons with 
similar backgrounds in South Africa whom they considered trustworthy for 
supporting their (illegal) activities, investing their money and meanwhile keeping 
it a secret. A Franco-Mauritian respondent in South Africa (a retired chartered 
accountant) told me that he went back and forth between South Africa and 
Mauritius to meet his clients, because the sensitivity of the matter required per-
sonal contact and not letters and phone calls. 
Transnational networks between the two countries were also used for studying 
opportunities. The high level of tertiary education in South Africa attracted many 
young Franco-Mauritians from Mauritius. In Durban, where most of the students 
went, they were taken care of by the local Franco-Mauritian community. Many of 
these students returned after their studies and today the influence of attending 
tertiary education in South Africa is still noticeable in Mauritius: Some Franco-
Mauritian businessmen who studied in South Africa refer to similarities in 
business approach between them and South Africans, which increased the possi-
bilities of business co-operation and joint ventures. Besides, Franco-Mauritians 
married South Africans, which further forged the links between Franco-
Mauritians and white South Africa.  
With the end of the apartheid era, however, the importance of the links 
between the Franco-Mauritian communities in Mauritius and South Africa 
declined. The stream of Franco-Mauritian students coming from Mauritius dried 
up, also due to the deterioration of security in South Africa – as a result a number 
of non-student Franco-Mauritians remigrated to Mauritius, too. The chairman of 
the Mauritian Association in Durban, which was predominantly a Franco-
Mauritian affair, said that until the beginning of the 1990s there were a lot of 
Franco-Mauritian students in Durban, who were additionally involved in the 
Mauritian Association, and consequently bringing a lot more members to events 
organized. These days, he said, it is much more difficult to arrange events and 
raise money for organizing them. 
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Furthermore, the illegal export of money and subsequent investment in South 
Africa came to a halt, because almost simultaneously with the abolition of apart-
heid the Mauritian government abolished the exchange control. Franco-Mauri-
tians could from that moment on officially invest their money outside Mauritius 
and a strong horizontal loyalty involving secrecy over the matter was less 
required. Much of the money invested was withdrawn from South Africa, out of 
fear for the political changes, and invested in Mauritius or elsewhere. A Franco-
Mauritian respondent in Durban cynically mentioned that the Franco-Mauritians, 
who had exported their money to South Africa out of fear of the Hindus taking 
over in Mauritius, were now afraid of the black South Africans taking over in 
South Africa although they were living in the middle of the Mauritian success 
story. The respondent considers the chance for return of Franco-Mauritians 
investing large sums in South Africa slim, because the new generation of Franco-
Mauritians who are in control of the business groups and the capital are less 
focused on South Africa. 
Although most investments are withdrawn from South Africa, business 
contacts between the two countries are still important. Durban has several local 
Franco-Mauritian owned export firms trading with Mauritius and Franco-
Mauritian businesses. Some of the transnational trading links have also adapted 
to the globalizing world: a Franco-Mauritian based in Johannesburg, South 
Africa, trades intensively with his Franco-Mauritian partner in Mauritius. When 
the South African Rand was strong, some products became too expensive for the 
Mauritian market, and the trade shifted towards China and Singapore as suppliers 
for their products.  
France has always been a reference point for the community, and is still an 
important marker of Franco-Mauritian culture. The majority of Franco-Mauri-
tians speak French as their mother tongue and many of my respondents feel 
culturally close to France. Similarly, the former Protestant elite of Curaçao, 
which strongly related to Dutch culture and language, shared close ties with their 
European place of origin (Hoetink & van Lier 1966: 51, 149).  
Franco-Mauritian ties with French culture may have grown even stronger the 
last decade, because there has been a complete withdrawal of Franco-Mauritian 
pupils from the English curriculum public schools. Almost all Franco-Mauritians 
send their children to private French curriculum schools. There are two primarily 
Franco-Mauritian-run French curriculum schools – next to a French government 
sponsored lyceum, which attracts many expatriates’ children – attended by the 
majority of Franco-Mauritian pupils. The schools attract members of all ethnic 
communities, but high school fees make it an elite affair, which furthermore 
underlines the image of transnational elite cultural links between Franco-
Mauritians and France. 
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Important also is that nowadays many more Franco-Mauritian students attend 
tertiary education in France than a few decades ago, when South Africa was often 
a more logical destination. French tertiary education is free for Mauritians and 
attending French curriculum schools is therefore seen as better preparation than 
the English curriculum state schools. I would like to argue that the attraction of 
French curriculum schools might also be a way of tackling the pressure on 
Franco-Mauritian businesses to open up their ranks for other ethnicities and 
implement a competitive system. By attending the private schools the Franco-
Mauritians have an above-average level of education, with which they can 
compete over jobs by merit and not affiliation, because, first, the French 
curriculum schools maintain higher standards than the average state school and 
second, studying abroad is certainly an asset, and Franco-Mauritians who lack 
the means for paying large college fees, may invest a bit more in the primary and 
secondary education of their children, which may then lead to a successful and 
easy admittance to the French tertiary educational system. 
Nevertheless, transnational contacts with France, French culture, and the 
attraction of tertiary education and to a lesser extent the French curriculum 
schools in Mauritius are not exclusively Franco-Mauritian domains. The French 
language and popular culture are dominantly present in Mauritius and over the 
last decades influencing more and more all of the ethnic communities. Interest-
ingly, the process that the Franco-Mauritians lose their monopoly on French 
culture seems two sided. On the one hand Franco-Mauritians lost their monopoly 
on French culture, because the French language dominates the mass media – the 
major newspapers have historically always been in French, and television and 
especially the radio is mainly a French affair, too. French culture has therefore 
become something of all Mauritians. Maybe this nation-wide attention for French 
culture and language even gives some credits to the Franco-Mauritians, as the 
original bearers of French culture. On the other hand the monopoly is supported, 
as shown previously: the Franco-Mauritians shifted in the last, say, fifteen years 
towards French curriculum education in Mauritius and as a consequence with-
drew completely from the English curriculum state schools. 
Conclusion 
The transformation of Mauritius from a colonial society to an independent 
democratic society certainly impacted on the social hierarchy of the island and 
the position of the Franco-Mauritians. New elite groups emerged and are chal-
lenging the powerful dominance of the Franco-Mauritians; the Hindu political 
elite virtually controls national politics and the state apparatus, and the Sino-
Mauritians have grown more strongly in the private sector. Consequently, the 
Franco-Mauritians have lost most of their political power and often have a tense 
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relationship with the Hindu elite. While competition with the Sino-Mauritians 
who are challenging the Franco-Mauritians in their last stronghold, the private 
sector, has certainly increased since the end of colonialism, the economic power 
of the Franco-Mauritians is still overwhelming. 
Nevertheless, the preservation of the elite position of the Franco-Mauritians 
required maintenance over the years. History and information on genealogies are 
used to create vertical and horizontal loyalty within the Franco-Mauritian com-
munity, because they construct a sense of belonging. Whether the Franco-
Mauritians’ historical role obtains vertical loyalty from other social groups or 
whether it is only a signal for the other Mauritians to indicate the importance of 
the Franco-Mauritians in the making of the island’s history remains the question. 
It is obvious that vertical loyalty between high-ranking and middle-class Franco-
Mauritians is certainly obtained via employment opportunities. 
However, the correspondence between elite status and Franco-Mauritian 
ethnic belonging is under threat. Negative associations that other social groups 
have about Franco-Mauritian colonial history and their “whiteness” may impact 
on obtaining vertical loyalty. In contrast to the clear-cut Afrikaner example of 
prevailing elite status over ethnic belonging, the Franco-Mauritian case study 
shows that the process is still ongoing. On the one hand, pressure on Franco-
Mauritian companies to open up their ranks for other ethnicities is working, 
considering the presence of non-Franco-Mauritians on the board of directors or at 
senior management level. And the marriage between a Franco-Mauritian and a 
Muslim of wealthy families without inducing a major stir within the Franco-
Mauritian community exemplifies a case in which elite status prevails over ethnic 
belonging and “whiteness”. 
On the other hand, non-Franco-Mauritian members of a board of directors and 
those at senior management level are considered puppets, because the Franco-
Mauritians still own the majority of shares. The existence of the exclusive 
Franco-Mauritian Dodo Club – an interesting club for obtaining and sustaining 
horizontal and vertical loyalties ‘out of sight’ of the rest of society – clearly 
exemplifies the importance that ethnicity, in correlation with elite status, plays in 
for Franco-Mauritians. The private French curriculum schools are a clear-cut 
example of Franco-Mauritians even intensifying the relationship between ethni-
city and elite status. The complete withdrawal of Franco-Mauritian children from 
the public school system obviously leads to decreasing encounters between 
Franco-Mauritians and other, especially lower-ranking social groups. Frictions 
between Franco-Mauritians and other segments of the Mauritian population, in 
effect, may easily be increased by their visible exclusion from the masses. 
Further study is required to really establish the impact of formative elements at 
play here. This is a general challenge to the anthropological research of elites. 
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For instance, how can other social groups accept the small group of Franco-
Mauritians who visually stand out due to their “white skin”? This is especially 
interesting because for a business elite a strategy of staying low-profile may 
function well, in contrast to the case of a political elite. Are vertical and horizon-
tal loyalties reinvented over time by conscious strategies? What is the impact of 
transnational networks in the maintenance of an elite position? And are the 
different Mauritian elites more occupied by inter-elite competition than by verti-
cal loyalty with the masses? These questions indicate some of the importance the 
Franco-Mauritian case for the general study of elites. 
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“These dread-locked gangsters”.  
The Mungiki as dramatic actors  
in Kenya’s public arena: From  
protest to political participation? 
 
 
Anna Betsy Kanneworff 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Mungiki as dramatic actors in Kenya’s public space 
My name is Kihara Kihanja. I am 23 years old and I live in Kangemi, one of the ghettos of 
Nairobi. In 1990 I heard Maina Njenga preaching for the first time. He told us about his 
visions and the message of Mungiki and that we should return to our real God. Not the one 
of Christianity, but of our ancestors.  
You know, the real Mungiki philosophy is a radical one. A radical change of life. A total 
change away from the western way of life. How can you believe you go up into the clouds 
after you die? Christian churches don’t solve our problems. The church even dominates our 
lives after our death. I want to be buried in the traditional way, under a fig tree or a tree 
planted at my grave. I have that written in my will. I don’t want the church to confiscate my 
body when I die. 
Today the leaders of this country don’t profess that philosophy. The youth of Kenya have 
lost contact with their history, their traditions and their ancestors. One of our prophets told us 
that after the white man came and dismantled Kikuyu traditions and cultural practices, the 
fourth and fifth generation would rise and redeem itself.1 
The Mungiki in Kenya, once heralded as a “Robin Hood” arising (Turner & 
Brownhill 2001), a grassroots social movement fighting for justice for the dispos-
sessed and disenfranchised Kikuyu youth, a resistance movement fighting against 
the Christianized, Westernized and capitalist society, “outcasts” in the era of 
                                                     
1  Personal accounts of the author with Mungiki members, published in Kanneworff (2004). 
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globalization, modern day cultural revivalists sidelined by modernity, “criminal 
subversives” and “dread-locked gangsters” playing a “barbaric” game, have been 
marring Kenya’s public arena for more than a decade.  
No other social movement, religious sect, cult or political player has touched 
upon Kenya’s subversive consciousness and national phobia as deep as the 
Mungiki. Indeed, no other group has managed to play such a dramatic, provoking 
and diverse role in Kenya’s public arena. Ever since Mungiki’s upsurge in the 
early 1990s, the radical Kenyan youth movement managed to play different roles 
in Kenya’s religious, cultural and political spheres of society. And, as if these 
diverse characters played by the Mungiki were not abundant enough, the 
Mungiki recently introduced another new role – as political player – as it vied for 
parliamentary seats and supported the presidential candidate for the govern-
ment’s party KANU in the run up to the 2002 national elections. This ultimate 
step was followed up by a recent move by one of Mungiki’s leaders, Maina 
Njenga, who stated that the Mungiki movement was “dead”, yet replaced by a 
“well-structured” political party whose membership was the youth and the 
unemployed. Maina Njenga made this statement on the phone to a news reporter 
while taking cover from a fresh attempt by the government to hunt them down.2 
Mungiki’s recent construction of “well-structured” political party stands in 
line with the immense proliferation of political parties in Kenya ever since its 
formal multi-party era. In 1997, 28 political parties were registered in Kenya and 
in 2002, 52 political parties were duly registered of which 34 fielded parliamen-
tary candidates.3 
The Mungiki as a religious sect or cult, or as political party, never took on any 
formal position. Their registration as a religious or social movement was always 
refused, thus resulting in the Mungiki being an illegal society or outlawed 
movement until the present day. However, without any formal registration, the 
movement managed to get itself involved in almost all of Kenya’s problems: 
Religious and ethnic frictions, political struggles, poverty, property rights and 
security.4  
Mungiki in the context of Africa’s postcolonial failed states 
Mungiki’s hybrid development from a neo-ethnic, religious and cultural revival-
ist protest movement into a “wannabe” political player, its constant efforts to 
define and redefine its identity and by so doing its eager waiting for a share of 
Kenya’s political “cake”, are remarkable, yet very African. It shows in great 
                                                     
2  East African Standard, 8 October 2005, ‘Police hunt down banned sect’s leader’. 
3  See Institute for Education in Democracy (1998) and European Union Election Observation Mission 
Kenya (2002). 
4  J-C. Servant, “Kenya’s righteous youth militia.” Le Monde Diplomatique, January 2005.  
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variety the dynamics of African informal, transitional and neo-patrimonial 
politics in contemporary society. The process of democratization and transition 
politics in Kenya’s postcolonial state parades a social reality wherein identities in 
public space are under constant construction. 
Mungiki’s pragmatic use of various and mixed identities, and its constant 
shifts and dramatic performance in Kenya’s public arena can be explained by an 
interplay of conditions standing in close relation to Africa’s failed or postcolonial 
state in crisis (Joseph 1991). Mungiki’s metamorphosis though is not unique. 
Throughout the continent similar developments take place as the African post-
colonial reality exposes an immense gap between the elite, the political leaders 
and the great masses of young Africans, idle, but eager: Struggling for survival 
and recognition in the prime of their life. In the authoritarian federal democracy 
Nigeria for instance, the Bakassi Boys, a young militant movement, set an exam-
ple in training, coordinating and mobilizing hundreds of Nigerian urban youth 
left powerless and frustrated in the face of the unable state. Starting as a local 
vigilante group taking the law into their own hands, the Bakassi Boys set up 
operation areas in several states, developing semi-professional urban military 
training centres and jobs for the youth as the movement finally was co-opted by 
the state, performing extended operations in large parts of the country as a state 
security force. Contrary to these Bakassi Boys, who fought without an explicit 
ethnic or political agenda, the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) in Nigeria 
started as an ethnic militia, advocating for the independence of Yoruba land, as 
they extended their activities over time into fighting alleged criminals in urban 
areas – thus evolving into a vigilante militia with a political agenda (Smith 2004, 
Gore & Pratten 2003, Akinyele 2001, Human Rights Watch & CLEEN 2002).  
It is this African postcolonial reality – with its blurred field between the public 
and the private domain and its constant shifting between them – that makes 
relations in the African political domain so unpredictable and often dangerous. 
Dynamics alter constantly as new groups are making inroads in traditional 
domains of the state like security and public order. Whether those new groups 
can be defined as new forms of “African fundamentalism” abiding the rules of 
the “instrumentalization of disorder” in Africa (Chabal & Daloz 1999), or just 
growing pains of an every day reality of a continent under construction, it makes 
future scenarios on the development of the African youth far from optimistic or 
easy to anticipate on. 
Contrary to the world’s expectation, Africa’s “third wave of democratization” 
(Huntington 1996, Young 1999) did not fulfil its prophecies of good governance 
and economic reforms to repair the arrears of its underdevelopment. Even with 
the apparent edifice of a “democratic” state – as most African nations during the 
1980s and 1990s transformed their one-party systems into multi-party systems – 
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the dynamics of neo-patrimonialism, clienteles and “belly” politics prevailed. 
Adaptation to the dominant western template of democracy did not prevent most 
African leaders from remaining “predators”, humiliating their population with a 
symbolic repressive regime of abuse (Abbink 2001), leaving the majority of their 
population in gross poverty and negligence. 
The youth in Africa is particularly vulnerable to these occurrences and 
practices. African youth, while forming a numerical majority, often feel excluded 
from power and are marginalized in socio-economic terms. In neo-patrimonial 
countries in particular, emerging generations are often confronted with “blocked 
mobility” and are therefore excluded from employment and access to political 
power. The issue of “blocked mobility” forms the background to the rise of 
various opposition groups and resistance movements among youth in Africa 
(Abbink & van Kessel 2005). 
Despite these pessimistic and chequered developments the postcolonial neo-
patrimonial state in Africa has been able to function, in its own way, for more 
then twenty years, to the “useful Africa” (Mbembe 2001). Inherent to this “use-
ful” Africa is the eminent battle for resources, mostly solely accessible through 
the patrimonial elite, the State and its cabinet holders, popularly coined “the 
family”. This competition in most parts of Africa is still contested by means and 
use of violence. As elsewhere in Africa, organized violence regulates large parts 
of society in Kenya and is being marshalled for the pursuit of well-defined 
economic or other goals. While government resources are economically limited 
and mismanaged by a small elite, resources of parallel organizations are growing 
and violent ways to get them are increasingly common (Chabal & Daloz 1999).  
A final remark needs to be made on the special role of the revivalism of 
African norms and values that flourish greatly in Africa’s public arena. Often, 
these traditional cultural mentalities are declared irrelevant, harmful or subver-
sive in line with a long history of alienating African discourse by both Islamic 
and Western hegemonies (Abbink & van Kessel 2005). The African elite and its 
leaders often adapt these processes. Nonetheless, these traditional African prac-
tices also play a very blurred and pragmatic role as they also become subject of 
negotiation, pragmatism and the “lure of power” as the Mungiki story powerfully 
demonstrates.  
These dread-locked gangsters: From political protest to political 
participation?  
The rise of Mungiki: Violence, contestation and the “coming of age” of 
democracy 
Mungiki’s early foundation was established at the dawn of Kenya’s “coming of 
age” of “democracy”. The early 1990s were marked by political unrest, initiated 
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by the national churches, the judiciary and several opposition leaders out of dis-
content with Moi’s repressive regime. The international community added extra 
pressure by demanding more transparent rules of governance, if donor funding 
was to be continued. Weeks of mass protests and public arrests led to a final 
decision by president Moi late in 1991 to prescribe “free” elections. Thus 
Kenya’s multi-party era could begin (Throup & Hornsby 1998: 55-58).  
After Moi’s enactment of a multi-party system, three general elections were 
held – in 1992, 1997 and 2002. While these elections proclaimed loyalty to 
democratic principles on a national and more symbolic level, restrictive rules of a 
one-party system were still forced on people at the local level – especially during 
the 1992 and 1997 elections – as these two elections were marred by ethnic 
violence also named ethnic clashes.5 
One night in October 1991, youthful Maasai and Kalenjin militias raided 
hundreds of houses and shambas (cultivated land), killing approx. 1,500 people, 
and leaving more than 300,000 people landless.6 Among these victims were 
many Kikuyus from marginalized areas in the Rift Valley. Just before the 
elections President Moi had declared the area of the Rift Valley the traditional 
home of pastoral groups, where his own ethnic loyalty was based. The 1997 
elections showed roughly the same pattern. Again hundreds of Kikuyus and other 
ethnic rivalry groups were evicted from their homes, forced to flee, left wounded 
and killed.7 
Thus the origin of the Mungiki is being legitimized by prophecies8 standing in 
close relation to these political events. Maina Njenga, known to be the “spiritual” 
leader of the movement, recalls to have had a personal revelation from his 
traditional God Ngai when he was sixteen years old. Maina Njenga states he saw 
a dove coming back to him three times, when he heard a voice, saying: “This is 
the voice of the Almighty God. I have heard the cries of my people. I am going to 
liberate them. Be ready for a great mission.” Not long after, the entire family, 
including the brother and father of Maina Njenga and his cousin, Ndura 
Waruinge, became actively involved in the movement.9  
                                                     
5  The phenomenon of ethnic clashes wherein state-sponsored ethnic militias were employed to attack 
areas of critical voting, is well known all over Africa. It is also known under the name of “informal” 
repression. “Informal” repression occurred in countries like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Malawi, 
Rwanda, Nigeria and Cameroon, Article 19 (1997); Kirschke (2000). 
6  See various reports on the clashes: Human Rights Watch (1993, 1994, 2002); KHRC (1998). 
7  Besides this direct ethnic violence, manipulations with the district borders, fraud with the voting boxes 
and dividing the opposition, were also “innocent” moves of the president trying to uphold his powerful 
position. 
8  Prophetism has roots that reach deep into Kikuyu society. Kikuyu prophetism started as a form of 
protest against British domination in the 1920s and 1930s. The response to crisis by the social phe-
nomenon of divine intervention prevails all over Kenya, among all ethnic groups; see Yvan Droz 
(1999). 
9  Personal interviews with Mungiki leadership, Nairobi 2002. 
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Maina Njenga thereafter started preaching in the many poor and disenfran-
chised urban areas of Kenya, where he drew substantial support from the young 
Kikuyu victims of the ethnic clashes – unemployed or working at the “jua 
khali”.10 As life was criminalized and impoverished in these shantytowns, 
Mungiki offered them a new structure, and moral order. Mungiki preached an 
alternative life style that touched the broken-hearted Kikuyu youngsters, reviving 
and revitalizing their Kikuyu pride and honour. 
Mungiki is a Kikuyu word which stems from the root word muingi, meaning 
“masses” or “people”, derived from nguki, meaning irindi, i.e. “crowds” (Wamue 
2001). For Mungiki members this term expresses a feeling of community and 
sharing, claiming “we are the people”. In a more intellectual sense, the term is 
acclaimed to reflect upon the notion “we are the public” and the inherent belief 
that “people are entitled to a particular place of their own in the ontological 
order” or “seeking for recognition in society while being marginalized”.11 
Mungiki members are organized into local cells of ten members. Each of these 
cells makes up a local and regional group – with an appointed leader, who reports 
to the leadership council and the council of elders. The council of elders notably 
takes an important authorizing task, and rules the movement from behind the 
scenes. Several religious leaders or prophets take up the role of foreseeing and 
strategizing future developments, advising the leadership council and communi-
cating these developments to the members.  
Mungiki revived new sets of cultural and religious practices, related to an 
idealized and re-traditionalized Kikuyu culture before colonialism and western 
education entered the community. These practices included initiation rituals into 
adulthood like circumcision, ritual cleansing, baptism ceremonies, praying facing 
Mount Kenya twice a day and oathing. Oathing is part of the process of inaugu-
ration into the movement, which is said to take part in different stages. Oaths 
were taken during the Mau Mau struggle and are known to be very secretive and 
paramount to life wherein oaths are believed to be stronger than a person’s 
individual life. Thus, if you betray the oath or do not live according to the rules 
of the oath – death is upon you. Although the Mungiki leadership constantly 
denies allegations of administering oaths, it is widely believed that oathing takes 
place within the Mungiki. 
Contrary to the imagined re-traditionalized Kikuyu life and culture to which 
Mungiki successfully mobilized its members (Wamue 2001), Mungiki developed 
itself during the 1990s as an urban militia and vigilante movement – forcefully 
providing new services such as security (night patrols), garbage collection, and 
                                                     
10  “Jua Khali” is “hot sun” in Kiswahili, signifying work that is done “open-air”, for instance hawking 
(street vending), and work of mechanics, artisans and matatu touts. 
11  Wamue (2001); Kagwanja (2003); The East African, November 6, 2000.  
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public transport as the Mungiki successfully monopolized several of the many 
matatu (mini-bus) routes in and around the city centre of Nairobi. These new 
services became an important yet unlawful economic resource of the Mungiki 
(Anderson 2002). 
 
Mungiki’s shifting agenda: Contradictions, controversies and a pragmatic stand 
At first during the early years of multi-partyism the Mungiki called out a strong 
revolting ethnic agenda, claiming a new form of Kikuyu revivalism and its own 
“Intifadah” – as they threatened the government with land re-claims after the 
ethnic clashes.12 Mungiki’s ideological stand at that point originated from other 
Kenyan social revolutionary movements, like the December Twelfth Movement 
(DTM) and Mwa Kenya, who aimed for a revolt against Moi’s oppressive regime 
in the eighties (KHRC 2002). Mungiki’s Kikuyu revivalism was rooted in the 
history of other Kikuyu “renaissance” movements – like the Tent of the Living 
God of the Kikuyu prophet Ngonya wa Gakonya – who proclaimed a return to 
traditional Kikuyu values while the position of many Kikuyus under Moi’s 
political regime was sorely devaluated. Mungiki took over a lot of luggage from 
these movements, and became the more youthful, vibrant and militant outlet. 
Mungiki was the most rebellious brother of them all, belonging to the generation 
of the iregi (Kagwanja 2006) – of the revolters, prepared to go for combat.13 
The state’s reaction to Mungiki’s rebellious nature was characterized by in-
tense counter-violence. Throughout the 1990s, meetings of the movement were 
constantly dispersed and hundreds of members were arrested, jailed and tortured. 
Mungiki’s history was labelled “a litany of state persecution, intimidation, jailing 
of its followers and gross human rights abuse. The Moi state has constantly 
treated Mungiki as a clandestine movement comprising of ‘anti-Christian crimi-
nals’ and sworn to destabilize the government” (KHRC 2002).  
As the opposition against Moi’s minority rule grew stronger, informal ways to 
mobilize support against the state increased. Therefore, Mungiki gained interest 
from various Kikuyu opposition politicians and patrons, interested in the mobi-
lizing force of Mungiki – as a youth militia for hire. With these new financial 
injections the Mungiki mayhem reached a new height by 2000. Every week riots 
broke out between Mungiki members and the Kenyan police. Again, hundreds of 
members were arrested and imprisoned. Some were killed. The local newspapers 
wrote: “Nearly 3000 Mungiki men staged a daring morning raid on Nyahururu 
police station to free three of their colleagues.” A local police officer declared: 
“They just chased us. Don’t joke with them. They are fearless and are well 
organized just like the police or the army.”14 
                                                     
12  Informal interview with Willy Mutunga, Kenyan Human Rights Commission, Nairobi 2003.   
13  Informal interview, Mungiki members, Nairobi 2002.  
14  Daily Nation, September 26; October 23, 2000. 
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This hard-hit anti-state approach of the Mungiki was alternated with more 
cultural and religious performances and public provocations. In 1998 Mungiki 
organized a “congress” at the historic Mukurwe-wa-Gathanga shrine15 – and 
declared its own “Kirinyaga Kingdom”16. Mungiki’s public spokesman Ndura 
Waruinge declared to the press: “Kirinyaga Kingdom is the first of community-
based kingdoms that will be established in this country. Like other tribal king-
doms it will rely on the traditional gods for guidance and sustenance.” One other 
morning, a few Mungiki members organized a raid at the Freemasons building in 
Nairobi, claiming it promoted ‘evil worship’.17  
Then, almost six years later, six women in clear daylight were attacked by 
three Mungiki-members at a public bus stand. The Mungiki stripped the women 
from their trousers, aggressively attacking them in clear daylight. Huge public 
outrage followed and the Mungiki leaders claimed the scene was stage managed 
by a pseudo-Mungiki gang, set-up by the government to demonize the move-
ment. Rumours of this nature continued to spread as the movement actively 
played a role in Kenya’s public arena. 
One-and-a-half years later the Mungiki were again lime-lighted due to public 
aggression against women as they were accused of circulating pamphlets in two 
divisions of Central Province. They had issued a three-month ultimatum to all 
women between 13 and 65 years who had not undergone circumcision, to do so. 
The group alleged that they were sent by God in a dream to “cleanse” the 
Kikuyu-community from the social evils that had invaded the community.18 
Shortly afterwards, the Mungiki staged another protest meeting at a politically 
sensitive place: The mausoleum of Jomo Kenyatta in the city centre of Nairobi. 
Hundreds of Mungiki-members stood in front of the mausoleum, protesting 
against the appointment of Uhuru Kenyatta, as Minister of Local Governance in 
the Moi administration. Kenyatta, being a representative of the Kikuyu elite from 
Central Province and the son of Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta, was 
blamed by many ex Mau Mau veterans and sympathizers for treating their 
national freedom fighters disrespectfully, never rehabilitating them nor rewarding 
them financially. Thus at the Nairobi scene, Mungiki-members burned an effigy 
pop, representing Uhuru Kenyatta, accusing him of being a “traitor”. 
A new shift into another direction represented the move of 13 Mungiki leaders 
on September 2, 2000, as they declared in front of the press to have been 
converted to Islam. Mungiki’s “national coordinator”, publicly known as Ndura 
                                                     
15  The Mukurwe-wa-Gathanga is a holy shrine for the Kikuyus. It is at this spot that the Kikuyus believe 
their spiritual fore-fathers created by God, Mumbi and Gikuyu – the Adam and Eve of the Kikuyus – 
set up their homes and delivered nine daugthers, who carried the nine clannames of the Kikuyus.  
16  Kirinyaga is the Kikuyu word for Mount Kenya. 
17  Daily Nation, October 23, 2000.  
18  East African Standard, April 23, 2002.  
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Waruinge – a grandson of former Mau Mau general Waruinge, now announced 
to be named Ibrahim Ndura Waruinge as he was converted into Islam. Maina 
Njenga, the traditional “spiritual” leader transformed into Mohammed Maina 
Njenga. In a statement the leaders declared that the government should stop 
harassing the movement as they converted into Islam. The action provoked 
strong resistance from moderate Muslims and the ruling Muslim elite from the 
Kenya Swahili Coast. Within a few weeks, the attempted alignment was over. 
Following Mungiki’s incidents and public actions at close scrutiny, it becomes 
clear how hybrid Mungiki’s identity is and how pragmatic its ideological stand is 
being used and manipulated in public space. Indeed Mungiki’s identity was 
manipulated and used in the public arena by a small faction within the move-
ment, who were triggered by the upcoming patrimonial relations with Kenya’s 
political elite. Yet as the forthcoming case on the 2002 national elections and its 
aftermath shows, Mungiki’s political choice was chosen as pragmatic as ever – 
not without serious consequences. It called into question the “true” mission of the 
movement and its leadership and its future course. 
 
Mungiki & the 2002 elections: Into the “lure of power”  
On August 20, 2002, as the stakes were running high for the next general elec-
tions, a “full Mungiki force” marched the streets of Nairobi, chanting Mau Mau 
war songs, holding sticks, tree-leaves and pamphlets stating “We support Uhuru” 
or “Uhuru na Kazi”.19 Mungiki announced its support to president Moi’s govern-
ment party KANU for the general elections and his appointed successive heir: 
The presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta. A remarkable choice, considering 
Mungiki’s accusation some years ago of Uhuru Kenyatta being a “traitor”. 
The self acclaimed leaders Maina Njenga and Ndura Waruinge held speeches 
that day at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park. “This is the time,” stated Maina Njenga in front 
of his following, “the time has come, to remove old leaders and replace them 
with young people. From now on it is your responsibility to defend yourself and 
the nation. We do not want politics of empty rhetorics, we want practical politics, 
politics of development.” Ndura Waruinge heralded: “We have heard others 
saying they will hire us as mercenaries. But we are not hired crowds. Lift your 
hands to say that you are not for hire!” Even Nairobi’s mayor Dick Waweru, a 
KANU member, was present on stage that day, claiming: “We do not want 
leaders into darkness. There is no discrimination against other tribes. This is not 
a Kikuyu affair. Tribalism is the problem, but we are a testimony that we can 
conquer it. This is the day.” 
On the eve of the 2002 Kenyan general elections, a new Mungiki strategy 
came to the limelight: An attempt to openly co-opt themselves in the realm of 
                                                     
19  “Uhuru na kazi” means “Uhuru [freedom] and work”. 
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mainstream politics. As president Moi had ruled for two consecutive terms, he 
was forced now to leave the political stage. But the self-proclaimed “master of 
politics” did not plan to leave the stage, without a well-masterminded succession 
strategy. Instead of playing the ethnic card as usually prevalent in African post-
colonial patrimonial politics, and as used by the Kenyan opposition appointing 
the senior Kikuyu politician Mwai Kibaki as their flag-bearer, Moi introduced a 
new discourse: The discourse of generational change of guard. Thus president 
Moi appointed new leaders or so-called “Young Turks”, to whom he would hand 
over power. These “Young Turks” were children of the leaders who ruled during 
Uhuru or Independence, like Raila Odinga, Musalia Mudavadi and Uhuru 
Kenyatta. It was Uhuru Kenyatta, a young and politically inexperienced Kikuyu 
leader who was finally appointed as Moi’s successive heir – to the discontent of 
his competitors who strategized themselves in a more ethnically inclusive oppo-
sition-coalition. 
This discourse of generational change won the support of the Mungiki as their 
support for “project Uhuru” could be legitimized by the re-traditionalized idiom 
of itwika – the Kikuyu practice of changing the ruling age group once every forty 
years. Mungiki members argued their revolt to be part of their generational 
heritage, as they categorized themselves as the generation of the revolters or 
iregi. The Mungiki ideology of resistance and revolt was connected to this iregi 
heritage. The language of Mungiki and the iregi generation alike was that of a 
warrior, of combat. “We carry peace at the front, but war at the back” as a mem-
ber claims.  
Thus, the concept of itwika was re-emphasized during the 2002 general 
elections by the Mungiki leadership as they grasped their change to step on 
board. Not all Mungiki members were convinced of this step – and indeed most 
of them figured Uhuru Kenyatta still to be a “sell-out”, someone not to be trusted 
and who does not represent their true spirit of revolt. Uhuru Kenyatta was in their 
eyes just a spoiled man, a representative of the rich Kikuyu elite, who neglected 
the Mau Mau heritage and the class of poor Kikuyus and victims of land evic-
tions. 
As the Mungiki leadership continued with their new political crusade, playing 
with double poker faces, they were rewarded with financial injections by the Moi 
and Uhuru Kenyatta’s patrimonial elite, thus hoping to finance themselves into 
political office: With a parliamentary seat. 
“Chief” and “spiritual” leader Maina Njenga and “national coordinator” Ndura 
Waruinge both campaigned for a parliamentary seat in their regional constituen-
cies: Laikipia West District and Molo District in the Rift Valley. Ndura 
Waruinge was forced to withdraw himself before the nomination procedure had 
commenced, notably because of continuous woes from women activists. Maina 
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Njenga managed to take a few more herds into the realm of local Kenyan neo-
patronage politics, as he was finally refused as well. 
Maina Njenga stated while on the campaign trail: “The party of Moi has 
changed. As Moi has declared KANU has its owners. The owners are Mau Mau, 
and we are the ones. We have to take over. And just like Moi said it is time for 
young men to take over leadership. And you know Uhuru cannot do the work 
alone. He needs the support of other young commanders. If we refuse to take the 
party, our community is at risk. Look at the people in jail, the unemployed and 
the dying: They are all Kikuyus. If we don’t think carefully, we will loose.” 
Beside the generational change, Maina Njenga legitimized his choice to his 
following by the traditional ethnic element intertwined with a strong notion of 
class awareness, as he speaks on behalf of the poor and disenfranchised Kikuyus.  
The evening before the local nomination began, Maina Njenga tried convinc-
ing some local Kikuyu councillors of the region to cooperate with him. “I always 
said I would fight the government forever. I was ready to fight them with any-
thing, clubs, weapons, but let me tell you a secret I saw politicians come and go, 
I saw planes crushing down, I saw women and children dying and now I know I 
should try the ballot. The army, the police, the GSU [General Service Unit], they 
are here to combat violence. I joined the government to fight these thugs. I have 
military titles and you see these young boys are my soldiers.” Njenga then asked 
the men and women present in the room. “How many goats can you eat? If you 
do not let me contest, give me back my money.” 
Maina Njenga mobilized a full “battalion” of Nairobi members20 into Laikipia 
District, assisting him to put up Mungiki “patrols” at the different polling stations 
in the region, “monitoring” the voting. Later that evening, when the votes were 
collected for central counting, the Mungiki leaders sabotaged the whole process, 
causing chaos, running off with the results, and accusing the opposition candidate 
of “stealing the election results”. Shops in the area were closed the next day out 
of fear for new violent outbursts. 
The next day a recount of the nomination was held in the area. The Mungiki 
candidacy held Laikipia in its grip as not many people dared to vote that day. The 
final counting took place under special supervision of two KANU Nairobi 
officers and behind closed doors. Njenga’s intimidation tactics had worked, as he 
was personally announced the winner of the race. However, the next day the 
results were withdrawn by the Electoral Commission of Kenya and KANU’s 
Head of Elections. Maina Njenga had invested a great deal of money in his local 
campaign, but was taken out by the higher party echelon before the official race 
started. Without further interference, Maina Njenga’s candidature was rejected 
from higher office.  
                                                     
20  At least 20 matatu buses were mobilized into Laikipia West for the local election of Maina Njenga. 
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This instance signified Mungiki’s last public involvement in the 2002 National 
Elections. The general elections resulted in a tremendous defeat for the ruling 
party. Uhuru Kenyatta had publicly distanced himself from the movement and 
Mungiki was left on its own again. In early January 2002, the united opposition 
parties or “Rainbow Alliance” took over power – a historic occurrence in Kenya. 
President Moi peacefully stepped down and Uhuru Kenyatta – the inexperienced 
Kikuyu leader of KANU – became the official leader of the opposition. 
 
Post-political trauma: Mungiki’s last dramatic act?  
Not long after the “Rainbow” opposition took over power, a severe backlash over 
Mungiki’s failed political strategy occurred as acts of terror broke out in various 
parts of the country. Mungiki members were locked in a series of fights for 
control over matatu (mini-bus) stands. By February 2003, nearly two months 
after the election outcome, more then 50 people had died in clashes, involving 
the Mungiki and owners of the matatus, drivers and other youth supporters.21  
The new NARC government took a tough stand on the Mungiki mayhem and 
called out a “shoot to kill on sight” order for all Mungiki members. At the same 
time, it announced a 30-day amnesty for members who surrendered to the police. 
Over the course of two months, the government declared to have arrested and 
charged 957 members in total.22 In October 2003, the transport Minister an-
nounced reforms on the matatu industry, which further decreased Mungiki’s 
control over these income resources.23  
Mungiki’s attempt to enter Kenya’s national political arena had miserably 
failed. Not only were the leaders sidelined by the political establishment, the 
move closer to the political centre had also cost a serious split among the “rank-
and-file” of the movement. Mungiki’s financial injections resulting from its 
temporary political adventure corrupted the leadership relations and increased 
competition over its internal resources. Pressure among its members to define a 
new position after the election outcome increased as members had to look for 
new survival strategies. The ideological new stand of the Mungiki connected to 
the ruling KANU elite, Uhuru Kenyatta and its legitimization of the itwika as 
idiom of generational change was not backed by most of the Mungiki following. 
Most of them felt betrayed by the elite even of the same ethnic affiliate. Uhuru 
Kenyatta was the ultimate representation of the wealthy Kikuyu elite who 
disinherited and abandoned the Mau Mau history. Mwai Kibaki’s election, a 71-
year-old Kikuyu, was a total failure in terms of awaiting generational change. 
Thus, its leadership strategy had failed completely. 
                                                     
21  BBC, 11 February 2003, “Kenya’s secretive Mungiki sect.” 
22  Daily Nation, 13 February 2003, “957 Mungiki members charged as state amnesty ends.” 
23  Mungiki is said to have collected at least KSh 10,000 (USD 125) a day per route at the peak of its 
influence as stated by Kagwanja (2006). 
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As Mungiki had manoeuvred itself into a severe crisis, reports on a new so-
called “bagation” squad entered the Kenyan media. Public claims on a new 
Mungiki cell were made who notably were assigned with special missions of “no 
bargain over death”. It was reported that this squad coordinated high-level crimi-
nal activities ranging from robbery and car-jacking to secure new income 
revenues for the movement. Also the squad was used to ensure the cohesion of 
the movement by protecting its leaders and dealing ruthlessly with defectors. It 
was estimated that by mid-2004, 75% of former Mungiki followers had aban-
doned the movement.24 Mungiki started an underground war on their former 
priests and other well-known defectors, for instance by severing off the head of a 
defector priest, leaving the head in a paper-bag, dumping it on a Nairobi bus 
stand – apparently as a sign of public terror and warning.25  
Maina Njenga, together with several other Mungiki leaders, was arrested in 
April 2003 on the accusation of murder. After two years in jail, the leader was 
released without proof of guilt, end of 2005.26 Just at this instance after years of 
severe backlash, terror and imprisonment, did Maina Njenga announce the 
Mungiki movement “dead”. However a new phoenix to rise from its ashes was 
instantly announced: “Mungiki has shed off its religious cloak and replaced it 
with a well-structured political party, whose membership was the youth and the 
unemployed. We do not fight. We are now brothers working for a common pur-
pose as we have joined forces to form the Kenya National Youth Alliance which 
is not a domain of one ethnic group.” 
With this effort, Maina introduced yet another – perhaps final – phase of the Mungiki: Its 
final fall. Ndura Waruinge, once the daring “national coordinator”, had already chosen 
another path. He converted himself into Christianity, founded the Universal Miracle Centre 
and Youth for Christ movement, and established himself as a very successful evangelical 
priest, organizing ceremonies all over the country. 
Conclusion: Politics as ultimate dramatic performance?  
Mungiki pursued a theatrical and moral crusade in Kenya’s public arena, oppos-
ing the “imaginative” hegemonic system: the state, the churches, the political, 
economic and religious elite of the country – as well as the West with its 
allegedly “symbolic suppressive” institutions like the World Bank and the IMF 
and the Freemasons.. Mungiki drew attention to its acts with its constant shifting 
agenda, advocating for a strange mix of new tribalism, traditionalism and cultural 
revivalism, pushed by violent means. Whether it was claiming to be the “sons 
                                                     
24  Daily Nation, June 21, 2004, War on Mungiki sect “still on”.  
25  Daily Nation, June 16, 2004, Mungiki sect members hack girl, 13, to death, Daily Nation, April 5, 
2004, Mungiki’s revenge.  
26  Supplementary note from the author: on February 2, 2006, Maina Njenga was again arrested and 
sentenced on June 21, 2007, to five years in jail. 
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and daughters of Mau Mau”, stripping women naked, revolting against the 
Kenyan police, converting into Islam, praying en masse facing Mount Kenya, 
growing provoking dreadlocks, baptizing hundreds of members at sacred public 
places or last but not least administering oaths and circumcising women, the 
Mungiki successfully employed an agenda full of controversial and fearsome 
items, provoking, terrorizing and shocking all, Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu, commu-
nities in Kenya. 
In this public arena, a group of self-acclaimed leaders came to the limelight, as 
they seemed to perform a special act directed by the financial injections of politi-
cal patrons. First, there was Maina Njenga, alias John Maina Njenga, alias 
Mohammed Maina Njenga alias “chief leader”, “bishop”, “doctor”, “spiritual 
leader” and “national chairman”; second best was Ndura Waruinge, alias Ezekiel 
Waruinge, alias Ibrahim Waruinge – alias “national co-ordinator”. These self-
acclaimed leaders piloted the movement into another stage-managed phase: The 
realm of mainstream patronage politics. With this next phase, Mungiki’s neo-
ethnic, religious and cultural identities were politicized and manipulated into 
another direction. The story of Mungiki’s cultural revival transformed into a 
political gimmick of wheeling and dealing with the political elite of the country: 
first the Kikuyu oppositional politicians and patrons, later president Daniel arap 
Moi and his designated heir-successor Uhuru Kenyatta. 
These unpredictable and pragmatic performances with their constantly shifting 
identities were desperate attempts to come out of a crisis. Perhaps this crisis can 
be analysed as a more permanent state, thus coping, surviving, and acting upon 
the constant “instrumentalization of disorder” in Africa’s public domain. In this 
process, the Mungiki became very successful in drawing attention from the 
media, which were used in a very instrumental way to portray their various 
provoking acts and identities. From 1998 onwards, media coverage of the 
Mungiki exponentially increased and stories on the movement were featured on a 
weekly basis. Then after years of reporting by the local media, the international 
media started drawing attention to “Kenya’s dreadlocked gangsters” as they 
politically manifested themselves in 2002,27 thus setting the movement onto the 
global stage. 
                                                     
27  Since 2002 the BBC reported many times on Kenya’s dangerous militia or its “dread-locked 
gangsters”, contining up to the phase of severe repression under Kibaki’s second government after the 
controversial 2007 elections. There were many reports on Mungiki violence (e.g. on “beheadings”). 
The 2007 elections ushered in a time of lethal violence in Kenyan politics. On 28 April 2008, Charles 
Ndungu, the leader of the Mungiki-affiliated Kenya National Youth Alliance, was killed by police. See 
BBC, 28 April 2008, “Mungiki sect leader is shot dead”.  
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Introduction 
Tanzania has witnessed a fairly good macroeconomic performance during the last 
three years (on an average 6.2% economic growth per year), but the impact on 
poverty reduction has been limited. Only in Dar es Salaam there was a clearly 
observable poverty reduction (World Bank 2005). The issue addressed in this 
study is: Why did poverty alleviation happen in Dar es Salaam and hardly in the 
rest of the country? What are the transmission mechanisms distributing the 
positive effects of economic growth across different cities and regions? How 
does this economic growth affect the poor in other cities and rural areas? We will 
put this issue in the framework of being a global city (London for example) or a 
peripheral node (Dakar for example). We will look to what extent Dar es Salaam 
is a global city or a peripheral node with growth potential. 
Global cities and peripheral nodes 
Cities are important in the development process. They are competing with each 
other and globalization is increasing this process. According to Sassen (1991), 
globalization exposes cities to ideas, goods and services from elsewhere, which 
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challenges the local production of industrial goods and services, creating global 
cities. The old model of global integration was based on increased exports of 
goods and services. Developing countries were considered the periphery of a 
dominant capitalist system residing in Europe, North America and Japan. The 
dominant metropolitan core controlled the process from within. The original 
meaning of “metropolitan zone of influence” meant “forming part of the mother-
land” as distinct from its colonies. The term is now used for an ever expanding 
urban area with some supra-regional role in trade or providing services to a larger 
area.1 Besides global cities there are peripheral nodes, which may have important 
regional functions. 
In Sassen’s book global cities go beyond a region or metropolitan area. She 
points to the role of knowledge, information and business services in the longer 
existing process of concentration of global production chains in the global cities 
or metropolitan areas. The characteristics of global cities are presented in Box 
8.1. A critique of Sassen’s definition of global cities could be that she focuses on 
one particular type of city, namely the global service centre. However, there are 
lots of cities in e.g. China and India that are centres of manufacturing activities 
and export an important part of their production to other countries, being part of 
all kinds of global value chains. 
 
 
Box 8.1   Global cities  
 
1. Global cities like New York, London and Tokyo are the production sites of global 
control over the lengthening production chains of which even the industrial home 
workers in remote rural areas are now part. 
2. Globalization is not just about networks and resulting flows, it is also about places 
for concentration of these flows. 
3. This concentration is the result of globalization and can be explained by: 
a. financial service providers concentrating around important financial centres; 
b. the need to have an innovative milieu requires networking among specialized 
business services to produce new managerial technological solutions; 
c. a high-tech infrastructure is required to assure permanent connectivity; 
d. a specific logistical infrastructure based on the previously mentioned functions. 
4.  Professional business services are the managers of the decentralization and 
globalization process. 
 
Source: Sassen (1991) 
 
 
In terms of van Dijk (2005a) the governance structure of such value chains 
(commanding what is happening in the chain) tend to be concentrated in such 
global manufacturing or services cities. These cities can compete with other 
                                                     
1  “Cosmopolitan” refers to the life style that tends to come with such metropolitan areas. 
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aspiring global cities if they are fed by knowledge activities such as research and 
development, finance, marketing and design activities.2 However, the dynamics 
of the current world economic system (Wallerstein 1989) is that other cities than 
the traditional metropoles are trying to take over the role of leader of production 
chains and try to become centres of knowledge and innovation as well. This 
process of competition offers chances to cities as far apart as Nanjing (van Dijk 
2005a) and Dar es Salaam (van Dijk 2005b). If they do not succeed in becoming 
global cities in Sassen’s sense, they may still be global manufacturing cities (say 
Shenzhen in China) or become peripheral nodes in the world capitalist system 
with a potentially important role to play in the future for the national or supra-
regional area surrounding them. The question remains, how do such nodes trans-
mit development to the rest of the country and what is the role of the informal 
sector in this respect? 
The context of economic restructuring and urban and regional 
growth 
After years of structural adjustment, liberalization, poverty eradication policies 
and programs and donor support, Tanzania has created a healthy macro-
economic context in which growth can take place. An overview of the liberaliza-
tion policies in Tanzania will not be given here (but see World Bank 2005). The 
Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) believes that the investments in 
reforms in Tanzania are now starting to pay off (van Dijk 2005b). 
The government of Tanzania nationalized and placed under state ownership 
and management all enterprises up to the mid-1980s. This movement had a 
negative impact on private sector development in the country. In 1992 the 
government launched the Parastatal Sector Reform Program (PSRP) to privatize 
public enterprises. Privatization sought to give the private sector a frontline role 
as the engine of economic growth. Following that, the participation of the private 
sector has increased and management of the restructured economic activities in 
the country has improved, particularly in the city of Dar es Salaam. In order to 
strengthen the business and investment environment, consultative dialogue 
meetings took place involving the government and private sectors under the 
auspices of the Tanzania National Business Council (TNBC). Moreover, the 
government continued to implement the Business Environment Strengthening for 
Tanzania (BEST) Program. 
                                                     
2  The movement of the headquarters of Philips electronic company from Eindhoven where the company 
started to Amsterdam in the 1990s perfectly illustrates this trend to be where knowledge activities such 
as research and development, finance, marketing and design activities are concentrated. 
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As an example of the economic success of the reform policies, the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA) collected 25 million US$ per month in 1995. Ten 
years later this is 160 million! With about 200 million the government could 
cover its budget instead of being dependent on foreign donors, who currently 
finance about a quarter.3 
Local governments have also done better (Heymans & Kumar 2002). They 
collect the development levy, land tax and a cess levy on the value added tax 
(0.3%), while for the national government the income, consumption (VAT of 
20%) and import duties are very important. The Ministry of Finance is responsi-
ble for tax reform. The tax system has also been made slightly easier, by 
abolishing a number of taxes or taking them away from local government and by 
providing an income transfer to local governments instead. The authorities also 
removed the stamp duty, but it came back under the income tax. The value added 
tax is a hot issue for business people and entrepreneuring professors because the 
rate is considered too high. However, people do not realize that it is deductible. 
The shocking figure about taxes is that 82% is collected in Dar es Salaam and 
only 18% in the rest of the country! The challenge is to strengthen revenue 
collection and not to exclude too many cases. The 2005/06 budget estimates that 
the government will collect Tanzanian Shilling (TSh.) 2.067 trillion (± € 1.414 
billion) from domestic sources, an equivalent of 14.3% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP; Citizen 12-7-2005). 
The World Population report (UNFPA 2003) notes that urban areas have 
become engines for growth in the global economy as centres for diversity and 
change. Is this happening in Tanzania as well? Dar es Salaam is certainly very 
different from the rest of the country, since most of the industries of Tanzania are 
concentrated there. The city has the biggest population and is the biggest market. 
The port also plays an important role in the concentration process. The creation 
and development of secondary towns is a strategy to spread development, but 
does it really work in Tanzania? 
How does growth affect the poor? 
Good macro-economic information is available in Tanzania since some ten years. 
However, little is known about the micro-level implications of economic growth 
for the poor living in different cities and regions in the interior. The existing 
inequalities come out very clearly in the Household budget survey 2000/01 (NBS 
2002b). The question is what can be done to spread welfare, rather than trying to 
stop it from coming into the capital. 
                                                     
3  In general import duties have gone down as a consequence of the Uruguay round of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Currently the Tanzanian customs uses only two rates (25% and 10%) and are 
moving to a single rate. 
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The World Bank (2005) Country Economic Memorandum provides an in-
depth analysis of the Tanzanian economy. However, it deals mainly with what 
can be measured in Tanzania. A number of the interesting issues in the develop-
ment process of a country, region or city are difficult to measure. For example: 
(1)  What explains the dynamics of cities like Dar es Salaam and Arusha? 
(2)  Which factors contribute to poverty reduction? 
(3)  Why did poverty alleviation happen in Dar es Salaam and hardly seemed to happen in 
the rest of the country? 
(4)  What is the role of migration, the urban informal sector, remittances and smuggling with 
respect to redistributing the positive effects of growth? 
(5)  To what extent has decentralization contributed to urban dynamics and how does it 
affect poverty? 
It is difficult to say whether poverty did or did not decline in the rural areas. 
There are no figures except two household surveys. The most recent one may 
have measured poverty in 2000/1 at the wrong moment (during a small dip in the 
economy) and hence poverty eradication efforts do not show (NBS 2002a). One 
can also argue on methodological grounds (concerning the “one dollar a day” 
criterion, or the level of the poverty line) against the current picture. However, 
one can also say that rural and urban poverty are different and fixed at too low a 
level.4 The valuation of subsistence is the biggest problem. The National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) currently uses existing prices, but should use opportunity 
cost. There are also big differences between different rural areas. Finally, a 
poverty line analysis may neglect the dynamics of poverty, as was the case in 
China and India (van Dijk 2005a), where research has shown that it is often 
different people who are poor over time. Poverty is then related to a phase in 
people’s life (transitory poverty), or people are growing out of poverty by 
undertaking certain economic activities, often originally in the urban informal 
sector. 
On the basis of figures of the Ministry of Finance, URT (2005: 66) decides 
that the disparities between the rural and urban population have increased, like in 
many other fast growing countries. Although basic needs poverty has declined, 
the absolute number of poor keeps increasing every year. The trends are analysed 
for the period 1991/92 until 2000/01. However, the Economic Survey 2004 does 
not mention the role of the urban informal sector, nor does it give the differences 
between different regions (URT 2005). 
In Tanzania statistics are often limited to the formal manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors, but an important part of what is happening does not show in 
the figures because it happens in the informal sector or “informally”. There are 
estimates of the share of the informal sector going up to 90% (if non-estate 
agriculture would also be included). A more realistic figure of 58% is mentioned 
                                                     
4  We should stress the limitations of the “poverty is below one dollar a day” concept. 
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in several World Bank publications. It means that labour is allocated, investments 
are made and raw materials are used without really being measured for half of the 
economy. It involves flows of people, goods and money, not shown directly in 
the statistics, but known to many people. We have concentrated during this re-
search on getting whatever data are available and on the stories about the urban 
informal economy and how it affects other Tanzanian cities and regions. These 
mechanisms are described in more detail below. 
Role of urban informal sector in spreading development and 
alleviating poverty 
While in other countries the informal sector is residual, in Tanzania it seems to 
be the contrary. Some say 90% of the economy is informal (Tripp 1997: 5), while 
the remaining 10% concerns employment in the formal sector including the 
government and public co-operation. With such a definition 50% would then be 
in traditional farming. Other authors go as far as stating that the informal sector 
employs two thirds of the population in Tanzania (ILO 2005). It does not seem 
useful to put traditional agricultural activities in the category “informal sector”. 
In this paper the term will be reserved for informal income opportunities in cities 
and non-agricultural activities in the rural areas. They are considered informal 
since the units involved have no legal status and hence the people working there 
do not receive the legal minimum wage or benefits from the social security 
system (van Dijk 1987). 
The difference between the urban informal sector in West Africa in the 1970s 
(van Dijk 1987) and the current informal sector in East Africa seems to be that 
this urban informal sector has become part of the global economy. For example 
informal tailors no longer compete with modern textile and garment industries in 
Tanzania, but they have to produce at lower prices than Chinese textile and 
garment industries and have to come up with more attractive products than the 
second-hand clothing from Europe, which is almost everywhere available nowa-
days. 
ILO (1991) makes an effort to estimate employment in the informal sector. 
The report suggests 2 million people are involved, which would be 2.5 times the 
number of people with formal wage employment. According to the ILO 
employment in the informal sector would be growing at 3.5% per year. The 
integrated labour force survey 2000/1 (NBS 2002d) measured informal sector 
activities by the number of households involved. It turns out that in Dar es 
Salaam 62 percent of the households are involved in informal sector activities. 
The percentage is 61 for other urban centres (used to be 42). In the rural areas 
27% of the households have informal sector activities (used to be 21%; URT 
2002). In terms of number of people the labour force survey found it would be 
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1,439,847 people doing informal sector activities as main activities and 
1,363,010 having them as secondary activities. This suggests that currently a 
much larger number of people are involved in this sector than according to ILO 
(1991). 
Tripp (1997) stresses the importance of women in the urban informal sector. 
NBS (2002d) provides the figures. In Dar es Salaam and in the rural areas there 
are slightly more males than females in both the main and secondary activities. In 
the other urban areas, more females were employed than males in both the main 
and secondary activities. 
According to different World Bank sources more than 50% of the urban 
population work in the urban informal sector in Tanzania. However, their activi-
ties are not covered in detail in the statistics (what kind of activities and how 
much does it earn a person). More importantly this sector has become a mecha-
nism to generate and redistribute growth. Hence we should understand better 
how it functions. The informal sector is the result of and results in flows of 
people, money and goods. These mechanisms of the urban informal sector like 
migration, remittances and smuggling will be discussed in the following sections. 
If more than 50% of the Tanzanian economy is informal, the current dynamics 
should also be reflected in the informal sector. The six percent economic growth 
will also apply to this sector, because a lot of money is spent in the sector and 
most of the money generated in the sector will be spent informally and bring 
about multiplier effects. Hence, the question is: What determines the further 
development of the informal sector?  
Where do the people come from? How do they finance their activities? What 
is the role of the government in their development? A first impression of some 
relevant factors is given in Table 8.1. For each flow we try to indicate how it 
works out in Dar es Salaam and the Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions. 
Tripp (1997), ILO (1978, 1991 and 2004), Wuyts (1998), Bagachwa (1995 
and 1997) and others help to get a picture of this sector and in particular of the 
investments made and income derived from working in the sector to understand 
its re-distributive function.5 A number of studies deal with rural-urban linkages 
(Bryceson & Jamal 1997, ESRF 2001). Finally some studies are very much 
policy oriented (ILO 2004, Mitullah 2005). ILO (2004) focuses in particular on 
the restrictive regulation and how to deregulate to allow more informal sector 
development. 
 
 
                                                     
5  Data on small enterprises in Tanzania were generated under the World Bank initiated REP studies. 
Later the University of Oxford collected additional data. 
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Table 8.1 How flows are affected in different locations in Tanzania 
Factor Dar es Salaam Arusha Kilimanjaro 
Flows of people    
Migration 
 
Strong inward migration In as well as out of the 
region 
Mainly out of the region 
Lifetime migrants 2004 1,319,360 249,971 113,743 
Flows of money    
Local tax revenues Increasing Increasing Declining 
Remittances, invest-
ments and government 
expenditure 
In and out but  
constantly increasing 
Coming in for the in-, and 
going out for the out- 
migration. Totals increase
Coming into the region to 
support those left behind, 
amounts decrease 
Flow of goods and 
services 
   
Local products and small 
scale services 
In and out, including  
from abroad 
In and out, from abroad, 
partially illegal 
Flows are not as important 
as before 
Source for migration: Mbonile (2004) 
 
Rural informal sector activities 
Rural households with non-agricultural activities (see Table 8.2) suffer less from 
poverty (Rutasitara 2002). Rutasitara gives characteristics of these activities, 
which can be considered the origin of many urban informal sector activities and 
hence we will draw on this study. The importance of non-farm activities is very 
much linked to the possibility of markets for these products. These products can 
be marketed more easily than agricultural products, which all come on the market 
at the same time and require the farmers to deal with only one party, who has a 
much better understanding of the price. Plus agricultural products face transport 
and storage cost; it requires more information and more capital. However, it is 
more difficult to get the message to the rural population that non-farm activities 
are more rewarding. It also requires knowledge and technologies and some small 
investments. Microfinance schemes can be very useful (see Gallardo et al. 2005). 
 
 
Table 8.2 Most important rural informal sector activities in Tanzania 
Small businesses in rural areas: Trade and services Manufacturing activities 
Trade of: 
- agriculture related products, such as grain, 
vegetables, fish and meat 
- industrial products 
- construction related products 
- wood for cooking 
Hawking and street vending 
Repair: 
- bicycles 
- cars 
Agro processing activities 
Blacksmithing 
Carpentry 
Construction material: Mud bricks, stone bricks, 
wooden planks, etc. 
Farm implements 
Tailoring 
Handicrafts and other crafts 
Pottery 
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Major food crops grown in the Dar es Salaam region are: Cassava, sorghum, 
maize, rice, sweet potatoes, bananas, and varieties of legume. Cash crops include: 
Cashew nut, coconuts, oranges, pineapples, and mangoes. Farming of these crops 
is done on small scale plots and land tilling is mainly done by using hand equip-
ments. Very few people are using tractors and traditional upgraded technology. 
Rutasitara (2002: 85-86) mentions as characteristics of the non agricultural 
activities that these are typical sole proprietorship activities, mostly managed by 
family members. The activities tend to be intertwined with the agricultural calen-
dar and usually use local inputs. Income may be unstable and hired labour is 
limited. However, there are low capital requirements to enter into the rural non-
agricultural activities and the technology tends to be simple. These activities are 
easily differentiated by gender, offering employment (and hence income) to the 
disadvantaged. 
A lot of these products and services end up in cities and towns. The rural 
informal sector and these non-agricultural activities are important examples of 
rural-urban linkages (Bagachwa 1997). He notes that a dynamic rural informal 
sector not only employs 21% of the nation’s labour force, and also provides 
estimates of the value added by the sector. He mentions that the sector (including 
the urban informal sector) contributes one-third of the total official economy’s 
value added. 
Different activities in the urban informal sector 
Table 8.3 gives an impression of the activities in the informal sector of Dar es 
Salaam. It should be noted that very different activities in this sector have very 
different problems. This suggests there is also not a “one size fits all” solution. 
The ILO (2005) perspective is getting the informal sector out of the margin into 
the mainstream. This requires removing a number of bottlenecks and introducing 
some specific facilities. For example, the ILO considers it very important that 
there will be a plastic recycling plant in the country soon with the help of  
 
 
Table 8.3 Most important informal sector activities in Dar es Salaam 
Small business license holders in Dar es Salaam: Trade Manufacturing activities 
Operating a stall for assorted items 
Selling firewood 
Selling buns, rice cakes and pastries 
Vending fruit 
Selling fried chips, chicken, eggs and or barbecued meat 
Vending fish 
Tailors 
Making buns, rice cakes and pastries 
Working as a carpenter 
Working as a cobbler 
Repairing watches 
Slaughtering animals 
Welding 
Source: Trip (1997) 
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UNIDO. Scrap metal has already become valuable, and the hope is that people 
will recover plastic as well. Currently most of the plastic bottles are compressed 
and exported to China! 
The informal sector may help families out of poverty, but it is also very much 
a subsistence sector in the rural areas. The question is how to get these people to 
invest in and to expand their businesses. A push from outside may mean much 
more for the local economy than efforts to develop policies for the informal 
sector in the capital. Such a push could be the training received, a trip to another 
city or country or financial support from a family member living elsewhere. The 
informal sector may have its own dynamics, but currently lack of credit facilities 
or fear for taxation does restrain it (Kweka et al. 2004). 
Mechanisms in the urban informal sector: Flows of people 
Because of its high population growth Tanzania has a relatively young popula-
tion. According to the 1988 census 46% of the population was under 15 years of 
age. The total population increased from 7.5 million in 1948 to 34.5 million in 
2002 (URT 2003b). Migration is common in Tanzania. People are moving from 
high density areas to less populated areas and people are opting for living in the 
cities. An important transmission mechanism for skills and income is the labour 
market and its functioning is influenced by good urban management (van Dijk 
2006). One could look at these migrants as physical capital, in the form of human 
bodies, being brought to the regions with more potential or to urban areas, where 
the capital will generate a higher rate of return than in the rural areas. 
There are also international flows of people. The number of people leaving 
Tanzania is not known, but Mbonile (2004) estimates international migration 
towards Tanzania to be 236,775 in 2002, based on the 2002 population census. 
12% of these migrants settle in Dar es Salaam, 2.1% in Arusha and 2.3% in 
Kilimanjaro. In total the census reveals 4,671,641 lifetime migrants, or even 
twice as much if in and out-migration movements are counted separately. He also 
notes big differences per region. 
Rural to urban migration played a big role in the urbanization process in 
Tanzania in the first two decades of the country’s independence. The major 
factor for rural youths to move to urban areas has been the search of a better life, 
especially aspiration for salaried jobs, access to services and social facilities 
(URT 2005). A lot of people seem to go directly to Dar es Salaam (Mlingi & 
Asey 2005: 71). There is less this two-step approach of going to regional capitals 
first in Tanzania. For Dar es Salaam City, the number of people born outside the 
Dar es Salaam region was 56.3% in 2004. This means that more than half of the 
city’s population were migrants. In the same year Arusha had slightly more than 
half of the population being migrants, i.e. 50.7% were not born in the localities of 
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the Arusha region. This shows that immigration has had a big impact on the 
population growth of major urban centres in the country. However, since the 
1980s, natural population increase has also become a major component of urban 
population growth. 
Towns like Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Tanga, which each had a population 
of less than 100,000 people in the 1940s and early 1950s had already a big 
population by 1988. Dar es Salaam, for instance, as a region accounted for 5.9% 
of the country’s total population in 1988. Tanzania’s urban population has 
increased from 6.4% in 1967 to 23.1% in 2002 (Table 8.4). Tanzania has also 
shown high urban population growth rates for the last three decades compared to 
other developing countries. 
 
 
Table 8.4 Urbanization trend in Tanzania over 1967-2002 
 1967 1978 1988 2002 
 Total % Total % Total  % Total % 
Tanzania 786,567 6.4 2,412,900 13.8 4,247,497 18.3  7,943,561 23.1 
Mainland 685,092 5.8 2,257,921 13.3 4,043,684 17.9 7,554,838 22.6 
Zanzibar  101,475 28.6 154,979 32.6 203,813 31.8 388,723 39.6 
Source: URT (2005) 
 
 
Based on the 2002 Population and Housing Census, Dar es Salaam had 
2,487,288 people of whom 1,254,853 were males and the rest females. The city’s 
population grew from 25,000 in 1919, 45,000 in 1945, 128,742 in 1957, 272,821 
in 1967 to 843,000 in 1978. The 1988 census recorded the city’s population to be 
1,360,850 and in 2002 the city population was 2,487,288 million. 
The growth of the informal sector has contributed to rural-urban migration. 
The major pull factor has been the search for a better life especially aspiration for 
employment opportunities, access to better services and social facilities. This in 
turn has put pressure on the utilization of undeveloped and developed facilities in 
Tanzania’s cities. Rapid growth of squatter settlements, peri-urban shantytowns 
and unsanitary environmental conditions are some of the common problems. 
There are also growing health and social problems in these cities. 
Informal flows of money 
Components of the flows of money, one of the mechanisms of the urban informal 
sector, which can be traced, are remittances, loans and savings. Remittances are a 
tricky concept, but the amounts involved are substantial. Conceptually remit-
tances are transfers without an exchange, while otherwise goods are exchanged 
for barter or money. The NBS (2002a: 155) registers the net remittances 
(received minus provided) but does not give a clue as to how the money is used. 
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Remittances and social networks are the key to survival strategies in the rural and 
urban areas. It turns out that net remittances make up 3.5% of the monthly 
income per household in Dar es Salaam. In the rural areas the percentage is 2.1 
and in other urban centres 3.2. The average for Mainland Tanzania is 2.4%. 
The urban informal sector mobilizes a lot of funds and generates income 
opportunities for the poor. The current policy trend is formalization, where poor 
people are given titles for land and other assets (their enterprise), which may 
make it easier for them to obtain loans. Loans will be discussed below, while 
savings in the informal sector are unknown because they do not pass through the 
formal banking system. Again microfinance and saving schemes could make 
these amounts visible. 
Flows of goods and services 
Tripp (1997: 164) distinguishes different informal marketing arrangements. 
Firstly, between members of one village or of a nearby village. Secondly, shuttle 
markets, where the products are taken by bus or truck to a nearby town and then 
to interregional trade where they are sold elsewhere and other goods are brought 
back. Finally, there are open urban markets and export markets, where goods can 
arrive formally or informally. 
The Quarterly report of industrial commodities (NBS 2002b) provides data on 
industrial production in 1985, 2000 and 2003. However, the location of the 
production and the destination of the products are not indicated. If this is the case 
for formal sector products it can hardly be expected that such data are available 
for the informal sector. However, we have learned form several sources that the 
two sectors compete. 
The Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) does not consider the 
competition from the informal sector as very damaging for its members. In fact 
they want the informal entrepreneurs to become members of CTI. For that reason 
they have diminished the membership fees for these smaller companies. How-
ever, they note that the bigger enterprises can also gain access to external 
finance, which is difficult for the small ones. 
The flows of goods are sustained through small-scale transportation and would 
often be called smuggling because the formal requirements are not met. These 
informal movements of goods and services in Tanzania are not always covered in 
the official statistics. However, although large quantities of goods and services 
“exported” are not covered, the information is well known, for example con-
cerning: 
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(1) the type of food going from Tanzania to Kenya; 
(2) the cattle going on hoof, even to Uganda; 
(3) other raw material: Coffee, tea and cashew nuts going out of Tanzania, often illegally; 
(4) sugar coming in from Malawi;6 
(5) hides and precious stones (Tripp 1997: 87); 
(6) textiles, possibly through under invoicing or through Mombasa; 
(7) chickens from Zambia; 
(8) prawns to Botswana; 
(9)  Makonde carvings and other crafts to the west (Tripp 1997: 96); 
(10)  all kinds of industrial products from Kenya usually essential goods; 
(11)  from Zanzibar they smuggle everything, using small boats (if one looks at the statistics 
of the island, the inhabitants import much more than they could possibly absorb). 
The government claims it contains smuggling. That is true for certain products 
(dry batteries and electrical products from South-East Asia), but in other areas 
there are problems. Smuggling is not very important according to some officials 
we talked to. They opine that they manage to control it. Nobody likes to see it 
growing. One way to reduce it was reducing the duties in the framework of 
different trade agreements. The Regional Commissioner in Arusha district also 
coordinates with partners on the other side of the border. The main category 
subject to smuggling is industrial products produced cheaply in Kenya according 
to government officials.  
The attitude of officials towards smuggling is that they do not think Tanzani-
ans smuggle so much. These are usually small producers and people on the other 
side of the border. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a 
study showing that 50 billion of Tanzanian shillings per year is lost as govern-
ment revenue in Tanzania, because of smuggling along the Indian Ocean coast-
line, according to a newspaper article (Citizen 12-7-2005). 
Promoting the role of the informal sector 
An alternative model of development is suggested for example by the ILO (1972) 
and by De Soto (1989). The emphasis would be on developing the informal 
sector further. The units thereof are not always registered, do not pay all the 
different taxes or the legal minimum wage, but they certainly make up a local 
sector, creating a lot of employment and with a lot of entrepreneurial capacity. 
We should be tapping into it. 
Most small-scale activities are still producing for the domestic market and 
some for informal exports. New exceptions are the flowers and certain fish from 
Lake Victoria such as the Nile Birch and the Tilalupa, which can be exported. 
The availability of finance is in general not considered the bottleneck in Tanza-
nia. It is available; the issue is to design mechanisms (microfinance and guaran-
                                                     
6  The Guardian (16-7-2005) reported that the TRA impounded sugar worth 6 million TSh. coming from 
Malawi in July 2005. 
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tee arrangements) to get it into the rural areas and small towns and to reach the 
farmers and the small entrepreneurs. Different levels of government can also 
mobilize more money through partnerships with the commercial and non-
commercial private sector and with other levels of government. 
The informal sector plays an important role and has a tremendous potential to 
spread development. We have to look for those activities that can grow out of the 
sector when they reach a certain level. Typically the gem stones trade (these 
stones are bought and sold in certain streets of Arusha) is in the informal sector. 
There is no viable formal industry and the government should not do it. It 
happens in this way as well, but could develop further. The growth of the 
informal sector could be quantified in terms of number of people involved. 
However, it is more difficult to get estimates of their turnover, income, invest-
ments and exports. There are certainly a number of indications that these vari-
ables are growing at the same speed or faster than the overall economy. 
If asked, many small entrepreneurs claim a lack of finance is their major 
problem. The question is whether loans are the real bottleneck. Other problems 
for micro and small entrepreneurs are a lack of (a) space, (b) infrastructure, (c) 
market outlets, (d) skills, and (e) innovative capacity. 
Current policies of the government for the informal sector and 
SMEs 
Policies for of the government for the informal sector and SMEs in Tanzania are 
very much based on what Altenburg (2005) calls “the minimalist approach to 
private sector development”. De Soto (1989) is an important thinker behind this 
approach, which according to Altenburg fails to point to the complementary 
factors, which are important for micro and small enterprise promotion. We will 
now discuss some current policies and indicate what does not get sufficient 
attention in Tanzania. Current policies of the government for the informal sector 
and SMEs in Tanzania include: (a) formalization policies, (b) credit or loans, (c) 
export promotion, and (d) other SME policies. 
President Kikwete showed in his campaign in 2005 that he is very much in 
favour of developing local small businesses, so SME development became a 
political issue. From 2004 small entrepreneurs can get a license without paying. 
Also the taxation system is more smooth and predictable. There have also been 
lots of policy reforms for the better. 
Formalization process  
In order to empower the informal sector, the government has prepared the 
Property and Business Formalization Program (PBFP). The Program seeks to 
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facilitate the transformation of informal (extralegal) properties and businesses 
into formal legal entities. Its aim is to enable Tanzanians to use the formalized 
resources as collateral in accessing credit from financial institutions and thereby 
enhance economic growth and ultimately reduce poverty. This requires according 
to De Soto (1989) title deeds. However, the question is what would be the value 
of such deeds in a village? Does Tanzania have the legal system to allow finan-
cial institutions to sell such property in case of non-repayment of loans? 
The formalization work has already started in Dar es Salaam. The Business 
Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA) has been created. It was estab-
lished in 1997 and launched at the end of 1999. It provides eight reasons to 
register as a business (see Box 8.2). The Agency is responsible under the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) for business facilitation and regulation. Its 
mission is to regulate and facilitate business operation in conjunction with other 
partner institutions in Tanzania, to ensure that they are in accordance with sound 
business and commercial principles. Their slogan is that BRELA provides 
business legality in Tanzania. Besides registration they are also granting patents, 
overseeing copyrights and involved in business and industrial licensing. 
 
 
Box 8.2    BRELA reasons to register your business 
1. Giving your business undertaking its legal life. 
2. Giving you the exclusive right to personally use your company and business name. 
3. Enabling you to enjoy the pride of being an honest Tanzanian or foreign business 
undertaker. 
4. Giving you the right to enter with confidence into the competitive business arena using 
your company name and business corporate identity. 
5. Granting you exclusive legal right to enjoy the product of your invention or innovation. 
6. Protecting your intellectual property rights, thereby stimulating the urge for further 
inventive, innovative and creative activities. 
7. Enjoying protection of your literary and artistic works against infringement and of your 
privacy. 
8. Affording you the chance to contribute to national economic prosperity. 
 
 
 
Mainstreaming informal enterprises into the formal sector faces some chal-
lenges, which include: Inadequate knowledge of the dynamics of the informal 
sector, and strategically inadequate location of areas for allocating space to 
informal sector operators. The PBFP program is currently limited to the first two 
phases, one of Diagnosis. The first phase has been completed. The second phase 
of Reform design will start when the evaluation of the first phase is completed. 
In Tanzania there is a lot of talking about formalization of the informal sector. 
In practice this does not mean much more than abolishing the license fee if your 
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revenue is below TSh. 20 million. Secondly, small entrepreneurs do not have to 
renew the license, like in the past. If the revenue is over 20 million, they pay 
TSh. 20,000, but only once. For tax purposes, if an enterprise does not have 
records, it pays a lump sum. If it keeps records, it pays a percentage. 
Credit or loans  
Financial experts estimate that in total there is only one billion US dollar in loans 
in Tanzania. Four commercial banks probably provide 70% of that. Four interna-
tional banks, are good for approximately 50%: $ 200 million from Standard and 
Chartered; $150 mln. from Barclay, $100 mln. from Stanbic and $50 mln. from 
the City Bank. Then local banks provide: NBC $200 mln.; Cooperative and Rural 
Development Bank (CRDB) $150 mln. and Exim $80 mln.; and another $80 mln. 
However, these loans do not go to SMEs, let alone the informal sector. 
The sectoral composition of loans is: Large local, 55%; multinational firms 
(without mining, which is self supporting) 20%; SMEs 10%; and consumer loans 
15%.7 Agriculture gets only 10% of this; the rest going to trading and manu-
facturing. The most revealing figure is the growth of the loan portfolio. With an 
economic growth of 6 percent, credit is growing at 25% per year. There is no 
mechanism in place to provide agricultural credit. This is a reason for some 
people to argue in favour of an agricultural bank, but the bankers we talked to 
opine this is too interventionist and the World Bank would be against it. 
Microfinance is not very much developed in Tanzania (Gallardo et al. 2005). 
Microcredit can play an important role for micro and small enterprise develop-
ment in the future. This is not the way the formal sector banks will go, but there 
is scope for alternative microfinance institutions in Tanzania to expand their 
business. 
Despite its name, the National Micro-finance Bank (NMB) is not very much 
into lending to small and micro entrepreneurs. Even now that the Dutch coopera-
tive RABO Bank has taken a major share in the NMB, microfinance for micro 
and small enterprises will not increase substantially in the near future. The NMB 
actually requires a regular income of 100 dollar per month to be eligible for 
loans. 
Investing by Tanzanian banks in risky business is not encouraged because of 
the high rate of interest paid on treasury bills (9 to 10% and risk free, while 
inflation is only 4%). Microloans are currently not interesting for the formal 
sector banks, because the cost involved in lending to one entrepreneur would be a 
few hundred dollars. With a saving component it may become interesting in the 
future. 
                                                     
7  There is a loan guarantee project, which the banks use, but the amount for SMEs in the project is only 
2 million dollar, which bankers consider a joke. 200 to 300 million would be needed! 
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Export promotion 
Several efforts are made to promote exports by small and medium enterprises in 
Tanzania. The Ministry of Industry and Trade with support from Denmark 
(DANIDA) focuses on a limited number of medium scale companies, which are 
willing and able to export and consider new markets (outside the region or 
Africa). The project helps these enterprises to overcome the barriers to export 
and to focus on quality requirements, helping them to satisfy international 
standards. For practical reasons the project focuses on a limited number of cities. 
The project does provide grants to help Tanzanian companies to export. 
The Danish consultant to the Ministry of Industry and Trade claims that they 
do not deal with the informal sector, but she agrees that there is some kind of 
continuum between informal micro and formal SME. They consider the main 
bottlenecks in the sector to be regulatory and administrative constraints, taxes 
and compliance cost. Although the administrative system is decentralized, entre-
preneurs often have to go to Dar es Salaam for tax purposes or to obtain an 
import license. 
Other SME policies 
Innovation is not a big thing in the small enterprise sector in Tanzania. A lot of 
entrepreneurs are mainly copying what is happening elsewhere. Also incubator 
centres do not exist yet. Still there are many Tanzanian producers in sectors like 
cloth, vegetable oil, soap, etc., which could benefit from innovation or incubation 
centres (Bongenaar & Szirmai 2002). Van Dijk & Sandee (2002) suggest using 
the term innovation in the broad sense of introducing new ideas, new products 
and ways of working or financing or selling the production of micro and small 
enterprises. The Technology Development and Transfer Centre (TDTC) at the 
university of Dar es Salaam now produces for example sieving machines for 
small scale mining (Sunday Observer 7-7-2005) and could be used for develop-
ing or adapting technologies for other activities as well. 
Although most of these informal sector enterprises are small, they trigger local 
economic development. However, there are export associations in Tanzania, even 
if these sectoral institutions are not always called export associations. For coffee, 
horticulture, sisal and mining such associations do exist and could be used. Also 
Trade Fair sales can help SMEs. The Sunday Observer (17-7-2005) reported that 
sales during the Dar es Salaam International Trade Fair (DITF) have been twice 
the record sales of 2004 (TSh. 78 million versus 38.9 million in 2004). 
The ILO promotes developing the urban informal sector in East Africa by 
promoting subcontracting of solid waste collection and treatment to small enter-
prises (Mitullah 2005). Preparing training manuals is part of their approach to the 
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issue. Local organizations develop the material. Other ideas mentioned in ILO 
(2004) to promote the informal sector are: (a) a new pact between central govern-
ment and small businesses, (b) improving their access to public procurement,  
(c) development of entrepreneurship, and (d) more efficient institutional arrange-
ments. 
Conclusions on promotion policies 
The process of formalizing the informal sector, which has started in Tanzania 
under the influence of De Soto (1989), has some dangers. One is that it will kill 
the sector, whose secret is that they are not paying all the taxes and satisfying all 
the rules and regulations developed for the formal sector. Secondly, it is noted 
that the large number of activities currently undertaken for this sector may 
stimulate people to actually go to the cities and try to benefit from these pro-
grams. Hence it could increase rural-urban migration. Finally there will always 
be an informal sector, even if you make registration easier and paying taxes more 
transparent and justifiable. New people will start economic activities without 
bothering to register or to pay taxes. 
Most informal sector activities do not believe in formalization and hence they 
want to stay out of the tax and credit web. However, the dynamic part of the 
informal sector will eventually make the shift. The approach of De Soto, giving 
everybody titles, is not a sufficient condition for successful small enterprise 
development. A lot more (education, training, markets, innovation) is necessary 
to turn the small and micro entrepreneurs into dynamic business(wo)men.  
Another point of departure for the promotion of the informal sector would be 
to take the real problems of these small entrepreneurs as the point of departure. In 
Trip (1997) one finds a number of positive and negative factors, summarized in 
Table 8.5. 
 
 
Table 8.5   Positive and negative factors for the urban informal sector  
Positive Negative 
Rotating credit societies (117) 
Networking strategies (122-24) 
Women taking control over their own lives (117) 
The moral economy model (127) 
Ending enforcement policies (193) 
 
Licensing restrictions (103) 
Oppressive laws (103) 
Harassment (124) 
Battle over grounds (158) 
One can add: Taxes, lack of space, lack of 
credit, etc. 
Source: Tripp (1997, with page numbers in the table). 
 
 
A positive policy environment largely determines the further development of 
informal sector activities. If its contribution to the economy is recognized and 
promoted the sector can really help to spread development over the country. 
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Micro and small businesses face a lot of competition and they need a friendly 
environment to be able to survive and to develop their businesses. The authorities 
have at least put in place a lot more positive regulatory framework. The previous 
president from Tanzania was very pro-private sector and CTI hopes that this 
approach will continue with president Kikwete, after the elections in 2005. As 
one of the CTI officials phrased it: “These small guys also help our members to 
sell their products for example in the interior.” Hopefully in due course a real 
businesses development support system (BDS) will develop. 
Conclusions on global city or local node 
Combining Sassen’s perspective and Kanbur (2001), who argues that an 
economy needs to be understood from below, Dar es Salaam is a node in the 
periphery of the global economy. However, it is a well connected node and it 
does use its position to help to spread development in that region, although 
possibly not enough. With its growth potential and in particular through informal 
flows of people, money, goods and services some development is already spread-
ing to the interior of the country and probably more than the official statistics 
show! The challenge is to serve a larger hinterland as well. 
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In the last decade, the concept of the everyday has come to feature prominently 
within the arts and humanities, and particularly also in the fields of media and 
cultural studies (Silverstone 1994, Scannell 1996, Mackay 1997, Gauntlett & Hill 
1999, Storey 1999, Moores 2000). The consolidation of this theoretical frame-
work can also be highlighted with the recent publication of an everyday theory 
textbook and reader (Highmore 2001, 2002). The emphasis in most of the work 
done within media and cultural studies has been on the role of media in people’s 
everyday lives, e.g. how new communication technologies change relationships 
between people, the manner in which media make available types of identity to 
audiences, and the way in which media structure everyday routines. 
This paper turns the relation between the everyday and the media around, and 
will instead look at how notions of “everydayness” and “ordinariness” have been 
constructed in the media, and particularly in comic strips in Zimbabwe. I 
attribute a key role to popular culture in this regard, as that is where “issues 
central to the everyday life of the majority of population are being articulated and 
debated, and new modes of life are made visible, audible, thinkable” (Folke 
Frederiksen 1997: 94). 
The comic strip “Chikwama” which appeared in the Zimbabwean private 
newspaper The Daily News provided a powerful but subtle commentary on the 
change of everyday lives that came with the increasing economic, political and 
social crisis. Whereas mainstream media reports highlighted the passivity of 
Zimbabweans in the face of increasing repression, this paper will argue that 
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comic strips provided a different and more diffuse conceptualization of power 
and subjectivity. Chikwama showed the more ambiguous ways in which Zim-
babweans negotiated changes in their everyday lives.  
Representing the rulers and the ruled 
In an article entitled “Dictator’s grip is tightened by weak protest” in the British 
newspaper The Daily Telegraph, journalist David Blair (2005) suggests that the 
“docile nature” of Zimbabweans has enabled President Mugabe to strengthen his 
rule: 
In fairness, there has been little spontaneous discontent. A few stones were thrown at police 
during the urban demolitions and street battles briefly erupted in towns such as Chitungwiza. 
But many Zimbabweans meekly submitted to the destruction of their homes and livelihoods. 
Any outsider with goodwill towards this beautiful country is led towards some pro-
foundly disturbing conclusions. The entire Zimbabwean nation seems to have given up 
opposing Mr Mugabe. Put bluntly, they are waiting for God to remove him. The MDC’s 
[main opposition party Movement for Democratic Change – WW] failure to offer any protest 
or resistance reflects the popular mood. 
But if 12 million Zimbabweans have no will to rid themselves of a dictator, why should 
anyone else help? Perhaps Zimbabweans deserve the most damning verdict of all – that they 
have the leader they deserve. 
I hasten to add that I do not believe this. But looking at the country’s recent history, I find 
it hard to listen to Zimbabweans who blame the outside world for failing to help. They have 
done precious little to help themselves and Mr Tsvangirai [MDC president – WW] seems 
most adept at machine-gunning himself in both feet. 
In other words, Zimbabweans had themselves to blame for the deteriorating 
situation in their country. Put bluntly, because of their passivity, they got the 
regime they deserved. Or as Richard Dowden (2005), the previous Africa Editor 
of The Economist, wrote in an article in The Times, “The opposition Movement 
for Democratic Change has missed its chance to follow the example of the citi-
zens of Ukraine, Georgia and Madagascar and take to the streets to force out a 
tyrannical ruler”. Especially, in the run-up to the Presidential Elections in April 
2005, the comparison with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was often made. 
The international media were waiting for Zimbabweans to rise up and stand 
against the Mugabe regime, just like people had done in Ukraine, Georgia and 
Madagascar. When it did not happen, they were disappointed and interest in 
Zimbabwe dropped. 
Apart from media representations of Zimbabweans as passive subjects to an 
all-powerful government, there has been a similar discourse on the influence of 
the media, and particularly government media. This discourse of what I would 
call “passive audiences” is expressed for example in a public opinion survey part 
of a series known as Afrobarometer. The survey concluded that the government 
media in Zimbabwe have been successful in their efforts to win the hearts and 
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minds of Zimbabweans (Chikwanha et al. 2004, Bratton et al. 2005). Afro-
barometer measures “the social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa”.1 
The project compares “trends in public attitudes” in various African countries 
and shares results with “decision makers, policy advocates, civic educators, jour-
nalists, researchers, donors and investors, as well as average Africans who wish 
to become more informed and active citizens” (emphasis added by author).2 The 
researchers of the Zimbabwean survey were confronted with an outcome that 
they could not quite explain. Although Zimbabweans seemed to blame the 
government for the deteriorating economic conditions, the results of the survey 
concluded that many Zimbabweans still respected and supported President 
Mugabe.  
The research team attempted to explain this “paradox” through three factors: 
Economic patronage, political fear and persuasion by the mass media. They did 
not find a significant relation between the first two factors and continued support 
to the government but did find a statistical significant relation between factor 
three and a positive evaluation of the government. Because readers attached a 
significant amount of trust in the government media, they concluded that this 
confidence must have motivated and convinced readers to continue to support the 
ruling regime. The research team here implies a straightforward, causal relation 
or “hypodermic needle effect” between trust in the media and support for the 
regime. This relation could be turned around as well. Would readers who are 
inclined to support the regime at all costs not also support the type of media in 
which their leaders are portrayed in a favourable way? In other words, could 
people’s support not precede their preference for certain media? 
The research team argued the other way to enable them to give their final 
report a catchy title “The power of propaganda” or as David Moore (2005) 
cynically noted in a response to the report, “we can guarantee continued donor 
funding for the science of surveying democratic progress across the Dark Conti-
nent”. Both the Bratton research team and Blair and Dowden expect a particular 
kind of resistance that Zimbabweans apparently have not demonstrated. How-
ever, these accounts have ignored both the repressive nature of the state and the 
different, perhaps less visible ways in which Zimbabweans have responded to 
their regime in their everyday lives. 
In a climate where efforts are being made to stifle flows of information, I will 
argue, other forms of media gain importance. With reference of Africa, Ellis 
(1989: 321) has noted the central role of what has become know as “radio 
trottoir” in Francophone Africa or “pavement radio” in Anglophone Africa, 
which he defines as “the popular and unofficial discussion of current affairs in 
                                                     
1  See the Afrobarometer website: www.afrobarometer.org. 
2  Ibid. 
 
154 Willems 
Africa, particularly in town”. Bourgault (1995: 201) identifies “parallel dis-
course” as a means through which Africans have managed to “deform, through 
deconstruction and reconstruction, the praises they are forced to sing and 
perform”. She refers hereby to the work of Comi Toulabor (1986) who has 
written on how official party slogans and songs are subverted by people during 
official visits of government officials. Mbembe (2001: 106), drawing on De 
Certeau (1984), speaks of “poaching of meanings” by Togolese who identified 
the Togolese party acronym RPT with “the sound of faecal matter dropping into 
a sceptic tank” or “the sound of a fart emitted by quivering buttocks which can 
only smell disgusting”.  
In the numerous queues that rapidly appeared and have grown in length in the 
past five years, Zimbabweans have been actively debating politics irrespective of 
their fears. In commuter omnibuses, people have been sharing jokes mocking the 
regime although not always without consequences. Naming and re-naming has 
been a powerful strategy that has long been used in Zimbabwe in order to com-
ment upon political affairs. For example the acronym ESAP which stood for the 
“Economic Structural Adjustment Programme” in the early 1990s came to be 
known as “Even Sadza is a Problem”, to denote the rising prices of food after the 
abolishment of food subsidies as a result of the implementation of neoliberal 
policies.3 The recent attempts by the Zimbabwean government to “clean up” the 
urban areas in “Operation Murambatsvina” (“Operation Drive Out Trash” in 
Shona) came to be known as “Tsunami” or Zimbabwe’s “Hurricane Katrina”.  
In order to understand how Zimbabweans relate to their rulers and have posi-
tioned themselves, it is probably more useful to look at these various ways of 
public speech and commentary instead of conducting surveys on public opinion 
and attitudes in a climate where fear and intimidation is rife. Comic strips have 
been important forms of commentary and I would agree with Francis Nyamnjoh 
(2005: 84) that “it is necessary to look beyond meta-narratives of euphoria and 
victimhood to understand how marginalized individuals and communities are 
responding to state repression …”. 
In an important article on popular culture in Africa, Johannes Fabian (1997: 
25) argues that “cultural expressions … are not evidence for how culture ‘works’ 
(or ‘functions’ or ‘determines action’); but they demonstrate how perceptions, 
experiences and problems are being ‘worked out’ in an open, never-ending 
process”. According to Fabian, cultural expressions should not be seen as 
“reflections” of an already-constituted “world view”. Rather, they are part of the 
work of cultural production. In a similar way, Mbembe (2001: 142) describes the 
cartoon as “a figure of speech” that is “never an exact copy of reality” but 
“always a conventional comment, the transcription of reality, a word, a vision”. 
                                                     
3  Sadza is a porridge made out of white maize flour which is Zimbabwe’s staple food. 
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In this paper, I would like to show how a study of comic strips in a private, 
critical daily Zimbabwean newspaper can tell us more about the way in which 
Zimbabweans have worked out the changes in their everyday life as a result of 
the crisis. 
Comic strips in Zimbabwe 
Until recently, newspaper editors in Zimbabwe often used syndicated interna-
tional comic strips from outside the country such as Hagar the Horrible, Andy 
Capp and Fred Basset for publication in their newspapers. As McLoughlin 
(1989: 217) has argued, the Zimbabwean comic strip has “long been on the 
fringe of popular culture, neglected as much by artists as by editors and their 
financiers”. Although magazines such as Parade, Moto and Prize had local 
comic strips, the main daily national newspaper The Herald relied on imports. 
However, with the launch of the private newspaper The Daily News in March 
1999, Zimbabwean cartoonists were offered a full page to publish their work in a 
new paper that rapidly gained popularity among Zimbabweans. This can to a 
large extent be attributed to the enthusiasm for cartoons and comic strips on the 
part of Geoff Nyarota, The Daily News’s editor. Together with Boyd Maliki, 
Nyarota had been involved in a strip called Nyati in the 1980s. 
The Daily News made a deliberate attempt to provide an alternative to the pro-
government daily newspaper The Herald that had been publishing since inde-
pendence in 1980, and was known as The Rhodesia Herald before Independence. 
Whereas both government print and electronic media relied to a large extent on 
the official voice of government elites, The Daily News sought to be a paper for 
“the common man in the streets”. Instead of relying on expert views, The Daily 
News felt ordinary Zimbabweans also had opinions which were worth recording. 
Especially in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary elections, the paper rapidly 
increased its popularity. This, however, was also noted by the government, which 
in the past has tried through various means to prevent the paper from publishing. 
Ultimately, in September 2003, the paper was forced to close down 4.5 years 
after it started publishing. 
Cartoons and comic strips are generally seen as a marginal genre within news-
papers. I consider a cartoon an image in a singular frame with no narrative. By 
contrast, a comic strip comprises a sequence of images which tell a particular 
story. Governments do not consider these to be of any importance. They assume 
that readers are more influenced by news articles. In Zimbabwe, numerous jour-
nalists from The Daily News have been arrested but cartoonists have generally 
been left alone. The indirect, ambiguous and polysemic character of comic strips 
and cartoons makes them less explicit in their meaning and therefore particularly 
suitable as forms of political critique. Cartoons and comic strips can be read and 
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interpreted in various ways which makes it more difficult and less straightfor-
ward for governments to target them with legal measures. In spite of government 
disregard, cartoons and comic strips are very popular with newspaper readers in 
Zimbabwe. Readers often turn to the cartoon section before reading other parts of 
the newspaper. Cartoons are stuck to walls in homes, internet cafes, hair salons 
and copy shops, and they often provoke conversations among people. 
Although in Zimbabwe comic strips in newspapers generally used to deal with 
social issues, such as infidelity, relationships, gender, they gradually came to 
address more political topics such as the economic crisis with which Zimbabwe-
ans were increasingly confronted. The new generation of comic strips in The 
Daily News started to focus on the hours and hours that Zimbabweans had to 
spend in queues in order to obtain basic commodities, the way in which watching 
television programmes on the monopoly state broadcaster Zimbabwe Broadcast-
ing Corporation became a very boring exercise when messages praising and 
commending the regime were repeated constantly.  
In The Daily News, cartoons were positioned on a page which also included 
the paper’s editorial, opinion pieces and preceding a page with Letters to the 
Editor. On the other hand, comic strips were placed towards the end of the paper. 
Initially, The Daily News had three comic strips but from March 2002, the paper 
carried four: Chikwama by Tony Namate, Nyati by Watson Mukutirwa, Samson 
by Noah Pomo and City Life by Boyd Maliki (see Figure 9.1).  
These cartoons are targeting an educated, literate audience, e.g. office work-
ers, rural teachers, secretaries, civil servants. Although they combine images with 
text in English, they are in fact not that visual, in the sense that the images do not 
always tell a story on their own. The strips mainly represent talk or dialogues 
between people, and involve them doing little other activities. Perhaps only City 
Life sometimes expresses something else than talk. I would therefore argue that 
the text is crucial to these comic strips and the image is secondary. This means 
that one needs to be literate (in English) in order to understand these cartoons.  
The comic strip Chikwama 
The focus in this paper is on the comic strip Chikwama which appeared at the top 
of the comic page in The Daily News. Chikwama is drawn by Tony Namate, who 
is currently probably the most well-known cartoonist in Zimbabwe, and who has 
received several awards for his work. Chikwama is a strip about an “ordinary” 
Zimbabwean man struggling with all the economic and political changes around 
him. The word Chikwama has several meanings in Zimbabwe’s major local  
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Figure 9.1 Comics by T. Namate, W. Mukutirwa, N. Pomo and B. Maliki 
From: The Daily News, 22 July 2002, p. 29. 
 
 
language Shona. It literally means wallet or purse, an object that is probably no 
longer very useful in Zimbabwe because of the hyperinflation. The stacks and 
stacks of notes that Zimbabweans carry around as a result of high inflation need 
to be kept in something that is bigger than a wallet, a small bag perhaps. The 
word Chikwama also refers more generally to money in the urban slang that is 
spoken in the capital Harare. Furthermore, it can also in an informal sense mean 
someone who is difficult to shrug off, someone who always sticks with you, 
wherever you go. 
In the strip in The Daily News, we see Chikwama, or Chiki as he is known to 
his friends, socializing with a variety of people, frequenting beer halls, hanging 
out drinking and joking with his friends. Chikwama is positioned as not a 
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particularly wealthy man. For example, in the following strip we see Chikwama 
talking to his more upper-class auntie (Figure 9.2):  
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Chikwama and his aunt 
From: The Daily News, 18 November 2001, p. 22. 
 
 
Chikwama’s auntie complains about the problems that are affecting her as an 
upper class Zimbabwean woman. She has to repaint her car, buy a new micro-
wave and on top of that, she needs to pay off the mortgage of her second house in 
Borrowdale, which is an affluent suburb in Harare where a lot of cabinet minis-
ters live. As reader, our sympathy is drawn to Chikwama who is struggling to 
pay his bills. Cartoonist Namate expects the reader to go through similar 
problems as Chikwama and addresses through Chikwama the struggles Zimbab-
weans go through on a daily basis. 
Another issue that Chikwama and his friends are struggling with are the food 
shortages. They are trying hard to find food in the shops, spending hours and 
hours queuing, which again means we are mainly dealing with urbanites here, not 
people who are growing their food themselves, as in the rural areas. The follow-
ing comic (Figure 9.3) shows Chikwama talking to his future wife about lobola 
(bride price): 
Whereas lobola these days is normally paid in cash, Chikwama is shocked to 
hear that his future in-laws are demanding payment in maize-meal! How is he 
going to take care of that? In this instance, maize becomes even more precious 
than money. One can have money, but that does not mean that one can buy 
maize. Maize therefore becomes an extremely valuable commodity that can 
almost replace money as a means of exchange.  
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Figure 9.3  Marriage and lobola 
From: The Daily News, 12 April 2002, p. 30. 
 
 
In another strip we see one of Chiki’s friends who has found a solution to the 
food shortages: He has started to attend funerals in order to get a decent meal 
(see Figure 9.4). Funerals in Zimbabwe are generally accompanied with large 
quantities of food, sadza and meat. This strip shows how these sad occasions 
suddenly became events to indulge in. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4    Assessing a funeral 
From: The Daily News, 29 May 2002, p. 29. 
 
 
In the examples I have shown we see how Chiki and his friends are making 
attempts to cope with the deteriorating economic and social conditions in Zim-
babwe but we do not learn why the situation has changed, we do not get to know 
the cause of the problems. There is no agent, there are victims. However, they are 
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not trapped in their victimhood, they have found creative ways to deal with the 
situation, and have therefore been attributed agency again. 
The same holds for the changing political situation. The emergence of the 
Movement for Democratic Change on the Zimbabwean political scene in 1999 
came to pose a serious threat to the ruling party ZANU PF. Political violence 
against the opposition became common, especially in the run-up to parliamentary 
and presidential elections. The following strip (Figure 9.5) shows how Chiki has 
been dealing with these political tensions:  
 
 
 
  Figure 9.5 Two membership cards 
  From: The Daily News, 15 November 2001, p. 26.  
 
 
Chikwama has bought not only a MDC card but also a ZANU PF card in case 
of emergencies. Namate here suggests that the implied reader of the strip is 
probably more sympathetic to the MDC than to ZANU PF. It is self-evident that 
Chiki would have a MDC card but perhaps at first sight not so clear why he 
would also have a ZANU PF card. However, he just wishes to protect himself in 
case he would come across representatives of the ruling party who would ask him 
for his card. 
This ambivalence between on the one hand resisting the regime but at the 
same time participating in its rituals in order to survive, is perhaps what Mbembe 
(2001: 110, 128) would refer to as “the intimacy of tyranny” which according to 
him inscribes “the dominant and the dominated within the same episteme”. It 
shows how the ruled are unable to resist and therefore are forced to join in the 
rituals of the state. Ultimately though, they are fooling the state by pretending to 
be ruling party supporters. But when it comes to voting day, they will express 
their true vote which will be for the opposition party. A similar situation is shown 
in the following strip (Figure 9.6).  
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  Figure 9.6   Independence day celebrations 
  From: The Daily News, 2 May 2002, p. 27. 
 
 
We see Chikwama’s friend talking about the annual Independence celebra-
tions, always held on 18 April in Rufaro Stadium in Mbare which is one of the 
oldest high-density suburbs in Harare. Chikwama’s friend suggests that most 
people attending are not really doing so because they want to show their patriot-
ism to the nation. As a result of the crisis in Zimbabwe, people are no longer 
interested to celebrate their Independence. Some may even argue the country 
needs a second liberation struggle. However, the Independence celebrations are 
always followed by a soccer match between Zimbabwe’s most popular clubs, in 
this case the Dynamos from Harare and Highlanders from Bulawayo. There is a 
catch though, in order to attend the match, people are required to be in the 
stadium in the morning which means they are forced to attend the official 
Independence celebrations as well. No one will be admitted to the stadium after 
the start of the Independence celebrations. Entertainment therefore comes at a 
price. However, at a time when Zimbabweans are deprived of leisure options, it 
is a price Chikwama and his friends are willing to pay.  
Conclusion 
These examples show how comic strips have presented a powerful commentary 
upon the suffering of “ordinary” Zimbabweans. Without clearly naming the agent 
that caused Zimbabweans’ deprivation, cartoonists left it to their audiences to 
interpret the reasons for their misery. Comic strips were what Spitulnik (2002: 
179) calls “diffused dialogues, not direct dialogues, with the state”.  
At a time when people’s everyday lives dramatically changed as a result of the 
economic and political crisis in the country, comic strips gave expression to the 
various ways in which these changes were “worked out” by Zimbabweans. 
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Comic strips provide alternative representations of ways in which Zimbabweans 
have dealt with their rulers to discourses in the mainstream media and some 
academic analyses. Comic strips show the complexity of relations between rulers 
and ruled in the postcolony. Their relation is never simply a dichotomy between 
resistance and passivity, autonomy and subjection. In order to survive in the 
postcolony, the ruled connive with the rulers, participate in their rituals but at the 
same time toy with their power and control in what Mbembe (2001) calls “the 
intimacy of tyranny”. 
Secondly, the examples which I have given have also demonstrated how Zim-
babwe’s lively informal and verbal culture in which jokes, gossip and rumour 
play important roles can be integrated into the perhaps more formal and written 
form of the comic strip. The way in which Chikwama engages, participates and 
listens to pavement radio makes this particular strip very much part of everyday 
talk in Zimbabwe. “Pavement radio” both feeds into comic strips and can also 
result into more talk when readers start discussing the comic strip they have seen 
in the newspapers.  
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A tale of two wars:  
The militarization of Dinka and  
Nuer indentities in South Sudan1 
 
 
Naglaa Elhag 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The war in Southern Sudan was complicated and prolonged, and has deep roots 
in the pre-state past. It is not the subject of this paper to trace the root causes of 
the conflict in Sudan. I will rather focus on a certain local conflict that existed 
(and may still exist) between the Dinka and the Nuer, the two largest peoples in 
Southern Sudan. Attention will be paid to the political elements that have con-
tributed to the internal fighting that took place between the Dinka and the Nuer 
and that left behind a high level of tension and animosity, present under the 
surface until today. The question is why the Dinka and Nuer came into such 
massive conflict during the North-South war. The answer is that the “South” had 
always been divided - although Sudan is now witnessing an era which may bring 
peace and stability to the region. Coupled with good prospects for long-range 
investments and sustainable development, the peace situation may help the 
people of South Sudan to solve their problems: Being economically crippled, 
military devastated and politically alienated. Second, the currently developing 
debate about peace between the North and the South tends to overlook that the 
conflict in Sudan is not only between the North and the South as such, but 
                                                     
1  My grateful thanks go to the Editors of this volume for their detailed comments and suggestions on an 
earlier draft of this chapter. 
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includes additionally various local conflicts with tribal militias that have taken 
deep roots in Sudan. 
Because Nuer and Dinka are the two largest groups in South Sudan, peace in 
South Sudan is impossible if these two peoples continue fighting each other. 
Additionally, the people of Sudan may need ages to solve the problems that have 
been an outcome of ethnic tensions and tribal militias. It needs a strong commit-
ment from the leaders and the local people themselves to sustain a long-term 
peace. Here I give a brief background analysis of the political elements that 
contributed to the split and to the fighting among the leaders of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA – with the Sudan People’s Liberation Move-
ment [SPLM] as its political wing), notably in 1991, at which point the result was 
a deep militarization of Dinka and Nuer societies and the politicization of their 
local ethnic identities. This paper is guided by the following questions: 
 
• Why has a movement that is raising the slogans of unity and equality, equal rights and 
representation been questioned even by its close members and high rank leaders? 
• How have SPLM leaders enhanced the tension that existed between the Nuer and Dinka 
peoples for their own personal benefits? 
• What are the elements and factors that connected Dinka and Nuer and how can these 
elements be enhanced? 
• Finally, what can be done to restore a real long-term peace between the two peoples and 
their civilian followers? 
Background to the conflict in South Sudan 
Context of conflict (I) – war 
The political history of what is now called Sudan is rather complex. One of the 
most important events of recent history took place in 1982, when the Govern-
ment of Sudan declared to apply shari’a law all over the country, which gave 
birth to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement. The birth of the movement 
was a big shift in the policy of the struggle in South Sudan, as it turned from 
separation to liberation, hence characterizing the SPLM as a national liberation 
movement. Since that date the leader of the movement, Dr. John Garang - who 
ethnically belonged to the Dinka, the most numerous people in South Sudan - 
had been fighting the government of Sudan and managed to liberate to some 
extent several areas within South Sudan. Although all political leaders of the 
SPLM have raised slogans of unity, liberation and human rights, the reality, 
nevertheless, seems to be different. 
The internal fighting that followed the Nasir-faction military coup in August 
1991 by one of its political and military leaders, Dr. Riek Machar – who ethni-
cally belongs to the Nuer people, the second largest in South Sudan – and other 
military officers has shown how the SPLM was internally devastated by the 
contradictions between its leaders. The main demand articulated by the Nasir 
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leaders was a need for a radical democratic reform. But the coup failed, as it 
proved to have hidden personal agendas that differed from the official declara-
tions. These hidden agendas were entertained by the leaders of the Nasir faction. 
The split of the SPLM and the period that followed the Nasir declaration were 
characterized by tension and tribal animosity as a consequence of a number of 
negative events, among them the invasion of the Nasir leaders of areas like Bor, 
which is mainly inhabited by the Dinka. The invasion of Bor and Kongor areas 
caused huge destruction and a humanitarian crisis that affected mainly the 
civilian population. Apart from the Nuer, many civilians from other tribes also 
joined the Nasir faction, because they simply did not want SPLM and its leaders 
anymore, viewing it as a Dinka movement. 
The Nasir faction, however, has proved to be a political and military disaster. 
The issue of the internal split among the SPLM political leaders had reached the 
state of being so personal that both leaders started using their ethnic affiliation as 
a card in their hands. Here I would like to quote one of the military officers who 
served both sides of the movement at that time, arguing about the struggle that 
followed the Nasir declaration: 
… this struggle, unfortunately, did not attain the ideological and political height that would 
have furthered the aims of the revolution, thus ensuring a fundamental impact on the political 
and military situation in the movement. It got frozen at the level of personal hackling, 
bickering and petty squabbles, leading to desertions and defections of the combatants to form 
their own splinter groups within or without military presence on the ground in South Sudan. 
(Nyaba 1997: 7) 
Instead of working out the differences and solving the internal fighting among 
themselves, leaders of the SPLM - be it the mainstream or the Nasir faction – 
committed a grave mistake by ignoring their own people and by neglecting all 
those who did not take part in that split by supporting neither the mainstream nor 
the Nasir faction. Moreover, political and military leaders turned their guns 
against each other’s entire civil populations. By such attitudes, leaders from both 
factions did not only enhance the oppression and the brutality that followed their 
split, but also created a good chance for the National Islamic government of 
Sudan in Khartoum to use this opportunity for its own benefit. The argument of 
some government members was: “Let the southerners fight each other and we 
will make peace with whomever remains.”2 
The main victims of the internal fighting were the unarmed civilians, as 
soldiers from both sides committed crimes against them, including murder, rape, 
torture, and other types of atrocities. Given their low level of political awareness 
and education, civilians found themselves trapped between what they called later 
a Dinka movement headed by Dr. Garang and a Nuer faction led by Dr. Riek 
                                                     
2  An argument made by Dr. G.S. Eldeen, in a public speech in Khartoum in 1996 during the celebration 
of the Islamic revolution in Sudan. 
 
 The militarization of Dinka and Nuer identities in South Sudan 167 
Machar. All these events contributed to and enhanced various “tribal” conflicts in 
South Sudan, but mainly between the Dinka and the Nuer, which resulted in a 
high rate of killing, looting, abduction of women and children, and the burning of 
houses and villages (Jok & Hutchinson 1999). 
On the one hand Riek Machar wanted to lead the SPLM in order to transform 
the unified Nuer into a powerful force that could dominate the whole of South 
Sudan, and on the other hand John Garang launched a war and continued with his 
authoritarian way of leadership, which made most of the civilians consider the 
SPLM a Dinka movement. Machar and his people played a very harsh game, 
using the tactic of blackmailing and ethnic loyalty. Officers from the Nasir 
faction claimed that they would get support against Garang either peacefully or 
by force, and consequently a state of terror and lawlessness in South Sudan 
began. Murder and executions of Dinka by Nuer militias took place, while the 
only justification for the killings was a refusal to follow the faction and its 
slogans. All Dinka areas bordering Nuer land were raided, people were killed, 
cattle were stolen, and women and children were abducted. 
Machar and some of his military officers continued to play the card of ethnic 
loyalty. One of the main tactics that the leaders of the Nasir faction followed was 
to equip all its Nuer followers with heavy arms in order to invade Dinka areas. In 
order to gain legitimacy for this fight, Machar managed to convince the Nuer 
people on his side that there were in fact “two types of wars”. As argued by 
Machar (see Hutchinson 2001: 314-16), the homicides within a “government 
war” were largely devoid of the social and political risks associated with deaths 
generated by a more localized “homeland war”. One of the arguments adopted by 
Machar here was that a death that took place within a government war would 
mainly be personal and final, and that there would be no way of claiming blood 
money, as is the case in a homeland war, where the families of the dead usually 
claim compensation. Moreover, Machar emphasized that any Nuer fighter should 
not claim or shoulder responsibility for any death that occurred within their fight 
against the SPLM-Mainstream, and hence that no personal responsibility should 
be claimed. With this argument, his intention was to destroy any mediation 
structures that might stand between him and his followers and that still existed in 
the Nuer community. 
Machar also managed to manipulate the Nuer people by claiming that he was 
destined to lead the people of South Sudan by misusing an old traditional belief 
about their prophet Ngundeng, who had prophesied that a leader of South Sudan 
would come from the descendants of Teny-Dhurgon. Continuing in manipulating 
the Nuer people and their legacy of the prophet Wurnyang, Machar managed to 
stage an attack with the aim of capturing the town of Malakal. As a result, many 
civilians fled their homes and had sought refuge in the town of Waat, where 
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severe starvation and famine took place. Many Nuer fighters joined the Nasir 
faction not because they believed in its declarations, but simply because they 
were Nuer. For instance, the earlier war of the Anya-nya (before 1972) took also 
place on a Nuer-Dinka base. 
During the Nasir coup period, many Nuer officers in Equatoria escaped to 
Upper Nile, not for the sake of the faction and its leader, but because they were 
Nuer. For them, fighting against the SPLM meant fighting against the Dinka, and 
hence restoring the domination that had been promised by the leaders of the 
Nasir faction. Machar always sustained the argument that he was the leader of the 
united South Sudan, and he expected by playing the ethnicity tune he would be 
on top of the leadership of the Nuer. Anyone who opposed him or who consti-
tuted a threat to this view was killed. Riek Machar and his political followers 
within the Nasir faction justified these deeds of killing, raping and stealing of 
animal wealth to their people by arguing that Nuer people were only recovering 
their own animal wealth, which had been stolen by the Dinka before, and 
furthermore that they were ensuring their dominance over the Dinka who had 
always taken the lead over the Nuer people. Moreover, followers of the Nasir 
faction also practiced violations of daily norms in the region by denying certain 
population groups within their areas – such as the Uduk – access to any relief 
supplies, a fact that caused UN and other relief organizations to suspend their 
operations in the region. 
On the other hand, Garang and his followers within the SPLM mainstream 
raided several Nuer areas in Western Upper Nile. These raids were done with 
very modern weapons supplied by political and military sources from outside. 
Additionally, Dinka people attacked Nuer land at night as a reaction to the 
actions of the Nasir faction, and that also resulted in the burning of villages and 
houses, rape, killing and murders. Furthermore, the counteroffensive by Garang’s 
forces yielded widespread killings of innocent populations, for instance in Baliet 
village, where they committed brutal crimes against humanity by burning Toposa 
villages and killing hundreds of civilians, causing a disaster that resulted in high 
numbers of displaced people. Garang, who was supposed to act as an open-
minded leader for all Southern Sudanese in their struggle for liberation, acted in a 
very dictatorial, violent way and many Southerners portrayed him as intolerant of 
any disagreement, trying to keep all power concentrated in his own hands. Under 
his command, many of the intellectuals and politicians in the South were margin-
alized as well. 
Disagreements and different opinions in any political or military institution 
may be healthy and may bring reform and changes, if they are addressed in a 
constructive manner. In the case of the SPLM, however, disputes among its 
leaders were transformed into a serious armed conflict and into internal fighting 
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among military officers, which then spilled over to innocent civilians. As has 
been argued by many Southerners in Sudan and mainly by former officers of the 
SPLM, the SPLM split and the fighting that followed played havoc with the lives 
of the civilian populations and the future of the Southern Sudanese struggle. 
 
Context of conflict (II) – linkages 
Looking critically to the above-mentioned historical events, one could easily 
conclude that the relationship between the Nuer and the Dinka had always been 
characterized by hostility, tension and fighting. To some extent this is indeed it is 
usually described. Looking at the reports that have been published during the 
violent conflict between the two peoples, one could get the impression that the 
mass media played a major role in portraying the picture of constant mutual 
hostility. However, there has always been another side of the story: A close 
examination of the relationship between Dinka and Nuer reveals a different 
pattern of interaction that long existed between the two. During the fights that 
took place between them and among each group, there have always been ele-
ments that interconnected people. Not all Dinka were fighting against the Nuer, 
and the same applies to the Nuer people. There were many people within each 
group living their normal lives, trying to do what they used to do every day: 
Securing their livelihood, feeding their families, trading, exchanging, and finding 
their way out of the conflict via local initiatives. 
In the following part, I would like to analyze some of the elements that are 
connecting both groups before and after the eruption of the fighting. Some people 
argue that Dinka and Nuer are “different people” having “different ways of life” 
– and that is how both leaders, Garang and Machar, managed to instigate a con-
flict between them by making use of their different ethnic identities. 
Both groups lived together for centuries. There were various elements that 
contributed to strengthening the relationship between them, such as intermar-
riage, which was one of the factors that helped in extending the Nuer kinship ties 
into their Dinka neighbours communities. This system of intermarriage has 
drawn both groups together and was one of the driving forces into bringing both 
groups together. One could argue, for instance, that ties through intermarriage 
helped the Nuer communities in establishing closer relations with the Dinka than 
with related but more remote other Nuer. Intermarriages between the two groups 
also inhibited the usual raiding that took place between western Nuer and Dinka. 
Additionally, such ties brought families together and helped them in commu-
nicating with each other during times of fighting. Some of them even helped in 
mitigating and ending the hostilities and the tensions between the two groups. 
Furthermore, Nuer and Dinka also share a considerable common vocabulary 
within their native languages. Both groups share the same high value and affec-
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tion for children from such intermarriage ties, and in some cases such children 
have played a connecting element between the two groups, as they were free to 
move from one group to the other without being part of the existing tensions. It 
has been argued by some researchers in this respect that the Nuer son of a Dinka 
mother would refrain from participating in any fighting that occurred between the 
two communities: 
… intermarriage and the creation of maternal relatives inhibits fighting, and this is recog-
nized by modern Western Dinka as the most effective way of ending a feud (Johnson 1982: 
186). 
Apart from intermarriage ties, there were some elements that led to the 
absorption/assimilation of some members of each group into one another. For 
instance, in the case of captives from wars by Nuer people, children and women 
were usually taken into individual Nuer families, with the women getting married 
to Nuer men and the children being adopted into Nuer families. Such ties also 
enhanced the communication among the two groups and had made it difficult for 
Dinka people to raid those communities. These Dinka women and children, who 
were living in a Nuer community, were free to travel between Nuerland – where 
they lived – and their own Dinka communities, a fact that brought both groups 
closer to each other. Furthermore, there were certain religious beliefs and 
symbols shared by the two communities. In both communities, religious/ritual 
leaders were very much respected and played a major role in bringing people 
together, making use of the peaceful era that followed any tension. One of those 
leaders was Ngundeng Bong, who was considered a prophet among the Nuer 
(Johnson 1982: 189). This prophet worked to bring both groups together and he 
tried to maintain peace and harmony among the Nuer, and between the Nuer and 
the Dinka. He prohibited the Nuer from raiding the Dinka, and he even created 
songs calling for peace, urging the Nuer to accept and to receive the Dinka. The 
community that was served by the prophet Ngundeng was a mixed community of 
both Dinka and Nuer. Ngundeng built a shrine to serve as a religious centre for 
both communities, considered as a holy place that symbolized their beliefs and 
bringing them together in order to share religious services. Another prophet was 
Deng Lakka, who also tried to bring the two groups together. Deng Lakka 
managed to establish peace between the two groups through peace-making occa-
sions and ceremonies. 
Analyzing the conflict and the tensions that existed between the two largest 
ethnic groups in South Sudan and that are likely to erupt again at some point 
given the present circumstances of the imposed peace proposals by the leaders, 
one cannot deny the existence of major external elements that enhanced the 
existing divisions between the two groups. One of these external elements was 
the work of international relief and humanitarian organizations. Most of the 
 
 The militarization of Dinka and Nuer identities in South Sudan 171 
international humanitarian and relief organizations that worked and that are still 
working in South Sudan unwittingly or not played a big role in enhancing the 
divisions between the Nuer and Dinka. Unfortunately, these organizations were 
misused by the warring parties in South Sudan for their own personal benefits. 
Examples are numerous, and I will try to limit myself by citing only those with 
direct effects. 
Several organizations allowed themselves to be used as a cover and as mes-
sengers of a movement or of leaders. Means of relief transportation and the staff 
that was allowed to travel in and out of the region were trapped in becoming the 
“mailbox” for the political and military commanders. Information flow in certain 
areas would not have been possible without the relief planes and their staff. The 
marriage of Machar to a British relief worker, for instance (see Scroggins 2002) 
had helped him a lot in getting access to the relief community and hence access 
to information. South Sudan had been an open ground for competition among 
humanitarian and relief organizations. In South Sudan, dozens of international 
humanitarian organizations were operating, and each one of them was trying to 
gain the front seat, becoming trapped in the local dilemma and allowing them-
selves to be manipulated by the warring parties. To some extent, this could also 
be attributed to the lack of proper analysis of the conflict in South Sudan: 
Humanitarian and relief agencies in South Sudan are just doing their own program and they 
do not care about the local complexities.3 
Moreover, cases have been cited where warring parties in South Sudan were 
easily managing to exploit and divert humanitarian resources. In one example the 
leaders of the Nasir faction managed to misuse relief agencies and their resources 
to help them in creating a forward garrison in Yuai to act as a buffer zone for 
their principal garrison in Waat. 
It has been obvious from historical facts that Southern Sudanese civilians – be 
it Dinka or Nuer – were trapped in highly ethnicized military tensions, mainly 
due to the leadership struggle within the liberation movement. However, not all 
Dinka and neither all Nuer participated in the violence that erupted; some of 
them even refrained from any participation and started talking about the “evils 
that are coming to destroy them”.4 
Some people from the two groups argued that there had always been raids 
between them as part of their life, but never to the extent of what happened in 
1991 and the following years. Dinka people remembered resource competition 
and how the different interests in the two communities had created tension and 
                                                     
3  An argument by Mr. J. Abugo, (then) director of the Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society, Yei 
County, South Sudan. Two interviews, one in Rubeke, South Sudan, 20 February 2002, and one in 
Nairobi, Kenya, 17 October 2004. 
4  An argument that has been made by an anonymous Nuer intellectual during an informal meeting in 
Nairobi, Kenya, at the NSSC office, 20 January 2003. 
 
172 Elhag 
disturbed their rhythms of life. But Dinka and Nuer had always lived close to 
each other, and within their traditions there had been no real major political or 
social differences. Realizing these facts, many Nuer and Dinka chiefs argued that 
what had happened after the failure of the Nasir faction was not part of their 
culture and was not the usual way the Dinka and Nuer had raided each other, as 
politicians in the South tried to make it look like. 
Many interviews were done by the author with different civilians from the two 
groups, including chiefs, local administrators, and intellectuals, and most of the 
people interviewed confirmed that what had happened between the two groups 
had nothing to do with the way things used to be handled in the past. For exam-
ple, some of the interviews were done with elders from the Dinka community, 
who argued that when raiding had taken place between them and the Nuer 
people, traditionally no-one thought of directly harming the women or the 
children. Raiders had usually cared most about livestock, and the same when 
Nuer had raided the Dinka areas. Both Dinka and Nuer believe that what had 
happened between them – and what might again happen in the future – was pri-
marily a product of personal ambitions by the leaders of the factions within the 
SPLM, which then had led to the split in 1991. 
As noted, historically both groups have common lifestyles; both are pastoral-
ists and hence share the same values regarding their animals and for potential 
development activities addressing issues related to animal husbandry. As a result, 
both Dinka and Nuer are in need of a reliable supply of water, improvement of 
pastures, and of opportunities for health treatment and vaccination for their 
animals. Due to these similarities, the two ethnic groups understand each other’s 
way of thinking perfectly, which has helped in connecting them in different 
ways. As has also been argued by Prendergast (1996b), the two groups had 
raided each other’s livestock, had traded grain and ivory, and had intermarried 
and expanded kinship networks, and that is exactly what local people from both 
groups are still considering and believing in, and they are blaming the politicians 
for misusing them and disturbing their traditional way of life. Moreover, people 
from both sides are arguing that there is nothing in their heart such as hatred or 
any other negative feelings, but what had happened between them had been an 
outcome of external forces and pressure from their own political leaders. In 
addition, intellectuals from both sides are convinced that they have been misused 
and misled by their leaders and that their capacities have been undermined, not 
taken serious, and on many occasions completely rejected.  
All this does not imply, however, that there were no supporters of what had 
happened between the two groups. Accusations and apportioning blame are now 
recurring features in the relationship between the two groups. For instance, the 
Nuer are blamed by the Dinka and other groups for “betraying the case of South 
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Sudan” as a result of their collaboration with the government, “the enemy”. The 
Dinka themselves are perceived by Nuer as arrogant and trying to dominate the 
whole South Sudan. With all these internal dilemmas between the two groups, 
however, desires and prospects for peace were still taken seriously, and many 
local peace initiatives emerged, especially the peace and reconciliation efforts led 
by the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC). 
Peace and reconciliation 
Local peace initiatives 
Based on their feeling that they had been trapped in the war dilemma and that 
their being tired of the fighting, traditional leaders from both groups took the 
initiative of communicating with some peace and church institutions and re-
quested them to take a role in facilitating their peace initiatives. The New Sudan 
Council of Churches (NSCC) was among the leading peace agencies which 
followed the initiative to facilitate peace talks between the two groups. The 
initiative within NSCC started in 1997, when the NSCC met with the SPLM in 
order to be given confirmation of its role as peace maker for South Sudan (NSCC 
1998).5 
In June 1998, thirty-five Dinka and Nuer border chiefs and church leaders 
from both the west and the east sides of the Nile River met in Lokichoggio, 
Kenya, under the facilitation of the New Sudan Council of Churches. They 
considered ways to bring peace and reconciliation to their peoples. They met for 
nine days to share the stories of the pain and suffering they had inflicted on one 
another for seven years. After coming to a consensus that they must help their 
people find a way to make peace, the chiefs and church leaders began planning 
for major Dinka-Nuer peace conferences. The Lokichoggio conference ended 
with the signing of the Nuer-Dinka Loki Accord. The West Bank conference was 
established as the next major step in the process. 
NSCC established an organizing team and hired short-term staff to focus 
exclusively on the Dinka-Nuer peace process. During the following eight months 
the team included field mobilizers and organizers, women, chiefs, liaisons from 
the SPLM and the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), intellectuals from 
the Sudanese Diaspora, and a consultant peacemaking facilitator. 
The Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference held in 
Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan in 1999 resulted in a bold commitment for 
peace that could have national implications. The Conference yielded a peace 
agreement called the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant. More than 300 Dinka and 
                                                     
5  Information about this process and about the involvement of NSCC has been gained during an 
interview with NSCC staff in Nairobi, Kenya, among others Dr. H.L. Ruun, (then) Executive Secretary 
of NSCC, 20 October 2001, and Mr. E. Lowilla, (then) Peace Desk Officer, 7 February 2003. 
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Nuer chiefs, community and church leaders, women and youth signed the Cove-
nant and its resolutions. It boldly promised an end to seven-and-a-half years of 
conflict between the Dinka and Nuer people on the West Bank of the Nile and 
declared a permanent ceasefire with immediate effect. Amnesty was to be 
granted for offences prior to 1 January 1999, freedom of movement across the 
lines of conflict was affirmed, and resolutions with far-reaching effects were 
adopted in a consensus style of decision-making. Traditional spiritual leaders of 
both peoples called for an end to the conflict and Christian church leaders con-
ducted daily prayers, while and the final Covenant was sealed both in Christian 
worship and in traditional sacrifices and festivities. 
Following that meeting in Wunlit, another reconciliation meeting was organ-
ized in Akobo, Upper Nile, in August 1999, as part of the East Bank peace 
initiatives. Peace talks and meetings continued to be held, with some taking place 
in Yirol and in Waat. 
During these meetings and the talks that followed, people from both groups 
were able to talk freely and to express their concerns. In addition, local people 
represented by their traditional leaders made it clear that they were not going to 
be used as pawns again in the internal South-South conflict. They also argued 
that as ordinary people they had to cope with the conflict and the resulting miser-
able situation within which they were living, including lack of education and 
health facilities, famine, malnutrition, insecurity and marginalization, while the 
real warlords had been enjoying access to all facilities when residing in Khar-
toum, Nairobi or other cities. Some people (not only the leaders) still refused to 
shoulder responsibility of what had happened, saying that the fights and tensions 
between the two peoples and factions were not of their own volition but had been 
imposed on them. Andrew Kuac Mayol, the commissioner of Tonj County, an-
nounced: 
… the Nuer and Dinka are one people given their social and cultural backgrounds, but in the 
course of time we have been divided by the enemies of the people to fight ourselves. How-
ever, it is okay because all of us are aware that sons quarrel with their father, and daughters 
with their mothers, but there comes a time when family sits together to resolve their differ-
ences …6 
Although the above-mentioned argument seems to be valid from a local point 
of view, nevertheless it is demonstrating a feeling of powerlessness among the 
local people. By arguing that “it was our enemies who pushed us to engage in 
fighting among ourselves”, local people may get the implicit message that they 
would not need to shoulder responsibility of what had happened to them and 
                                                     
6  Part of the speech delivered by A.K. Mayol, Commissioner of Tonj County during the opening day of 
the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer conference, 1999. 
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what might happen in the future, contradicting what NSCC and some traditional 
chiefs were trying to articulate: 
We are all responsible for what happens among us. And we must all together accept the 
responsibility and work toward a solution.7 
Another important point worth mentioning is the language used during the 
peace talks between the two groups. People tended to link themselves to the 
political party or to the military group to which they belonged, rather than 
addressing the gathering as being a “Southerner” and a child of both peoples. 
One example has been Joseph Juac Kon, the Commissioner of Ler, who started 
his speech by putting emphasis of being the person responsible in the govern-
ment of Riek Machar, thus sending the message that there are two governments 
in the South. This emphasis contradicted the main goal of the mentioned peace 
talks. Nevertheless, most of the peace talks between the two groups ended with 
one agreement and one conclusion, demonstrating that historically, Nuer and 
Dinka have been sharing one bond and that many Nuer chiefs were originally 
Dinka. 
 
Implications and observations of the local Sudanese peace initiatives 
To sum up the intervention by the NSCC and its implications, one could come to 
the following conclusion. The primary goal of the intervention by NSCC was to 
reconcile the Dinka and the Nuer on the West Bank of the Nile. From my point 
of view, reconciliation as such could not be achieved by organizing a three-day 
conference, but rather by being connected and being tied to a real and serious 
development intervention that carries reconciliation as one of its main objectives. 
Otherwise, the initiative might die quickly – and this was practically the case in 
South Sudan. To some extent, NSCC and other peace agencies involved in this 
process managed to bring people together – like in the Wunlit conference and 
again in the Upper Nile Reconciliation conference, and finally in the Liliir con-
ference, which has become officially known as the “people-to-people peace and 
reconciliation conference”. 
Among the local people themselves, it was obvious that the initiatives of 
NSCC to have a people-to-people dialogue had very positive results on commu-
nity relations. The key evidence of that were the ceasing of the clashes and the 
tendency of the local people to overcome their previous tensions. Moreover, 
SPLM could not longer deny the vital role that NSCC was playing in the area of 
reconciliation, despite the problems raised by these initiatives. Additionally, all 
abducted children and women returned to their original families upon ending of 
these talks.  
                                                     
7  Part of the speech of Dr. H. Ruun, the (then) Executive Secretary of the New Sudan Council of 
Churches (NSCC). 
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The fighting and tensions that occurred among the people in South Sudan 
created a big economic gap and hindered the economic activities and exchanges. 
As a result, local markets which had been one of the main elements connecting 
people together through trading and other commercial interactions, had col-
lapsed. The resumption of economic activities between the two groups was 
achieved as an immediate effect of the newly gained political stability. 
Based on the given practical evidence, NSCC and other agencies involved 
could claim the success of the efforts they undertook to facilitate the people-to-
people peace talks. They met most of the anticipated conditions for success, and 
without any reservation, the intervention within the local community was (and is) 
the backbone for any sustainable peace in South Sudan, and hence in Sudan as a 
whole. Nevertheless, there are some weak points within that intervention which 
should be overcome in future peace initiatives. For instance, it would be impor-
tant that such peace initiatives and dialogues on the local community level 
continue as a request by the people involved to ensure the sustainability of such 
initiatives. Compared to that, the current debate about the peace process in Sudan 
is taking the shape of being imposed on the local people in Sudan by neglecting 
the local conflicts existing in the South and in other regions of Sudan. Moreover, 
all people involved in the current peace debate are the same political and military 
leaders who played an effective role in instigating many conflicts within Sudan 
and still continue to do so. Additionally, there seems to be a real danger facing 
the fate of the peace in Sudan, as the current peace mechanisms show that there is 
too much at stake in terms of funding and too much external pressure. This might 
have caused leaders in Sudan to sign a peace agreement largely for the sake of 
pleasing the international community and hence receiving the funds promised, 
but one upon which they cannot or will not deliver. 
Most important, however, is the fact that the international community still 
tends to see the conflict in Sudan as only a South-North conflict; a view that 
overlooks other local conflicts such as the one between the Nuer and the Dinka, 
which constitutes a real threat to political stability and to sustainable peace not 
only in Sudan but also within the region as such. In order for any peace initia-
tives to be successful, all stakeholders ought to be involved from the beginning. 
This should be accompanied by activities raising the awareness of the local 
people themselves and by building their peace capacities through enhancing and 
strengthening the elements that connected them before or during the conflict, and 
through undermining and weakening the elements that divided them or may 
divide them in the future. 
In a wider argument, the lesson that might have been learned from the people-
to-people initiatives is that a one-shot mechanism usually does not work well if 
not accompanied by sufficient support. This support should come mainly from 
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the local people, who should be aware about their need for peace, but also from 
the political and military leaders, who should be serious about achieving peace, 
and from the international community, who should have the political will in 
attaining real peace and not only imposing it by putting funding conditions. It is 
also important to take into consideration the fact that the time frame for peace in 
a certain conflict setting has to reflect what the local people are prepared to do, 
rather than what the donors or international community want or push them to do. 
This, of course, does not imply that the international community should not assist 
in guiding the negotiations by offering advice about options for problem solving, 
especially when it comes to a very complicated context of conflict like the one in 
Sudan. 
Following this line of argument and the involvement of the international 
community in achieving peace in Sudan, there are still other actors in this 
dilemma, namely the non-governmental organizations, which have been operat-
ing in South Sudan in the past and which are operating there at the moment. 
Attitudes towards such organizations always followed the assumption that they 
are neutral and that they play no role in the South-South conflicts. When analyz-
ing the engagement of the NGOs in South Sudan in the light of the context of 
conflict in South Sudan, one could reach the conclusion that the development aid 
and the services delivered by development and relief organizations unintention-
ally played a great role in exacerbating some of the fighting that took place in 
South Sudan. The following is an analysis of ways through which services of 
development and relief organizations have been misused by the warring parties. 
Within the context of the conflict in South Sudan, development aid and resources 
fed into, worsened and prolonged the conflict in various ways. 
Development assistance as an instrument of conflict 
Diversion of resources, theft and manipulation of access 
Very often in war and disaster zones, aid resources are stolen by warlords and 
used for their own purposes, including military. In the case of South Sudan the 
warring parties within the SPLM (the SPLM-Mainstream and the Nasir faction) 
denied and blocked access for relief organizations for the sake of serving their 
military strategies. Selling and trading of resources meant to assist vulnerable 
people who were trapped in the conflict were a principal method of the warring 
parties to obtain arms and extend power. During 1991-1992, both in Gambela 
refugee camp in Ethiopia and in Torit, which served as the main garrison for the 
SPLM-Mainstream at that time, aid resources such as food supplies were confis-
cated by the SPLM and exchanged for fuel and spare parts for cars. At that time, 
World Vision took the decision to suspend its activities in the refugee camps in 
Ethiopia, claiming the lack of accountability and abuse. Likewise in Torit, 
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Catholic Relief Services had tried to improve its monitoring policies but ulti-
mately had also to take the decision to suspend its services in the area. In South-
ern Sudan Independence Army (SSIA)-controlled areas in 1993, relief resources 
were diverted by SSIA soldiers, who were going from house to house to impound 
humanitarian aid items such as food and medicine, regardless of the presence of 
the monitoring committees of the aid agencies. 
Towards the end of the war, in the early 2000s and after the 2005 peace accord 
(Comprehensive Peace Agreement – CPA), warring factions in South Sudan 
tended to become more sophisticated: Instead of blocking aid resources, they 
more often attempted to directly control access to these resources. Following 
these methods, the SPLM issued a rule which obliges every relief or development 
organization working in South Sudan to pay a sort of tax to their humanitarian 
wing, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA). 
 
Aid resources as a cover for military operations 
Besides diverting and stealing aid resources, warring factions in South Sudan 
misused aid resources and the organizations involved as a cover for their own 
military and political actions. For instance, the leaders of the Nasir faction used 
international humanitarian organizations in creating a garrison in Yuai as a buffer 
zone for the principal garrison in Waat. In 1992, leaders of the same faction 
urged some of the humanitarian organizations to come to Yuai, based on the 
prospect of malnutrition due to the low water level of the river. The same leaders 
then organized their people to move from Waat to Yuai before any relief opera-
tion could have started. Upon arrival of those needy and hungry people, relief 
agencies had had no choice but to start distributing aid resources. At that time, 
leaders of the Nasir faction controlled all areas where relief operations started: 
Kongor, Ayod, Waat and Akobo. When SPLM-Mainstream attacked Yuai in 
1993, the media and the international community described the attack as one 
against relief centres, and this was exactly what the leaders of the Nasir faction 
had intended, using relief resources as a cover for their own ends. 
Such incidents happened until quite recently: There is one case where a 
military commander of the SPLM demanded the field co-ordinator of a develop-
ment and relief organization working in South Sudan to participate in the diver-
sion of relief resources by falsely signing papers that those relief resources had 
been delivered to a certain location, which was not true in reality. When the field 
co-ordinator from that organization refused, a decision was made to expel the 
project staff – a fact that has led to the closure of the project and to the 
suspension of activities in the area.8 
 
                                                     
8  Information on this was gained by the author during an informal interview with the involved project 
staff, whose names cannot be released for reasons of confidentiality, 23 October 2003. 
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Aid and substitution effects 
The dilemma of “substitution effects” occurs when the international community 
assumes responsibility for the survival of the population to such an extent that 
this allows local leaders and warlords to define their own roles solely in terms of 
warfare and control through violence. This usually happens when aid organiza-
tions are intervening without an appropriate mechanism. When development and 
relief organizations involved in any conflict setting are not demanding any sort of 
accountability from the local authority, this can have demanding effects on the 
local welfare mandates. As has been argued by Mary Anderson, aid providers 
who are or appear to be in solidarity with an authority’s political or military goals 
can harden the position of that authority and make it less likely to negotiate.9 
There are a number of ways through which development aid and relief re-
sources may inadvertently feed into conflicts. As this is not the topic of this 
paper, however, I will not go in to detail here (but see Loane & Schümer 1999). 
The examples mentioned before are to underline the point that such organizations 
may also not be innocent in terms of feeding into the conflict, even though their 
impact may be unintentional. Development and relief organizations should be 
aware of the potential negative impacts of their services in conflict settings. Of 
course I do not intend here to put the blame on development and relief organiza-
tions, as in certain areas these organization may not be able to change the situa-
tion, but at least it should be expected that they minimize their involvement in 
that dilemma, especially within the on-going debates about peace in Sudan. 
Based on information obtained from people in the field and from some intellec-
tuals and peace activists in the South, the following observations should be made. 
Prospects for peace 
First, it is obvious that the perception of the international community about the 
conflict in South Sudan portrayed it as a South-North conflict. This in many 
ways wrong perception constitutes a high risk for achieving a durable peace 
specifically in the South, as it implies that donors are reluctant to address certain 
root issues within the on-going peace and reconstruction process. Local civilians 
need to feel that they are taken serious and that their demands are accepted, first 
by their leaders and then by the international community and by the facilitators of 
any peace talks. Many people in South Sudan have considered the peace negotia-
tions leading up to the CPA a discussion between elites, and as having (too) little 
to do with the people on the ground, and some said that they “… would carry on 
                                                     
9  An informal discussion with Dr. M.B. Anderson, Collaborative for Development Action, Cambridge, 
Ma., USA, 2001. 
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fighting even if their leaders were forced to sign an unjust peace.”10 This argu-
ment shows the frustration of many civilians in South Sudan and the extent to 
which they have lost hope in attaining durable peace and reconstruction in South 
Sudan through their current political and military leaders. 
Another observation is that there were no proper and concrete awareness 
raising programmes informing the local civilians about their rights, their duties 
and also enhancing their peace capacities through building on the elements that 
connect them and through bridging the divisions that existed or might emerge in 
the future. Without such initiatives and without attempts for a participatory 
democracy and for “good governance” in line with local ideas of decision-
making and justice to be practiced in the liberated areas in South Sudan, there 
will be no future for a “sustainable peace” with a long-term perspective. Partici-
patory democracy can only be achieved by bringing together the warring parties 
with their local leaders in South Sudan, primarily the Dinka and the Nuer, in a 
serious and open discussion as to the nature and heritage of the conflicts and to 
the future of their communities in the post-CPA era. 
In order to attain this objective gradually, involvement of NGOs in the South, 
attempts were made to shift from relief to development. Such a shift requires 
serious discussions about the future of South Sudan, and this discussion should 
include local institutions from different regions. Indications are that this process 
was not very successful. Within such a mechanism, however, local civilians in 
South Sudan – through their representing institutions and organizations – could 
be provided with the ability and the space to re-engage in different economic 
activities, to promote the peace capacities of the civil society with its different 
sectors, and most important to create a responsible, accountable, transparent civil 
administration truly and comprehensively representing the civilian population. 
Bringing local leaders in South Sudan together would at least create more 
opportunity for bringing political stability into the region, which is one of the 
prime conditions for peace building in South Sudan. In addition, there were high 
expectations among the international and regional community that, after signing 
the present CPA peace agreement by the political leaders both of the Government 
of Sudan and the SPLM, everything would be restored to normal and that peace 
and reconciliation would be achieved immediately. Such a view was naïve. The 
reality within the Sudanese context of conflict is highly fluid, and defies easy 
characterization. Recognition should hence be paid to the intention of the local 
leaders and civilians themselves and to the fact that the conflict has a long and 
ever-present history full of complications and drama (cf. Omaar & de Waal 1993, 
Human Rights Watch 1994, Prendergast 1996a, Johnson 1999, Ryle 2002, ICG 
                                                     
10  Information gained through interviews in South Sudan headed by Sudan Focal Point Africa, Mr. J. 
Ashworth, South Africa, 10 February 2003 (Yirol, Bahr Al-Gazal, South Sudan and Nairobi, Kenya). 
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2003; on aspects of cultural identity, see Deng 1994, 1995). It was a culmination 
of tragedies, and therefore, the peace dividend will not come overnight. 
After the comprehensive peace agreement 
The year 2005 was a year full of interesting and tragic events surrounding the 
peace process. In January 2005, the last scene of the longest and deadliest civil 
wars in Africa was played out with the signing the so-called Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) between the SPLM/A and the ruling party in Khartoum, 
the National Congress Party (NCP, formerly NIF or National Islamic Front). 
After the signing of this agreement, the establishment of a new interim constitu-
tion on 9 July 2005 formally marked the beginning of a six-year interim period. 
At the end of that phase, in 2011, a referendum will determine whether Southern 
Sudan will remain part of a united Sudan or become independent. 
According to some analysts, the agreement itself presented a unique chance 
for the Sudanese people to grasp the last hope for a comprehensive peace in their 
country. I would like to reflect on the term “comprehensive”, however. Looking 
at the development of events around this agreement, it has become quite clear 
that it was formulated and developed by the international community, who had 
lost the political will and the interest to engage in further talks and negotiations 
about peace in Sudan. Hence, it opted for the quickest option, which does not 
necessarily represent the will of the ordinary Sudanese people apart from the 
political leaders. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is an agreement reached 
between only two political parties or movements, and accordingly lacks fair 
representation and support throughout the country. The last phases of the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) negotiations were largely 
limited to Dr. John Garang and to the vice-president of Sudan’s central govern-
ment, Mr. Ali Osman Taha, excluding a large number of local groups and actors. 
I would like to argue that the agreement does not reflect the real wish for peace 
within the larger Sudanese civil society both in the North and the South. During 
informal talks with people in both parts of Sudan it became evident that there is a 
general lack of knowledge about the content of the peace agreement. To some 
extent, it has even met resistance from local groups because it represents peace 
with the declared “enemy”, for which most of the Sudanese people were not 
ready yet. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement in general represented the wish of the 
political leaders for a solution, but this peace remains and will remain on the 
political level only. Unfortunately, this is due to the enormous pressure exerted 
by the international community. The way that the CPA was drafted – with exclu-
sion of many other parties – made it much less than “comprehensive” and 
provided little prospects for the promises of a sustainable long-term peace. Many 
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critics of the CPA have attributed the failure to include other parties and armed 
groups to the fact that the government would only negotiate with the SPLM/A. 
Since the signing of the CPA it has become more than clear that there are huge 
risks associated with the implementation of the agreement. This can mainly be 
attributed to the fact that the Khartoum government is not serious at all about the 
full implementation of the agreement and does not comply with all its terms, as 
some examples can prove. This includes, among others, the non-implementation 
of the Abyei Protocol, on the border of the North and the South in the Dinka 
Abyei area, and rejection of the careful and in principle binding report of the 
international experts that determined the borders of the Abyei area.11 After al-
most three years into the interim period, the Abyei issue is still unresolved. 
Another problem is the demarcation of the entire North-South border. The border 
commission was supposed to convene during the interim period, but until now it 
has not started its work, delaying the implementation of the CPA. A third exam-
ple is related to the oil-money transfers. The south is supposed to get a 50% share 
of the oil revenues, but the calculations are in doubt because nobody from the 
south is participating in the management of the oil industry. Accordingly, the 
south only receives what the National Congress Party decides. This has been 
recognized as a problem and needs to be corrected. Another violation of the CPA 
is the continuing support for other militia groups in southern Sudan, specifically 
to Joseph Kony's LRA troops in Jonglei, to Gordon Kong in Upper Nile, to Tom 
Al Nour in Western Bahr El Ghazal, and to other smaller groups in Eastern 
Equatoria, the remnants of the EDF (Equatoria Defence Force). 
Many people in South Sudan are still reluctant about the idea of “Peace with 
the Enemy”, not being prepared and not ready yet for a comprehensive peace 
with their fellow citizens in the North. The same applies for the Sudanese in the 
North, of course. This has been clearly shown by the events following the tragic 
death of John Garang, the leader and the father of the SPLM/A, as he was called 
by his followers. His death occurred in July 2005 following a plane crash and 
sparked off serious riots in Khartoum, coupled with looting. Thousands of 
Southern Sudanese, Darfurians and other groups were involved in looting 
property and clashed with police in the streets of Khartoum after learning of the 
death of their leader. From my perspective, the death of Garang and the violence 
that followed have raised serious doubts about the sustainability and the serious-
ness of the signed Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
The relation between the Dinka and the Nuer has been by and large free of 
violent clashes after the “People-to-People Peace Process” leading to the Wunlit 
                                                     
11  The report can be downloaded from www.sudanarchive.net/cgi-bin/sudan?a=d&d=Dl1d18. See also 
the comment by one of the commission members: D. Johnson, “The Abyei Protocol demystified”, 
Sudan Tribune, 11 December 2007 (online available at:  
www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25125). 
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agreement. As has been argued by Young (2005), however, the tensions and the 
divisions that existed and continue to exist among different ethnic groups in the 
South have appeared again during the violence and the riots that erupted in 
Khartoum after the death of Garang. Some Dinka claimed that the Nuer did not 
show enough grief and sadness for the death of their leader. Nuer were not 
allowed to attend the funeral of Garang mainly because of fear of tensions and 
fighting, and this remains one of the decisive facts shaping the relation between 
the two groups. Since Salva Kiir has taken over the vacant position of SPLM 
leader, relations between the two ethnic groups have improved to some extent, as 
it seems that Salva Kiir is more of a listener and is more willing to accommodate 
differences. Under the surface, however, animosities between the Dinka and the 
Nuer still continue, with the competition about positions in the army as a recent 
example. 
Apart from the tensions that exist between these two main ethnic groups in the 
South, the general environment and the atmosphere in Sudan remain to be 
characterized by tensions and by the potential for violent conflicts. Other ethnic 
groups in various parts of Sudan have also engaged in serious fighting and in 
clashes of war-like dimensions. Most prominent in the recent past have been the 
Murle, who are considered as enemies by both the Nuer and the Dinka. Above 
all, however, rises the tense situation in Darfur. The crisis around the marginali-
zation of people in Darfur and the resulting war have developed into one of the 
biggest humanitarian crises in Africa. Mass killings, murder, rape, kidnapping 
and looting have occurred and are still occurring in that region mainly between 
various local ethnic groups, including the Fur, Masalit and the Zaghawa, and 
groups of Arab origin linked to the government in Khartoum. Darfur has become 
a dividing factor between the SPLM/A and the NCP. There have been – incorrect 
– allegations that the SPLM/A instigated the people of Darfur to take up arms. 
The bad history of the relationships between the South and the people in Darfur, 
however, has prevented strong feelings of solidarity. Nevertheless, the political 
demands are quite similar, with access to land and control over resources forming 
the main issues. From my own perspective, one of the main unanswered ques-
tions is the level of representation that the local militias in Darfur are claiming to 
have on behalf of the local communities. 
Conclusion 
Given the intensity and the sensitivity of the conflict in South Sudan, it has been 
a common attitude of the international community to overlook certain local 
conflict settings such as the case of the Dinka-Nuer conflict. One of the main 
points observed in this study is the tendency of most of the international donors 
to either suspend their activities or impose certain conditions on the local popu-
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lations, hence making it more difficult for local people who depend on outside 
assistance due to the stubbornness and the problematic situation enhanced by 
their leaders. 
Although it is quite clear that a long-term peace in Sudan essentially depends 
on the will and the intention of the civilian population, nevertheless this seems to 
be a forgotten element within the current peace debate, due to the fact that the 
international community is viewing the conflict in Sudan mainly as a North-
South conflict. It has become obvious that grassroots interaction and dialogue are 
very effective factors in creating and maintaining peace, provided that they are 
done with serious intentions and comprehensive methods. The most important 
elements for any successful peace initiative and implementation within the 
context of South Sudan are: 
 
• strong political will of the warring parties to take part in the on-going discussions; 
• general understanding of the international and national facilitators that it is up to the people 
themselves in Sudan to sustain peace (including when and how); 
• addressing the local issues and not focusing on the South-North fighting alone. 
 
Generally speaking, peace initiatives on the local level should be expanded so 
as to prepare local people for the era of peace if it materializes. It is also quite 
important that the intervention by the international community should remain a 
response to a request from the local institutions representing the local population, 
rather than an imposed agenda by the international donors fuelled by impatience. 
Support for peace in Sudan should therefore be incremental, and local institutions 
such as the NSCC should be seen as being neutral. Working through them is 
critical at the moment. Most important, however, is the fact that in order for any 
peace initiative to be successful, all stakeholders should be involved from the 
beginning and a real representation of the civilians should be looked at seriously 
by external actors. It should not be left in the hands of the warring parties to 
decide who should represent civil society from both sides. 
The timetable for additional peace initiatives has to reflect the needs and the 
desires of the local civilians. It should be based on what they are prepared for, 
and not on the needs and the desires of external facilitators. Inclusion as an over-
arching principle for political participation should be looked at seriously. For 
Sudan as a whole and for South Sudan as a region in order to be recognized as a 
multi-ethnic state even by its own people, the element of inclusion must be 
consciously crafted and negotiated to permeate every facet of the functions of the 
Sudanese state. 
As has been argued by Krennerich (2001), there are three dimensions or 
elements of inclusion. First, inclusion implies protection from exclusion and 
oppression for all individuals and groups. This aspect of inclusion connotes 
respect for the basic human rights, civil liberties, rule of law, separation of 
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powers and the judicial control of political power. The second element is political 
inclusion, which should be pursued through political participation and political 
representation so that it is perceived as justified by all groups. Democracy and its 
discourse should be designed to assure inclusion regardless of its form within the 
Sudanese society. Finally, inclusion has also a social dimension that should be 
expressed in the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights. Taking into 
consideration the above mentioned three fundamental preconditions for inclu-
sion, participation will also be promoted, which in turn will play an effective role 
in promoting and satisfying the people’s needs, which is a fact that in itself is a 
precondition for constructive peace building and political stability. This will be 
quite a challenge in conditions of underdevelopment, lack of educational and 
occupational infrastructure, and communal tensions. But, to sum up, I would like 
to quote a statement made by Mr. Annan, the former UN Secretary-General 
(2000), to the effect that democracy, human rights, good governance, justice and 
the rule of law are not rewards to be claimed at the end of the development 
process or when a stable state is achieved. They are the essential ingredients of 
development itself and the fundamental prerequisites to prevent conflict from 
degenerating into violence. Moreover, there have been certain negative lessons 
from previous peace and reconciliation efforts within other ethnic conflicts in 
Africa (cf. Ottaway 1999), which should be taken into consideration when look-
ing at the South Sudan Case - or in other words, what not to do (see Nair 2002): 
 
• Do not deny the salience of ethnicity within the context of the South Sudan conflict. 
• Do not blame poverty for ethnic conflicts. 
• Do not encourage the fortification of group boundaries. 
• Do not disregard human rights. 
• Do not copy solutions without reflection. 
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Several informal meetings and interviews were conducted with the local popula-
tion in South Sudan, particularly in Yei, Rumbek, Yirol and Southern Blue Nile. 
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Burkina Faso: Governing sites,  
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Introduction 
In Burkina Faso, the gold mining sector has expanded rapidly since the country’s 
droughts of the 1980s. At present, between 100,000 and 200,000 artisanal miners 
are actively involved in gold mining in Burkina, dispersed at more than 200 sites 
across the country. The estimated value of gold produced by non-industrial 
means since 1986 is about US$ 95 m (CFA 50,000 m) (Gueye 2001a). 
Gold production is seen as a means for reducing poverty in Burkina Faso, 
which, since 1997, has been a “Heavily Indebted Poor Country” (HIPC) (IMF 
2002). Country officials have been involved in negotiations with the World Bank 
and the IMF in an attempt to relieve national debts. Since the early 1990s, 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) have largely shaped Burkina Faso’s 
agendas for financial reorganization. “Structural adjustment” is the name given to 
a set of free market economic policy reforms imposed on developing countries as 
a condition for the receipt of loans. To ensure a continued inflow of funds, 
heavily indebted countries have to adhere to conditions mandated by the IMF and 
World Bank. 
As in other African countries, in Burkina, SAP measures aim to roll back the 
state through privatization of state sectors and to encourage the spread of NGOs 
(Nugent 2004). In this context, the gold mining sector has been targeted, since 
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gold is, next to cotton, the country’s chief export product. The country has wit-
nessed a combination of privatization of government-held enterprises and liber-
alization of trade and investment to attract foreign investment. 
In this paper I will start with a case study of a gold-rush in the province of 
Sanmatenga in Burkina Faso, and move on to situate this case in a wider field of 
relationships implicating state authorities, national and international gold compa-
nies, as well as international banking institutions and donor organizations. My 
goal is to discuss how we can cover the ground of these articulations without 
falling into the pitfalls of current models that take the distinction between state 
and society for granted. Foremost, I want to question the assumption that liber-
alization can be equated to a weakening of the state per se. As we will see, the 
position and tasks of the Burkinabe state have clearly changed with regard to the 
gold mining sector, but the state is still in a dominant position as singular 
authorizing instance to issue permits for research and exploitation of sites as well 
as for the rights to buy and sell gold. Liberalization implies that the state has 
become one of many players, but not necessarily a weak one. The mining sector 
in Burkina shows a very interesting configuration of institutional connections. 
The ideological climate in which the position of the state has been redefined is 
epitomized by the notion of governance, a term that comes from economic 
practice (corporate governance) as well as political science (State governance). It 
is the explicit attempt to implicate a whole set of actors in the field of governing. 
The UN website www.unece.org states: 
Government is one of the actors in governance. Other actors involved … may include influ-
ential land lords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, NGOs, research institutes, 
religious leaders, finance institutions political parties, the military etc.1 
Indeed, it is such a complex field of actors and the ideas that allow different 
authorities to pose as governors, that this paper seeks to portray and analyse. 
A case study:  
The village of Liliga-Goren in the province of Sanmatenga 
The artisanal mining site discussed in this paper is situated in the Province of 
Sanmatenga and is called Liliga-Goren. The site is situated in the département of 
Maane, and in comparison with other sites in Burkina it is small in several 
respects; the scale of the site does not surpass 1 km2; the number of people 
working on the site never exceeded 300; the pits were no deeper than about three 
metres and worked by small groups or individuals without a rigid division of 
labour; the gold-dust was separated with simple techniques based on gravity, 
helped by wind and water; the site was close to agricultural fields and arrange-
                                                     
1  www.unece.org/trade/ctied/wp6/documents/wp6_05/wp6_05_09e.doc, accessed 17 August 2007. 
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ments concerning their incorporation were subject to debates. Various reasons 
led to this choice for a case study. First of all, the site is located in a village 
where, over the past fifteen years, I have regularly done anthropological research. 
I have been able to see the effects of the finding of gold on local village relation-
ships. In addition, I could witness how the organization of this site depends on 
the interaction between legally authorized parties and specific local people. 
Moreover, it became clear how this organization is informed by local ideas about 
gold as a particular kind of wealth. 
As will be described below, in Liliga-Goren the search for gold on a commer-
cial scale commenced in the mid-1980s, and ever since several gold-rushes have 
occurred. Once more, at the beginning of the rainy season in June-July 2004 a 
frantic gold search started following the first rainfalls, which washed away top-
soil and uncovered mineralized sediments. Many men and women from resident 
and adjacent villages immediately began searching for gold. At this point in the 
year, villagers debated the following two converging issues: 
1) Should one work the fields or look for gold?  
2) How to regulate the access to the gold area? 
In this region, mining is often carried out over a particular period of time (i.e. 
a season), after which people resume their agricultural activities. With the rains 
starting, however, individuals had to decide either to focus their efforts solely 
upon finding gold, or to ignore the temptation and continue to work agricultural 
fields, or to combine these tasks during the course of the rainy season. This 
decision had moral implications. The choice not to sow at all – which at least 100 
villagers opted for – was considered by many to be morally wrong. Generating 
income from selling gold or from cultivating crops is perceived as two different 
exercises. The latter is seen as a more sustainable practice, giving annual yields, 
whereas the former is viewed more as a short-term “stop gap” venture, which 
results in temporary wealth. A harvest may give new yields whereas gold once 
sold will not be replaced. Those who took up mining as an occupation and aban-
doned farm work did not – of course – hold this view. Nevertheless, the idea that 
the search for gold can only lead to short-lived wealth was expressed time and 
again by many villagers. 
The second issue concerns land rights. As we will see, the maps and the files 
of the national authorities (notably the BUMIGEB, Bureau des Mines et Com-
pagnie de la Géologie du Burkina) give a clear picture of the distribution of 
mining titles. GEP-MINES, a Burkinabe company owns the permit to search for 
gold in this area. However, on the ground the situation is more complicated. In 
2004, gold was initially discovered in the middle of an agricultural zone that was 
the property of some villagers. The challenge, therefore, was how to take into 
account these rights, and override them so that the gold mining could expand. 
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This issue was handled by a man referred to in this paper as “Mahama”, who 
resides in the village, is in his forties, and has extensive experience in gold 
mining both within and outside of Burkina. His authority in land issues was 
based on a combination of different factors, including his prestige as an extraor-
dinary miner, his position as a “strong” local person with family ties, and his 
status as close collaborator with GEP-MINES. Mahama managed to negotiate the 
expansion of the gold site, arranging for the sale of farmland so that it could be 
mined. Many disapproved of his actions because again, the issue was morally 
loaded. Some people in the village who opposed mining altogether would 
sarcastically remark: “Look what gold does to us. Now we are even selling our 
lands.” The intention was to convey the disapproval shared by many villagers 
over miners and Mahama’s actions in particular. Others maintained, however, 
that farmland had not been sold; owners had only been given compensation for 
the loss of the year’s harvest.  
The agricultural fields that became available were immediately reallocated to 
mining villagers and outsiders. Mahama set out to demarcate “squares” of land, 
within which pits were dug. Per workplace 4,000 tot 5,000 CFA ($ 7.50 to 9.50) 
was paid. All of the men involved in allocating and mining these plots of land 
agreed that financial transactions for land “acquisition” should not be interpreted 
as the “selling” of places. What men – only men were involved in these transac-
tions – paid for was not access to the plot, but their “freedom”: These payments 
assured individuals that they would not be sent away, would not be robbed, and 
would be safely protected under Mahama. The money simply bought them this 
protection. 
These first impressions on the site raise two lines of questioning: 
 
1) How can we trace the claims in governance of GEP-MINES? 
2) How can we trace the claims in governance of this particular personality, Mahama? 
GEP-Mines claims in governance:  
Political economy of mining titles 
Finding information on the mining companies and the formal mining titles in 
Burkina Faso is in fact very easy. Access to Internet and a visit to BUMIGEB 
suffice to obtain information on: Mining titles, geological potential and mining 
policies. Decisions and decrees of the government are neatly presented on formal 
websites: 
www.legiburkina.bf; 
www.primature.gov.bf. 
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In the course of the 1990s a lot has been done to make data on the mining 
sector available in an apparently transparent manner. In the 1980s, in particular in 
the period of Sankara’s presidency (1983-1987), the state had a monopoly on 
mining, as well as on gold purchasing and selling rights (Gueye 2001a; Luning 
2006). As part of the liberalization of the gold sector the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), the authority that decides over loans to “Heavily-
Indebted Poor Countries”, provided the Government of Burkina Faso with a loan 
for restructuring the Bureau des Mines et de la Géologie. Among other things 
these funds have been used to put in place an information system in which details 
on developments in mining titles and permits are updated on a very regular basis. 
Moreover, very good formal maps and dossiers are available to determine the 
situation of the gold sector and its major formal players. These maps have been 
created with donor funding, e.g. from the European Community.2 The French 
geological survey organization BRGM (Bureau de recherches géologiques et 
minières) was responsible for the research that resulted in the maps. 
These efforts are part and parcel of an ideology stipulating that appropriation 
of natural resources requires appropriate regulation and transparency. This has 
led to a system, which emphasizes public announcements of mining titles and 
publicly accessible knowledge banks. Investments in media such as WebPages 
on the Internet and maps are crucial for these goals. In the performance of these 
tasks we see a mingling of national state institutions and international advice 
centres. Large internationally facilitated support systems help to create images of 
transparency and open access to knowledge about natural resources and appro-
priated terrains. 
The central point of departure in the present allocation system of mining titles 
is the fact that the land and what lies beneath it are the property of the state, but 
specific laws regulate sites and quarries, depending on the nature and location of 
activities (Gueye 2001b: 12). The claim of the state as the sole owner of the lands 
stems from a law formulated in the 1970s (Zatu n° AN VIII-0039 bis/FP/PRES – 
cf. Gueye 2001b: 12) and was forcefully put into practice in the 1980s when 
Sankara was Burkina’s president (Réforme Agraire et Foncière, 1984). During 
the four years of his regime, Sankara used the law to claim state monopoly on 
both gold production and marketing. The situation has changed drastically over 
the last 15 years (with the Réorganisation Agraire et Foncière in 1997, DECRET 
97-54/PRES/PM/MEF), but the liberalization is still based on a law that stipu-
lates that all lands belong to the state, even though an implicit tolerance towards 
existing land rights is expected (Lavigne Delville 1999).  
                                                     
2  The EU supports so-called SYSMIN projects for ACP countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States) with mining potential. Since 1993 Burkina Faso received SYSMIN funds, first for the 
rehabilitation of the industrial mine at Poura, and since 1999 (€ 15 Mio) for the programme of 
geological cartography 7ACP BK 074 (Rapport annuel conjoint 2002). 
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In January 2005 I obtained a CD Rom at the BUMIGEB with the up-to-date 
information on the “titres miniers”. According to this data bank, the location 
Liliga-Goren is part of the Bissa research permit, which covers an area of 43 km2 
and is in the possession of the Burkinabe Company GEP-MINES. A research 
permit covering an area of 249 km2 has also been awarded to GEP-MINES for 
the adjacent Zandkom region. In Burkina, holders of a research permit are 
required to report annually on research findings, are expected to spend a mini-
mum amount of money per square kilometre, and during the second renewal, 
must reduce the surface area of their permit zone by 25%. Any deposit that is 
discovered must be reported to the government, and can only be worked if the 
request to transfer the “right of research” to a “mining permit” is granted. A 
permit for small-scale mining (permis d’exploitation) authorizes a holder to own, 
retain and transport extracted minerals and/or crude mineral-aggregated ore to 
storage or processing areas, and to market these products within or outside of the 
country (Gueye 2001a: 14). Permit holders are also required to adhere to strict 
rules regarding environmental issues and working conditions onsite. Mining titles 
are open to foreigners and Burkinabe alike.  
The permits of GEP-MINES are research permits, but at present the company 
is not active in this area. Apparently, they do allow individual miners to look for 
gold, with Mahama as supervisor of their work. At Liliga-Goren, GEP-MINES 
uses its position to pose as sole purchaser of gold within the Bissa permit area. 
As we will see, Mahama is precisely a key player in this process of buying up 
gold and transmitting (part of) it to GEP-MINES. GEP-MINES is thus a major 
governing instance on the site, even though the company is hardly visible in the 
daily gold mining activities going on at Liliga-Goren.  
However, anyone with access to Internet can obtain information that further 
complicates the picture. Using “Bissa permit” as a search entry to Google shows 
that GEP-MINES is not the only company with property claims in the locality of 
Liliga-Goren. A Canadian company named Jilbey Gold mentions the Bissa 
permit on its website. In January 2005 the webpage proudly announced that this 
Canadian Multinational recently forged an agreement with GEP-MINES, to 
acquire in the coming years a 90% interest in the Bissa and Zandkom projects. 
These plots are situated at the centre of the company’s existing holding; com-
bined, these three permits cover an area of approximately 800 km2. Between 
1993 and 2001, some $9 m was used to explore for gold on these adjacent con-
cessions. According to the BUMIGEB CD Rom with mining titles, in January 
2005 Jilbey had nine research permits in Burkina covering a combined area of 
2,000 km2, five of which are adjacent to the Bissa and Zandkom area (Namtenga 
250 km2, Tosse 250 km2, Gargo 250 km2, Raka 107 km2, and Tema 186 km2).  
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A search with Google in September 2005 led to information on new develop-
ments: 
On Thursday September 1, 2005 High River Gold, another Canadian Multina-
tional, announced that it had completed Acquisition of Jilbey. On its website 
www.hrg.ca/s/Home.asp High River Gold states: 
The Bissa Project exploration programme for the remainder of 2005 will be accelerated, with 
US$2,400,000 budgeted for the last three months of the year.3 … The successful completion 
of the merger with Jilbey will establish High River as a dominant gold mining and explora-
tion company in Burkina Faso. High River will have the first new gold mine in the country at 
Taparko-Bouroum, a promising advanced exploration project at Bissa, which has the poten-
tial to become High River’s second mine, and a large (approximately 8,000 square kilome-
tres) highly prospective property package. The Company intends to use Taparko-Bouroum 
and Bissa as a base to expand its activities within Burkina Faso and throughout the rest of 
West Africa. [//] In addition to its two development projects, High River intends to aggres-
sively explore its Burkina Faso properties, with a focus on Bissa, and its Novophirsovskoye 
Ore Field property in Russia.4 
The Bissa project mentioned on the website of High River Gold covers the 
whole area of the patchwork of permits mentioned by Jilbey Gold for this region. 
The Bissa project is carried out both in parts of the province of Sanmatenga, and 
in the adjacent Province of Bam. 
The website of High River Gold provides reports on prospecting results, 
illustrated by maps. On the map reproduced here (Figure 11.1), the site dealt with 
in this paper, Liliga, is identified as gold prospect. However, present prospecting 
activities are limited to the site near the village of Bissa, marked as gold deposit. 
In the field of private enterprise for this region, again we see a mingling of 
national and international players. In order to understand the articulation between 
national and international companies, further research has to be carried out. The 
arrangement between Jilbey Gold and GEP-MINES concerns a takeover in the 
course of the coming years. Eventually Jilbey Gold will become 90% owner, but 
that the Burkinabe Company is presently the visible partner in the system of 
formal titles and governance. Apparently, Jilbey Gold as well as High River Gold 
has chosen to focus on research within large permitted concession areas where 
individual miners are excluded. Simultaneously they sponsor a national company 
that seeks to organize exploitation in collaboration with miners-farmers. 
 
 
                                                     
3  www.hrg.ca/s/NewsReleases2005.asp?ReportID=116459&_Type=News-Releases-2005&_Title=High-
River-Gold-Completes-Acquisition-Of-Jilbey, accessed 17 August 2007. 
4  www.hrg.ca/s/NewsReleases2005.asp?ReportID=115050&_Type=News-Releases-2005&_Title=High-
River-Reports-Second-Quarter-2005-Results, accessed 17 August 2007. 
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Figure 11.1 Location of Liliga within High River Gold’s Bissa project 
Source: www.hrg.ca/i/maps/BISSAGROUPTARGET.jpg, High River Gold website. 
 
 
The question is, why do these multinational companies choose to operate in 
this manner? Perhaps from the perspective of the Canadian company, the actual 
individuals working at Liliga-Goren are the cheapest way to get prospecting done 
in this area. It may very well be that the company intends only to step in with 
research activities more actively when gold findings increase in the near future. 
And if that happens: What are they going to do? Will they take up the task of 
actual exploitation of the site and if so in what legal format will they do so, and 
how will the capital and the labour input be organized? How will they operate in 
the Canadian stock market? Will they try to attract capital for prospecting and 
exploration, from investors or will they choose to sell their permit with a good 
profit to a registered senior company? The latter option is open, since the 
Canadian stock market is characterized by limited ruling in this respect. In the 
Canadian context we clearly see that permits are objects of exchange and trade. 
Only the future and further research can provide answers to these questions. The 
articulation between national and international players should be looked at in 
terms of input of technological knowledge, capital requirements, social organiza-
tion of labour, as well as legal arrangements for joint ventures between national 
(state as well as companies) and international partners. 
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For the moment, we see that the national and international players involved in 
governing the gold sector may intend to provide transparent information. How-
ever, a brief glance on the ground of a site and some Internet searching show a 
very complex field of connections, and partnerships based on divisions of tasks 
and competences. 
Mahama’s claims in governance:  
Moral geography of the gold site in Liliga-Goren 
We have seen that Mahama is in a position to police the site at Liliga-Goren. He 
operates as a representative of GEP-MINES, and is in fact much more active than 
the two staff of the company who are present but virtually idle. Mahama is active 
in policing the site, helping with the washing of gold, and foremost buying gold. 
The staff of GEP-MINES claimed that GEP-MINES was in possession of an 
exploitation permit and that this title provides the company with a monopoly on 
buying gold in the permit area. Without exception they spoke of an exploitation 
permit, even though at the level of the BUMIGEB the permit is qualified as 
research permit. The confusion of titles serves the purpose of positioning the 
company to buy up the gold. 
In the area of Liliga-Goren GEP- MINES primarily operates as a buyer of gold 
with Mahama acting as an intermediary. Mahama provides kinsmen and friends 
with money to purchase gold at different sites within the permit zone of GEP-
MINES. All miners who owe their pit on the site to him are obliged to sell him 
their gold, which, in turn, he sells to GEP-MINES at a standard price of 36,000 
CFA per unit of six grams, that is about $70.5 There were strong indications at 
the time of research that daily earning for miners-farmers were in the range of 
4,000-5,000 CFA ($7.50 to $9.50). 
It was noted that illegal buyers potentially offer higher prices – as high as 
45,000 CFA ($86) per unit of gold – although legal and clandestine buying often 
go hand-in-hand. Mahama himself was suspected of “mélange”: For every four 
kilograms of gold produced, he would purchase three kg at 36,000 CFA per unit 
for legal resale to GEP-MINES. He would also buy one kg at a higher price, and 
sell it through illegal channels. Moreover, whenever he is offered gold for sale, 
Mahama subtracts a certain amount from the price for “services rendered” to the 
                                                     
5  The weights used in the scales are coins and matchsticks. At the site, 1 matchstick of gold values 500 
CFA ($1); an old franc coin (with the weight of 1 gram) in gold gives a price of 6,000 CFA ($11.50); 1 
piece of 25 CFA provides the standard unit (6 gram) that equals 36,000 CFA ($70). For northern 
Bénin, Grätz describes a similar system of weighing gold dust in scales, with coins serving as weights. 
In most cases traders use whole 1 CFA franc coins, as well as 1 CFA coins that have been cut in halves 
or quarters. He states that the FCFA weighs 1.2 gram (Grätz 2004: 151-152). 
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miner. These services consist of the insurance that nobody will steal the gold that 
is mined, or the money that is earned. 
Both on the level of attributing pits and the purchase of gold Mahama’s posi-
tion is strong and hardly contested. Why? Mahama himself explained his position 
in terms of his historical role in properly developing this gold site due to his 
experience in gold mining. 
The first gold rushes at Liliga-Goren occurred in the 1980s during Thomas 
Sankara’s tenure as Burkina’s president. Mahama emphasized the excessive state 
control of mining and gold marketing that took place at the time. Initially, it was 
forbidden to seek gold altogether, forcing villagers to search for the mineral at 
night. After making a move to permit gold mining, the state attempted to regulate 
extractive and marketing activities. Representatives of the government at the 
time, the CDR (Comité de Défense de la Révolution), as well as policemen, were 
present on the sites. Individuals were required to purchase a ticket of 200 CFA 
($0.40) per day to work on mine sites. A state cashier would arrive daily from the 
provincial capital of Kaya to purchase gold, issuing payments in the range of 
2,300 CFA ($4.40) per gram (presently 6,000 CFA, $11.50) and travelling under 
police protection. 
During personal interviews, Mahama elaborated extensively on his prominent 
role when gold was first found at Liliga-Goren. His stories show that in Burkina 
gold is seen as a thing of the earth that can only be obtained if ritual practices are 
respected (see Werthmann 2003). In the mid-1980s, Mahama explained, shortly 
after his return from Ivory Coast, youths discovered gold on a hill nearby the 
village. They wanted to take it home, but could not bring it into their houses. At 
the doorstep, the gold fell to the ground and disappeared. Mahama advised to 
invite the earth priest to make the necessary sacrifices, which would assure that 
the gold could be properly appropriated. This precipitated the gold boom in 
which Mahama actively participated; he was searching for gold whilst maintain-
ing peace at Liliga-Goren. 
At first the villagers did not know the real value of gold, but one of the men 
working for the comptoir (the state organization that bought up gold) instructed 
them. He told them: “Half a matchstick of gold values more than a human life.” 
This remark had two meanings. First, it indicated that the price the state paid was 
less than the real value of gold. Secondly, and more importantly, it taught miners 
about the importance of policing the gold site; anyone caught stealing as much as 
the value of half a matchstick of gold ran the risk to be killed. This story was one 
of Mahama’s favourites: It had taught him the lesson of how to “protect” the site 
from theft and other misconduct. It had also taught him to mistrust the state and 
other larger players in the gold sector. When I first started to ask questions about 
the gold rush in this village, Mahama and his close relatives thought that I had 
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taken an interest in gold itself. Actually they hoped that I would go into the gold 
business and connect them directly to European gold markets. This would allow 
them to dismiss other – unreliable – intermediaries. 
Since the mid-1980s, gold has been discovered at different places around the 
village, giving rise to four separate gold rushes and initiating an influx of 
transient workers. Mahama declared having earned some 30 million CFA ($ 
56,300) to date. His dominant role at this gold site seems uncontested, and was 
confirmed by other miners. Most of them link Mahama’s role in policing the site 
to the personal qualities that allowed him to facilitate the appropriation of gold. 
Not everyone is capable of taking gold into possession. This quality is not simply 
a function of command over labour power and possession of technical knowl-
edge. Rather, a person must be well connected to the real owners of gold, 
particular bush spirits, the so-called djiins. Mahama is very well connected to 
these beings; some people even indicated that his birth was facilitated by djiins. 
Such a connection does, however, have its downside: People who are closely 
associated with djiins do not have the temperate character of “normal” people. 
They behave excessively in most respects; they act too generous, too violent, and 
take too many risks. Mahama’s life is filled with excessive events, including 
fights, road accidents, and mixing with unsavoury individuals. Stories of 
Mahama are told and retold on and off gold sites, and confirm his reputation 
rather than destroy it. They strengthen the awe with which people deal with and 
talk about him. The stories also explain why his wealth comes and goes. Time 
and again, to get him out of trouble or the hospital costs him a fortune. The 
stories provide keys to an understanding of the way a gold site may be policed, 
and how gold may be obtained but is hardly ever a potential source for sustain-
able wealth. 
In the mid-1990s, South African scientists had come to Liliga-Goren to 
undertake geological research (the historic overview on the webpage of High 
River Gold learns that these must have been employees of Randgold Resources 
Ltd). At the time, so I was told, people lacked knowledge about these strangers: 
Where had they come from, what were their aims, and what were their land rights 
in relation to those of locals? Even today, with the continued presence of GEP-
MINES, working relationships with outsiders are not clear-cut for many locals. 
Villagers are well aware that their land rights – when it comes to gold – are in the 
hands of the state. Strangers pay the state rather than local landowners to be 
allowed to explore or mine particular sites. Most people do not contest this since 
the spin-offs are sufficiently interesting: Additional (unofficial) compensations 
for loss of agricultural lands will be made, research provides jobs, the strangers 
are in need of services (house construction, water fetching, etc.) that bring in 
additional money, and villagers can often share in the finding of gold. However, 
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what constitutes the basis of the authority of these outsiders to govern the gold 
mining activities is far from clear for the local villagers and gold miners. Infor-
mation about the issuing of permits and foreign investors may now be available 
at the Internet, but the locals most directly affected do normally not have access 
to these data. In particular the claim of companies to the monopoly of buying up 
gold is regarded with mistrust. We have seen that even Mahama, the closest 
partner of GEP-MINES at the site, suspects the company of cheating with the 
gold price that is offered to the miners. This mistrust is a standard attitude; inter-
mediate buyers representing companies are expected to cheat. The real value of 
gold is thought to be much higher than suggested by intermediaries. Privatization 
of the gold sector has increased the distrust towards gold buyers. In the present 
situation miners are confronted with ever more intermediaries representing a vast 
field of enterprises. This situation is experienced as random (in Moore: Yare 
yare), intermediaries are thought to say and do as they please. Miners – at best 
only sellers of gold – experience the gold market as a chain of relationships 
between different buyers and sellers that is lacking in transparency. This social 
context of mistrust and uncertainty allows a personality like Mahama to step in 
and to “arrange things”: For a certain period of time he is capable of creating an 
atmosphere of governance on the site. However, like the wealth that may stem 
from it, a gold rush is inherently a haphazard and temporary event. Both the 
beginning and the ending of a gold rush are unpredictable. 
The rainy season in 2004 was disastrous. Local debates over mining and 
farming proved futile: Those who had been working the land were, for the most 
part, unable to harvest. The individuals who had discovered gold had at least 
earned some income which in many cases proved to be sufficient to purchase 
sorghum during the periods of food scarcity that lay ahead. 
The response to the bad agricultural season was immediate: The locations at 
Liliga-Goren where gold could be extracted were always congested. Local people 
and outsiders from the north – among them many Fulbe6 – desperately worked to 
compensate for lost incomes from the poor agricultural season. The social con-
stituencies at the mine sites changed after the rainy season: A diminished local 
male workforce but greater participation from local women and children, and a 
high concentration of men from elsewhere. They did not have to pay to get 
access, since in most locations; gold reserves had nearly been exhausted. In 
response to enquiries about the results of extraction efforts, replies were mostly 
                                                     
6  The Fulbe, also known as Fula, Fulani, Pulaar, and Tukolor, are spread from Senegal to the northern 
Cameroon and even into the Sudan. This dispersal is the result of migrations. The Fulbe consider 
themselves originally to be cattle-herders, but today they have also established sedentary populations 
across this region, and these are not necessarily cattle-herders, although cattle remain an important part 
of their identity. 
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negative: “Nothing found, nothing gained, but we will pursue, what else are we 
to do?” 
Over the year, the local social situation had clearly become more tense; some 
people had been successful in finding gold, which caused jealousy and envy 
occasionally manifested as outbursts and verbal disagreements. The poor harvest 
increased local disparities in wealth. The daily availability of alcohol on the 
market of the gold site did not help the social situation. Even the people who had 
benefited from gold sales earlier in the year appeared to suffer from a sort of 
“post-rush-depression”. Gold mining certainly served as a band-aid solution to 
the poor harvest, but could it provide long-term benefits to the farmers-miners of 
Burkina? 
Some of Mahama’s family members clearly benefited from the gold rush: 
During field visits in August 2004, many claimed to be affluent. During follow-
up visits in December, however, it became evident that much of the money 
earned from gold mining had been spent. The elder brother of Mahama claimed 
that gold made them suffer. He described the calamities that had occurred with 
his close kin due to gold discoveries. Two of his children had found substantial 
amounts of gold at the beginning of the rainy season. This had frightened the 
elder brother, and in reaction he had given all sorts of alms to prevent calamity. 
Despite this, his mother had fallen ill and had to be taken to the local dispensary, 
and eventually, to the hospital in Kaya. Later, his wife and he himself had fallen 
ill. In due course, all of the money gained from gold had been spent on medical 
bills. Everyone is now recovering slowly, but there are insufficient funds remain-
ing to purchase supplementary sorghum later on in the year. He was grateful that 
at least the alms had prevented death in the family.  
Rapid wealth accumulation and rapid loss of earnings is a recurrent theme in 
discussing gold mining activities in this region of Burkina Faso. Gold hardly ever 
brings about lasting wealth: The money earned from gold mining is said to lack 
“barka” (“blessing” in Arabic). The revenues accrued are likely to fail to deliver 
long-term benefits. By the time this particular gold rush ended, Mahama had 
moved on. On occasion, he would come back to the village to relax, but his work 
has taken him north to the Province Bam. On a mining site near Sabce, he now 
engages in activities very similar to the ones described. Again, he is working 
within a permit zone of GEP-MINES.  
Conclusion 
In this paper I have looked at actors involved in governing a gold site in the 
Province of Sanmatenga. First I looked at the formal structure of the new permit 
system and the authorizing processes which involve the state and mining compa-
nies since the liberalization of the gold sector. The present mining title of GEP-
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MINES finds its legitimation in an interesting interplay of international and 
national partners: 
The state, by law, proclaims that it is the sole owner of the land and its 
resources. In the Sankara period this ownership was the point of departure for a 
monopoly of the state on the exploitation and appropriation of mineral resources. 
Even though the state is still the sole owner of the lands, IMF and World Bank 
policies have established that the state “rolled back” in the actual task of pros-
pecting and exploitation. The state is owner but not any longer a dominant player 
in the economic exploitation of the mineral wealth nowadays. Is this position to 
be assessed as a weakening of the state? It is important to stress that international 
monitoring and banking institutions have forced the state into this position, a 
position that implies transference of political choices to multilateral organiza-
tions. The state in Burkina is still the owner of natural resources, but what should 
be done with these resources is co-determined by international organizations. As 
many authors have pointed out, in the context of structural adjustment pro-
grammes political decisions are taken by international organizations that are not 
politically accountable. At present, governance of African economies represents 
a kind of transfer of sovereignty away from African states and into the hands of 
the multilateral organizations. James Ferguson (1998) has rightly argued that 
African governments are forced to be accountable (elections) for policies that are 
to a large extent formulated by international organizations, which cannot be 
voted away. He shows that in ideological terms governance issues are ingrained 
with rigid distinctions between local, national and international levels, between 
politics and economics, as well as between state and civil society, whereas in the 
practices and interactions of different players we see a systematic blurring. In 
order to study these different representations, he proposes to investigate govern-
ing instances, and in particular the state, as bundles of social practices.  
This paper is a first step to study mining practices in Burkina Faso along those 
lines. Hence I have discussed the formal system of mining regulations under the 
heading of “political economy of governance”. Around specific practices of 
governance we see strong collaborations between both national and international 
partners, and economic and political partners. The present ideology of good 
governance allots the state with a limited task, but this task should be executed 
properly: The state should refrain from formal economic activities, it should 
follow the advice of international banking institutions, and it should proof trans-
parency in procedures and vigilance in reinforcing laws and regulations. Para-
doxically, the state obtains a lot of help to set up the institutional and information 
facilities to perform their “downsized” tasks. This paradox is particularly appar-
ent with regard to the mining sector. Again an ideological axiom informs this 
paradox. Most parties involved in the mining sector agree (or are forced into 
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proclaiming that) that the sites with natural resources should be exploited in the 
present, but they should also be protected for the future. Mining these resources 
is seen as a means to alleviate debts and poverty, but exploitation should be done 
in an appropriate manner. Economic exploitation should be left to private enter-
prise, but this sector should be watched over in order to limit environmental 
damage. International donors and consultancy agencies provide the state with 
means and services to monitor the mining sector in this respect. But more is at 
stake. The mining sector in Burkina is considered to depend on foreign capital 
and technological knowledge. International companies are explicitly invited to 
invest in Burkina. Courting these companies is done both by the state and by 
junior mining companies. Attracting foreign investors depends on the state’s 
capacity to guarantee stability and security in the country, whereas junior compa-
nies try to attract investors by promising prospects. It is in this light that we have 
to understand the overt efforts to put information on the mining sector in the 
public domain.  
In the efforts to inform “the” public, both the state and mining companies are 
first of all addressing an international audience of potential donors and investors. 
In this context “keeping up appearances” (see Tsing 2000, 2005) is key, both for 
the state and for the companies. The information should proof to foreign donors 
and investors that both the state and operating companies are strong, stable, 
reliable and promising enough to bank on. Of course this cannot depend on 
window dressing alone. The state has to show its capacity to do its job in secur-
ing safety and stability. Moreover, attracting investors requires that results of 
prospecting activities are considered reliable. Companies should be careful in 
how they provide prospective investors with test results, and have to invite third 
parties to check the research at sites. The case presented here deserves to be 
compared to other sites where more active forms of policing by state officials 
occur, and where more knowledge about the actual prospecting practices of com-
panies can be gathered. 
For the present data we conclude that the state’s and the companies’ messages 
are passed on in media – internet, maps – which can be expected to attain the 
targeted audiences. However, these messages do not (aim to) reach the people 
who might actually be working in the pits. This particular case study shows that 
for these people the present situation, characterized by a large set of (private) 
players, has become less transparent. The coming and going of different pros-
pectors and gold buying “authorities” are experienced as random and unregu-
lated. In this particular case one contrast is rather extreme: The visibility of the 
state and the companies in the public high-tech media, contrasts very strongly 
with their virtual invisibility on the ground. When it comes to the governing of 
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the site itself, the state seems absent and the permit holder GEP-MINES is 
heavily dependent on local power holders.  
This local power holder 1) advises on necessary sacrifices; 2) assures compen-
sation for owners of agricultural fields; 3) allocates workspaces to miners; and 4) 
guarantees protection for people and their property. I have shown how the 
governing tasks of the key person at the site are reinforced by local ideas stating 
that gold is precious but perilous. This feature is connected to the idea that gold 
is owned by djiins, beings of the bush. Strength in gold mining depends on a 
close connection to these localized beings. This connection does affect the 
person’s characteristics; excessive sides thereof inspire awe, which may help 
both in policing the site and in explaining haphazard turns of luck. Only a fortu-
nate few are strong enough to take gold from the earth successfully. This dis-
course on governing gold sites refers to a particular moral geography. 
However, Mahama’s position is based on these ideas in combination with his 
connection to the permit holder, GEP-MINES. Mahama capitalizes on two 
ideologies of ownership of the resources of the earth: One stating that bush 
beings are ultimate owners; the other attributing this position to the state. 
Mahama can step in as representative of the “formal” owners due to his close 
links to the other type of owners. I have started out by tracing two claims in 
governance, one by GEP-MINES, one by a local person, Mahama. It is in the 
way that these two are articulated that we are to understand the interplay of actors 
involved in appropriating wealth at this particular gold site. In this articulation 
we see a complex bundle of practices based on a variety of cultural repertoires 
and routines. In these practices actors are tapping into different forms of author-
ity, defined by international and local arenas, and they are borrowing from politi-
cal, economic and “traditional” status positions. Even if, as we have seen, the 
discourse on mining presents the political, the economic and the traditional actors 
as distinctive, the study of practices demonstrates that these types of authorities 
are entangled, and are only effective due to this hybridity. 
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Introduction 
Globalization theorists’ claims in the 1990s that globalization would demise the 
nation-state (Amin & Thrift 1995, Ohmae 1996, Held et al. 1999) and create a 
“borderless world” (Ohmae 1990) have proven to be highly premature, at least 
for now: Boundaries have remained an important feature of the political land-
scape and continue to shape cultural-political identities world-wide (Blake 1998). 
This development means that inter-state conflict over boundaries has remained a 
political reality in many places around the world (Ghai 2003). Africa is no 
exception. As Figure 12.1 indicates, the continent knows a relatively high num-
ber of contested boundaries. The majority of these disputes have their roots in 
colonial times. The boundaries drawn by the end of the 19th century by Western 
colonial powers little reflected the settlement and mobility patterns of the indige-
nous population and some boundaries were not delineated according to proce-
dures common in international law. Boundaries in international river basins 
constitute a good example (Conley & van Niekerk 1998). Coupled with the fact 
that the boundary treaties were all signed by the former colonial powers instead 
of independent African states, their legitimacy can be relatively easily questioned 
(Griffiths 1995, Griggs 2002). 
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Figure 12.1 Disputed boundaries in Africa (based on Downing 1980) 
 
 
On the other hand, and notwithstanding various inter-state wars and armed 
conflicts over boundaries (for example, between Eritrea and Ethiopia and Came-
roon and Nigeria respectively), the outbreak of large-scale boundary conflict 
between African states has been rather successfully prevented by the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU). By signing unto its Cairo Resolution in 1964, 
Africa’s newly independent states accepted their colonial boundaries and agreed 
to pursue modification demands through legal routes only (Brownlie 1979). In 
70% of all boundary conflicts in Africa the states in question adhere to peaceful 
means to settle their boundary dispute.1 
Even when “managed” (CIA 2004), ongoing boundary conflicts are likely to 
be problematic (Davidson 1992, Griggs 2002), however. Contested boundaries 
tend to be relatively closed, constraining legal cross-border trade and social 
traffic (Nugent & Asiwaju 1985; Nkiwane 1997, Miles 2005), often to the detri-
                                                     
1  Personal Communication, Prof. G.H. Blake, founder and former director of the International 
Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 2003. 
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ment of a borderland’s population’s well-being and economic development 
(Martinez 1994, Miles 2005). National economies may also suffer, for example 
when the boundary conflict hampers wider regional attempts to create common 
markets (Anyang’-Nyong’o 1990, Henz 2004) or prevents the exploitation of 
natural resources located in the contested borderland (Griggs 2000). Finally, 
unresolved boundary conflicts may represent significant political liabilities. 
Persistent disagreements over the location of their boundary may put pressure on 
the overall quality of international relations between states, thereby introducing 
the prospect of violent conflict at a later stage (Davidson 1992, Akweenda 1997). 
With the persistence of boundary conflicts in Africa and elsewhere in the 
world (International Boundaries Research Unit [IBRU] 2006), the necessity of 
finding strategies and mechanisms to help settle boundary conflicts between 
states in a non-violent way remains acute. This article explores the possibilities 
of Peace Parks to do so, with a focus on the creation of a Transboundary 
Protected Area in Southern Africa and its bearing on a long-standing boundary 
conflict between South Africa and Namibia. 
Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) can be defined as “biodiversity and 
wildlife conservation areas that straddle the boundaries of, and are managed in 
common by, two or more countries” (van Amerom & Büscher 2005: 160). In 
addition to their assumed contribution to sustainable development,2 TBPAs have 
been promoted as means to help settle boundary conflict (McNeil 1990, Brock 
1991, McManus 1994, Hamilton et al. 1997, Griffin et al. 1999, Ramudsindela & 
Tseola 2000, ITTO/IUCN 2003, van Amerom 2005: 10-18, Westing 1993, 1998). 
The notion is supported and promoted by international environmental organiza-
tions, including the IUCN, the UNEP and the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), as 
well as the World Bank and politicians, including former South African President 
Nelson Mandela. The notion that TBPAs can act as Peace Parks, even in “once-
conflict ridden borderlands” (Hanks 2001), by reducing or settling boundary 
conflict, is underpinned by notions that co-operation in transboundary projects 
will strengthen, improve or reconcile relations between states: Increased expo-
sure to “the Other” (Said 1993) is alleged to increase cross-border trust and 
friendship (Mitrany 1965, Swatuk & Vale 1999, Henz 2005). Co-operation in 
environmental projects is deemed particularly suitable to further this end (Zbicz 
                                                     
2  As large-scale natural areas hosting a relatively wide range of biodiversity and in which tourists can 
freely cross boundaries, TBPAs have been predicted by environmentalists, ecotourism developers and 
politicians supporting their creation to lead to a massive rise in ecotourism to the borderland in which 
they are located (Spenceley 2001). Local communities are often portrayed as the prime beneficiaries of 
such developments through increased income and employment opportunities. In reality, these pros-
pects are likely to greatly differ from area to area depending on such factors as actual tourism attract-
ions, accessibility and also political stability (Schoon 2004, van Amerom 2006). In addition, local 
communities often only marginally benefit, and sometimes outright suffer from the creation of TBPAs, 
most notably where these limit or cancel local land rights (Draper et al. 2004, Norman 2005). 
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1999, Anonymous 2000: 4). It is alleged to be less politically sensitive and easier 
to realize than inter-state co-operation in more “loaded” “high politics” areas, 
such as security (Mitrany 1965, Anonymous 2000). Transboundary co-operation 
could allegedly also discourage conflict over boundaries through the cultivation 
of joint economic or other shared interests between states in their disputed 
borderlands (Swatuk & Vale 1999). Reflecting the growing popularity of the 
notion of “environmental security” (Westing 1998), the presumed ability of 
TBPAs to prevent wars over limited resources by setting up regimes that enable 
the sharing and more effective use of natural resources in borderlands has also 
been used to underpin the notion of Peace Parks (Duffy 2005). Where the 
delimitation of boundaries in a given area is hindered by competition over access 
rights to natural resources in the borderland the creation of Peace Parks could 
thus, in theory, provide a possible solution through an improved allocation of 
resources (Griggs 2001). 
Since the first de facto Peace Park in 1932,3 over a dozen TBPAs have been 
created world-wide, many of which have the explicit aim of promoting peaceful 
relations between the states involved. In 1999 the “biggest Peace Parks plan 
ever” was adopted in Southern Africa, envisaging the creation of six Peace Parks 
between South Africa and neighbouring countries (see Figure 12.2). Following 
the quick improvement in relations between South Africa and neighbouring 
countries since the ending of apartheid (1994), and stimulated by the newly 
founded Peace Parks Foundation4 (1997), the Peace Parks concept was put on the 
highest political agendas and became a formal policy priority of the Southern 
African Development Community. The Botswana-South African Kgalagadi Park 
was the first TBPA to open in 2000. In 2004 wildlife corridors and free tourism 
traffic were created in the Mozambican/South African part of the Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park. 
The TBPA which seems next in line to be established is the South African-
Namibian Ai-Ais/Richtersveld TBPA. In 2004 a treaty was signed and the TBPA 
formally declared open.5 The remaining three TBPAs are in various stages of 
progress (van Amerom and Büscher 2006). 
 
 
                                                     
3  The US-Canadian Waterston-Glacier Park is widely recognized as the first de facto Peace Park, an 
important objective of its creation being the celebration and strengthening of the high quality relations 
between the US and Canada.  
4  Founded by South African businessman Dr. A. Rupert, together with Prince Bernard of the Nether-
lands (former WWF chairman) and then South African President Nelson Mandela. The networks of 
these “Big Men” and their access to international funding facilitated the promotion of the concept in 
Southern African’s highest political and business circles in as well as outside Southern Africa (van 
Amerom 2005, van Amerom & Buscher 2005). 
5  But not de facto. The underlying causes for the delayed opening of the TBPA will be discussed in 
more detail in section three below. 
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Figure 12.2 Peace Parks and contested boundaries in Southern Africa6 
1) Ai-Ais/Richtersveld TBPA 4) Great Limpopo TBPA 
2) Kgalagadi TBPA 5) Lubombo TBPA 
3) Limpopo Shashe TBPA 6) Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA 
=== Land claims on South African territory 
 
 
Particularly since the announcement of Southern Africa’s large Peace Parks 
Plan, the Peace Parks concept has gained world-wide prominence, attracting 
favourable media coverage world-wide (Warburton-Lee 1999, van der Linden 
2000, Godwin 2001, Bittorf 2002, Süddeutsche Zeitung 2002, Pabst 2002, 
Michler 2003). Western donors and NGOs7 have embraced the concept as a 
means to promote sustainable development and political stability. With evermore 
actors jumping on the TBPA “bandwagon”, Peace Parks are now set up in “virtu-
ally every corner of the African continent” (Wilkie et al. 2001, Wolmer 2003, 
Lycklama à Nyeholt et al. 2001, van Amerom & Büscher 2005). The presumed 
ability of Peace Parks to promote peace, including by reducing boundary 
conflicts, is an argument often used, alongside their expected ecological and 
economic benefits, to justify the reservation of land for TBPAs (Griffin et al. 
1999, Hanks 2001). Some conservationists present the ability of TBPAs to 
                                                     
6  Thanks to Dr. T. Islam for assistance in the production of this figure. 
7  In addition to the World Bank, Save the Children, USAID, GTZ, the German Development Bank and 
the Italian CESVI are all involved in the creation of Peace Parks, for example. 
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promote peace in contested borderlands to be so enormous that they recommend 
the creation of Peace Parks in areas still engaged in armed conflict, such as 
borderlands in the Great Lakes region (van der Giessen 2005). Other Peace Park 
protagonists have acceded, however, that without the absence of armed conflict 
no TBPAs are possible (Hammelburg 2006). 
The potential of TBPAs to help settle boundary conflict between countries 
maintaining peaceful relations can also be questioned, although the conditions in 
which these TBPAs are created are clearly more favourable. The “rational actor”, 
“resource scarcity” and other notions implicitly underpinning the idea that inter-
state co-operation and governments’ stakes in TBPAs will result in international 
friendship and clear the way for a resolution of boundary disputes have been 
uncovered as inadequate explanatory models for the behaviour of states in 
TBPAs (Lejano 2006, Duffy 2005). The scant empirical findings on the political 
performance of TBPAs in borderlands indicates that persistent boundary conflicts 
may hamper the creation of Peace Parks, rather than Peace Parks settling or 
lessening inter-state conflict over boundaries, particularly if the TBPA in ques-
tion has not been explicitly founded to help settle a given boundary conflict, for 
example in the aftermath of a peace treaty in post-boundary conflict areas 
(Hearns 1997, Alcalde et al. 2005). 
Considering that the peace-building and boundary conflict reducing effects of 
TBPAs cannot be assumed, the generation of more data on the interaction 
between inter-state cooperation in TBPAs and existing boundary conflicts is 
desirable. This article aims to contribute to this line of inquiry by considering the 
creation of the Namibian-South African Ai-Ais/Richtersveld TBPA (see Figure 
12.3) and its effects on the status of the Namibian-South African conflict over the 
location of the Orange River boundary, if any. The next section will first outline 
the history and status of the Orange River boundary conflict in more depth. The 
following section describes major developments and patterns in Namibian-South 
African collaboration and negotiations on the TBPA. The final section discusses 
the implications of these for the Orange River boundary conflict and reflects on 
the broader significance of the findings. 
The contested Orange River boundary 
Namibia and South Africa share a nearly 1,000 km-long boundary, a consider-
able part of which runs through the Orange River, along the northern high water 
mark (Brownlie 1979), rather than being in the middle of the river, as is common 
international practice.8 This delineation originated in July 1890 (Demhardt 
                                                     
8  Personal communication (e-mail), M. Pratt, Director International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 
2004. 
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1990), when the Germans accepted this boundary line proposed by a military 
superior Britain,9 and agreed to article III of the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty: 
In Southwest Africa the sphere in which the exercise of influence is reserved to Germany is 
bounded. To the south by a line commencing at the mouth of the Orange rivers, and ascend-
ing the north bank of that river to the point of its intersection by the 20th degree of east 
longitude (Herslet 1967, quoted in Dierks 2000). 
This situation posed few problems until Namibia’s independence from South 
Africa in 1990. The Namibian constitution (article 1(4)) stipulated that: 
The national of Namibia shall consist of the whole of territory recognised by … the United 
Nations as Namibia … and its southern boundary shall extend to the middle of the Orange 
River (Demhardt 1990: 362, italics added). 
Namibia referred to, amongst others, the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of Inter-
national Rivers to defend its claim. 
With reference to the OAU’s Cairo Agreement, South Africa continued to 
adhere to the existing boundary contract, however, claiming “both [river]banks 
(Evans 1993: 134). From the early 1990s onwards South Africa and Namibia 
discussed the location of the Orange River boundary, establishing a Joint Techni-
cal Committee to research and report on the boundary demarcation in 1993 
(Evans 1993: 134). Contrary to other Namibian territorial claims in South 
Africa,10 the boundary dispute was never settled. The issue is complicated by two 
factors: 
 
(1) The presence of valuable natural resources in, and on the banks of, the Orange River 
 
The river mouth contains major diamond deposits, and islands in the Orange 
River provide valuable grazing land, while the river also provides good fishing 
opportunities and is a source of water in the arid desert borderland. Both Namibia 
and South Africa claim access to these resources.11 While South Africa has ex-
pressed the willingness to revise the boundary to follow the river’s median line, it 
has never been willing to relinquish its water, grazing, fishing and mineral 
property rights, to the dismay of Namibia (Maletsky 2000, van Amerom 2005). 
  
                                                     
9  The then colonial powers of respectively Namibia and South Africa. 
10  On 1 March 1994, following three years of bi-lateral negotiations, a South African-Namibian dispute 
over ownership of Walvis Bay, a coastal enclave, and 12 offshore islands was resolved, when South 
Africa returned these areas to Namibia. 
11  When South Africa still ruled Namibia, it exercised sovereignty over the whole river, which is very 
wide in places. During this period South Africa granted mineral rights to South Africa’s mining 
companies to exploit the area’s valuable diamonds, and land rights to the river’s islands to the local 
communities in and around the Richtersveld. Under pressure from these beneficiaries, South African 
governments have generally been unwilling to release South Africa’s access rights to these natural 
resources. Access to land and diamonds in what it perceives to be “its” side of the river and river 
mouth is a key motivation for Namibia’s request for boundary re-adjustment, however (van Amerom 
2005: 198). 
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(2) Disagreements over earlier agreements 
 
South Africa already agreed to review the boundary during the two presiden-
cies preceding President Thabo Mbeki’s ones. The premature ending of De 
Klerk’s administration and postponements during the Mandela regime meant, 
however, that the process of specifying what had to be delineated was never 
accomplished (Conley & van Niekerk 1998, Graig 2001). Namibia requests a 
following up of these tacit agreements. Current South African President Mbeki 
does not feel obligated by these never formalized arrangements of his predeces-
sors. South Africa decided that the boundary would not be adjusted during his 
first presidency, in July 2000 (Graig 2001) and demanded that Namibia would 
adhere to “the OAU’s policy on respecting colonial boundaries” (Pana 2000). 
This has not happened; the Orange River boundary dispute has continued to flare 
up periodically and put pressure on the otherwise cordial relations between South 
Africa and Namibia (Evans 1993).  
At the start of the Namibian-South African cooperation in the Ai-Ais/Richters-
veld the boundary dispute had been laid dormant for some time. This may well 
have been a precondition for co-operation on the TBPA to occur – the Ai-
Ais/Richtersveld incorporates a substantial part of the contested South African-
Namibian border along the Orange River (see Figure 12.3). South African 
conservation authorities had earlier excluded Namibia from the Botswana-South 
African Kgalagadi TBPA, allegedly out of fear that the Namibian boundary 
claims would interfere with the creation of the TBPA (Ramutsindela 2004: 66). 
While, perhaps for similar reasons, the settlement of the Orange River boundary 
conflict was never listed as a formal aim of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld TBPA’s 
creation, Namibian-South African co-operation in the TBPA might nevertheless 
de facto contribute to this scenario, according to the earlier discussed premises 
underpinning the Peace Parks concept. Aided by favourable geographical circum-
stances and a general consensus between Namibia and South Africa on desired 
land use, jurisdiction and security management of the TBPA, negotiations took 
place in an amicable atmosphere and caused few tensions. 
Furthermore, many of the key South African and Namibian players in the Ai-
Ais/Richtersveld Park, such as the Ministries of Mining and Natural Resources, 
are also major players in the boundary conflict. This overlap increases the likeli-
hood that friendship and mutual understanding generated in the cause of co-
operation in the TBPA could have a spin-off effect and facilitate renewed discus-
sion on the boundary or its “dépassement” (i.e. setting aside territorial claims for 
greater mutual benefits – Bourguiba quoted in Nordquist 2001: 28, 37). For this 
to happen, negotiations on the TBPA needed to develop in isolation of the 
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Figure 12.3 Map of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld 
Source: Peace Parks Foundation (2004).12 
 
 
boundary conflict, however. Instead, co-operation in the TBPA became soon 
hampered by, and subjected to, a renewed outbreak of conflict over the location 
of the boundary. 
Namibian-South African collaboration in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld 
Compared to many other TBPAs (van Amerom & Büscher 2005, van Amerom 
2006), the connection of the Namibian Ai-Ais with its South African counterpart 
(the Richtersveld Park) can be undertaken relatively easy. The Ai-Ais hot springs 
reserve and the Richtersveld Park are adjacent and, with the boundary separating 
the two conservation areas being little demarcated with fences, already de facto 
connected in many places. Especially in the dry season, when the Orange River 
separating the Richtersveld from its Namibian counterpart tends to dry up, 
uninhibited pedestrian and wildlife cross-border access is a reality. Furthermore, 
there are no major security issues constraining the creation of unimpeded cross-
                                                     
12  Thanks to Mr. C. Beech. 
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border access for animals and people alike within the TBPA. For these reasons, 
the creation of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Park could and did initially progress 
relatively rapidly. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Transbound-
ary Park was signed on 17 August 2001 (Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2003). 
The smooth Namibian-South African co-operation in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld 
did not have a noticeable positive effect on the Orange River boundary issue, 
however. Two months after the signing of the MoU on the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld 
the boundary conflict flared up once more, with Namibia demanding once more 
an adjustment. South Africa attempted “agenda-removal”. It referred to a presi-
dential summit in 2001, during which President Thabo Mbeki and his Namibian 
counterpart Sam Nujoma had already agreed on the boundary’s present location, 
for which reason the boundary dispute had not come up since. This did not 
resolve the issue, however. Namibia claimed that it had raised its concerns 
regarding the location of the boundary in discussions between the ministers of 
trade on a project around the Orange River later in the year (Graig 2001, van 
Amerom 2005: 199).  
Not only did Namibian-South African relations become strained once more by 
the boundary conflict following their collaboration in the TBPA, the continuation 
of negotiations on the TBPA became linked to progress on the boundary issue. 
When South Africa failed to re-negotiate the boundary issue, Namibia strategi-
cally started to demand that the boundary issue be settled prior to any further 
meetings on the TBPA, turning it into a de facto condition for further coopera-
tion.13  
Namibia could use its continued participation in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld as a 
pressure means for various reasons. While “Namibia has an interest in develop-
ing ecotourism to its Ai-Ais Park by means of the TBPA, the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld 
is particularly driven, and desired, by South Africa. Namibia provides most of the 
land for the Peace Park, however (4,326 km2 of a total 5,921 km2). The involve-
ment of the South African PPF also made it attractive for Namibia to try and 
politically exploit its participation in the TBPA. As an NGO, the PPF has no 
major say in the boundary dispute” (van Amerom 2005: 200). However, Anton 
Rupert, its founder and head, could exercise considerable influence in this area, 
because of his involvement with Transhex, a powerful South African mining 
company which he founded. Although headed by his son, Anton Rupert still 
owned a substantial number of shares in the company and Transhex actively 
supports the creation of the TBPA. “By refusing to further co-operate with the 
TBPA Namibia could use its participation in the Park as a means of pressurizing 
                                                     
13  The following discussion of events is based upon fieldwork undertaken in the period 2002-2003, PhD. 
Discussed events that took place after 2003 have been observed and researched through literature 
research. 
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the Rupert family to give up its resistance to a revision of the boundary. Protect-
ing its exploitation rights to diamonds in the area, Transhex fiercely opposes a 
settlement of the boundary dispute to Namibia’s advantage, and lobbies the 
South African government accordingly” (van Amerom 2005: 201). 
Furthermore, Namibia demanding a re-adjustment of the Orange River 
boundary prior to further progress on the TBPA made sense politically. Possible 
security implications of the connection of the South African Richtersveld with 
the Ai-Ais Park included the usage of the TBPA by criminal syndicates involved 
in diamond and arms smuggling (Minaar 2001). Both Namibia and South Africa 
acceded that, in order to check this risk, custom officials needed to be installed 
(two at each side of the border) requiring the erection of a border post. The 
existing, but closed, Sendelingsdrift border post was identified at the most 
suitable spot, as a result of which its re-opening became part of the plans for the 
TBPA, following the MoU. The establishment of a border post is not just 
functional, however, but also has a highly symbolic meaning. Indicating where 
the territory of one country ends, and that of the other starts, border posts 
implicitly confirm a given boundary line, even with those not internationally 
recognized or disputed (van Amerom 1997, Custred 2003). By implicitly con-
firming the existing boundary line in the Orange River, which Namibia wants to 
be re-drawn to follow the river’s middle, the erection of a border post in the 
TBPA along a not re-drawn boundary could achieve the very thing Namibia 
wants to avoid: Weigh in against a possible future settlement of the Orange River 
boundary dispute in its advantage. 
South Africa, by means of its Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism (DEAT), continued to resist the Namibian demand, however. It refused 
to link the discussions on the boundary arrangements in the TBPA to wider 
discussions on the location of the boundary (van Amerom 2005: 201). The South 
African lack of willingness to discuss the boundary issue eventually led Namibia 
to unilaterally break off negotiations on the TBPA. Rather than providing a 
platform to bring Namibia and South Africa closer together on the boundary 
issue, prior to its official opening the Peace Park became a “stage for magnifying 
historical grievances, hegemonic relations, and mistrust”, as Peace Parks may 
also do (Lejano 2006: 577). 
In mid-2002 the Namibian government “put on hold” all plans regarding the 
TBPA (Namibian official in confidential correspondence with South African 
National Parks [SANPs] official). Namibian officials involved in the negotiations 
on the Peace Park were explicitly instructed by their superiors not to organize or 
attend any meetings on the creation of the TBPA “until further notice” (Namib-
ian Park official, Interview, 2003). South Africa did not respond to these actions. 
In fact, officials of the South African Department of Environmental Affairs and 
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Tourism denied there was a dispute over the boundary in the TBPA, given that 
Namibia had “at no stage” launched such a request “through the appropriate 
channels”, or even at earlier meetings at ministerial levels on the TBPA (anony-
mous source DEAT, 2002). They also contested the legitimacy of Namibia’s 
claims on the Orange River, pointing to the decision of the International Court of 
Justice in 1999. Asked by Namibia and Botswana “to determine the boundary … 
around Kasikili/Sedudu Island” (International Court of Justice 1996) the Court 
ruled in favour of Botswana, rejecting Namibian claims on the island and main-
taining the current Botswana-Namibian boundary as stipulated in the Anglo-
German Treaty of 1890. As such, the court recognized the validity of the Anglo-
German boundary agreements, illustrating, according to DEAT, that Namibia’s 
demands were not legitimate. DEAT also perceived Namibia’s behaviour as 
“unacceptable blackmail” (anonymous source, DEAT 2002). 
At lower levels, relations seemed remarkably little affected. Park officials, 
NGO people and other actors actively involved in the day-to-day planning of the 
park on both sides of the boundary expressed regret that the boundary issue 
halted the process, but many were sympathetic to the position of the adjacent 
country. One South African expressed understanding for Namibia’s desire to 
want to challenge an “apartheid boundary” and hoped it would succeed, whilst a 
Namibian felt apologetic towards its South African colleagues for suddenly 
having to stop the work on the TBPA. All expressed a desire to reconnect with 
their colleagues across the boundary as soon as the “crisis” would be over, and at 
international meetings on TBPAs Namibian and South Africans readily engaged 
in conversations. They also made it clear, however, that the breaking of the 
deadlock would depend on the respective Ministries of Environment on both 
sides of the boundary (see also van Amerom 2005: 235). 
In spite of the lack of South African concessions regarding the position of the 
boundary, the Namibian government eventually eased its resistance and negotia-
tions on the TBPA were resumed. Three years after the signing of the MoU, the 
treaty for the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld was eventually signed on the 1st of August 
2003. Missing out on the economic advantages of cross-border co-operation 
generated by the TBPA is likely to have played a role in Namibia’s resumption 
of the negotiations on the Peace Park with South Africa. Namibia’s withdrawal 
of support in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld delivered no results whilst Namibia has 
considerable ecotourism interests in a linkage of its relatively underdeveloped 
Ai-Ais Park to the more advanced and better known Richtersveld Park. Had 
Namibia resumed negotiations on the TBPA solely, or mainly, in order not to 
loose future ecotourism benefits from the TBPA, the binding role of a TBPA 
between two countries engaged in a boundary dispute could be said to have been 
confirmed. Moreover, considering that the creation of the TBPA would entail the 
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creation of border posts, thereby confirming its current status, Namibia’s con-
tinuation with the TBPA represented some sort of acceptance at least to some 
extent, of the Orange River boundary as currently drawn. This could indicate the 
start of the boundary dispute’s “dépassement”. This situation entails that there is 
de facto and durable acceptance of the status quo: The “claimant” state accepts 
the boundary demarcation and stops demanding an alteration of the boundary 
(Nordquist 2001). As such, Namibia’s decision to continue to participate in the 
TBPA at the first sight appeared rather promising: Not just for the creation of the 
TBPA, but also because it could pave the path for the boundary conflict’s 
ultimate disappearance of the agenda.  
However, Namibia’s decision to re-engage with the TBPA appears to have 
only been limitedly motivated by the prospect of growing ecotourism revenue 
from the TBPA. Economic interests in transboundary co-operation with South 
Africa in other policy areas played a considerably important role as well. 
Hostile relations between Namibia and South Africa as a result of the renewal 
of their boundary dispute meant that lucrative marine diamond mining plans had 
to be delayed, as well as an exploitation of recently discovered gas reserves in the 
area, leading to corporate pressure on both governments to bypass the boundary 
dispute and come to a workable agreement (van Amerom 2006: 202). Prospects 
of gains from gas finds in the borderland seem to have also fuelled Namibia’s 
willingness to co-operate with South Africa in spite of the outstanding boundary 
dispute. It is interesting to note that the treaty of the Ai-Ais/Richterveld was 
signed on the same day that the countries signed a Bilateral Gas Trade Agree-
ment to exploit gas reserves on the Kudu Gas Field (1 August 2003) (Nujoma 
2003b). On the 5th of August, an agreement over shipping gas was signed. As 
part of this agreement the countries committed themselves to negotiate on other 
policy areas, including environmental ones. The progress made on the Ai-
Ais/Richterveld seemed therefore to depend on progress made in transboundary 
economic cooperation in other areas (van Amerom 2005: 202). 
Secondly, Namibia’s resumption of negotiations on the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld in 
spite of South Africa’s refusal to honour Namibia’s border adjustment request, 
and the subsequent signing of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld treaty, does not necessar-
ily mean that its position regarding the boundary has changed. Namibia has, thus 
far, failed to follow up its arrangements with South Africa regarding the 
Sendelingsdrift border post and the operation of a pontoon across the Orange 
River, which would enable transboundary tourism traffic within the TBPA. 
Although the TBPA was already formally declared open in 2003, following the 
signing of the treaty, it was still not possible for tourists to legally cross the 
Orange River by means of the appointed pontoon. This is rather remarkable. 
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From a technical viewpoint, in 2003 it was already possible to cross the 
Orange River by means of the traditional “pontoon” installed for that purpose at 
the Sendelingsdrift border post on the western boundary of the Ai-Ais/Richters-
veld (Dentlinger 2003). Furthermore, the border crossing point could play a 
“pivotal role for tourism” (Kanzler 2005). As a reporter of a magazine for ad-
venture motoring notes, its instalment would mean that 
it will no longer be necessary to make the lengthy detour to the Vioolsdrif/Noordoewer 
border post via the main South African N7 and Namibian Bl route which links Cape Town 
and Windhoek” or “to exit the Richtersveld at the Helskloof gate and drive the mountain 
pass via Helskloof Reserve between Eksteenfontein and Vioolsdrif (Dalglish 2006).  
Nevertheless, Namibian and South African immigration authorities had by 
August 2003 still not put the “administrative procedures in place” (Dentlinger 
2003), meaning that the pontoon continued to be used only for mining personnel 
working across the border, not tourists. Given the relatively long time that passed 
between the signing of the MoU and the treaty, coupled with the fact the Park has 
been formally declared open and that there are no major security constraints 
preventing the connection of the two parks, these delays can be called remark-
able. Even more striking is that none of the subsequent deadlines to operational-
ize the Sendelingsdrift Border Post and the pontoon have been adhered to, in 
contrast to stipulated progress in other policy areas, such as the development of a 
joint tourism marketing plan,14 due to continued inaction or changing demands 
by Namibia (see also Table 12.1). 
On the other hand, limited capacity to finance its border posts (Philander 
2006) could also account for Namibia’s failure to create transboundary cross-
border access for tourists in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld. Following promises by 
mining companies Scorpion Zinc, Rosh Pinah and Namdeb to fund a building 
with offices for border officials and nature conservation staff, Namibia commit-
ted itself once more to the opening of the Sendelingsdrift border post in Novem-
ber 2005, which suggests that limited finances may have been an obstacle. 
However, this goes only so far in explaining the Namibian delays. Following this 
agreement, no action to construct the border post was undertaken on the Namib-
ian side until present (2006). Furthermore, delays were also caused by an appar-
ent lack of willingness by the Namibian government to clear administrative 
obstacles to the operation of the pontoon, and to formally sanction the creation of 
the Sendelingsdrift border post.  
 
                                                     
14  On 28 February 2004 at Sendelingsdrift, the then Ministers of Environment and Tourism of Namibia 
and South Africa respectively, Philemon Malima and Valli Moosa, appointed a Joint Management 
Board (JMB) for the TBPA, whilst also deciding that South Africa would be the co-ordinating country 
for the first two years. In addition to completing a tourism plan, their tasks involved the opening of the 
boundary between the two countries. By the end of 2004, the tourism plan was being finalized, but the 
pontoon was still not operational for tourists. 
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Table 12.1 Overview of announced expected opening dates/time frames of the  
 Sendelingsdrift Pontoon Border Post 
Year of  
announcement 
Source Event/publication Announced  
opening date 
Announced reason  
for earlier delay 
2003 
(18 February) 
Vali Moosa (South 
African Minister of 
Environment and  
Tourism) 
Comment to  
Parliamentary 
Monitoring  
Committee 
1st of August  
2003 
Delays in implementing 
agreements of Joint  
Management Plan 
2004 Peace Park Foundation Annual Review June/July 
2005 
Namibian desire to  
conduct further study 
into feasibility of  
border post  
(van der Walt 2004) 
2005 
(14 May) 
Kanzler, S. InterMinisterial  
Meeting on TBPA 
“soon” Formal procedures in 
Namibia not yet in  
place  
2006 South African National 
Parks 
Website November 
2006 
 - 
2006 South African National 
Parks 
Annual Report March 2007  - 
2006 
(28 November) 
Konjore 2006, quoted  
in Gaomas 2006 
Interview to New  
Era 
May/June  
2007 
 - 
 
 
In 2004 the installation of the renovated pontoon was completed thanks to 
contributions by Scorpion Mine, and started to be used for mining personnel 
already (van der Walt 2004). On the basis of earlier made arrangements with 
Namibia, South African National Parks expected thereafter the Sendelingsdrift 
border post and pontoon to be operational towards the end of 2005, with the work 
on the boundary post to starting “in the first quarter of 2005” (SANPs 2004: 14). 
However, the special permission needed from Namibia to operate the ferry had 
still not been given by spring 2005, in spite of Namibia’s completion of a com-
prehensive study into the construction of a pontoon-operated border post facility 
at Sendelingsdrift in 2004 (van der Walt 2004). “Concrete talks … about opening 
the border crossing at Sendelingsdrift on the Gariep/Orange River to establish a 
direct link between the parks” only started in September 2005 (Kanzler 2005), 
including, as explained by Namibian Minister of Environment and Tourism 
Fanual Demas, because Namibia was “still looking into registering ... the ferry” 
(Demas 2005, quoted in Kanzler 2005). 
By October 2006 the Namibian cabinet had still not formally approved of the 
plans for the construction of the Sendelingsdrift border post. More than three and 
a half years since its official opening in 2003, the TBPA is still not operational as 
a result of these delays. Even if Namibia may no longer demand an adjustment of 
the Orange River boundary in exchange for its continued participation in the 
planning of the TBPA, negotiations on boundary management issues, that by 
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their very nature explicitly draw attention to the position of the boundary, appear 
to have remained a sensitive issue.15 
Expected future ecotourism spin-offs from the TBPA continue to play a rather 
marginal role in structuring Namibia’s willingness to create the Ai-Ais/Richters-
veld. This might well change, once the TBPA is operational, and generates more 
ecotourism income. However, this prospect will depend on the construction of 
the border post, creating a Catch-22 situation. 
In the meantime, rather than or alongside Namibia’s economic interests in the 
TBPA, expected economic advantages from agreements with South Africa in 
other areas shape Namibia’s continued engagement with the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld. 
These dynamics indicate further limitations to the ability of TBPAs to promote 
close ties between countries involved in a boundary dispute, on the basis of their 
shared interests in expected ecotourism benefits. Renewed pledges made by 
Namibia to fulfil its earlier promise of constructing the border post tend to follow 
or coincide with the finalization of agreements with South Africa on economic 
co-operation in other areas, or other initiatives that are, also, in Namibia’s favour. 
For example, in November 2006, the Namibian cabinet eventually sanctioned the 
creation of the Sendelingsdrift pontoon border post and the operation of the ferry. 
This decision followed South Africa’s publicly announced resolve to re-open the 
Mata Mata border post to allow tourism traffic to and from Namibia into the 
Botswana – South African Kgalagadi,16 six weeks earlier. This measure is an 
important victory for Namibia, which has always contested the “unilateral” 
closure of the border post by South Africa following its independence in 1990 
and has tried to re-negotiate its re-opening since then. The economic benefits of 
such a linkage are likely to be considerable, with polls indicating that 80% of 
tourists visiting the Botswana- South African Kgalagadi Park will want to conti-
nue to Namibia from there (Springer 2005).  
Furthermore, the Namibian cabinet approval for the construction of the 
Sendelingsdrift border post coincided with the finalization of new Namibian-
South African development initiatives along the Trans-Kalahari Highway, as 
well as with a Namibian-South African agreement to market 48 identified pro-
jects at a jointly organized investors’ conference mid-2007. As part of a Presi-
dential Top discussing these subjects, the movement of tourists in the Ai-Ais/-
Richtersveld Transfrontier Park was once more put on the agenda (Ngatjizeko 
                                                     
15  By the end of November 2006 Namibia made renewed promises to re-open the Sendelingsdrift border 
post, however, with Minister of Environment and Tourism, W. Konjore, confirming the prospect that 
the pontoon-operated border post would be functioning by June 2007 (Konjore, quoted in Gaomas 
2006). This plan and its planned financing were officially adopted by the Namibian Cabinet, which 
may indicate that the opening of the Sendelingsdrift border post has gained higher priority.  
16  In addition, the Peace Parks Foundation allocated N $1 million (€ 104,606) to Namibia to assist it with 
its creation of the Mata Mata border post in November 2006.  
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2006, quoted in Maletsky 2006). Progress with the creation of the TBPA seems 
therefore to be considerably linked to agreements on Namibian-South African 
projects in other areas. Rather than a TBPA working as an independent variable 
able to change the wider economic-political settings in which it operates, as 
Peace Park protagonists maintain, its course may be greatly determined, and at 
times subjected to, developments in these spheres. 
Conclusion 
Two main ways in which the Namibian-South African boundary dispute could be 
peacefully resolved, other than through international arbitrage, can be identified: 
 
-  a re-drawing of the boundary line, as requested by the claimant state (Griggs 2001); 
-  a fading away into non-existence or insignificance as a political predicament, with the 
claimant country ceasing to request a adjustment of the boundary (Nordquist 2001). 
  
Thus far, Namibian-South African co-operation on the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld 
has not led to any of these changes. Namibia’s demands to re-adjust the boundary 
prior to the TBPA’s opening, were not met by South Africa, as a result of which 
Namibia withdrew temporarily from the negotiations on the TBPA. Considering 
Namibia’s reluctance to construct the Sendelingsdrift border post, the boundary 
dispute seems not to have faded away into non-existence either. Not only has the 
formal establishment of the TBPA not had any noticeable positive effect on the 
boundary dispute, it may have fuelled existing resentments over it. In the mean-
time, the TBPA’s de facto opening appears to be dependent on the arrangements 
that Namibia and South Africa make in other economic areas, whereby expected 
economic benefits seem to serve as a motivation for Namibia to continue with the 
TBPA. 
Indirectly, and as part of a wider web of transboundary projects between 
Namibia and South Africa, Namibian-South African co-operation in the Ai-
Ais/Richtersveld may have laid some foundations for the future settlement of the 
boundary dispute, however. According to Nordquist (2001), the extent of com-
pensation that a claimant state may receive from the country that wants to main-
tain the boundary line as it is, may play an important role in promoting an 
acceptance of the boundary line as it stands. By using its continued participation 
in the TBPA as a “pawn” in negotiations in other areas, Namibia may have 
assured certain economic benefits it might not otherwise have obtained. In the 
meantime, a new set up of the Namib borderland has been negotiated with South 
Africa, whereby Namibian access into Botswana and South Africa will be 
assured through the Mata Mata border post. While these agreements do not 
directly compensate Namibia for its perceived loss of diamond fields and other 
resources (due to a boundary granting South Africa these rights up to the north-
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ern bank of the Orange River, rather than just up to the middle of the river), they 
might have a similar function. As such, they might make it easier for Namibia to 
accept the boundary as it stands, without experiencing major loss of face and by 
limiting its economic losses. Whether these agreements will be enough “compen-
sation” for Namibia to drop its boundary alteration demands remains an open 
question, however. 
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Development encounters:  
Westerners and chieftaincy  
in Southern Ghana1 
 
 
Marijke Steegstra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Every once in a while, one can read about the installation or the good deeds of a 
so-called development chief or queen mother in Ghanaian newspapers and maga-
zines. Often the development chief concerned is a wealthy Ghanaian, possibly 
living abroad, who shows concern for his/her (home) community. Remarkably, 
however, many times the development chief mentioned is a foreigner from the 
Netherlands, Germany, America or elsewhere. How to interpret this phenome-
non? 
A development chief or queen mother occupies a special position in the 
complex Ghanaian chieftaincy tradition. The word “development chief” is the 
English translation of the Akan title Nkosuohene. Nkosuo means “progress”, or 
“development” (“-hene” is the designation for a chief). Since the late Asantehene, 
Otumfuo Opoku Ware II, created this new position in 1985 at the occasion of his 
25th jubilee of his ascension to the golden stool, dozens of Ghanaians, but at least 
as many Westerners, have been installed as development chiefs or queen 
mothers. The latter category (Westerners) is especially on the rise since the mid-
                                                     
1  This paper is based on material that was assembled during fieldwork conducted in Ghana’s Volta, 
Eastern, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti Regions between 2004 and 2005. The research took place in the 
context of my post-doctoral research project “The cultural construction of development: the installation 
of ‘white’ chiefs in Ghana”. It was made possible financially by the Netherlands Foundation for 
Tropical Research (WOTRO). 
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1990s, which seems to coincide with a sharp increase in international tourist 
arrivals at that time.2 The people involved range from gap-year students, tourists 
and African-American roots pilgrims to businessmen and aid workers (see Steeg-
stra 2006 for more details). 
The impulse to “enstool” foreigners was given by the Asantehene and thus was 
encouraged among the Akan speaking chiefs.3 But soon non-Akan speaking 
communities in mostly southern Ghana started to copy the phenomenon and used 
their own terms to designate very similar positions. For example, among the 
Ewe, a development chief is called Ngoryi-fia (ngoryi = “to go forward”, “to pro-
gress”, “development”; “-fia” is the Ewe designation for a chief) or Dunenyofia 
(literally “to make the town beautiful” [in terms of development]). A develop-
ment chief is usually installed without very elaborate procedures, which are 
mostly based on the public aspects of chieftaincy. The installation ceremonies 
vary very much and can be characterized as local inventions of tradition. They do 
not follow customary regulations and are not subject to political considerations 
like that of regular chiefs. Likewise the powers of development chiefs are limited 
to matters of “development”. Although people in Ghana in general do respect the 
“white” chiefs and take them serious, most Ghanaians know how to interpret the 
position and where to place it in the chiefly power hierarchy.4 
However, Western popular media have often depicted these white chiefs as 
“rulers” and “kings”, thereby exoticizing or even ridiculing the phenomenon. The 
stories typically lack any nuancing or explanation. For example, The Sun recently 
published a story entitled “Brit pair rule in Africa”, which says that the British 
couple “became Africa’s first white chief and queen”.5 This type of stories is one 
of the reasons why development chiefs are the subject of debate, especially 
among Ghanaians abroad. Also some chiefs and opinion leaders in Ghana fear a 
degradation of the chieftaincy institution as a result of the seemingly indiscrimi-
nate installation of foreigners. At the same time, many African-Americans and 
other diasporans view the enstoolment of whites as a corruption of tradition, 
sacrilegious and disgraceful, because they have laid claim on the institution of 
chieftaincy as a distinction mark of a “Black identity” (Schramm 2004: 166). 
                                                     
2  See also www.world-tourism.org. 
3  A chiefly “stool” symbolizes authority and the power of the ancestors. A chief “occupies a stool”, 
which refers to his influence sphere. It also is an actual wooden seat. During the enstoolment the new 
chief or queen is ceremonially seated on his or her stool (see also Sarpong 1971). Thus installation is 
called “enstoolment” and deposition is known as “destoolment”. 
4  To most Ghanaians a “white” skin color is quite loosely defined. A “white man” can be somebody 
from the Netherlands, but also from China. Both will be called “oburoni” (Twi for “from overseas”, 
“white man”). Even African-Americans, often much to their amazement, are called “aburoni” (plural). 
The subject of this paper is such that the term white is being questioned; however, for ease of reading I 
have not used scare quotes throughout. For ease of reading I have also not referred to “chiefs and 
queen mothers” throughout. Where I mention “(white) chiefs” I refer to both men and women. 
5  The Sun Online, July 11, 2006. Retrieved from: www.thesun.co.uk/article. 
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One example of a development chief whose installation has created a lot of 
media attention as well as confusion and debate, is Dutchman Henk Otte. He has 
been a chief in Mepe in the Volta Region of Ghana since 1997. He has appeared 
in many television shows in the Netherlands and elsewhere, and newspaper 
articles about him appeared all over the world. Headlines in the media said for 
example: “Jobless man ruler of a kingdom” (Birmingham Evening Mail, January 
19, 2000); “White man proclaimed king of Ghanaian tribes: In Ghana, the Dutch 
native is carried by throne-bearers and surrounded by cheering crowds” (The 
Vancouver Sun, January 19, 2000); “Jobless white builder rules as African king. 
Dutchman is declared reincarnation of monarch” (Sparks 2000, Sunday Tele-
graph [London], March 26, 2000). Otte also featured in an American documen-
tary film called “Togbe” (“The incredible true story of how an ordinary man 
became a King” – Reel Films, 2001).6 The stories of Otte supposedly being a 
reincarnation of a “monarch” and “ruler” in Ghana was picked up by Ghanaians 
living abroad and consequently by Ghanaian media too and caused much turmoil. 
Otte subsequently has been the subject of much debate on discussion fora on 
Ghanaian websites. 
In this essay, I approach the emergence of white development chiefs from an 
ethnographic perspective. In order to comprehend this relatively new phenome-
non, it is necessary to place it in the wider societal context of the Ghanaian 
communities in which they are installed. In so doing, the relationship between 
development chiefs and contemporary transnational connections, as well as the 
popularity of the development discourse will be taken into account. The attitude 
and intentions of both Ghanaian chief makers and white development chiefs and 
queen mothers will be illustrated through the case study of the Dutchman Otte. I 
will argue that it is not adequate to approach the institution of white development 
chiefs as an example of exotic culture, or to condemn it as a degradation of 
chieftaincy. I suggest approaching this phenomenon from an agency point of 
view. The installation of white development chiefs and queen mothers offers 
Ghanaians the possibility to appropriate development and express dreams of 
development. The installation of development chiefs is a way for both villagers 
and those bringing “development” from outside to find a style of synthesis, 
through which they can realistically engage with a world of development (cf. 
Leigh-Puigg 1997: 282). However, the involvement of “white” chiefs can be a 
risky undertaking as Otte’s case will make clear. 
 
                                                     
6  For an impression of this film, see: www.christmaswish.org/togbe/Togbe.htm. 
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Chiefs and development in Ghana 
Southern Ghana has a longstanding history of kings, chiefs and their female 
counterparts the “queen mothers”, especially among the numerically and cultur-
ally dominant Akan-speaking communities, who make up almost 50% of the 
total population of Ghana. During the period of British indirect rule, chiefs were 
integrated in colonial governance. Since the early 1950s the national state 
declared that power was to reside with elected politicians rather than with those 
who occupied traditional offices (Arhin 1985b, chapter 6). After independence, 
and particularly in the Nkrumah era, the attempt to contain chiefs went beyond 
the whittling of power to the crushing of Ghanaian chiefs suspected of opposition 
sympathies (Arhin 1985a; Rathbone 2000a, 2000b). Classical modernization 
theories in the 1950s and 1960s assumed that the principles of modern bureau-
cratic office would become more important than traditional hereditary leadership 
anyway. Chiefs were seen as anachronistic and as barriers to the achievement of 
material modernization. The processes by which chiefs rule and the rituals and 
mystique that legitimized their authority were considered incompatible with rapid 
transformation. Chieftaincy was seen as a major aspect of the problem of “under-
development” rather than as part of the solution (Rathbone 2001: 3-4). 
By the mid-1960s the institution of chieftaincy had been significantly weak-
ened, although a genuine popular interest in chieftaincy affairs remained (Nugent 
1996: 211-212). Chiefs lost most of their local government and judicial func-
tions, but were left with a residual role in the Regional Houses of Chiefs. The 
1969 Constitution, however, established a National House of Chiefs.7 Within this 
institution, traditional rulers, despite various degrees of power, have been formal-
ly incorporated into the modern structures of governance. The Fourth Republican 
Constitution of 1992 restored the dignity of chiefs, debarring them from active 
participation in politics, but allowing them to be appointed to serve in public 
institutions with non-partisan character (CDD-Ghana 2001: 37-39; van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal 1987). 
Today, the state’s position vis-à-vis chieftaincy is ambivalent, but the latter’s 
popularity, especially in the rural and in the Akan-speaking areas, remains un-
challenged. In Ghana, chiefs and queen mothers are usually called “traditional 
rulers” (Arhin 1985b) and custodians of “traditional culture”, and function as an 
emblem of authenticity in the discourse of cultural nationalism (Schramm 2004: 
158). In general chiefs play an important role in ceremonial and political-judicial 
functions, control lands and resources and have actual power to mobilize people. 
As brokers between “local culture” and “development”, traditional rulers in 
                                                     
7  Queen mothers are debarred from participation in the National House of Chiefs. 
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Ghana are urged to work towards “development”. Yearly festivals where chiefs 
and queen mothers gather have themes such as “Unity – tool for development” 
(Ngmayem festival 2004 in the Eastern Region) and “Consolidating Gbidukor. 
Unity and development” (Gbidukorza 2004 in the Volta Region). At durbars 
(parades) during such yearly festivals an “appeal for funds for development” will 
usually be part of the programme. In their speeches chiefs talk about the need to 
raise the standard of living in their area. Therefore, they are called “vessels for 
development” (e.g. Agyekum 2004: 31). Instead of being seen as impediments to 
development, they are now seen as catalysts in development on the local front. 
And as such they are now regularly urged by government officials to modify or 
eliminate cultural practices that are seen as inimical to “development”. At the 
same time, cultural traditions are to be harnessed to development, as nation-
building is promoted through the appreciation of their diversity (Lentz & Nugent 
2000: 10). Chieftaincy is therefore indicative of an area where the assumed 
paradox of the preservation of “culture” and the pursuit of development and 
progress, is tried to be resolved (cf. Mazrui 1979). 
Chieftaincy in Mepe 
The road from Accra to Mepe in the Volta Region leads through flat grasslands 
with an occasional village along the road. Mepe is a small town along the Volta 
River in the North-Tongu District and the capital of the Mepe Traditional Area, 
which includes almost forty surrounding villages. Its inhabitants are Tongu-Ewe 
speaking. The Basel Mission came to Mepe town in 1898 and brought the first 
school. Today the successor of the Basel Mission Church, the Presbyterian 
Church of Ghana, is still strong in Mepe. Other denominations that are present 
are the Apostolic and the Catholic Church, and several charismatic churches. 
There is one secondary school and a rural bank. The town only has had electricity 
since 1995. The main economic activities are farming and fishing. The women 
also used to do oyster and clam picking along the Volta River, while the men did 
creek fishing. Still many roads in Mepe are paved with oyster shells. The women 
were doing so well, that they were the ones supporting their children through 
school. But the closure of the Volta Dam in 1964 led to ecological changes that 
obliterated these sources of income. Tongu people’s livelihood was then organ-
ized around male-centred lake-side fishing, which had consequences for 
women’s autonomy and created tensions in gender relations (Tsikata 2006). 
Generally it led to impoverishment in the area. Now the river is polluted and 
causes water-borne diseases. Also, the fact that Mepe is a stronghold of the 
former government party NDC seems to have slowed down its development. The 
electoral defeats of NDC in 2000 and 2004 are considered to have quarantined 
power brokers in the region. 
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Chieftaincy has been shaped by values of very different cultural traditions and 
consequently carries different meanings from area to area within Ghana 
(Rathbone 2000b: 4). The Ewe must have had their own chiefs already in pre-
colonial times (Amenumey 1986: 13), but the stools are probably an Akan bor-
rowing (Nugent 2005: 31). Overall the chiefs’ power base in the Volta Region is 
weaker than that of their counterparts in the Akan areas in Ghana. The different 
Ewe peoples do not recognize one central ruler and the Volta Region can be 
characterized as a “regional melting pot” (Nugent 2005). In addition, unlike the 
Akan chiefs, the chiefs do not own any stool lands,8 thus they have less power to 
control access to land and the people who work on that land. The amalgamation 
policy of the British colonial regime has left its mark too (see Nugent 1996 for a 
more detailed discussion). The disregard of the British colonial state of historical 
relationships or even ethnic and linguistic differences in the process has gener-
ated problems that have continued into the present. 
Four of the five different “houses” in Mepe (Adzigo, Sevie, Dzagbaku and 
Gbanvie) claim to have migrated from different areas and settled in the present 
area in the 15th and 16th centuries.9 The Akovie are late-comers in the area and 
are said to originate from the Akan (Akwamu). They are the ones who deliver the 
paramount chief. The current paramount chief of Mepe (since 1986) is Togbega 
Kwao Aniparti IV, who also is the president of the Tongu House of Chiefs. He is 
an educated man in his seventies, who has a doctorate degree in agriculture from 
the Michigan State University and who has worked in the University of Ghana 
for 28 years. He is now the dean of the (private) Wisconsin University of Ghana, 
which is situated in Accra. 
Ewe chieftaincy does not have a long tradition of queen mothers. Akan chiefly 
traditions have influenced the appearance of chieftaincy all over (southern) 
Ghana. In Mepe area too this Akanization of “traditional” chieftaincy is reflected 
in the rising profile of queen mothers. The old paramount queen mother from the 
Adzigo house, mama Awusi Sreku III, was installed in Mepe in 1954. At the time 
of my research, at the end of 2004, there were only two others, who were 
divisional queen mothers. Queen mothers are seen as the ones who organize the 
women, for example for communal labour. They also see to any affair concerning 
women and try to settle domestic disputes. The men handling chieftaincy affairs 
vigorously opposed to an attempt by the paramount queen mother to be carried in 
a palanquin during the yearly festival in 1972. This incident has dampened the 
                                                     
8  Stool land is land vested in a stool on behalf of and in trust for the subjects of a stool – a customary 
community – in accordance with customary law and usage (sections 36[8] and 267[1] of the 1992 
Constitution). 
9  A “house” refers to a lineage, or “people of a house”, i.e. “house” conceived as a social unit. Some 
Mepe citizens called the “houses”: “tribes” or “clans”. 
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relations between the different groupings in Mepe society ever since and accord-
ing to some of the chiefs, has diminished the influence of the queen mother. 
The case of the Dutch Togbe 
Togbega Aniparti IV, the paramount chief of Mepe, recalled that the story of 
Togbe Ferdinand Gakpetor began with his marriage in the Netherlands to a 
woman whose grandfather is from Mepe. Togbega Aniparti told me: “When they 
came to visit, he was with us … Every project we wanted to do, Henk wanted to 
take part. After visiting Ghana three times, my leaders met. We decided we 
wanted to honour him and give him a ceremonial title so that he can use his 
influence and connections to help us.” He admitted that the initial idea came from 
the elders and the chief of Otte’s (Adzigo) house. But Togbega Aniparti and his 
elders wanted to share in the idea when the Adzigo people came to ask permis-
sion from him: “When we met him [Otte], we wanted him to rather be the chief 
for the whole of Mepe, instead of just a development chief for Adzigo.” 
Otte is connected with the Adzigo people through his wife. But as in other 
cases where people told me that through an installation they wanted to make the 
person a part of their community, Otte’s people tried to stress the kinship rela-
tions by giving him a special name. They named him Togbe Korsi Ferdinand 
Gakpetor II, after his wife’s grandfather, Ferdinand Gakpetor, who died in 1974. 
The family head and another elder present during an interview I had with them, 
agreed that naming a person after someone is normally done to “encourage the 
person”, and his behaviour should reflect that of his namesake. As Sarpong 
(1976: 88-89) indicates, one is not simply called X in Ghana, one is X. In this 
manner, the name expresses the identity of the person who bears it. A name 
given to a child eight days after birth by his father is usually the name of some-
one, dead or alive, whom he loves very much and wants to honour; and the child 
is supposed to grow to be like the person after whom it has been named. This 
naming tradition is also followed in the case of many of the development chiefs. 
Therefore, Henk Otte’s being named after his wife’s grandfather Ferdinand 
Gakpetor means that he resembles the latter who was (also) considered a good 
and kind man. Henk Otte’s own additional understanding of the explanation of 
people in Mepe, however, was that a soothsayer had revealed that he is the grand-
father’s reincarnation. Therefore they call him Togbe Ferdinand Gakpetor II (“the 
second”). Even though he did not believe in his own reincarnation, Otte told me, 
this convinced him that the people of Mepe wanted him, a “common man”, as 
their chief. However, an elder from his wife’s family who took part in the instal-
lation said: “He [Otte] was installed as Ngoryifia. The story that a fetish priest 
was consulted to install him is a lie. It is a total fabrication. How Otte laughs and 
talks does resemble the way Ferdinand behaved, but it is not a divine source.” 
 
 Westerners and chieftaincy in Southern Ghana 235 
Nevertheless, the Western media from Japan to the USA picked up the story 
about the “unemployed ex-builder from Amsterdam” who “has been crowned 
King Togbe Korsi Ferdinand Gakpector II following the discovery that he is the 
reincarnation of the last great warrior king of the 250,000-strong Ewe tribe in 
Ghana” (Sparks 2000). But even if the grandfather had been a chief and Otte had 
been a blood relative, he would not have been considered a rightful heir to the 
stool of his wife’s grandfather. Ewe society is patrilineal, and a hereditary chiefly 
position would normally follow the (direct) male line. Otte’s wife’s father does 
not originate from Mepe or even Ewe society (her mother and her mother’s father 
do), and her own position is that of an honorary queen mother. In short, in line 
with Mepe people’s explanation, the link with the dead grandfather must be 
solely interpreted as forging a bond between Otte and his Ghanaian family, be-
tween a foreigner and the community. 
Where some of the Mepe people thus tried to stress bonds of kinship with the 
new development chief, others preferred to make a sharp distinction between 
“honorary positions” such as Ngoryifia, and the “real stools”. Many people, 
including the paramount chief, but especially Ewe living abroad, reacted to the 
reincarnation story by saying: “How can a white man be a reincarnation of a 
Ghanaian?” They make the point that the grandfather was not a “real” chief, 
which is also indicated by his name Ferdinand. A stool name would not be a 
“foreign” name. One elder explained to me: “A real stool is something from 
nature; it has been there since time immemorial, nobody knows where it comes 
from. It came with us when we migrated to this place.” Some of the “real stools” 
are so-called black stools, consecrated stools. One chief, togbe Amafu, said: “A 
black stool is a war stool. It is higher in rank than a newly created one, and 
spiritually too it is stronger.” The black stools and other “real stools” are kept in 
the “stool room”, which is only accessible for certain people like the chiefs and 
the elders. They have to bath in order to become ritually clean before entering. 
The powerful stools are passed on from generation to generation, they are 
hereditary stools. Togbega Aniparti too stressed that Otte’s position is an honor-
ary one. According to him, a “real chief” has to come from the right lineage and 
has to be qualified, whereas: “Otte is not from Mepe. His title is a ceremonial 
type of recognition.” With “qualified” he meant that “[the person is] from the 
male line. He has not done anything bad. He is pure, and has never been in 
prison.” Thus a development chief is chosen on his merits but not based on 
descent and he does not occupy a “real stool”. 
According to the Togbega and other interview-partners, Otte’s installation in 
1997 was clearly stating that his position is an honorary one and the whole 
ceremony was again “to encourage him” as an elder of the Adzigo “house”. He 
was given cloth, a crown and sandals, but he did not have to be secluded in the 
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bush or confined in a room for a longer period. The whole ceremony resembles 
the “outdooring” part of an installation, as any final “coming out” of a rite of 
passage is called in Ghana. Some of the interviewed said that Otte did swear an 
oath to the Adzigo chief and again to the paramount chief, others said he did not. 
All agreed that Otte’s wife accompanies him dressed as a queen mother because 
she is the wife, but she was not installed as such. The wife herself, though, claims 
to have been given the title of “Mamaa Awo Mepeyo Kpui II” and calls herself 
the “Ngoryi-nyornufia of Mepe Traditional Area”, thus the development queen 
mother of Mepe. 
The elders of the Gakpetor family had taken initiative to install Otte on their 
own account in the family house in 1995 already, before they presented him to 
the paramount chief. There he was confined for a few days in a room where 
accordingly he was advised and taught by the elders about how to rule, dress and 
dance as a chief and about his responsibilities and the family structure. After two 
days, two bottles of schnapps and two bottles of akpeteshie were presented to the 
elders, together with a ram. Accordingly, the ram was slaughtered and Otte had 
to walk through the blood. The elaborate ceremony reflects the seriousness with 
which his people took his installation. At the same time the whole ceremony can 
be called an invention of tradition, following arbitrary rules, as Otte was the first 
development chief ever in the whole area. According to the mankrado (the one 
that installs the chiefs and is the custodian of the town) and his elders, among the 
established chiefs and queen mothers, only the paramount chief and the para-
mount queen mother and the mankrado are confined in a room for one week, the 
other (war-) chiefs are brought to the wilderness for one day. Sheep are slaugh-
tered, but the blood is not poured on the particular candidate’s feet. 
In Western media “chiefs” are usually called “kings”, which evokes romantic 
associations with cultural Others that are quite different from African reality. 
Although in Ghana all chiefs are addressed in English as chiefs, making it 
difficult for outsiders to know their exact rank and position, in local languages 
there are different titles, such as the Akan omanhene (paramount chief), ohene 
(divisional chief) and odikro (sub-chief). But in Western media, the romantic 
idea that Otte was an “ordinary man” who became a “king” was stressed all the 
time. The Western media that came with this unnuanced story of Otte being the 
“king” of “the Ewe tribe” caused Mepe citizens living abroad to complain about 
the matter. Otte was accused of posing for a paramount chief. But in Mepe 
nobody saw Otte as a threat and according to the elders of the paramountcy: 
“Any time he comes he lowers himself to the Togbega”, and they work “in 
harmony”. Otte’s installation was based on family relationships through his wife, 
but his position clearly states what was expected of him: To bring development. 
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Development encounters 
Development is the buzz-word in Ghana. It is almost impossible to escape 
involvement in the discourse of development wherever you go. In ordinary 
Ghanaians’ view, development means, at the very least, satisfying basic needs 
such as education, clean water, employment, health services, and good sanitary 
conditions and roads. The implementation of modernization by the national 
government has failed. The elders in Mepe said that the government is not 
assisting their area with development. People in the area feel things have come to 
a standstill, because they are known to support the former government party of 
J.J. Rawlings, the NDC. Supposedly due to the partisan politics of the District 
Assembly, hardly any projects are allocated to them. Togbega’s linguist said for 
example: “If your political representative is not there, then you will not get any-
thing from the national cake.” There are some local development initiatives, like 
the “C5-foundation” that helped finishing the local post office. 
The installation of development chiefs in Ghana is seen as a more promising 
way of attaining the benefits of modernity. Many of them have constructed 
school blocks, provided bore holes or wells, and donated poles for electricity, 
books for libraries, or hospital equipment and supplies. Many of the Ghanaian 
development chiefs are migrants who have access to international networks and 
funds and support their home community. The acceptance of a long-term com-
mitment as development chiefs to a (small) community by Westerners also fits in 
with a recent trend of concerned Westerners who initiate small-scale develop-
ment projects after having travelled to Third World countries. They want to make 
a direct contribution to the improvement of the lives of people they have met. 
Otte has founded a Mepe Foundation in order to raise funds for the development 
of Mepe. Many of the other development chiefs in Ghana have initiated NGOs to 
support their communities. Some cooperate with existing organizations. But in 
many cases the help remains a one-time affair. The case of Mepe looked pro-
mising in the sense that a long-term connection seemed viable, as Otte had 
married into the town. 
Most people in Mepe who are familiar with their Dutch development chief 
know that he has sent hospital beds, bicycles, wheel chairs and some other items 
at his own initiative, and they want him to send more. According to the elders of 
the paramount chief, they did not tell Otte what to send, but only that they want 
“development”. The Mepe Development Association (MDA), a very active asso-
ciation that works together with the Traditional Council, does still have a number 
of things on its wish list: A hostel, a school, internal roads, a better drainage 
system; and they want an extension of the electricity network. Nevertheless, in 
general most people in Mepe I talked to, chiefs, queen mothers, elders and local 
opinion leaders, all talked very positively about their development chief and his 
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achievements. They all pleaded with me to tell him to return to Ghana. He should 
send more “things” and bring “development”. Only two men who were agricul-
tural officers and worked with the MDA between 1995 and 1997, told me that in 
their opinion the development chief had brought “unnecessary things”, like the 
pumps that could not be used because the necessary pipes were not there. 
According to them, the MDA rather had to pay for the clearance of the hospital 
beds from the harbour. They claimed the development chief had lost popularity 
since the negative messages on the internet and in the newspapers. 
Otte’s way of raising money for his Mepe Development Foundation was by 
seeking media attention and asking donations from interviewers. However, he 
found out that this was a risky undertaking. After earlier commotion about his 
supposedly being “the king of Mepe”, the biggest turmoil came about when the 
Associated Press in 1999 published an interview in which Otte allegedly said that 
Mepe’s elders were barmy to have given him the status of chief (“king”) and that 
he could go nowhere unescorted, not even to the bathroom. When this story was 
copied by many other “reporters” and appeared in similar forms all over the 
world, the controversy surrounding Otte’s position reached a height. Especially 
Ghanaians living abroad who had access to these media reacted to the story. Otte 
received so many bad reactions on his website, that he decided to close it down. 
Otte was even denied a visa from the Ghana embassy in the Netherlands the 
following year, because he was said to have damaged the country’s reputation. 
Only when the paramount chief of Mepe intervened with Ghana’s foreign 
minister, was he reprieved. However, due to threats he received at home, Otte has 
been reluctant to return to Ghana afterwards. 
Most of the Westerners installed seem to be wanting “to do good” in Ghana. 
They try to raise funds and usually do not see themselves as very affluent. But of 
course, in the eyes of Ghanaians they are very rich. Otte may be portrayed as an 
“ordinary man becoming king”, but many Ghanaians, especially those in the rural 
or impoverished areas, do not see any white man or woman as “ordinary”. 
Benevolence is expected from those whom the local people perceive as possess-
ing more than they can possibly ever afford. As much as the installation of whites 
as chiefs can be a sincere demonstration of friendship and appreciation, it is also 
an implicit indication of responsibility on the part of the white to help raise the 
image of the particular town or community, preferably financially endowed.10 
Even though a development chief or queen mother is said to be selected on 
qualities such as “being respectful, a good listener, social and active”, people 
nowadays are often quick to install any willing foreigner that more or less passes 
by. To them the “white man” represents wealth, or at least he is close to it. 
                                                     
10  Compare F.B. Nyamnjoh & B. Page’s examples of strategies of Cameroonians in using white people as 
a gateway to the benefits of modernity (Nyamnjoh & Page 2002).  
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Neighbouring towns of areas with a white chief also want their own. In the Mepe 
case, I was told that neighbouring towns and villages such as Battor, Dove and 
Tefle now also have a “white” chief or queen mother. People claim that a 
Ghanaian development chief would only help his own “house” and not the 
community. In Mepe some people felt that Otte was likewise claimed by his 
Ghanaian family. The paramount chief of Mepe tried to prevent this partiality by 
making him a development chief “for the whole area”. 
Conclusions 
After the development chief’s donations of wheelchairs and hospital beds several 
years ago, people in Mepe are waiting for more. But the controversies have made 
it difficult for Otte to raise money and have made him reluctant to return. Else-
where in Ghana, similar stories of disappointments and about development chiefs 
who have never returned, vanished money, one-time actions, or failed projects 
can be told. But there are also success stories, of development chiefs or queen 
mothers who visit “their” community in Ghana every year and have been able to 
build school blocks, deliver hospital equipment and bring electricity. In short, 
there are chances of productive partnership, but also real possibilities of disap-
pointments and opportunism. Chances of success depend on the personal quali-
ties of the development chief and the local leaders, and their capacity to cooper-
ate in the interests of their particular community. 
From the point of view of Ghanaian chiefs and their entourage it is quite clear 
why some of them, who are eager to defend chieftaincy as an emblem of authen-
tic national culture, see the installation of foreigners as chiefs as an erosion of 
chieftaincy. In this view Ghanaian culture, chieftaincy in particular, is made 
“cheap” by “selling” it to outsiders. It is felt that “white” chiefs and queen 
mothers give wrong impressions to outsiders of what Ghanaian chieftaincy is all 
about and make it seem as if just anybody could become a chief or queen mother. 
Indeed the idea that Westerners are “ruling” in Ghana is based on misconception 
and romanticized ideas of African chieftaincy. But their position also does not 
lead to an erosion of “authentic” chieftaincy as if that would be an unaltered relic 
from the past. Chieftaincy as it is today is the result of historical processes, which 
have changed much of its essence over time (Rathbone 2000: 4). The creation of 
new titles and changing functions proves chieftaincy’s flexibility and ability to 
adapt to changing times. The installation of foreigners as chiefs or queens of a 
specific community link that community to the world at large. Chiefs seek to 
reassert their authority by becoming brokers in the development arena. To people 
outside the big cities, the government is far away in Accra, and government 
representatives do not often come to their aid. What people still want in the first 
place are the basic needs such as education, better sanitary and health conditions, 
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and they look for means to get access to these. Ordinary Ghanaians take chief-
taincy very serious. To them chieftaincy is not an emblem of the past, something 
exotic, but real and representing their “culture”. They welcome any help they can 
get which in their view brings them closer to “development”. Their chiefs try to 
bring development by installing foreigners as development chiefs and queens. 
Ghanaian chiefs thus act as active agents in the development encounter. 
However, the somewhat indiscriminate and arbitrary installation of foreigners 
as development chiefs, which is often mainly based on whiteness, carries the risk 
of confusing and distorting images of African chieftaincy. This is clearly shown 
in Otte’s case, where in the eyes of the Mepe citizens, he represents access to 
funds in the West. The fact that he is from “outside” enhances the position of 
their town in Ghana. Also, a white chief is expected to serve the community, 
whereas a Ghanaian development chief, especially a migrant, is more likely to 
support his (extended) family. But to the general Western audience the image of 
an exotic and traditional Africa is reinforced. That the fairy tale of a construction 
worker on disability benefit, a “common man”, a “Homer Simpson with a heart 
of gold” as the “Togbe” filmmaker described him, who becomes a “king” in 
Africa, has proved to be very appealing says much about the continued image of 
Africa in the West. 
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African writers in the global  
world: Tierno Monénembo1 
 
 
Elisa Diallo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the 1990s, the phenomenon of ‘migrant writing’ has become an important 
focus of attention in the field of African literature written in European languages. 
This literature has been increasingly studied as a conjunction of the emerging 
culture of the globalization era; critics and scholars locate in them traces of the 
multiple identities of the postcolonial African subject. However, while this dis-
course provides interesting reading perspectives, it also tends to simplify the 
subject, or even sometimes tends to ignore differing discourses, such as those 
which are less ‘multicultural’. Starting from this consideration, my objective in 
this essay is twofold. First, through the close reading of two novels by the 
Guinean writer Tierno Monénembo (b. 1947), I examine how the discursive 
perspective of the genre of migrant writings can help to outline and understand 
the changes in his writing since the end of the 1990s. At the same time, I show 
how such a reading helps, in turn, to moderate this discourse; it reveals, for 
example, that while writing in the context of a global world and multiple identi-
ties, Monénembo, like many other African writers living outside the continent, 
still writes of Africa, of its specific history and its specific concerns.  
                                                     
1  I am grateful to the Editors of this volume for their detailed comments and suggestions on an earlier 
draft of this chapter. 
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New African writings 
When studying recent theories and critics on Francophone African literature in 
connection with my research project on the Guinean writer Tierno Monénembo2, 
I was struck by a sort of consensus among critics, scholars and writers. Since the 
1990s, there seems to have been a general tendency to speak of a “renewal” of 
African literature, of a “new generation” and of “nouvelles tendances”.3 From the 
1950s until about ten years ago, “Africanité” was the predominant concern within 
the field of Francophone African literature; efforts were made to define an Afri-
can aesthetic, in which the concept of “orality” was seen as central. However, 
nowadays it seems as if African writers are less preoccupied with their “Afri-
canité”. In the current context of globalization, and with the corresponding 
massive and worldwide movements of people, ideas and images, African texts 
today are said to be more about universality and global culture. 
Within the Francophone literary scene, the debate about the renewal of 
African literature begins with Abdouraham Waberi’s article, Les enfants de la 
postcolonie, which appeared in 1998. In this article, we find the most important 
concepts that have become central to the debate. Waberi deals primarily with the 
multiple identities claimed by writers of the new generation, with the fact that 
they want to present themselves as more than just African, and also with the 
themes of migration and immigration, which appear frequently in the work of 
contemporary writers. Many journals and magazines that deal with “non-
Western” literature, in particular with African literature, such as Notre Librairie, 
and Africulture, as well as publications with broader concerns, have taken up and 
fed this debate. Notre Librairie recently published two issues with revealing 
titles: “Nouvelle génération”, in 2001, and “Plumes émergentes”, in 2005. In the 
first one, Jean-Louis Joubert (2001: 6) writes about a “… sentiment général que 
quelque chose a changé, qu’une nouveauté littéraire s’est affirmée pendant les 
années 90 …” Tirthankar Chanda penned a representative article in Le Monde 
Diplomatique entitled “Les combats d’une nouvelle génération d’écrivains”:  
A number of writers, born after the Independences, claim the universal quality of an art that 
not only speaks of Africa, but of the whole world. Their works, written in the first person 
pronoun, reveal new concerns. 
… The new generation of writers of the 1990s, has broken with militant visions of denun-
ciation, controversy and resistance. They seek to develop new literary forms, which are more 
introspective, in a context of globalization and migration.4  
It is important to note that this “new generation” consists predominantly of 
writers who live and work outside Africa, often in France, or at least in a western 
country. They thus take part in the massive migration flows that typify the 
                                                     
2  Pseudonym of D.T. Saïdou, born in 1947 in Porédaka, Guinea. 
3  See, among others, Joubert (2001), Diop (2001), Cazenave (2003), Carré (2004) and Chanda (2004). 
4  Chanda (2004). My translation. 
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present era of globalization, notably from the South to the West. For this reason, 
the discussion about the new generation of African writers, as well as its terms, 
must be seen as part of a broader literary debate – that of immigrant/migrant 
writings. In its turn, this debate is part of an even wider cultural and discursive 
movement, both international and interdisciplinary, which is centred on questions 
of hybridity, transculturalism, multiculturalism, displacement and ‘up-rooted-
ness’.5  
Certainly, experiences of displacement have always been addressed in African literature 
written in European languages, which more often than not engages with the themes of exile 
and African diasporas. But what is characteristic about the discourse of migrant literature is 
its strong connection to a specific context – that of globalization – and of the large move-
ments of people to the rich, western countries. In this specific context, the migrant writer is 
seen simultaneously as a product, witness and spokesperson. From this perspective, the 
position of the African writer in the West has shifted: S/he used to be in the first place 
African, and at the same time an exile, a temporary guest or part of the black or African 
diasporas. Now s/he is either a migrant or immigrant, and is placed in the same literary 
category as Francophone writers of Arab descent, or with Indian, Pakistani or Caribbean 
writers working in England, or Moroccan writers in the Netherlands.6 Along with others, 
Francophone African texts are studied as representative of a so-called “migrant culture”. 
Special attention is thus drawn to the specific themes they engage with, and that are related 
to the contemporary migration phenomenon: Multiple identity, integration problems, 
discrimination, minority status, cultural difference, etc. An “African aesthetic” per se is no 
longer searched for, but instead an aesthetic which mirrors the multiple contexts of global-
ization. In this regard, one often speaks about literature that “crosses boundaries”, produced 
by “cosmopolitan” writers, about a blurring of identity references, or about a “cheerful 
multiculturalism”: 
These days, the space of creation does not necessarily coincide with the geographical 
space of origin. … Heterogeneity … has become the true condition of literary creation. 
Taking inspiration from various sources, among which the “shadows of the birth country” 
and world literature, the writer addresses the issue of “belonging” in new ways, invents 
“imaginary homes” and seeks to position himself in this space of “otherness” that some call 
“La République mondiale des Lettres”.7 
We should comment here that this criticism sometimes tends to generalize, 
and also – when one speaks of “cheerful multiculturalism” – to idealize. Indeed, 
there is a certain renewal of African literature, in which the problem of cultural 
identity does play an important role, and more and more African writers do in 
fact engage with the theme of globalization. But this engagement does not always 
mean crossing borders and praising the global and multicultural world. Amongst 
other things, I will try to show this while undertaking a close reading of the work 
of Tierno Monénembo.  
                                                     
5  See Joffrin (2000). 
6  See Lionnet and Scharfman (1993), Laronde (1993), Bonn (1995), Griffiths (2000), Canadé Sautman 
(2003), and Cazenave (2003). 
7  Carré (2004). My translation. The quotations – except for the last one – are from Salman Rushdie in 
Imaginary Homelands (1991). See also, for the three previous comments, Bessière & Moura (1999), 
Diop (2001) and Albert (2005). 
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It is essential for a researcher to be aware of the wider discursive framework in 
which s/he participates (be it cultural, literary or scientific), as the framework is 
formed not only by him/herself but also by other literary writers. All literary 
works are, to a certain extent, related to one or more such public discourses.  
Tierno Monénembo: The writing of exile, migrant literature 
Monénembo is an interesting case for anyone interested in the developments in 
Francophone African literature. This is mainly due to his personal history: First 
in exile (living in France since 1973), later as a “regular” immigrant (since 1984 
and the death of the Guinean dictator Sékou Touré that year). What is more, in 
his career he belongs to the different generation of writers commonly distin-
guished by critics. His first book appeared in 1979, and initially Monénembo was 
seen as a typical “post-independence” writer; his novel was about Guinea, his 
country of origin and about the disappointments with independence, and he 
expressed an especially strong criticism of the country’s dictatorial regime. 
Between 1979 and 2004, Monénembo published a total of eight books. As noted, 
the critics observing developments in African literature, especially among writers 
who work outside Africa, paid more and more attention to the emerging dis-
course of migrant literature outside Africa. Did this migrant discourse influence 
the work of Monénembo? Can characteristics of migrant literature be discerned 
in his work? I will briefly discuss the relationship between the work of Moné-
nembo and this discourse on the basis of two of his later novels: Pelourinho 
(1995) and Cinéma (1997). 
 
Pelourinho 
Predominantly because of its theme and the location of the story (Brazil), 
Pelourinho differs from the earlier books of Monénembo. Until Pelourinho he 
only wrote about Guinea and France, and about exile. Romuald Fonkoua speaks 
of a “liberation” of Monénembo’s writing after the fall of Sékou Touré’s regime 
in 1984:  
Monénembo used to be an immobile writer, with an imagination that seemed to be confined 
between predictable places (Ivory Coast and France, for example). He has become a travel-
ling writer, accepting his journeys and their purpose – to produce literature. This way, 
Guinean literature has become part of world literature.8  
Pelourinho has, indeed, more to do with travel than with exile. With this text, 
Monénembo opens his eye to the world. Here, displacement is no longer viewed 
solely in terms of pain, for which writing serves as an outlet. The journey’s 
destination is depicted as the domain of imagination and of literary creation. Of 
Escritore, the main character and alter ego of the writer, another character says 
                                                     
8  Fonkoua (2004: 25-26). My translation. 
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that he has come to Brazil “to write a book”. It thus seems that in this text, the 
writer seeks and claims the position of migrant – no longer as an exile but as a 
voluntary traveller – because travelling is the starting point of writing. 
Moreover, because he chooses South America as his destination, Escritore 
short-circuits, as it were, the West, and frees Africa from France and from the 
colonial past. Europe is no longer the centre, the obligatory destination. To the 
question: 
-  Africano? Brazil and Africa have so much in common! We are just like twins, on both 
sides of the Ocean. Only, we never wave to each other, why?  
Escritore answers: 
-  That’s why I have come. To correct the abnormality! (Monénembo 1995: 30) 
In an implicit way, the colonial perspective is indicated as an “abnormality”. It 
is now time to build a future no longer based on the memory of colonialism, time 
to let go of the vision that had Europe as the “centre”. In an interview, Moné-
nembo explained that Africa “is awakening from a long period of amnesia”, and 
that “as long as we – [the Africans] – continue to view colonialism as the starting 
and end point of our history, we have no hope.”9 Through his journey, Escritore 
tries to trace new routes that no longer go via Europe and no longer remind us of 
the colonial era. 
   
Cinéma 
While Monénembo reveals his work to the world with Pelourinho, he returns to 
his country of origin with his next novel Cinéma, a story about a young adoles-
cent in Guinea in the 1950s, crazy about American Western movies – a theme 
used to express the problematic relation between African societies and foreign 
(western) cultural imports. The boy, Binguel, is the narrator of the story. We 
follow him as he wanders through the streets of his hometown, Mamou, behaving 
as a delinquent under the influence of his older friend and mentor, Benté. Both 
boys have dropped out of school, and obey only one law – the law of the Ameri-
can Far West that they derive from the movies they watch at the local theatre.  
Not only does Monénembo go back to Guinea with Cinéma, he also returns to 
a time about which he wrote earlier, namely that of the independence of Guinea 
in 1958. This forces us to refer back to the discourse mentioned above, about the 
cosmopolitanism of the African writers. In 1997, after he had travelled to Brazil, 
Monénembo still wrote about his country of origin and about colonialism. 
However, some crucial elements in Cinéma reveal how this text also engages 
with contemporary concerns (1990s and after).  
                                                     
9  Boutures, vol. 1, nº 3, September 2000: 4-7. My translation. 
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One of the most salient aspects of Cinéma is the importance of the theme of 
space, which is treated in various ways. Interestingly, space is a key concept for 
the migrant writings’ discourse. Migrant authors are often said to be caught 
between two – or more – cultures, and the metaphor of “in-betweenness” is 
widely used to analyse their work. The thematization of space in migrant writings 
is also commonly studied, as much as it complicates new or shifting relationships 
between the local and the global.10  
In Cinéma, space is, first of all, that of Mamou, the small town in which the 
young Binguel grows up. On various occasions, this location is placed in relation 
to an elsewhere, inaccessible, mysterious, strange. In the following extract, we 
hear Binguel wondering about the journey of the American cowboys, from their 
“remote and fabulous” country, to the theatre of his small Guinean town:  
I wondered, for example, why that old Lebanese, Seïny-Bôwal, had to wait until dusk to 
open his movie theatre. And it took weeks before the bright answer came and illuminated my 
stupid head: Cowboys could not have arrived earlier even if, in their extreme kindness for 
own town, they had left at dusk the remote and fabulous country they surely came from. At 
last I understood why the old Lebanese lost it when an impudent kid asked him to show Les 
Cavaliers or Le Bourreau du Nevada again the next day: “I first have to write them, you 
stupid fool! Do you think heroes from the movies can just come to Mamou whenever they 
want?” (Monénembo 1997: 101)11 
The irony of this fragment highlights not only the naivety of the boy, but also 
the marginality of a town like Mamou in relation to the United States of America, 
to Hollywood, to wherever the internationally most visible cultural products 
come from. The following passage, on the foundation of Mamou, participates in 
the same discourse:  
That’s why a relay city was necessary, to allow, via railway transportation, the passing 
through of latex and wax produced in the mountains. Mamou, a town without name or 
memory (just enough passion and self-esteem), was condemned from the very start to be 
nothing more than a brothel, a refuge or a camping site! (Monénembo 1997: 158)12 
                                                     
10  Blommaert & van der Donckt explain for example that “the thematization of space and place (the latter 
denoting a space made social, hence becoming a space in which humans make social, cultural, political 
and historical investments) is […] a crucial ingredient of the process of coming to terms with 
globalization.” (Blommaert & van der Donckt 2002: 138). 
11  My translation. (“Je me demandais par exemple pourquoi ce vieux Libanais de Seïny-Bôwal attendait 
la tombée de la nuit pour ouvrir son cinéma. Et il m’avait fallu des semaines avant que l’étincelante 
réponse n’illumine ma pauvre tête : les cow-boys ne pouvaient arriver qu’à ce moment-là, même si par 
extrême gentillesse pour notre cité ils avaient quitté depuis l’aube le lointain et fabuleux pays qu’ils se 
devaient d’habiter. Enfin, je comprenais pourquoi le vieux Libanais sortait de ses gonds quand un 
malappris lui demandait de repasser le lendemain Les Cavaliers ou Le Bourreau du Nevada : ‘Faut 
d’abord que je leur écrive, bougres de cons ! On ne vient pas à Mamou à n’importe quel moment 
quand on est un héros de cinéma.’”) 
12  My translation. (“D’où la nécessité d’une ville-relais à même de faire écouler par le transport 
ferroviaire le latex et la cire produits sur les montagnes. Mamou – cité sans nom et sans mémoire (juste 
ce qu’il faut de passion et d’amour-propre) – était condamnée dès l’origine à tenir lieu de bordel, 
d’asile et de bivouac!”) 
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The town of Mamou, founded for the economic needs of the imperial power, 
now a neglected place, can be viewed as a metaphor for the whole African conti-
nent: Previously exploited, and now “left behind” in the contemporary globaliz-
ing world. We recognize here a major concept of the migrant writings’ discourse, 
namely the opposition between centre and periphery. This metaphor is widely 
used in cultural and literary studies to explain asymmetrical power relations (be it 
economically, socially and culturally) between the old imperial centres – now 
extended to the whole of the western world – and the former colonies. From this 
point of view, Mamou can be said to symbolize the peripheral situation of the 
whole African continent in the world. From the two fragments quoted above, we 
can thus see how in Cinéma, contemporary concerns are projected on the 
Guinean context of the 1950s and how the text seems to take part in actual 
debates about the place of Africa in the global world at the end of the 20th 
century. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the theme of space in Cinéma reveals the specific 
position of the young narrator Binguel in relation to his geographical surround-
ings. Such a closer analysis also shows how this text addresses contemporary 
issues related to globalization, American cultural influence in the world, and to 
the impact of these developments on the African youth. 
Binguel is an African child, a Guinean child, a child from Mamou. But he is 
also, because of the influence of the Western movies he watches, a child from 
elsewhere, from America in particular. While calling himself “l’Homme de 
l’Ouest”, and calling his friend Benté “Oklahoma kid”, he declares: 
 “I heard strange city names: Télimélé, Youkounkoun, Siguiri, Bamako, Kénéma, Ziguin-
chor! Unreal places, charming, in a delicious way disquieting …” (Monénembo 1997: 104) 
We see here a key concept of the discourse of globalization, namely that this 
phenomenon has caused drastic changes in the way people experience the here 
and the there, the near and the far. Geographical distance and cultural distance 
no longer coincide or agree per se: 
… it is one of the main assumptions of globalization studies that multiple cultures can exist 
in one space and that, conversely, one culture can be produced in different spaces. (Blom-
maert & van der Donckt 2002: 138)  
In the imagination of this Guinean boy, names of cities relatively near to his 
home town, sound “strange”, “disturbing” and “unreal”. They become the loca-
tions of the “exotic”, while Oklahoma is completely familiar to him. 
American culture and counter-nation 
The problem of the estrangement of the African youth from their immediate 
environment is, of course, not new within the field of Francophone African 
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literature, whether colonial or postcolonial. It is traditionally associated with the 
issue of cultural alienation as a result of (neo)colonialism. However, Cinéma 
distinguishes itself within this specific tradition, as the force of alienation comes 
from America, not France.13 This element is significant. First, because it indi-
cates that Monénembo endeavours to highlight alternative connections between 
Guinean society and the world (as seen in Pélourinho). But what is more signifi-
cant, is that these specific connections in fact characterize the contemporary, 
globalized world order, in which the American cultural influence has largely 
supplanted the French. Thus, in the same manner as the theme of space discussed 
earlier, the theme of American culture’s domination of the African youth indi-
cates that Cinéma engages with contemporary concerns, different from those of 
the 1950s. Binguel, admiring Gary Cooper and Rod Steiger, represents a culture 
drastically different from that of his parents, but also from most other boys of his 
generation, and is suggestive of the contemporary global youth with their admi-
ration of American idols.  
Also significant, is the fact that Binguel does not place any hope in the future 
of his newly independent country. Not only is he completely estranged from the 
traditional French influence, preferring the American one, he does not care much 
for the ideal of an independent and renewed African culture either. Rachael 
Langford (2005) analyses the way in which Binguel systematically chooses high-
up places from where to observe and comment on his environment. She shows 
how the boy uses this position to mark his distance from – and his superiority to 
– the rest of the inhabitants of Mamou. Furthermore, his positioning signifies, in 
terms of space, a process towards autonomy and the creation of his own identity, 
built around alternative cultural values. We find a representative example of this 
attitude at the very beginning of the text. Binguel comments on the iron post he 
has climbed upon to observe the town’s market square and his friend Benté: 
I should be happy to have discovered such a great hiding place. Just as the market, or Seïny-
Bowal’s movie theatre, or the Almamya stadium, this good old iron post also has its own 
history. They used to attach oxen to it, and thieves. It served to hoist the French and later the 
Guinean flag, to rape girls from the countryside and hang the first conspirators against the 
reborn and eternal Africa. But we don’t care about that. To us it’s nothing but an old iron 
post, without past or intelligence, on which we sometimes used to masturbate and tell the sky 
our first insults. Before, the 14th of July, now the 2nd of October, one date or another, one 
journey or another, mine starts today ... (Monénembo 1997: 24) 14 
                                                     
13  It is worthy of note that the French cultural influence is almost never referred to in Cinéma.  
14  My translation. (“Je dois plutôt m’estimer heureux d’avoir déniché une si bonne cache. Comme le 
marché, comme le cinéma de Seïny-Bowal ou le stade d’Almamya, il a aussi son histoire à lui, ce bon 
vieux poteau de fonte. On y a attaché des bœufs, des brigands, hissé tour à tour les pavillons français et 
guinéen, déviergé les campagnardes et pendu les premiers comploteurs de l’Afrique renaissante et 
éternelle. Mais, nous autres, on s’en fout. Ce n’est rien d’autre qu’un vieux poteau sans mémoire et 
sans malice où il nous arrive de nous masturber et de dire au ciel nos premières injures apprises. Avant, 
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That Binguel makes this post his own is an act of trespassing; he chooses to 
ignore its historical and social value. But, at the same time, it is also a construc-
tive act; this positioning, high up and out-of-the-way, is a starting point for his 
own history, disentangled from that of colonialism and independence. What is 
telling is his rejection of the different authority figures in his direct environment: 
His father, the French school, Islam. 
The figure of the child lends itself very well to such a challenging attitude, 
both destructive and affirmative. As a future adult, he symbolizes a generation to 
come. The use of the pronoun “we” – in “but we don’t care” – is, in this sense, 
revealing; Binguel’s project is a collective one. The boy incarnates an alternative 
ideal, a new future and a new identity. Here again, it seems that Cinéma engages 
with questions characteristic of the actual, globalized world, more than of the 
1950s. Indeed, Binguel can be said to personify the contemporary “global youth 
culture”, the “world culture of the street kids”, modelled on the American ghetto 
culture.15 In their article on the figure of the child and the globalization 
discourse, Jean & John Comaroff (2000: 92) assert that: 
The idea of a notion of globalization, at least as an analytical concept, is still questioned in 
some circles. But hardly anybody would deny that one of the global characteristics that 
define the contemporary world, from Chicago to Cape Town, via Calcutta and Caracas, is the 
feeling of crisis around the uneasiness of the youth.16 
In the global context:  
Young people, as well as people deprived of their right to be represented, constitute a sort of 
counter-nation with its own illegal economy, its own production and leisure spaces, its own 
caricatured patriotism. (Ibid.: 91)17  
In Cinéma, the child narrator represents this culture, the culture of globaliza-
tion par le bas, that of the marginalized. Binguel symbolizes this culture even 
more, in that he chose street life. He is not poor – his father is a prosperous trader 
– and he chose this street life because it was his ideal. Binguel is, in this sense, an 
emblematic figure of a sort of subaltern culture, the culture of the subordinated, 
who himself claims his subordinated position and meanwhile challenges the 
dominant culture. He prefers his heroes from the American Western movies.  
                                                     
 
le 14 Juillet, aujourd’hui le 2 Octobre, date pour date, épopée pour épopée, la mienne commence 
maintenant …”). 
15  See Comaroff & Comaroff (2000: 94). 
16  My translation. (“Le sens de la notion de globalization, du moins en tant que concept analytique, est 
encore discuté dans certains cercles. Mais rares sont ceux qui pourraient nier que l’une des 
caractéristiques globales qui définissent le monde actuel de Chicago au Cap, en passant par Calcutta et 
Caracas, est le sentiment de crise qui entoure le malaise de la jeunesse.”) 
17  My translation. (“[…]les jeunes, ainsi que d’autres personnes privées de leur droits de représenta-
tion[…], constituent une sorte de contre-nation avec sa propre économie illégale, ses propres espaces 
de production et de recréation, son propre patriotisme parodique.”) 
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Conclusion 
We have seen in this essay how the theoretical tools developed around the 
concept of migrant writings – such as the metaphor of centre versus periphery, 
the idea of decentring, of local versus global – can help identify important 
concerns in Monénembo’s recent texts. Significant aspects of the novel 
Pelourinho indicate its author’s ambition to shift the positioning of the African 
continent in the world and separate it from its exclusive connection with the 
European (former) centre. In Cinéma, the analysis of the thematization of space 
reveals a range of concerns shared by many contemporary texts, which, in one 
way or another, take part in the current debates on the accelerating globalization 
of the world and its effects on local cultures. Such a reading is thus productive. 
However, we should be careful not to become blind to other discourses in Moné-
nembo’s writing. If Cinéma, for example, refers to contemporary processes of 
globalization, the text is also – and perhaps more importantly – strongly anchored 
in a local context, that of Guinea. The character of Binguel can be read as an 
emblematic figure of the current global culture. But he also gives shape and voice 
to a personal memory – that of the author. It is a memory rooted geographically 
and historically in a specific, national space. 
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